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I  * 


A  Galleass  of  the  Seventeenth  Century 


A  Galleass 

(Furttenbach,  Architectura  Navalis,  1629) 


©  u.  &  u. 


U.  S.  Battleship  “  Arkansas  ” 


SEA  POWER  AND 
FREEDOM 


A  HISTORICAL  STUDY 


BY 

GERARD  FIENNES 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

BRADLEY  ALLEN  FISKE 

Rear  Admiral,  U.S.N. 


Illustrated 


G.  P.  PUTNAM’S  SONS 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
Gbe  Iftnfckerbocker  press 
1918 


Copyright,  1918 

BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM’S  SONS 


Ube  tfmfcfterbocfcer  press,  'Pew  Borft 


FOREWORD 


The  conquest  of  the  sea  is  man’s  greatest  triumph. 
The  stages  of  this  triumph  from  the  time  when  the 
savage  first  took  advantage  of  the  floating  properties 
of  the  log,  down  through  all  the  ages  until  the  present 
day,  are  shown  in  moving  pictures  by  this  book.  Sea 
Power  and  Freedom  depicts  mainly  the  career  and 
achievements  of  the  British  Navy;  because  the  British 
Navy  is  the  greatest  embodiment  of  sea  power  that  has 
ever  been  attained,  and  because  it  has  accomplished  more 
than  any  other  agency,  to  achieve  the  conquest  of  the 
sea.  The  career  and  achievements  of  other  navies  and 
of  various  merchant  marines  as  well  are  picturesquely 
shown ;  and  the  scenes  succeed  each  other  in  such  rapid 
but  well-ordered  fashion,  that  the  story  runs  uninter¬ 
rupted  and  harmonious  from  the  first  page  to  the  last. 

There  is  nothing  a  man  fears  more  naturally  and  more 
profoundly  than  the  water.  While  the  ordinary  man 
remains  on  land,  though  subjected  to  dangers  of  various 
kinds,  he  has  a  feeling  of  being  where  he  belongs;  but 
once  in  the  water,  or  in  a  vessel  floating  on  the  water, 
fear  that  his  breathing  will  suddenly  be  stopped  has  to 
be  subdued  by  force  of  will ;  and  it  is  only  after  familiar¬ 
ity  with  the  danger  has  been  attained  that  the  fear  is 
entirely  overcome.  If  this  feeling  exists  at  the  present 
day,  when  people  know  that  millions  of  men  have  sailed 

over  the  seas  during  thousands  of  years,  and  that  the 

iii 

- 

«r 


aorfi 


IV 


FOREWORD 


vessels  now  constructed  are  so  strong  that  they  can 
defy  even  hurricanes  and  typhoons,  what  must  it  have 
been  in  remote  times  and  among  savage  tribes ! 

Man’s  long  and  often  painful  contest  with  the  sea 
is  a  story  of  adventure,  labour,  skill,  courage,  science, 
and  achievement,  which  has  no  parallel  in  any  other 
of  man’s  endeavours.  No  other  achievement  has  tri¬ 
umphed  over  such  great  obstacles,  no  other  achieve¬ 
ment  has  brought  about  such  great  results.  No  forces 
of  Nature  have  assailed  man  with  such  success  as  have 
storms  at  sea,  no  forces  of  Nature  have  been  so  bravely 
faced  and  so  successfully  overcome.  Courage  was 
needed  to  do  this;  but  mere  courage  accomplished  little, 
till  Engineering  came  to  its  assistance,  and  gradually 
brought  into  being  those  giants  of  mechanism  that  now 
cross  the  ocean  with  mathematical  precision,  alike  in 
calm  and  storm.  These  steamships  represent  the  high¬ 
est  point  attained  in  the  contest  of  men  with  Nature; 
and  the  highest  development  of  the  steamship  is  the 
battleship.  No  other  engineering  product  of  equal  size 
is  so  delicate,  so  manageable,  or  so  perfect;  no  watch 
or  chronometer,  no  wireless  telegraph  apparatus,  no  as¬ 
tronomical  instrument,  is  constructed  with  more  scien¬ 
tific  accuracy,  or  fitted  with  more  delicate  care.  And 
a  battleship  is  not  merely  a  battleship  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  a  kind  of  ship ;  because,  aside  from  being  a  ship,  it 
is  an  organism  containing  hundreds  of  mechanism  of 
different  kinds,  each  ready  to  do  its  part  in  the  work  of 
fighting  battles.  A  like  remark  may  be  made  of  the 
other  types  which  make  up  a  navy,  such  as  destroyers, 
battle -cruisers,  cruisers  of  different  kinds,  and  submar¬ 
ines; — and  now  a  new  type  of  unit  is  being  added,  in 
the  shape  of  dirigible  balloons,  and  seaplanes  of  many 
kinds. 


FOREWORD 


v 


Sea  Power  and  Freedom  shows  how  the  early  efforts  of 
the  seaman  started  near  the  shores  of  rivers  and  after¬ 
wards  of  lakes  and  seas;  how,  as  the  seaman’s  art 
progressed,  and  the  mechanic  arts  as  well,  their  craft 
became  stronger,  and  instruments  of  propulsion  and 
navigation  were  devised.  Then  the  navigator  slowly  en¬ 
larged  the  radius  of  his  trips  from  shore,  then  cautiously 
ventured  out  upon  the  ocean,  and  finally  launched  out 
bravely  into  the  unknown,  leaving  behind  him  the  solid 
safety  of  the  land. 

For  the  most  part,  the  efforts  of  navigators  were 
directed  then  to  navigating  vessels  which  were  built  and 
used  for  the  purposes  of  trade;  and,  for  the  most  part, 
the  efforts  of  navigators  are  similarly  directed  now. 
In  those  days,  transportation  over  the  water  was  under¬ 
taken  for  the  same  reason  as  was  transportation  over  the 
land — for  trade.  This  is  the  fact  now,  and  the  reason 
is  the  same.  In  those  days,  the  water  separated  por¬ 
tions  of  the  land  from  other  portions,  and  dwellers  in 
one  place  could  usually  find  in  other  places  certain  pro¬ 
ducts  of  the  soil  or  handiwork  which  they  did  not  them¬ 
selves  possess  but  which  they  could  obtain  in  exchange 
for  certain  products  of  their  own.  This  was  sea  com¬ 
merce  in  the  earliest  days,  and  it  is  sea  commerce  now. 
The  main  difference  is  in  the  number  and  quantity  of 
the  things  produced  and  traded  for. 

There  was  no  supreme  law  upon  the  sea  then,  and 
there  is  none  now.  No  place  upon  the  sea  had  a  police 
force  which  protected  the  lives  and  property  of  people 
as  is  now  done  in  cities ;  and  so  it  came  about  that  each 
trading  vessel  carried  with  it  the  laws  of  its  own  country, 
and  carried  weapons  with  which  to  protect  itself.  From 
these  armed  vessels  which  carried  commerce,  there  were 
afterwards  developed  vessels  which  were  armed,  but 


VI 


FOREWORD 


did  not  carry  commerce,  their  task  being  to  protect 
commerce-carrying  vessels.  One  armed  vessel,  or 
naval  vessel,  could  protect  many  merchant  vessels  on 
a  voyage,  convoying  them  from  one  port  to  another. 
Thus  was  the  convoy  system  started. 

It  was  not  until  the  late  Admiral  Mahan  published 
his  epochal  book,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  His¬ 
tory,  in  1890,  that  the  truth  was  finally  apprehended 
that  sea  power  has  had  any  distinctive  influence  upon 
history.  Such  an  idea  had  occurred  to  many  men  and 
had  appeared  sometimes  in  print;  but  the  book  of 
Mahan  was  so  attractive,  so  complete,  and  so  convincing, 
that  it  woke  men  suddenly  to  a  perception  of  the  truth, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  a  realisation  of  the  fact  that 
this  truth  was  of  supreme  importance  to  mankind. 

That  men  should  not  have  realised  the  importance  to 
any  nation  of  having  a  large  commerce  on  the  sea,  with 
sufficient  naval  force  to  guard  it,  can  easily  be  under¬ 
stood  ;  because  the  sea  is  so  far  away  from  the  lives  and 
experience  of  most  people,  that  its  very  existence  is  hard 
to  realise;  and  it  is  so  associated  in  some  minds  with 
stories  of  suffering  and  danger,  that  it  has  seemed  to 
them  an  agency  of  evil  only.  Furthermore,  to  most 
people,  the  battle  of  life  is  so  strenuous,  and  the  neces¬ 
sity  for  earning  the  daily  bread  is  so  imperious,  that  they 
are  forced  to  concern  themselves  with  the  things  which 
they  can  see  with  their  eyes  at  the  moment,  and  hear 
with  their  ears,  and  taste  with  their  lips.  Few  people 
can  take  a  comprehensive  view  of  any  subject,  so  con¬ 
cerned  are  they  forced  to  be  with  its  details.  Few  men 
and  women  have  a  clear  idea  of  even  the  main  facts  in 
the  government  of  their  own  cities ! 

In  order  to  look  at  any  subject  as  a  whole,  one  must 
get  high  enough  above  the  subject  to  see  all  parts  of  it 


FOREWORD 


Vll 


unobstructed  by  other  parts;  just  as  one  must  do,  in 
order  to  look  at  a  city  as  a  whole. 

If  one  desires  to  look  at  sea  power  in  this  way,  let 
him  take  an  atlas  of  the  world  and  note  how  three- 
quarters  of  the  globe  is  covered  with  water,  while  only 
one-quarter  is  covered  with  land ;  and  let  him  also  note 
how  small  a  part  of  even  the  land  is  possessed  by  people 
who  have  very  much  to  say  about  the  government  of 
that  land.  Let  him  note  how  nearly  one-quarter  of  all 
the  land  in  the  globe  is  under  the  British  Government, 
and  how  most  of  the  rest  of  it  is  under  the  governments 
of  France,  Germany,  Russia,  and  the  United  States. 
Let  him  also  note  that,  in  many  of  the  civilised  coun¬ 
tries  such  as  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  Belgium,  the 
most  important  work  of  the  people  is  in  manufacturing ; 
while  in  many  countries,  such  as  those  in  Africa,,  and  in 
most  of  those  of  Asia,  Australia,  and  South  America, 
comparatively  little  manufacturing  is  done,  while  there 
are  millions  of  square  miles  of  productive  soil;  and  he 
will  realise  that,  while  the  sea  separates  countries,  the 
ships  which  sail  upon  it  act  like  bridges  over  it,  joining 
the  countries  together,  and  permitting  a  world-wide 
commerce. 

But,  in  one  way  or  another,  men  always  have  to  pay 
for  what  they  get,  and  they  pay  for  the  benefits  of 
ocean  commerce  by  the  necessity  of  guarding  that  com¬ 
merce,  and  by  incurring  the  dangers  which  result  from 
any  failure  to  guard  it  adequately.  The  benefits  of 
ocean  commerce  bring  about  competition  among  mari¬ 
time  nations  to  obtain  the  most  they  can;  and  in  this 
competition,  as  in  all  great  competitions,  the  rewards 
go  to  him  who  is  the  most  diligent,  the  most  wise,  and 
the  most  brave.  The  nation  which  has  been  the  most 
diligent,  wise,  and  brave  in  carrying  on  commerce  on  the 


Vlll 


FOREWORD 


sea,  has  gotten  the  most  commerce  on  the  sea,  and  has 
employed  the  most  complete  measures  for  its  protection. 
The  sails  of  her  ships  and  the  smoke  of  her  steamers’ 
funnels,  in  both  merchant  craft  and  men-of-war,  rise 
above  all  the  waters  that  cover  three-quarters  of  the 
earth,  and  attest  the  omnipresence  of  her  sea  power. 

Is  this  omnipresence  of  sea  power  an  unimportant 
matter  ?  Imagine  a  city  in  which  there  were  a  hundred 
business  firms  in  competition  with  each  other,  but  in 
which  there  was  no  protection  for  the  goods  of  any  firm 
in  transportation  through  the  city,  except  such  protec¬ 
tion  as  the  employees  of  that  firm  could  give.  In  such 
a  condition  of  affairs,  the  wagons  of  each  firm  would 
probably  carry  armed  employees ;  contests  between  the 
employees  of  one  firm  with  those  of  another  firm  would 
be  possible;  and  the  advantage  possessed  by  the  firm 
that  had  the  most  and  the  biggest  wagons  and  the  best 
guards  would  be  obvious.  Now  such  a  condition  is 
much  like  the  condition  on  the  sea,  over  which  each 
nation  transports  its  goods,  with  no  protection  except 
that  given  by  its  employees. 

To  a  greater  degree  than  any  other  nation,  Great 
Britain  has  carried  on  and  has  protected  commerce  on 
all  the  oceans  of  the  world.  The  power  she  has  exerted 
has  been  greater  than  any  other  nation  ever  exerted 
before,  and  has  been  so  obvious  that  in  recent  years  it 
has  come  almost  to  be  accepted  as  a  law.  Great  power 
is  a  curse  if  it  is  misused,  but  a  blessing  if  it  is  well  used. 
Fortunately  for  the  world,  her  power  has  been  exerted 
in  the  main  for  the  benefit  of  mankind.  As  this  book 
so  clearly  and  beautifully  shows,  the  sea  power  of  Great 
Britain  has  been  exerted  in  the  main  to  preserve  the 
freedom  of  the  seas,  in  the  sense  that  it  has  made  the 
sea  free  to  travellers,  and  has  assisted  commerce  by 


FOREWORD 


IX 


assuring  safety  to  it,  and  by  bringing  about  the  removal 
of  narrow  rules  and  needless  and  burdensome  restric¬ 
tions. 

This  does  not  mean  that  all  the  acts  which  have  es¬ 
tablished  and  maintained  the  sea  power  of  Great  Britain 
have  been  unselfish;  but  it  does  mean  that,  even  if  the 
British  sea  policy  has  been  guided  by  self-interest,  that 
self-interest  has  been  intelligent;  and  that,  even  if  we 
may  justly  find  fault  with  some  things,  we  must  admit 
that  the  far-sightedness  and  broad-mindedness  shown 
by  Great  Britain  in  the  use  of  the  unprecedented  power 
given  her  by  her  predominance  at  sea,  has  no  parallel 
in  history. 

Possibly,  one  explanation  is  that  many  of  the  selfish 
acts  of  men,  and  perhaps  nearly  all  their  cruelties,  have 
been  because  of  short-sightedness,  a  narrow  view  of  life, 
a  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  things  near 
in  place  or  time,  and  a  failure  to  realise  how  trivial  and 
how  fleeting  are  many  of  the  things  men  strive  for.  If 
this  be  so,  large  undertakings,  involving  great  bodies  of 
men,  and  extending  over  continents  and  seas,  tend  so  to 
broaden  men’s  views  and  elevate  their  aims,  as  to  re¬ 
duce  the  temptation  to  gain  small  personal  advantages, 
or  gratify  petty  spites. 

Such  an  effect  seems  to  be  in  the  mind  of  the  author  of 
this  book;  and  for  this  reason,  as  well  as  others,  his 
narrative  of  events  and  the  conclusions  which  he  reaches 
are  of  vital  interest  to  the  world  at  large,  and  especially 
to  the  people  of  the  countries  that  border  on  the  sea. 

Bradley  A.  Fiske. 


New  York,  February  9,  1918. 


PREFACE 


It  was  while  revising  the  lectures  of  which  this  book 
is  chiefly  composed,  that  the  vital  part  played  by  the 
maritime  races  in  establishing  and  maintaining  the 
freedom  of  mankind  was  borne  in  upon  my  mind. 
Hence  the  title  of  this  volume,  expressive,  as  I  venture 
to  think,  of  much  which  is  in  our  thoughts  to-day,  and 
cheering  withal. 

I  would  ask  my  readers  to  remember  that  I  did  not 
set  out  to  write  a  treatise  on  the  relation  of  Sea  Power 
to  Freedom,  but  to  prepare  a  set  of  lectures  on  the 
Meaning  and  Function  of  Sea  Power  which  should 
interest  an  audience  of  Teachers,  in  whose  hands  rests 
so  great  an  opportunity  for  impressing  on  the  minds  of 
those  who  are  to  follow  us  the  lessons  of  duty  and 
devotion  which  the  history  of  maritime  nations  affords. 
The  idea  of  the  connection  of  Sea  Power  with  Freedom 
is  only  one  strain  of  thought  out  of  many.  The  stress 
of  the  time  did  not  admit  of  extensive  revision  and  re¬ 
writing.  Therefore  I  hope  I  may  be  forgiven  a  certain 
discursiveness  of  matter  and  colloquialism  of  style  less 
proper  to  the  printed  page  than  to  the  spoken  word. 

The  history  of  the  world  matches  in  orderly  sequence. 
No  study  convinces  one  so  clearly  of  this  fact  in  the 
case  of  our  own  country  as  the  study  of  Sea  Power. 
Approached  from  this  standpoint,  the  events  of  the 
ages  show  one  steady  stream  of  development,  rich  with 
purpose  and  promise.  In  the  issue  of  to-day,  Great 


XI 


Xll 


PREFACE 


Britain,  her  children  oversea,  and  the  United  States 
could  not  have  been  but  where  they  are,  without  being 
false  to  their  past  and  prodigal  of  their  future.  Nor 
can  they,  without  certain  disaster,  sheathe  the  sword 
till  all  that  for  which  they  are  fighting  is  fully  won. 
“  Here  stand  we.  We  can  no  other.  ” 

Those  acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Admiral 
Mahan  will  be  at  no  loss  to  trace  their  influence  in  the 
following  pages.  I  can  hope  for  nothing  better  than 
that  this  book  may  induce  others  at  present  unfamiliar 
with  those  writings  to  study  them  at  first  hand,  and 
also  the  no  less  valuable  works  of  Sir  John  Knox 
Laughton,  Sir  Julian  Corbet,  and  other  British  naval 
writers  of  far  deeper  learning  and  greater  authority 
than  I  can  pretend  to.  I  must  also  acknowledge  the 
debt  I  owe  to  Mr.  E.  Hallam  Moorhouse  for  his  in¬ 
valuable  volume,  Letters  of  the  English  Seamen;  to  Mr. 
Archibald  Hurd,  most  painstaking  of  naval  writers, 
and  Mr.  Henry  Castle  for  the  information  supplied  by 
their  German  Sea  Power :  Its  Rise ,  Progress ,  and  Eco¬ 
nomic  Basis;  to  Miss  Alethea  Wiel’s  engrossing  study  of 
The  Navy  of  Venice ,  and  to  Mr.  Ernest  Law’s  England's 
First  Great  War  Minister ,  a  book  which  casts  light  on 
a  period  of  English  history  much  overlaid  by  prejudice. 
For  the  early  history  of  Sea  Power,  I  derived  great 
help  from  The  Historian's  History  of  the  World ,  published 
by  the  Times . 


Gerard  Fiennes. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  pAGE 

I. — Introductory . i 

II. — Sea  Power  in  the  Ancient  World  .  19 

III.  — “A  Place  Where  Two  Seas  Meet”  .  42 

IV.  — The  Making  of  England  .  .  .61 

V. — The  Mediterranean  in  the  Middle  Ages  85 

VI. — The  Age  of  Discovery  <  .  .  .108 

VII. — The  Mastery  to  Britain  .  .  .  134 

VIII. — Pride  and  a  Fall  .  „  ...  162 

IX. — Sea  Power  Saves  Europe  .  .  .191 

X. — The  Restorer  of  Paths  .  .  .  .220 

XI. — The  Challenge . 248 

XII. — The  Valley  of  Decision  ....  277 

XIII.  — The  Main  Fleets . 309 

XIV.  — Conclusion . 333 

Index  .......  357 


XI 11 


1 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

U.  S.  Battleship  “Arkansas”  .  .  Frontispiece 

The  Hereford  Map  of  the  World.  .  .  .24 

Map  of  the  Mediterranean  in  Ancient  Times  .  26 

Statue  of  Alfred  the  Great  at  Winchester  .  .  48 

The  Baltic  Fleet  Leaving  Spithead  ...  64 

The  Capture  of  an  Algerine  Corsair  ...  68 

“  The  Duke  of  Wellington  ”  ....  68 

Henry  VIII.  Embarking  at  Dover  ...  82 

The  Man-of-War  “  Great  Harry  ”  ...  84 

The  Battle  of  Lepanto  .  .  .  .  .104 

A  Caravel  of  the  Fifteenth  Century  .  .  no 

Columbus’s  Caravels  .  .  .  .  .110 

A  Galleon  of  the  Fifteenth  Century  .  .  1 1 8 

A  Galley  of  the  Sixteenth  Century  .  .  1 1 8 

A  Galley  Running  before  the  Wind  .  .  .122 

An  Admiral’s  Galley.  .  .  .  .  .122 

A  Galleass  of  the  Seventeenth  Century  .  126 

A  Galleass  .......  126 

XV 


XVI 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


The  Defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada,  1588  . 

Edward  Lord  Hawke,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet 

Robert  Blake,  General  and  Admiral  of  the 
Parliament  Forces  ..... 

The  Bombardment  of  Algiers  .... 

Engagement  between  the  English  and  Dutch 
Fleets  at  the  Mouth  of  the  Thames,  1666 

The  Battle  of  Quiberon  Bay,  November  20,  1759 
\ 

Admiral  Duncan’s  Victory  over  the  Dutch 
Fleet  . 

The  Battle  of  the  Nile  ..... 

Naval  Battle  Won  by  the  Knights  of  Saint 
Jean  ........ 

The  British  Destroyer  *“  Foam  ”  . 

A 

A  British  “Dreadnought”.  . 

U.  S.  Battleship  “Nebraska”  .... 

Sir  John  Jellicoe  ...... 

Lord  Fisher  ....... 


PAGE 

128 

146 

146 

I48 

152 

180 

194 

200 

232 

272 

272 

300 

304 

304 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Sea  Power  and  Freedom 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

As  the  Great  War  has  taken  its  course,  from  August, 
1914,  when  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies,  aroused  from 
their  dreams  of  peace,  stood  up  all  unprepared,  against 
the  Central  Empires  which  had  made  them  ready  for 
battle,  till  the  time  when,  at  last,  they  are  bringing 
their  full  might  to  bear,  it  has  become  more  and  more 
evident  that  the  bed-rock  on  which  the  hope  of  victory 
rests  is  sea  power.  The  events  of  the  years  just  past 
have  taught  us  more  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  than 
has  been  popularly  understood,  at  least  since  Trafalgar. 
We  have  seen — or  rather  we  have  not  seen,  save  with 
the  eye  of  faith — the  Grand  Fleet  standing  ever  on 
guard  in  “the  Northern  mists,”  and  we  have  realised, 
more  or  less,  that,  so  long  as  it  retains  what  is  known 
as  the  “Command  of  the  Sea,”  we  cannot  be  invaded. 
The  war  is  being  fought  on  other  soil  than  that  of 
Great  Britain  by  reason  of  the  predominance  of  that 
Grand  Fleet.  Great  armies  have  been  transported, 
not  only  across  the  Channel,  but  from  the  uttermost 
parts  of  the  earth,  with  the  loss  of  scarce  a  man  or  a 


2 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


pound  of  stores,  again  because  the  Grand  Fleet  has 
“banged,  barred,  and  bolted’ ’  the  gates  of  the  world 
against  the  Germans  and  their  allies.  We  have 
learned  that  the  reason  why  we  suffer — but  not  un¬ 
bearably — from  high  prices  is  that  the  demands  upon 
our  mercantile  marine  and  the  depredations  of  the  “U  ” 
boats  have  caused  a  scarcity  of  tonnage  for  the  carry¬ 
ing  of  trade.  We  have  been  taught,  by  the  logic  of 
events,  that,  for  us,  security  and  prosperity  rest  upon 
the  power  to  use  the  sea. 

Sea  power  means  that,  and  it  means  nothing  more 
— save  the  corollary:  the  power  to  deny  the  use  of  the 
sea  to  the  enemy  in  time  of  war.  This  definition  should 
be  kept  clearly  in  mind.  It  is  all-important  to  what 
is  to  follow.  The  military  navy  is  a  necessary  instru¬ 
ment  of  sea  power,  since  it  is  on  the  military  navy  that 
a  maritime  State  must  rely  to  “impeach”  the  enemy, 
as  the  Elizabethans  said,  in  his  use  of  the  sea-routes. 
But,  in  itself,  it  is  only  a  part,  though  a  most  important 
part  of  the  whole.  The  sea  has  no  owner.  It  has 
been  compared  to  a  wide  common,  free  to  the  use  of 
all  mankind.  The  right  of  ownership  only  begins 
within  the  curtilage  of  the  house,  so  to  speak :  with  the 
carriage-drive,  the  estuaries  of  the  rivers  and  the 
harbours.  Even  within  territorial  waters — the  much- 
quoted  three-mile  limit — there  is  no  right  of  possession 
until  low  water-mark  is  reached.  It  follows,  then,  that 
sea  power  is  not  the  monopoly  of  any  one  nation.  All 
nations  who  have  the  requisite  natural  facilities  may 
possess  it  in  measure.  Conceivably,  all  nations  might 
possess  it  in  an  equal  degree,  so  long  as  they  remain 
at  peace  with  one  another. 

In  effect,  however,  though  the  right  of  all  be  equal, 
the  possession  of  sea  power  is  limited  by  natural  con- 


INTRODUCTORY 


3 


ditions.  Switzerland  has  the  same  right  as  Britain 
to  use  the  sea,  but  she  has  no  more  the  power  than  has 
a  paralysed  man  the  power  to  cross  the  common.  All 
she  needs  from  over-sea  must  be  brought  her  in  the 
ships  of  other  nations.  The  first  condition  of  sea 
power  is,  obviously,  access  to  the  sea:  favourable 
geographical  position,  an  easily  accessible  coast,  secure 
and  commodious  harbours.  Thus  baldly  stated,  it 
appears  a  mere  platitude  to  enunciate  this  condition. 
But  there  are  many  degrees  of  ability  and  disability, 
ranging  between  Switzerland,  cut  off  entirely  from 
access  to  the  sea,  and  Britain  or  Japan,  with  the  sea 
surrounding  them,  and  ports,  always  possible  of  access, 
on  all  their  coasts.  There  is  Russia,  for  instance,  with 
her  Baltic  ports  sealed  for  nearly  half  the  year  by  ice, 
and  Rumania,  whose  only  approach  to  the  outer  seas 
is  through  the  Dardanelles,  the  control  of  which  is 
destined  for  ever  to  rest  in  the  hands  of  another  Power. 
Or,  again,  there  is  Belgium,  with  her  great  port  of 
Antwerp  situated  on  a  river,  the  mouths  of  which  are 
controlled  by  Holland.  The  gradations  are  endless; 
but  the  instances  given  show  that,  in  peace  as  well  as 
in  war,  geographical  position,  apart  from  actual  exclu¬ 
sion  from  the  shore,  is  the  first  and  most  important 
factor  in  the  incidence  of  sea  power. 

Next  in  importance  comes  the  need  of  the  nation 
for  over-sea  commerce.  So  far  as  geographical  posi¬ 
tion  is  concerned,  France  and  Spain  are  but  little  less 
favourably  situated  than  Great  Britain.  Yet  neither 
of  these  countries  has  succeeded  in  maintaining  a 
really  developed  sea  power.  Why? 

The  answer  is  partly  to  be  found  in  the  condition 
stated  above.  The  first  thing  necessary  to  the  life  of 
man  is  eatables.  When  a  nation  produces  at  home  all, 


4 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


or  almost  all,  it  requires  in  the  way  of  eatables;  when 
its  soil  is  the  true  mother  of  the  people;  when  they 
have,  perhaps,  a  surplus  of  corn  and  wine  and  oil  to 
barter  for  manufactures,  or  for  luxuries  of  other  kinds, 
they  do  not  take  that  surplus  in  their  own  ships,  seek¬ 
ing  a  market  among  the  hungry.  Just  as,  when  Egypt 
was  in  plenty  and  there  was  scarcity  outside  the 
borders,  Joseph  hoarded  the  produce  of  the  fat  years 
and  the  patriarchs  went  down  into  Egypt  to  buy  food 
for  the  famine  of  their  houses,  so  the  nation  similarly 
situated  nowadays  will  say,  in  effect,  to  the  world: 
‘  ‘  If  you  wish  to  partake  of  our  superfluity,  come  down 
in  your  ships  and  fetch  it,  and  bring  with  you  your 
goods  in  exchange.”  The  importing  country  is  not, 
of  course,  necessarily  a  poor  country,  or  short  of  re¬ 
sources.  That  could  not  be  said  of  Britain  with  her 
coal  and  iron  and  immense  industries,  nor  of  Germany. 
But  it  is  true,  all  through  history,  that  the  nations 
which  have  had  to  exchange  their  products  for  food¬ 
stuffs  have  been  the  great  Sea  Powers.  Phoenicia, 
Greece,  Venice,  Holland,  Britain  stand  on  the  one 
hand;  ancient  Egypt,  Babylonia,  France,  and  the 
United  States  stand  on  the  other.  The  instance  of 
the  United  States  is  peculiarly  instructive,  for,  until 
she  began  to  develop  her  natural  resources  in  the  great 
lands  of  the  West,  she  was  a  great  Sea  Power,  with  a 
mercantile  marine  at  one  time  only  second  to  that  of 
Great  Britain.  Now  she  is  one  of  the  greatest  export¬ 
ing  countries  in  the  world,  but,  in  comparison  with 
the  bulk  of  her  trade,  her  mercantile  marine  is  insigni¬ 
ficant.  As  regards  this  country,  which,  of  course, 
has  a  great  agriculture,  and,  in  early  times,  was  at 
least  self-supporting,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  her 
sea  commerce  was  small,  and  that  she  relied  on  Vene- 


INTRODUCTORY 


5 


tian  and  Hanseatic  ships  to  bring  her  what  she  required 
from  abroad — chiefly  articles  of  luxury — up  to  Tudor 
times.  Why  was  there  then  a  change,  and  why  did 
she  become  a  maritime  State? 

Partly,  no  doubt,  the  change  was  due  to  the  fostering 
care  of  her  kings.  Partly  it  was  due  to  the  discovery 
of  America  and  of  the  passage  round  the  Cape,  which, 
in  the  long  run,  ruined  Venice.  But,  in  addition  to 
these  political  and  external  causes,  it  may  be  remem¬ 
bered  that  during  the  fourteenth  century  the  popula¬ 
tion  was  reduced  to  one-half  by  the  Black  Death,  the 
whole  system  of  villenage,  on  which  agriculture  de¬ 
pended,  was  overthrown,  and  that  large  tracts  of  land 
went  out  of  cultivation,  while,  during  almost  the  whole 
of  the  fifteenth,  the  land  was  distracted  and  recovery 
retarded  by  the  troubles  leading  up  to  and  ensuing 
upon  the  Wars  of  the  Roses.  These  events  upset  the 
balance  between  town  and  country  and  compelled 
the  importation  of  necessaries.  Much  has  been  attri¬ 
buted  to  the  Black  Death;  but  its  possible  effect  upon 
our  sea  power  has  been  overlooked  by  historians. 
Were  the  latter  accustomed  to  pay  much  heed  to 
maritime  matters,  their  silence  might  condemn  the 
conjecture  as  of  little  value.  But  it  is  an  extraordinary 
fact  that,  with  the  exception  of  the  few  who  specialise 
in  the  subject,  our  historians  seem  oblivious  of  the 
immense  effect  which  the  sea  and  the  use  thereof  have 
had  on  the  making  of  Britain  and  her  history. 

Next  in  order  of  the  factors  which  go  to  building 
up  sea  power  must  be  placed  the  character  and  habits 
of  the  people,  a  factor  which  depends,  in  part  at  least, 
on  the  condition  just  discussed.  The  need  of  food 
first  drives  men  to  seek  the  harvest  of  the  sea,  and, 
thus,  fisheries  are  invariably  the  nurseries  of  mariners. 


6 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


But  also  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  great  seafaring 
peoples  have  been  a  stiff-necked  breed,  little  wont  to 
accept  either  foreign  domination  or  tyrannical  govern¬ 
ment  at  home.  The  docile  subjects  of  the  Pharaohs, 
the  Chaldean  and  Persian  kings,  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  the 
Spanish  monarchy  were  never  imbued  with  the  true 
sea  spirit,  although,  from  time  to  time,  some  of  them 
have  shone  as  soldiers  at  sea.  The  temperament 
which  endures  personal  rule  is  lacking  in  initiative 
and  self-reliance.  It  was  widely  different  with  the 
Phoenicians,  the  Athenians,  the  Norsemen,  the  Vene¬ 
tians,  the  Dutch,  and  the  English.  The  restless  mind, 
the  independent  and  individualistic  spirit  with  its  love 
of  adventure  and  desire  for  gain,  have  made  of  these 
true  seafaring  peoples,  when  once  it  was  fairly  aroused. 
True,  the  awakening  may  take  centuries.  It  has  been 
noted  that  the  English  people  of  the  Middle  Ages 
were  of  almost  Oriental  docility  save  for  the  turbulent 
Normans  among  them.  But,  in  those  centuries, 
their  dwelling-place  was  wide  enough  for  them,  and 
the  conditions  of  life,  for  all  but  the  villeins  and  serfs, 
at  any  rate,  easy.  They  had  not  yet  begun  to  find 
the  incentive  to  use  the  sea.  The  French  are  a  people 
with  many  of  the  qualities  which  go  to  make  a  great 
colonising  and  seafaring  nation.  But  the  true  maritime 
spirit  has  never  yet  come  to  life  in  the  people  as  a 
whole.  No  lands  have  offered  them  a  fairer  prospect 
than  sunny  France.  They  have  always  had  elbow- 
room  and  plenty,  and,  to  the  detriment  of  the  national 
life,  they  take  care  that  there  are  never  too  many 
Frenchmen  for  the  soil  of  France.  They  are  a  thrifty 
and  home-loving  nation.  They  lack  the  incentive  to 
seek  their  fortunes  over-seas,  or,  if  they  do,  they  look 
back  with  yearning  and  a  determination  to  return  to 


INTRODUCTORY 


7 


their  native  land.  They  have  developed  at  least  a 
theoretical  passion  for  political  freedom,  and,  in  these 
latter  years,  seem  to  have  acquired  a  practical 
capacity  for  self-government.  But  the  causes  noted 
above  continue  to  operate  to  prevent  the  growth  of 
the  maritime  and  colonising  spirit. 

It  will  be  gathered  that  what  is  meant  by  sea  power 
is  by  no  means  confined  to  the  military  navy.  The 
division  of  the  maritime  strength  of  a  country  into 
fighting  and  mercantile  ships  is,  indeed,  a  plant  of 
comparatively  recent  growth.  After  fishing,  the 
earliest  development  of  sea  power  was  piracy.  No 
need  to  boggle  at  the  word.  Piracy  and  empiricism 
have  both  the  same  derivation,  though  the  pirate  is 
regarded  as  a  bloodthirsty  ruffian  and  the  empiric, 
at  worst,  as  a  harmless  lunatic.  They  are  both  people 
who  try  experiments,  discoverers.  In  Elizabethan 
times,  pirates  were  known  by  the  more  endearing 
name  of  merchant,  or  even  gentlemen,  adventurers. 

Regard  the  Phoenicians  who  first  fared  forth  with 
their  freights  to  Cyprus  and,  later,  to  Tarshish  and 
beyond,  seeking  copper  and  tin.  They  went  armed, 
for  they  knew  not  whom  or  what  they  might  meet. 
They  were  not  perhaps  too  nice  in  their  methods  of 
barter  with  the  strangers  they  met  in  the  lands  they 
sought.  It  has  not  infrequently  happened  since  that 
the  simple  savage  has  held  views  on  the  subject  of  the 
comparative  value  of  copra  and  beads  which  have 
led  to  a  difference  of  opinion  between  him  and  the 
seafaring  man,  who  has  felt  himself  obliged  to  chastise 
him  for  the  benefit  of  his  commercial  morals. 

But  there  was  no  law  on  the  sea,  or  in  the  lands 
beyond,  to  protect  these  early  voyagers.  Their  safety 
and  their  success  depended  on  the  arms  they  carried 


8 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


and  their  ability  to  use  them.  When  the  Greeks  in 
turn  sought  the  riches  of  Spain,  the  Phoenicians  fought 
the  Greeks  at  sea,  though  here  was  no  war  between 
Phoenicia  and  Hellas,  but  trading  relations  continued. 
Merchants  and  merchantmen  went  armed  for  protec¬ 
tion,  but  their  object  was  not  war  but  wealth.  It 
was  the  same  with  the  “adventurers”  of  our  own  land, 
though  they  had  the  added  joy  of  striking  a  blow  for 
the  Protestant  cause  by  snapping  their  fingers  at  the 
King  of  Spain  and  the  Bull  of  Alexander  VI.  Mer¬ 
chantmen  went  armed  at  least  down  to  the  Peace  of 
1815,  and  many  are  the  instances  in  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries  of  combats  and  captures  at 
sea  while  peace  still  nominally  reigned  between  the 
home  governments.  That  there  was — perhaps  still 
is — no  law  on  the  sea  save  that  of  the  States  which 
use  it  is  shown  by  the  fact  that,  until  quite  recently, 
every  crime  committed  on  the  high  seas  and  cognisable 
by  the  British  Courts  was  deemed  to  have  been  com¬ 
mitted  “in  the  County  of  Middlesex,”  and  was  triable 
at  the  Old  Bailey  alone. 

That  special  types  of  ships  fitted  for  war  were  early 
evolved  by  the  maritime  nations  does  not  alter  the 
case,  nor  that  certain  States  which  were  not  strictly 
speaking  maritime  built  navies  for  the  special  purpose 
of  war.  It  is  in  the  main  true  that  the  military  navy, 
so  far  from  constituting  the  substance  of  sea  power, 
is  rather  its  accident,  and  that  the  need  to  possess  the 
military  ‘  ‘  command  of  the  sea  ’  ’  is  exactly  proportioned 
to  the  dependence  of  a  State  on  sea  communications 
for  its  wealth  and  subsistence.  To  take  the  instance 
nearest  at  hand:  If  Germany  were  at  war  with  us 
alone, ^she  could  still  draw  her  necessary  supplies  of  food 
from  the  sources  whence  she,  in  the  main,  draws  them 


INTRODUCTORY 


9 


in  time  of  peace:  wheat  and  rye  from  Russia  and 
Rumania,  dairy  produce  and  meat  from  Holland, 
Denmark,  France,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and  so  forth. 
She  could  draw  raw  materials  for  her  industries  from 
all  the  ports  of  Europe.  She  would  have  lost  nothing 
but  the  power  to  carry  these  things  in  her  own  ships 
— a  severe  economic  loss,  but  not  fatal.  As  it  is, 
she  has,  by  her  own  act,  turned  herself  into  an  island. 
She  has  failed  to  gain  the  advantage  of  the  sea  power 
for  which  she  strove,  and  she  has  lost  that  of  her  con¬ 
tinental  position.  “Bitter  is  the  need,”  not  only  of 
a  strong  German  navy,  but  of  one  strong  enough  to 
keep  open  her  sea  communications,  and  this  all  the 
millions  she  has  lavished  have  failed  to  provide.  Her 
sea  power  for  the  time  being  has  vanished,  for  she  has 
lost  the  power  to  use  the  sea.  With  the  impotence 
of  her  battle-fleet,  there  has  disappeared  her  great 
mercantile  marine. 

The  real  separation  between  the  functions  of  a 
military  navy  and  a  merchant  fleet  came  with  the 
introduction  of  cannon.  The  trader  desired,  of  course, 
to  devote  all  the  space  he  could  to  cargo-carrying.  He 
did  not  wish  to  carry  a  larger  crew  than  was  needed 
to  work  the  ship.  But  guns  and  ammunition  are 
bulky  and  heavy,  and  extra  men  are  required  to  fight 
the  guns.  So  the  State  took  over  certain  functions 
necessary  to  trade  by  sea,  both  in  peace  and  war. 
The  policing  of  the  trade  routes,  exploration,  charting, 
lighting,  the  establishment  of  bases  of  supply  and  re¬ 
freshment  and  their  protection,  were  all  essentials, 
and  were  all  made  the  function  of  the  military  navy. 
Hence  it  comes  about  that,  quite  apart  from  the  de¬ 
fence  of  the  shores  from  invasion  and  the  necessity 
to  transport  land  forces  by  sea,  which  was  the  earliest 


10 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


purpose  served  by  the  construction  of  special  war- 
vessels,  the  possession  of  a  large  mercantile  marine 
involves  the  establishment  and  the  upkeep  of  a  military 
force.  But  the  essence  of  sea  power  must  still  be  looked 
for  in  the  use  of  the  sea  as  a  means  of  peaceful  inter¬ 
course  and  commerce  between  nations. 

The  earliest  known  civilisations  established  them¬ 
selves  on  the  seashore,  or  on  the  alluvial  plains  stretch¬ 
ing  along  the  course  of  mighty  rivers.  Behind  lay 
the  hills  or  the  desert;  in  front  the  sea.  As  popu¬ 
lation  and  wealth  increased,  the  place  where  they 
dwelt  became  too  strait  for  nomadic  life.  There 
was  strife  between  the  herdsmen,  as  between  those  of 
Abraham  and  Lot,  for  the  most  fertile  and  well-watered 
stretches  of  pasture.  The  strongest  ceased  to  wander 
and  settled  themselves  permanently  on  these.  Man 
took  to  agriculture,  then  to  dwelling  in  cities,  to  arts 
and  crafts,  to  exchange  and  barter.  But,  directly  you 
reach  that  stage,  means  of  transport  and  communica¬ 
tion  become  all  important.  The  further  you  go  from 
sea-level  the  more  difficult  does  transport  become. 
There  were  no  roads,  nor  wheeled  vehicles.  But  the 
rivers  provided  an  inclined  plane,  up  and  down  which 
goods  might  easily  be  transported,  once  the  principle 
of  buoyancy  was  understood.  No  doubt  that  elemen¬ 
tary  principle  was  mastered  by  our  arboreal  ancestors, 
who  floated  down  stream  on  a  tree  trunk,  wet  but  safe. 
From  the  trunk  to  the  dug-out,  or  to  the  raft,  made 
by  lashing  several  trunks  together,  was  an  easy  step; 
to  fashion  frames  and  knees  and  to  cover  them  with 
planks  or  hides,  and  thus  to  form  a  hollow,  cargo¬ 
bearing  ship  was  less  elementary,  but  not  beyond  the 
powers  of  rude  races  of  mankind,  as  the  records  show. 
When  means  of  propulsion  by  pole,  paddle,  oar,  and 


INTRODUCTORY 


ii 


eventually  sail,  had  been  devised,  an  easy  means  to 
transport  large  weights  of  merchandise  on  the  broad 
bosom  of  the  Nile  or  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  was  at 
the  disposal  of  man.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  from  very 
early  days  the  produce  of  Armenia  was  transported 
to  Babylon  on  rafts  which  floated  down  the  Euphrates 
and  were  sold  at  the  end  of  the  journey  to  save  the 
labour  and  expense  of  poling  or  towing  them  up  stream 
again.  The  same  system  prevails  to-day. 

It  is,  however,  to  the  man  in  the  coracle  or  dug-out 
that  we  must  look  for  the  first  adventurer  who  put  to 
sea  from  the  mouth  of  the  river  where  lay  his  fishing- 
ground.  Perhaps  he  went  to  see  what  was  round  the 
next  promontory,  and  there  found  a  fishing  village 
similar  to  his  own/ with  the  inhabitants  of  which  he 
entered  into  relations,  if  they  did  not  obey  the  time- 
honoured  advice  to  “  ’eave  ’arf  a  brick”  at  the  stranger. 
Perhaps  ahead  of  him  he  saw  “summer  isles  of  Eden, 
lying  in  dark  purple  spheres  of  sea,”  as  one  sees  St. 
Honorat  and  St.  Marguerite  from  Cannes,  with  the 
snowy  mountains  of  Corsica  behind  them.  Greatly 
daring,  the  voyager  fared  forth  and  crossed  the  strait, 
to  find  himself  the  first  colonist.  So  traffic,  demand¬ 
ing  ever  larger  craft,  would  be  established  between 
himself  and  those  who  followed  him  and  their  mother 
city,  and  ever  their  eyes  would  turn  to  other  islands 
lying  yet  further  beyond.  Consider  the  early  history 
of  Cyprus,  and  all  that  it  has  meant  to  the  world. 
Here  East  and  West  first  came  into  contact.  The 
Phoenician,  creeping  along  the  coast  of  Syria  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Orontes,  saw  Cape  Andrea  lift  above  the 
sea-rim  and  set  his  sail  for  it.  The  Greek,  coasting 
along  the  shores  of  the  Levant,  saw  it  also.  There 
they  met,  Aryan  and  Semite,  and  there  they  traded 


12 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


copper,  all  important  in  the  Bronze  age.  Thence 
Cadmus  carried  letters  to  Greece  and  there  Ashtoreth 
of  the  Zidonians  rose  from  the  waves,  Aphrodite 
Anadyomene  of  the  Hellenes. 

Adventures  by  individuals  apart,  however,  what 
was  it  which  first  drove  man  to  the  sea  ?  He  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  lands  which  lay  beyond.  His  pro¬ 
gress,  creeping  from  point  to  point,  was  slow  and 
fraught  with  peril.  Yet  he  dared  the  mysterious  forces 
of  Nature,  leaving  security  and,  perchance,  ease  behind 
him.  First  and  foremost,  no  doubt,  necessity,  the  res 
angusta  domi.  Driven  by  the  stronger,  or  the  more 
cunning,  from  the  fat  pastures,  a  tribe  of  refugees, 
such  as  the  Phoenicians  or  the  Venetians,  would  take 
refuge  in  some  undesired  spot,  protected  by  the  ranges 
of  Libanus  and  Anti-Libanus  or  by  the  swamps  and 
lagoons  of  Venetia,  and  would  there  learn  the  hardi¬ 
hood  and  skill  which,  in  process  of  time,  enabled  them 
to  outstrip  the  oppressor  in  wealth  or  in  power  or  in 
both.  Or,  again,  the  trouble  might  not  be  external, 
but  internal.  There  might  be  those  who  felt  them¬ 
selves  evil  intreated  of  tyrants;  those  to  whom  the 
right  of  private  judgment,  so  passionately  claimed  by 
some  races,  our  own  among  others,  was  denied.  Or 
the  seafarers  might  themselves  be  fiery,  turbulent 
spirits  who  would  not  submit  to  the  reign  of  law.  For 
law,  be  it  remembered,  is  the  compromise  of  individual 
right  which  man  has  found  to  be  necessary  if  he  is  to 
live  in  a  society.  We  still  talk  of  the  right  of  con¬ 
quest  as  between  nations.  But  it  is  obvious  that,  if 
conquest  is  admitted  as  a  right  between  individuals, 
our  lives  would  be  one  continual  turmoil  and  strife. 
Man  is  therefore  called  upon  to  abandon  his  in¬ 
dividual  right  when  it  impinges  upon  the  right  of  his 


INTRODUCTORY 


13 


neighbour,  and,  if  question  arises,  to  submit  the  matter 
to  judgment. 

Since  all  law  needs  force  behind  it,  it  has  frequently 
been  found  the  most  practicable  plan  to  invest  the 
sole  right  of  plunder  in  the  strongest  or  shrewdest 
member  of  the  community,  on  condition  that  he  allows 
no  one  to  plunder  but  himself.  Or  he,  being  the 
stronger,  has  seized  that  power.  Hence  arose  tyrants, 
and  hence  arose  the  necessity  for  those  who  could 
not,  or  would  not,  submit  to  betake  themselves  else¬ 
where.  Aut  disce ,  aut  discede.  Manet  sors  tertia , 
ccedi. 

There  are  two  main  refuges  for  the  persecuted  and 
the  lawless:  the  hills  and  the  sea.  The  weaker  breeds 
have,  as  a  rule,  taken  to  the  hills,  where,  in  the  hard 
school  of  adversity,  they  have  learned  hardihood,  and 
in  time  have  avenged  themselves  upon  the  more 
prosperous  and  slothful  dwellers  of  the  plain.  As  the 
poet  sings: 

“  The  mountain  sheep  are  sweeter, 

But  the  valley  sheep  are  fatter. 

We  therefore  deemed  it  meeter 
To  carry  off  the  latter.” 

Those  who  took  to  the  sea  have  been,  for  the  most  part, 
the  stronger,  the  fiercer,  the  more  adventurous.  For 
the  wrath  of  Nature  is  more  terrible  than  the  wrath  of 
man.  They  chose  the  better  part.  The  way  of  the 
sea  leads  to  wealth  as  well  as  liberty;  the  way  of  the 
hills,  to  liberty  indeed,  but  seldom  to  wealth. 

We  shall  see  as  we  proceed  that  the  motives  which 
have  led  man  to  take  to  the  sea  have  had  an  immense 
influence  on  the  future  of  the  races  from  which  they 
have  sprung.  The  Phoenicians,  the  Venetians,  and  the 


14 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Dutch  are  instances  of  peoples  driven  to  seafaring  and 
colonisation  by  the  narrow  resources  of  the  lands  in 
which  they  dwelt,  and  the  pressure  of  stronger  races 
behind  them.  Although,  in  two  cases  out  of  three,  the 
possession  of  colonies  eventually  overtaxed  the  strength 
of  the  mother  State,  and,  in  the  case  of  Venice,  the 
colonists  made  themselves  fiercely  hated  by  the  peoples 
among  whom  they  dwelt,  yet,  with  all  three,  the  exiled 
branches  remained  faithful  to  the  parent  stem,  and 
trade,  at  any  rate,  did  “follow  the  flag.”  The  same 
cannot  be  said  of  the  colonies  of  the  Hellenic  States. 
Lack  of  subsistence,  it  is  true,  drove  many  of  the 
colonists  to  seek  distant  homes,  and  they  took  Greek 
customs,  Greek  art,  and  Greek  culture  with  them.  But 
the  causes  of  their  departure  were,  in  many  cases, 
political  also,  and  the  colonists  were  of  little  aid  to 
Hellas  in  her  struggles  with  the  barbarian  invaders; 
indeed,  they  were  frequently  themselves  to  be  counted 
among  her  enemies.  No  Greek  city,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Corinth,  became  a  great  mart  of  the  world’s 
merchandise  through  the  energies  of  its  sons  as  did  the 
Phoenician  cities  through  those  of  the  Carthaginians 
and  the  settlers  in  Spain.  The  Greeks  were  essen¬ 
tially  without  sense  of  solidarity,  factious  and  lacking 
in  national  spirit,  except  under  stress  of  overwhelming 
danger  and  for  short  periods  of  time.  Most  of  the 
Ionian  colonies  of  Asia  Minor  marched  under  the 
banner  of  Xerxes  to  the  conquest  of  Greece.  Take 
again  the  case  of  the  Northmen,  whether  Saxons, 
Danes,  or  Norse.  They  planted  themselves  in  England 
and  in  Normandy;  they  settled  and  became  English 
or  Norman.  But  they  cut  themselves  off  completely 
from  Scandinavia.  They  ceased  absolutely  to  belong 
to  the  nations  from  which  they  sprang.  Our  own 


INTRODUCTORY 


15 


case  is  particularly  instructive,  seeing  that  those  who 
left  our  shores  to  escape  political  or  religious  persecu¬ 
tion  in  the  long  run  broke  away,  while  those  who  went 
to  distant  lands  to  seek  fortune,  neglected,  it  may  be, 
but  left  free  in  conscience  and  in  their  civil  rights, 
protected  by  the  long  arm  of  British  sea  power  without 
money  and  without  price,  are  loyal  to  the  Crown  and 
Blood,  as  they  are  proving  more  magnificently  than 
our  warmest  hopes  have  whispered  to  us.  The  sea 
has  proved,  not  a  barrier,  but  the  strongest  link  of 
union.  And,  as  we  have  every  reason  to  believe,  the 
best  is  yet  to  be.  It  is  an  idea  of  Empire  quite  new  to 
the  world,  this  free  bond  between  free  peoples,  in  which 
the  Mother  Country  exacts  no  tribute  and  asks  no 
special  privileges.  It  is  the  latest  and  completest 
product  of  sea  power  in  its  widest  sense:  born  of  its 
spirit,  nurtured  by  its  genius.  It  will,  of  course,  be 
one  of  the  principal  aims  of  this  volume  to  inquire 
how  the  Ocean  Empire  was  made  and  what  are  the 
conditions  under  which  it  exists.  It  is  an  almost 
miraculous  story,  and  not  the  least  marvellous  part 
of  it  is  that  many  of  its  chroniclers  have  almost  seemed 
to  miss  the  chief  force  on  which  it  depends,  so  silent 
and  invisible  is  it  in  its  working. 

The  British  boy,  taught  history  in  the  schools,  can 
name  five  British  victories  on  land  to  every  three  at 
sea.  Crecy,  Poitiers,  Agincourt;  Blenheim,  Ramillies, 
Oudenarde;  Minden,  Dettingen,  Corunna,  Vimiera, 
Albuera,  Badajoz,  Talavera,  Salamanca,  Vittoria, 
Waterloo,  Alma,  Inkerman,  Balaklava,  and  so  on: 
these  are  all  household  words.  On  the  naval  side,  he 
would  perhaps  name  Sluys  (probably  knowing  no  more 
about  it  than  that  the  Court  Fool  of  the  King  of  France 
announced  it  to  his  master  by  saying:  “What  cowards 


i6 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


these  English  are !  They  had  not  the  courage  to  jump 
overboard  like  the  French!”),  the  defeat  of  the  Ar¬ 
mada,  La  Hogue,  Quiberon  Bay,  The  Saints,  the 
Glorious  First  of  June,  Camperdown,  St.  Vincent,  The 
Nile,  Copenhagen,  and  Trafalgar.  Nineteen  victories 
by  land  to  eleven  at  sea.  The  proportion  is  a  strange 
one  for  the  greatest  Sea  Power  in  the  world’s  history. 
But  sea  power  has  its  perfect  work  in  the  slow  and 
silent  pressure  it  brings  to  bear,  by  denying  to  the 
enemy  freedom  of  action  while  maintaining  that 
freedom  for  itself  and  its  allies,  rather  than  in  the 
actual  clash  of  arms.  It  resembles  in  its  working  the 
serpents  which  arose  out  of  the  sea  at  Tenedos  and 
wound  themselves  round  the  limbs  of  Laocoon  and  his 
sons.  The  Germans  know — most  painfully — this  im¬ 
palpable,  impermeable  force  which  surrounds  the  war¬ 
ring  armies  on  the  Continent  and  constrains  them  to 
its  will.  Belgium  was  overrun,  beaten,  crushed;  yet 
Belgium  lives.  Her  army  has  been  refitted  by  the 
Power  which  has  been  untouched  by  the  invader  and 
has  the  resources  of  the  world  at  its  back.  Its  flank 
is  secured  by  the  British  Navy,  which  has  the  control 
of  the  North  Sea  and  has  the  dunes  under  its  guns. 
Or  take  the  case  of  Serbia.  A  rabble  of  starved  and 
beaten  men  straggled  down  to  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic 
in  the  autumn  of  1915.  They  were  rescued  by  sea 
power  as  the  army  of  Sir  John  Moore  was  rescued 
after  the  retreat  to  Corunna,  and  was  brought  back  to 
Salonika,  equipped  and  reorganised,  to  aid  in  recovering 
the  freedom  of  their  native  land.  Take  the  Russians 
in  France  or  at  Salonika,  brought  all  the  way  round 
from  Vladivostok.  Take  the  marvellous  odyssey  of 
the  British  armoured  cars,  which  were  landed  at 
Archangel,  and  fought  on  the  frontiers  of  Persia. 


INTRODUCTORY 


1 7 


These  are  but  a  few  telling  incidents.  They  do  not 
show  a  tenth  part  of  what  sea  power  is  accomplishing 
to  derange  the  plans  of  the  enemy,  even  in  parts  remote 
from  the  sea.  That  will  be  dealt  with  in  its  proper 
place.  But  they  serve  to  illustrate  the  immediate 
point:  that  it  is  not  amid  the  roar  of  the  guns  of 
Jutland  Bank  that  the  truest  and  most  vital  workings 
of  sea  power  are  to  be  sought.  It  is,  rather,  in  the 
use  of  sea  communications  to  succour  and  support 
the  weaker  combatants  and  to  force  the  enemy  to  turn 
from  his  purpose  and  to  strike  his  blows  in  the  air. 
An  army  which  has  the  free  use  of  the  sea  is  ever  an 
elusive  foe  against  whom  it  is  almost  impossible  to  seek 
a  decision,  unless  he  himself  is  prepared  to  welcome 
it.  Besides  which,  there  is  always  economic  pressure 
working  inexorably  to  derange  his  military  plans  and 
force  him  to  adventures  beyond  his  strength. 

“He  that  commands  the  sea,”  said  Bacon,  “hath 
great  liberty  to  take  as  much  or  as  little  of  the  war  as 
he  will.”  That  is  unquestionably  true,  and  we  shall 
find  instances,  in  the  histories  of  Phoenicia,  of  Greece, 
of  Venice,  and  of  Britain,  in  which  full  advantage  has 
been  taken  of  this  liberty.  Indeed, Japan  is  exercising 
it  now,  in  so  far  as  she  commands  the  sea  in  her  own 
region  of  the  world.  To  our  credit  be  it  said  that,  in 
the  great  struggle  of  to-day  we  are  using  our  liberty 
to  take  as  much  of  the  war  as  we  can. 

The  history  of  sea  power  to  the  Briton  is  the  history 
of  the  evolution  of  the  British  nation  and  Empire. 
Towards  that  culmination  all  else  moves.  But  before 
tracing  the  development  of  our  race  it  is  necessary  to 
show  something  of  the  general  working  of  sea  power  in 
the  ancient  world  and  of  the  gradual  process  by  which 
maritime  ascendency  crystallised  round  these  islands. 


i8 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


If  the  story  is  one  rather  of  war  than  of  peace,  that  is 
no  contradiction  of  the  statement  made  above  that 
sea  power  is  not  primarily  an  affair  of  the  military 
navy.  Just  as  the  great  sea  battles  are  the  events  on 
which  the  imagination  seizes  in  war-time,  rather  than 
upon  the  silent  pressure  of  the  Navy,  which  is  of  even 
greater  moment,  but  which  cannot  easily  be  described 
in  words,  so  war  is  the  touchstone  by  which  sea  power 
is  brought  to  the  test.  The  use  of  the  sea  being  its 
main  end,  the  ability  to  use  it  depends  on  the  ability 
to  keep  the  highway  clear  in  times  of  crisis.  But 
let  it  never  be  forgotten  that,  since  the  British  Navy 
won  first  place  in  the  world,  it  has  saved  more  wars 
than  it  has  fought.  It  has  been  the  instrument  of 
peace,  of  law,  and  of  liberty,  keeping  open  the  highway 
of  the  sea  so  that  “the  wayfaring  men,  though  fools, 
shall  not  err  therein.”  In  this,  we  claim,  it  plays  its 
destined  part  in  promoting  the  welfare  of  mankind. 


CHAPTER  II 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD 

To  the  ancient  Greeks,  from  whom,  apart  from  the 
Scriptures  and  the  monuments  of  Egypt  and  Assyria, 
our  knowledge  of  antiquity  is  almost  wholly  derived, 
the  Mediterranean  was  the  centre  of  the  (Ecumene, 
or  habitable  world.  All  the  known  races  of  mankind 
dwelt  round  its  shores  or  to  the  east  of  it,  as  far  as 
the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  and 
the  Caspian.  The  Balkans  and  the  Alps  formed  its 
northern  boundary;  the  Pillars  of  Herakles,  set,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Phoenician  legend,  by  Melkarth  on  either 
side  of  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  the  western.  West 
of  these  again,  in  the  golden  sea,  which,  struck  by  the 
setting  sun,  gave  forth  the  sound  of  a  harp-string, 
were  the  Islands  of  the  Blest,  the  fabled  Atlantis,  the 
land  where  Hesperides  guarded  their  golden  fruit. 
To  the  south,  the  weary  Titan  upheld  the  roof  of  the 
world.  To  the  north  dwelt  the  Cimmerians  in  outer 
darkness,  the  Laestrygons  in  endless  day,  and  the  happy 
Hyperboreans  in  the  ‘‘dancing  places  of  the  dawn.” 
Outside  all  these,  Okeanus  flowed  endlessly  round 
the  disc  of  the  world.  Such  was  the  conception  of 
geography  and  ethnography  at  the  date  of  Homer. 
But  the  bounds  of  the  CEcumene  were  ever  being 
pushed  further  from  the  centre  as  knowledge  grew 
with  exploration. 


19 


20 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


It  is  then,  among  the  races  living  round  the  Medi¬ 
terranean  that  great  and  mighty  empires  developed, 
advanced  in  many  respects  in  civilisation  to  a  degree 
which  man  has  hardly  yet  surpassed.  How  much  of 
their  greatness  did  they  owe  to  sea  power?  How  much 
did  it  contribute  to  their  upbuilding;  how  much  to 
the  fall  of  those  which  did  not  possess  it,  or,  having 
possessed  it,  lost  it?  The  question  is  asked  of  the 
history  of  Egypt,  of  Chaldea,  of  Phoenicia,  Persia, 
Greece,  Carthage,  and  Rome,  from  about  the  year  2000 
B.C.  to  the  foundation  of  the  Empire  of  the  Caesars 
at  Actium. 

The  first  two  great  Empires  of  the  world  were  river¬ 
ain:  Chaldea,  depending  on  the  Euphrates  and  the 
Tigris,  and  Egypt  on  the  Nile.  They  were  self-sup¬ 
porting  in  the  necessaries  of  life;  their  capitals  were 
situated  on  rich  alluvial  plains;  the  rivers  afforded 
convenient  inclined  planes  for  transport  and  supply. 
Thus  neither  of  them  experienced  the  first  and  most 
cogent  impulse  for  the  development  of  sea  power,  and, 
in  fact,  neither  of  them  developed  it  to  any  great  extent; 
the  Chaldeans,  so  far  as  we  can  tell,  not  at  all.  There 
are  representations  of  galleys  and  even  of  naval  en¬ 
gagements  to  be  found  on  the  bas-reliefs;  but  the 
ships  are  not  Assyrian  or  Babylonian  ships,  but  those 
of  some  ally,  hired  for  the  purpose  of  fighting,  or  of 
transporting  Chaldean  soldiers.  The  wares  of  Chaldea 
were  carried  overland  to  the  Mediterranean,  or  along 
the  great  trade  route  by  the  oasis  of  Palmyra,  thence 
down  through  Syria,  and  thus  to  Egypt.  The  Midian- 
ites  to  wThom  Joseph  was  sold  were,  perhaps,  engaged 
on  such  a  journey.  There  was  no  reason  to  think  that 
Chaldean  ships  sailed  the  Red  Sea  or  the  Indian  Ocean, 
though,  as  we  shall  see,  the  Egyptians  occasionally 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  21 


made  expeditions  there,  and  the  Phoenicians  thought 
it  worth  while  to  maintain  fleets  in  the  Gulf  of  Akaba, 
in  order  to  fetch  the  treasures  of  Ophir  and  Punt  for 
the  magnificent  Solomon,  and  may,  perhaps,  have 
journeyed  as  far  south  as  Taprobane,  or  Ceylon.  It  has 
been  conjectured  that  the  failure  of  the  Chaldeans 
to  use  the  sea  was  due  to  the  lack  of  suitable  woods  for 
ship-building.  This,  however,  can  hardly  have  been 
the  case,  since  they  had  the  resources  of  Armenia 
behind  them  and  easy  transport  by  water.  The  reason 
must  be  looked  for  in  the  absence  of  necessity  and  the 
richness  of  the  more  temperate  part  of  their  dominions, 
which  kept  the  people  from  seeking  the  seacoast.  If 
the  Chaldeans  had  established  a  sea  power  based  on 
the  Persian  Gulf ;  if  they  had  been  the  bold  and  hardy 
sailors  the  Phoenicians  were,  the  history  of  the  world 
might  have  been  fundamentally  different.  They  would 
have  sailed  south  and  east,  and  have  established  inter¬ 
course  with  the  peoples  of  India,  perhaps  even  of  China. 
The  course  of  empire  might  well  have  taken  its  way 
eastwards  instead  of  westwards. 

So  also  it  might  if  the  Egyptians  had  developed  into 
a  maritime  people.  With  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean 
and  in  the  Red  Sea,  they  would  have  brought  the 
eastern  and  the  western  world  into  contact  many  hun¬ 
dreds  of  years  before  that  contact  actually  occurred. 
Without  any  doubt  they  would  have  constructed  the 
Suez  Canal — mere  child’s  play  to  the  builders  of  the 
Pyramids — and,  securely  seated  on  their  two  seas, 
they  must  have  been  the  rulers  of  the  world,  which 
might  never  have  had  occasion  to  look  elsewhere 
for  a  master.  But  the  Pharaohs  developed  no  great 
measure  of  sea  power.  From  time  to  time,  some  ruler, 
more  ambitious  or  more  far-seeing  than  the  rest,  main- 


22 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


tained  a  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  or  the  Red  Sea, 
but  these  were  all  comparatively  small  achievements 
for  a  people  so  favourably  situated  for  sea  trade  and 
endowed  with  so  high  a  measure  of  constructive  skill. 
The  ancient  Egyptians  were  never  a  seafaring  people. 
When  the  Phoenicians  and  the  Greeks  had  developed 
their  civilisation  sufficiently  to  engage  in  maritime 
industry,  the  Egyptians  resigned  their  pretensions  to 
sea  power  altogether  and  were  content  to  make  use 
of  foreign  shipping  for  their  trade.  In  this  they  fol¬ 
lowed  the  universal  rule  already  laid  down,  that  the 
peoples  which  have  a  surplus  of  the  necessaries  of  life 
to  dispose  of  make  those  who  want  that  surplus  come 
and  fetch  it,  bringing  with  them  the  luxuries  and  super¬ 
fluities  which  the  favoured  nation  desires.  Yet  ancient 
Egypt  was  destined  to  fall  by  sea  power,  and  she  has 
ever  since  been  the  prize  of  that  nation  which  had  the 
supremacy  at  sea.  It  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that 
there  is  no  people  in  history  more  blind  to  the  things 
which  belonged  to  their  peace  and  greatness  than  the 
subjects  of  the  Pharaohs  in  their  neglect  of  the  sea  and 
all  it  might  have  given  them. 

Mention  must  be  made,  however,  of  one  or  two 
notable  enterprises  during  the  short  periods  when 
some  monarch  arose  who  was  alive  to  the  opportunities 
afforded.  The  earliest  maritime  expedition  of  which 
we  have  any  authentic  record  was  fitted  out  by  Sankh- 
ka-Ra,  the  last  Pharaoh  of  the  Eleventh  Dynasty. 
It  sailed  to  Punt,  or  Somaliland,  about  the  year  2800 
B.c.  Eleven  hundred  years  later,  the  enterprise  was 
repeated  by  Queen  Hat-Shepsu.  The  expeditions  were 
undertaken,  not  to  fetch  articles  of  necessity,  but 
“resin  of  incense,  ebony,  ivory  set  in  pure  gold,  scented 
woods,  paint  for  the  eyes,  with  dog-headed  apes,  long- 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  23 


tailed  monkeys  and  greyhounds,  with  leopard  skins, 
and  with  natives  of  the  country,  together  with  their 
children.”  All  these  for  the  luxury  of  Pharaoh  and 
energetic  Queen  Hat-Shepsu.  One  is  reminded  of 
King  Solomon’s  cargoes  of  almug  trees,  of  ivory,  apes, 
and  peacocks,  fetched  by  the  navy  which  was  built 
for  him  by  King  Hiram  of  Tyre.  The  earliest  recorded 
sea  fight,  however,  was  won  by  Rameses  III.  at  Mygdol, 
over  the  Colchians  and  Carians,  about  1200  B.c. 

For  many  hundreds  of  years  Syria  was  the  scene 
of  struggles,  first  between  the  mysterious  Empire  of 
the  Hittites  and  Egypt  and  Assyria  in  turn,  and  then 
between  the  Egyptians  and  Chaldeans.  Carchemish, 
Megiddo,  Lachish  are  names  which  are  continually 
recurring  as  the  scenes  of  great  battles,  according  as 
one  State  or  the  other  obtained  a  temporary  mastery 
and  carried  the  war  into  or  towards  the  territory  of 
another.  None  of  these  campaigns  appear  to  have 
been  decisive,  save  that  the  Assyrians  eventually 
broke  the  power  of  the  Hittites  in  pieces.  Egypt 
never  subdued  Chaldea,  nor  Chaldea  Egypt,  until  the 
time  of  the  Medes  and  Persians  arrived,  and  their 
kings  made  tributary  to  them  a  confederation  of  small 
States,  which  placed  in  their  hands  the  weapon  needful 
for  success,  namely,  sea  power. 

The  Phoenicians  were  the  first  of  the  early  peoples 
to  become  great  by  sea.  They  were  probably  a  Canaan- 
itish  race,  driven  by  more  powerful  tribes  from  the 
fertile  plains  of  Palestine  to  the  narrow  strip  of  country 
which  is  shut  in  between  Libanus  and  Anti-Libanus 
and  the  sea.  This  strip  is  some  two  hundred  miles 
long,  nowhere  more  than  forty  miles  in  breadth.  Here 
they  founded  cities,  Byblus,  Berytus,  Akko,  Arvad,  and, 
above  all,  Si  don  and  Tyre.  Sidon  was  the  oldest  of 


24 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


them  all.  An  interesting  legend  makes  its  founders 
to  come  from  the  shores  of  Lake  Gennesaret.  The 
name  “Si don”  means  “fishing,”  and  it  is  said  that, 
even  at  this  remote  period,  the  Lake  was  famous  for 
its  fish.  But  it  is  more  probable  that  the  name  of  the 
city  was  derived  from  the  earliest  occupation  of  its 
inhabitants,  fishing  being  generally  the  first  stage  of 
sea  power.  These  communities  were  united  in  a  loose 
confederation;  they  were  too  weak  and  incoherent 
to  resist  attack  by  land  from  their  powerful  neighbours, 
and  they  fell,  over  and  over  again,  into  the  position 
of  tributaries.  But  they  always  retained  their 
autonomy  and  their  pre-eminence  in  trade,  till  their 
final  subjugation  by  Alexander  the  Great. 

The  history  of  Phoenicia  bears  striking  resemblance 
to  that  of  Venice  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Both  alike 
were  the  sea-mercenaries  of  great  land  Powers.  Both 
alike,  from  a  constricted  and  unprofitable  homeland, 
planted  great  colonies,  developed  into  the  foremost 
trading  nations  of  their  times,  and  owed  their  eventual 
fall  partly  to  the  exhaustion  caused  by  this  very 
colonisation,  partly  to  the  pressure  of  their  military 
neighbours,  and  partly  to  a  diversion  of  the  great 
trade  routes  of  the  world.  But  the  Phoenician  colonies 
were  of  greater  importance  than  those  of  Venice,  and, 
on  the  whole,  the  influence  of  Phoenicia  on  the  world 
has  been  more  widespread. 

The  history  of  Phoenician  colonisation  is,  indeed, 
a  remarkable  one.  As  early  as  1950  B.c.  the  Phoeni¬ 
cians  had  subdued  at  least  a  part  of  Cyprus.  That 
is  in  pre-Homeric  times,  before  the  history  of  Greece 
had  emerged  from  the  realms  of  myth.  From  Cyprus 
they  spread  to  Rhodes;  to  Cythera,  sacred,  like  Cyprus, 
to  Aphrodite,  whence  they  obtained  the  mureux ,  from 


The  Hereford  Map  of  the  World 

This  Map  was  Executed  about  1300  A.D. 

At  the  top  is  a  representation  of  the  Last  Judgment.  The  Earth  is  repre¬ 
sented  as  round  and  is  surrounded  by  the  Ocean;  the  upper  part  is  the  East. 
Rather  more  than  half  is  taken  up  by  the  Continent  of  Asia.  Europe  is  at 
the  left  hand  of  the  lower  half,  Africa  at  the  right  hand.  By  a  singular  error 
the  words  Europa  and  Africa  are  transposed  on  the  Map,  Europa  being 
placed  on  the  continent  of  Africa,  and  vice  versa. 

For  convenience  of  reference  the  Key  Map  is  divided  into  squares  marked 
by  Roman  capitals,  which  represent  approximately  the  following: 

I.  II.  III. — South-Western  Asia. 

IV — Caspian  Sea. 

V. — Bokhara  and  Thrace. 

VI. — Babylonia  and  part  of  Palestine. 

VII. — Red  Sea  and  Mount  Sinai. 

VIII. — Monastery  of  St.  Anthony  in  Ethiopia. 

IX. — Scythia. 

X. — Asia  Minor  with  the  Black  Sea. 

XI. — The  Holy  Land. 

XII. — Egypt  with  the  Nile. 

XIII.  — Ethiopia. 

XIV.  — To  the  left  is  Norway,  in  the  middle  Russia;  Scotland  and  part  of 

England  are  shown  in  the  lower  part,  but  the  British  Isles  are  de¬ 
scribed  in  XIX. 

XV. — Germany  with  part  of  Greece;  Venice  is  shown  on  the  right. 

XVI. — Italy  and  a  great  part  of  the  Mediterranean.  About  the  centre  is  Rome. 

XVII. — Part  of  Africa,  including  Carthage  in  the  lower  part  to  the  left  on  a 
promontory. 

XVIII. — Part  of  Africa. 

XIX. — On  the  left  are  the  British  Isles,  on  the  right  France. 

XX. — The  upper  part  is  Provence,  the  lower  Spain. 

XXI. — At  the  top  to  the  left  is  St.  Augustine  of  Hippo. 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  25 


which  was  made  the  far-famed  Tyrian  purple;  and 
to  Thasos,  where  their  gold  workings  were  the  marvel 
of  the  Greeks.  Their  influence  is  seen  in  the  ruins  of 
Tiryns  and  Mycenae;  from  their  intercourse  with  the 
Greeks  sprang  the  first  rude  beginnings  of  a  law  of 
nations,  which  did  not,  it  is  true,  run  on  the  sea,  but 
rendered  the  person  and  goods  of  the  voyager  who  had 
divided  a  potsherd  with  his  host  inviolate  on  shore. 
The  seafaring  peoples  had  now  come  into  contact, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  regularise  their  intercourse  in 
their  common  interest.  From  the  Phoenicians,  accord¬ 
ing  to  common  tradition,  the  Greeks  learned  letters, 
numbers,  a  rudimentary  banking  system,  and  the  art 
of  navigation  by  the  stars. 

By  1500  B.c.,  still  before  Agamemnon,  Phoenician 
traders  had  penetrated  beyond  the  Pillars  of  Herakles 
and  had  established  their  colonies  of  Gadeira  (Gades, 
or  Cadiz)  and  Tarshish  (Tartessus)  in  Spain.  It  is 
possible,  though  not  certain,  that  they  penetrated 
further  and  brought  tin  from  the  Cassiterides,  which 
some  have  identified  with  the  Scilly  Islands,  but  which 
others  think  are  the  islands  of  Morbihan  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Vilaine.  At  any  rate,  tin  was  an  essential  com¬ 
modity  in  the  Bronze  age,  and  the  only  known  deposits 
of  it  were  in  north-western  Europe.  It  may,  however, 
have  been  brought  by  land  to  Mediterranean  ports. 

These  Spanish  colonies  preceded  those  on  the 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  at  Lixos  and  Utica  in 
northern  Africa,  in  Sicily  and  the  other  islands,  and,  by 
very  many  centuries,  the  great  offshoot,  Carthage.  By 
the  time  that  Hiram,  the  friend  of  David  and  Solomon, 
sat  on  the  throne  of  Tyre,  the  Phoenician  States  had 
arrived  at  a  very  high  pitch  of  wealth  and  splendour. 
They  built  navies  on  the  shore  of  the  Red  Sea,  and  they 


26 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


traded  not  only  with  the  Greeks  and  the  peoples  of 
the  far  West.  Their  argosies  sought  the  wealth  of 
Punt  and  Ophir:  that  is  to  say,  of  Somaliland  and 
India.  If  Herodotus  may  be  believed — and  one  is 
inclined  to  give  credence  to  a  story  so  inconsistent 
with  the  ideas  of  geography  which  a  Greek  of  his 
time  would  have  held — they  anticipated  Bartholomew 
Diaz  by  two  thousand  years  and  more  by  sailing  round 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  returning  by  the  Pillars 
of  Herakles.  They  spent  two  years  on  the  voyage, 
going  ashore  in  the  autumn  to  sow  their  crops,  and 
putting  to  sea  again  when  the  harvest  was  reaped. 

The  magnificence  of  Tyre  in  her  days  of  highest 
glory  is  a  continually  recurring  theme  in  the  books 
of  the  Prophets.  The  Phoenicians  were  not  only  the 
“wagoners  of  the  world,”  as  were  the  Dutch  in  the 
seventeenth  century.  They  were  also  its  greatest 
manufacturers  and  its  leaders  in  art  as  well.  But 
their  sea  power  was  peaceful.  Not  that  the  Phoeni¬ 
cians  were  by  any  means  unwarlike.  They  had  sharp 
conflicts  with  the  Greek  colonists  of  the  Mediterranean 
shores  and  islands.  But  their  object  was  not  conquest, 
but  trade.  Sea  power  wins  empire  by  taking  the  line 
of  least  resistance.  It  does  not  seek  the  conquest  of 
nations  in  an  equal  state  of  development.  It  has 
often  been  harsh  in  its  dealings  with  inferior  races. 
But,  on  the  whole,  it  has  brought  benefits  to  these, 
and  its  empires  tend  to  endure  longer  than  those  of 
the  great  world-conquerors. 

When  the  Phoenician  cities  passed  under  the  con¬ 
trol  of  foreign  empires,  in  the  sixth  and  fifth  centuries 
B.C.,  they  became  a  potent  factor  in  the  struggle 
between  Europe  and  Asia.  They  were  the  carriers 
in  turn  of  the  armies  of  the  Persians  and  of  Alexander 


Map  of  the  Mediterranean  in  Ancient  Times 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  27 


the  Great.  What  they  accomplished  for  their  masters, 
and  what  they  refused  or  failed  to  accomplish,  are 
both  equally  significant. 

In  525  b.c.,  or  thereabouts,  ‘Cambyses  invaded 
Egypt,  defeated  Psammenitus  at  Pelusium,  and  added 
the  country  of  the  Pharaohs  to  his  empire.  In  this 
enterprise,  the  navy  of  Phoenicia  was  used  by  the 
conqueror,  and  Egypt  fell  as  she  had  never  fallen  be¬ 
neath  the  arms  of  the  Chaldeans,  even  when  divided 
against  herself  by  the  hated  Ethiopian  rule.  But 
when  Cambyses  wished  to  extend  his  conquests  further 
and  to  attack  Carthage,  the  Phoenicians  refused  their 
aid,  alleging  the  impiety  of  aiding  in  the  downfall  of 
their  own  offspring.  Cambyses  was  fain  to  make  the 
attempt  unaided  by  the  power  of  the  sea,  and  his  army 
perished  in  the  Libyan  desert.  It  is  very  striking 
that  the  Great  King,  lord  of  the  armies  which  had 
subdued  Chaldea,  and  himself  the  conqueror  of  Egypt, 
made  no  attempt  to  coerce  the  little  maritime  people 
which  defied  him.  He  was  not  prepared  to  undertake 
the  arduous  task  of  subduing  the  cities  by  force  of 
arms.  Besides,  he  required  the  help  of  their  navies 
for  other  enterprises.  So  the  Persian  Empire  did  not 
extend  beyond  the  western  border  of  Egypt,  and 
Carthage  survived  to  give  Hannibal  to  history  and  to 
engage  in  her  duel  with  the  power  of  Rome. 

The  meaning  of  what  happened  to  Cambyses  is 
illustrated  by  an  episode  in  the  career  of  Alexander  the 
Great,  which,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  shall  be  dealt 
with  here,  though  it  occurred  two  hundred  years  later. 
After  the  battle  of  Issus  (333  b.c.),  Darius  was  driven 
beyond  the  Euphrates,  and  Alexander  found  himself 
in  almost  undisputed  possession  of  Syria.  Sidon, 
Aradus,  and  Byblus  submitted  to  him;  but  Tyre  held 


28 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


out,  faithful  to  the  Persian  rule.  Alexander  wished  to 
conquer  Egypt,  in  order  that  he  might  have  a  free 
hand  to  follow  his  great  adversary  in  northern  Asia; 
but  he  dared  not  undertake  an  expedition  to  Egypt 
while  the  Persians,  through  the  power  of  the  Phoenician 
navy,  held  command  of  the  sea.  He  therefore  set 
himself  to  reduce  Tyre,  a  result  which  he  accomplished 
after  a  desperate  and  bloody  siege  of  seven  months. 
These  events  of  the  remote  past  are  highly  instructive 
as  to  the  workings  of  sea  power.  Cambyses,  aided  by 
the  Phoenicians  reduced  Egypt.  When  they  refused 
their  aid,  he  failed  to  carry  his  conquests  further  into 
Africa,  and  to  subdue  Carthage.  Alexander,  one  of 
the  greatest  strategists  of  the  world,  recognized  that 
the  attempt  to  conquer  Egypt  without  such  command 
of  the  sea  as  would  ensure  his  communications  was  a 
hopeless  task  in  the  then  condition  of  the  world.  Napo¬ 
leon  was  destined  to  learn  the  same  lesson  regarding 
an  attempt  to  invade  Asia  Minor  from  Egypt.  He 
marched  across  the  desert  and  over  the  plain  of  Pales¬ 
tine,  to  find  himself  held  up  at  Acre  (the  ancien  Akko) 
by  a  small  garrison  of  Turks  which  had  the  support 
of  a  squadron  under  Captain  Sydney  Smith.  He  could 
not  take  Acre;  he  dared  not  leave  it  on  his  flank  un¬ 
taken;  his  own  fleet  had  been  destroyed  by  Nelson 
at  the  battle  of  the  Nile  in  the  preceding  year.  So  the 
great  conqueror  killed  his  prisoners,  poisoned  his 
wounded,  and  returned  to  Egypt  a  baffled  man.  Mehe- 
met  Ali,  the  Egyptian,  was  similarly  held  up  at  Acre 
by  Sir  Edward  Codrington  and  his  fleet.  Sea  power 
along  the  Syrian  coast  has  always  been  the  key  to 
Egypt,  and  the  attempts  of  the  Turks  to  take  it  from 
us,  with  the  command  of  the  sea  in  our  hands,  have 
been  hopeless  from  the  first. 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  29 


The  sea  power  of  the  Greeks  differed  from  that  of 
Phoenicia  both  in  its  origin  and  in  its  workings.  It  was 
more  truly  military  in  its  nature.  The  Greeks  re¬ 
sembled  the  Phoenicians  in  that  they  were  divided 
into  a  number  of  quasi -independent  communities 
individually  weak  and  still  further  weakened  by  inter¬ 
nal  dissensions ;  difficult  to  unite,  save  under  the  most 
overpowering  sense  of  danger.  The  restless,  the 
insubordinate,  and  the  adventurous  found  the  place 
wherein  they  dwelt,  too  strait  for  them,  and  Greece, 
like  Phoenicia,  threw  off  numerous  swarms  from  the 
parent  hive  which  settled  on  the  coasts  and  islands 
of  the  Mediterranean,  in  Propontis  and  on  the  shores  of 
the  Euxine.  But  there  was  a  wide  difference  between 
the  Greek  colonies  and  the  Phoenician.  The  Greeks 
went  as  settlers  rather  than  as  traders,  seeking  fertile 
lands  to  till,  determined  to  settle  down  under  a  govern¬ 
ment  suited  to  their  own  minds.  Greece  had  no  in¬ 
dustries,  such  as  glass-making  and  dyeing;  in  those 
early  days,  no  products  for  sale  or  barter.  Phoenicia 
set  up  “factories,”  or  trading  establishments;  Greece, 
“plantations,”  or  agricultural  communities.  The 
Greek  colonies  were  seldom  a  support  to  their  parent 
States.  Moreover,  in  the  cases  of  the  former,  whether 
the  colony  was  planted  by  Tyre  or  Sidon,  the  settlers 
were  simply  Phoenician.  In  the  case  of  the  Greeks, 
they  remained  Athenian  or  Corinthian  or  Phocean; 
Ionian  or  Dorian.  They  exacerbated  the  differences, 
instead  of  supplying  a  cement  of  union. 

How  would  it  be  with  the  British  Empire  if  Canada 
had  been  settled  entirely  by  the  Scots,  Australia  by 
the  English,  and  New  Zealand  by  the  Irish?  Most 
probably  unity  would  have  suffered,  not  only  in  the 
over-sea  dominions,  but  also  at  home.  The  growth 


1 


30 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


of  separate  English,  Scottish,  and  Irish  communities 
across  the  seas  would  have  accentuated  the  racial 
differences  in  these  islands.  Certainly,  what  we  know 
of  the  strong  Nationalist  feeling  of  the  over-sea  Irish, 
even  when  mixed  with  settlers  of  English  and  Scottish 
descent,  does  not  tend  to  the  belief  that  the  Imperial 
tie  with  an  Irish  New  Zealand  would  be  a  strong  one. 
It  is  no  disparagement  of  the  gifted  Irish  race  to  say  so. 
Fortunately,  British  colonisation  was  not  widespread 
until  the  organic  union  of  the  greater  island,  at  any 
rate,  was  complete.  Among  the  Greek  States,  there 
never  was  any  organic  union  at  all. 

Greek  colonisation  began  in  the  seventh  century 
B.C.,  and  spread  both  east  and  west.  To  the  east, 
the  chief  settlements  were  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor 
and  Thrace,  on  the  shores  of  Propontis,  or  the  Sea  of 
Marmora,  in  the  islands  of  the  Aegean  and  even  on  the 
shores  of  the  Euxine.  To  the  west,  the  chief  settle¬ 
ments  were,  of  course,  those  in  the  Ionian  and  Tyrrhe¬ 
nian  seas,  on  the  coast  of  Italy  and  on  the  island  of 
Sicilv.  Greek  colonies  and  Phoenician  were  inter- 
mixed.  While  the  Phoenicians  held  Sardinia,  the 
Phoceans  were  in  possession  of  Corsica.  The  Greeks 
founded  a  colony  at  Tartessus,  in  Spain,  two  hundred 
years  after  the  settlement  of  the  Phoenicians  at  Gadeira. 
The  two  peoples  were  dove-tailed  in  with  one  another 
on  Sicily,  much  as  the  French  and  the  British  were  in 
India  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  Phoenicians 
held  Malta  and  Gozo ;  the  Greeks  Capri  and  the  Lipari 
islands.  Lastly,  in  the  sixth  century  b.c.,  the  Phoceans 
founded  the  colony  of  Massalia,  which  is  now  Mar¬ 
seilles.  On  the  northern  shore  of  Africa,  the  only  Greek 
settlement  was  in  Cyrenaica,  now  part  of  the  Italian 
possessions.  All  the  rest  was  held  by  the  Phoenicians. 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  31 


In  this  mosaic  of  civilisations  was  the  germ  of  in¬ 
evitable  trouble,  even  had  no  other  seafaring  races, 
such  as  the  Etruscans,  been  involved.  The  Greek 
colonies  along  the  coast  of  Italy,  the  Phoenician  in 
northern  Africa,  important  as  both  were  in  themselves, 
became  links  in  the  chain  of  communications  which 
joined  their  parent  States  with  the  possessions  in 
Spain,  or,  in  the  case  of  the  Phoceans,  with  Massalia. 
The  collision  came  in  the  sixth  century  B.C.,  when 
the  Phoenicians  of  northern  Africa,  joining  with  the 
Etruscans,  attacked  the  Phoceans  in  Corsica,  with 
the  result  that,  despite  a  victory  in  a  fleet  action, 
Massalia  was  isolated,  and  the  Phoenicians  possessed 
themselves  of  the  Greek  colony  of  Tartessus.  They 
had  Carthage  to  rely  on  as  a  base  of  sea  power,  nearer 
than  the  bases  of  the  Greeks.  Oversea  possessions 
must  always  be  a  source  of  anxiety  under  such  cir¬ 
cumstances.  Hence  the  nervousness  of  the  Austral¬ 
asian  Dominions  at  the  growing  sea  power  of  Japan. 

The  conflicts  between  the  Phoenicians  and  Greek 
colonists,  however,  were  but  preliminaries  to  the  great 
trial  of  strength  which  was  to  come  when  Darius  and 
Xerxes  attempted  to  make  the  land  conquer  the  sea. 
The  Persian  monarchs  were  able  to  overrun,  and  to 
join  into  one  great  Empire,  all  Asia  Minor,  Mesopo¬ 
tamia,  Syria,  and  Egypt.  In  doing  so,  they  were  helped 
to  no  inconsiderable  extent  by  Phoenician  sea  power. 
But,  so  far,  the  armies  of  Asia  had  met  with  no  opponent 
who  was  formidable  upon  the  water.  It  was  left  to 
Greece,  or  rather  to  parts  of  Greece,  weak,  selfish,  and 
divided  as  were  the  Hellenic  States,  to  pronounce  ‘  ‘  Thus 
far,  and  no  farther,”  on  the  schemes  of  the  first  aspir¬ 
ants  to  the  dominion  of  the  world.  That  has  been 
the  immemorial  and  the  noblest  function  of  sea  power. 


32 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


The  first  encounter  took  place  by  land.  The  Per¬ 
sians  sailed  across  the  Aegean  unchecked  by  the  Greeks, 
and  landed  on  the  east  coast  of  Attica.  The  Spartans, 
the  leading  military  people  among  the  Greeks,  were 
late  in  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the  Athenians  and 
Plateans,  who  gave  battle  on  the  plain  of  Marathon, 
between  the  mountains  and  the  sea,  where  the  Persian 
cavalry  had  not  room  to  act.  The  Persians  were  com¬ 
pletely  defeated  in  what  has  been  described  as  one  of 
the  decisive  battles  of  the  world.  They  took  to  their 
ships,  and,  sailing  round  Cape  Sunium  to  Phaleron, 
hoped  to  storm  Athens  before  the  Greek  army  could 
arrive  for  its  defence.  But  Miltiades  by  a  forced  march 
forestalled  them,  and  the  Persians  sailed  for  home. 

Ten  years  later,  Xerxes  renewed  the  attack  with  an 
immense  armament,  gathered  from  all  the  nations  of 
his  realm.  The  army  marched  by  way  of  Thrace, 
Macedonia,  and  Thessaly,  the  fleet  sailing  parallel 
with  it  along  the  coast,  as  the  fleet  of  Henry  V.  sailed 
parallel  to  the  army  marching  from  Harfleur  to  Calais, 
which  fought  at  Agincourt.  Mardonius,  Xerxes’ 
general,  was  met  with  and  withstood  for  a  time  by 
Leonidas  at  the  renowned  Pass  of  Thermopylae.  The 
Greek  and  Persian  fleets,  meantime,  lay  in  the  straits 
which  separate  the  island  of  Euboea  from  the  main¬ 
land,  the  Persians  having  the  advantage  of  position 
off  the  mainland  itself.  Two  indecisive  actions  were 
fought  here,  the  Greeks  bearing  themselves  well  against 
superior  numbers.  But  on  hearing  of  the  fall  of  Ther¬ 
mopylae,  Themistocles  resolved  to  retreat.  He  sailed 
round  Sunium  to  Salamis;  the  defence  of  Athens  was 
abandoned  and  the  city  stormed  and  taken  by  the 
Persians. 

So  far,  it  would  appear  that  Greece  was  more  effec- 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  33 


tually  defended  by  land  than  by  sea.  In  490  B.C.,  the 
Persians  had  command  of  the  sea,  but  Miltiades  beat 
them  by  land  at  Marathon,  and  forestalled  them  when 
they  attempted  an  attack  on  Athens.  Ten  years 
later,  owing  to  the  failure  of  the  Greek  resistance  on 
land,  Mardonius  advanced  over  the  terrain  where 
Artaphernes  had  been  successfully  withstood,  and 
sacked  Athens  itself.  Had  the  Persians  made  a  proper 
use  of  their  superiority  at  sea  on  the  former  occasion, 
however,  the  result  might  well  have  been  different. 
If  Artaphernes  had  made  use  of  a  portion  of  the  fleet 
to  threaten  the  coast  of  the  Peloponnesus,  he  would 
have  broken  up  the  Hellenic  confederacy,  and  he  could 
have  landed  his  army  at  some  spot  where  his  still 
overwhelming  superiority  in  numbers  would  have 
enabled  him  to  break  down  the  resistance  of  the 
Athenians.  But  the  Persians  did  not  understand  the 
use  of  sea  power.  All  the  same,  Marathon  has  no  title 
to  be  described  as  a  decisive  battle.  The  Persians  got 
away  practically  unscathed.  The  land  fight  was  a 
portent,  not  a  decision.  The  decisive  battle  was  to 
take  place  at  sea. 

When  Themistocles  arrived  at  Salamis,  the  separa¬ 
tist  tendencies  of  the  Hellenes  at  once  began  to  show 
themselves.  The  Peloponnesians,  under  the  leader¬ 
ship  of  Sparta,  gave  no  proper  assistance  to  the 
defence  of  Attica.  They  busied  themselves  with  build¬ 
ing  a  great  wall  across  the  Isthmus,  and  wished  to 
withdraw  their  ships  to  defend  its  flanks.  If  they 
showed  in  this  a  realisation  of  the  elementary  principle 
that  it  is  the  fleet  and  not  the  sea  which  defends,  they 
ignored  the  far  greater  maxim  of  naval  strategy,  that 
the  proper  objective  is  the  enemy’s  fleet.  Themis¬ 
tocles,  with  that  mother-wit  which  is  not  incompatible 


34 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


with  baseness  of  character,  anticipated  Drake  and 
Nelson  in  his  realisation  of  this.  The  Council,  over¬ 
borne  by  the  Spartans,  decided  on  retreat.  Themis- 
tocles  adopted  the  doubtful  expedient  of  sending 
word  to  the  enemy  of  this  decision.  Whether  he  was 
actually  in  treasonable  correspondence  with  Xerxes 
is  a  much-debated  point.  It  may  be  that,  like  Judas 
Iscariot,  he  was  a  traitor  with  the  firm  belief  that  his 
treason  would  bring  gain  to  himself  and  no  great  harm 
to  the  betrayed.  He  gained  his  purpose  and  brought 
on  a  battle,  in  which  the  Persians  were  signally  de¬ 
feated.  The  light,  well-handled  ships  of  the  Athe¬ 
nians  and  iEginetans  dashed  among  the  heavy  craft 
of  the  enemy,  jammed  together  in  a  too-narrow  space, 
broke  their  oars  and  left  them  helpless  upon  the  water. 
The  Greeks,  like  the  English  of  Elizabeth’s  time,  were 
sailors,  and  had  evolved  a  system  of  sea  warfare.  The 
Persians,  who  had  control  of  the  fleet,  though  it  was 
mainly  composed  of  Phoenician  and  Ionian  ships,  were 
landsmen  and  fought  as  soldiers  upon  the  water. 
Artemisia,  Queen  of  Halicarnassus,  who  was  fighting 
in  the  Persian  cause,  rammed  and  sank  an  Ionian 
trireme  which  stood  in  her  way  of  escape.  Xerxes, 
watching  from  the  “rocky  brow”  immortalised  by 
Byron,  imagined  the  vessel  sunk  to  be  an  enemy. 
“My  men  have  become  women,  my  women  men,” 
he  exclaimed,  and  loaded  the  indomitable  queen  with 
honours.  Herodotus  says  that  the  Greeks  lost  forty 
ships  and  the  Persians  two  hundred,  exclusive  of 
those  which  were  captured  with  all  their  crews.  A 
contingent  of  troops  which  had  been  landed  on  the 
island  of  Psyttalia  was  also  destroyed. 

The  sea  battle  of  Salamis  saved  Greece  and  Europe. 
Xerxes  became  nervous  about  his  communications,  fear- 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  35 


in g  that  the  Greeks  would  sail  up  the  Hellespont  and 
destroy  the  bridge  of  boats,  as,  indeed,  Themistocles 
was  anxious  to  do.  The  king  therefore  left  Mar- 
donius  with  three  hundred  thousand  men,  and  retired 
with  the  rest  of  his  army  and  the  remnant  of  his  fleet. 
Mardonius  was  defeated  and  slain  at  Platea,  and, 
on  the  same  day,  or  a  few  days  later,  the  Athenians 
won  another  great  naval  victory  at  Mycale,  which 
detached  the  greater  part  of  Ionia  from  the  Persian 
cause.  Thus  ended  the  attempt  of  Xerxes  to  add 
Europe  to  his  empire.  Of  the  Persian  fleet,  one-fourth 
was  Phoenician,  and  one-third  at  least  was  contributed 
by  the  Greek  colonies.  The  defection  of  the  latter 
shows  the  moral  effect  of  the  Athenian  victory. 

The  war  left  Athens — the  one  State  which  had 
grasped  the  meaning  and  function  of  sea  power — with 
the  hegemony  of  Hellas,  which  had  previously  belonged 
to  the  Spartans.  The  League  of  Delos,  which  com¬ 
prised  most  of  the  States  of  Central  Greece  outside 
the  Peloponnesus,  and  the  Ionian  States,  was  formed 
immediately  afterwards.  In  process  of  time,  the 
smaller  members  became  mere  tributaries  of  Athens, 
which  was  thus  able  to  build  up  a  centralised  and 
homogeneous  sea  power.  The  mutterings  of  the  storm 
which  was  to  burst  in  the  Peloponnesian  war  hardly 
disturbed  the  glories  of  the  era  of  Pericles.  It  would 
be  too  long  a  matter  to  follow  in  detail  the  events  of 
that  protracted  struggle  in  which  Hellas,  having  saved 
Europe,  did  her  best  to  destroy  herself.  One  fact 
stands  out  pre-eminent:  that  Athens,  surrounded  as 
she  was  on  land  by  forces  greatly  superior  to  her  own, 
ill-supported  by  jealous  allies  and  tributaries  whom 
her  domineering  conduct  had  alienated  from  her, 
was  yet  able  to  sustain  the  unequal  contest,  and  even 


36 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


to  emerge  the  victor  in  the  first  period  which  ended 
with  the  peace  of  Nicias.  She  owed  her  escape  from 
destruction  entirely  to  her  sea  power.  She  lost  battles 
even  by  sea;  the  hoplites  of  Sparta  ravaged  the  lands 
of  Attica;  her  people  fell  by  thousands  before  the 
plague.  But  she  surrounded  the  Peloponnesus  with 
her  fleet  and  naval  stations,  and  the  Spartan  armies 
fought  with  their  heads  ever  turned  over  their  shoul¬ 
ders,  never  daring  to  be  long  away  from  their  own  soil. 
She  cut  off  her  foes  from  the  granaries  of  Syracuse. 
She  suppressed  the  revolts  in  Mitylene  and  elsewhere 
with  a  high  hand,  preventing  the  succour  which  Sparta 
would  have  sent  from  reaching  the  rebels.  Her  fleets 
forbade  co-operation  between  the  Spartans  and  their 
allies  in  the  north,  and  at  the  time  of  her  deepest 
distress  she  was  able,  by  her  superiority  at  sea,  to  hold 
on  tenaciously  to  the  blockade  of  Potidea  and  to  com¬ 
pel  the  surrender  of  that  stubborn  town.  It  is  interest¬ 
ing  to  note  the  great  name  of  Sophocles  among  those 
who  had  the  best  grip  of  the  vital  importance  of  sea 
power  to  Athens. 

In  the  second  phase  of  the  war,  the  conditions  com¬ 
pletely  altered.  The  baneful  influence  of  Alcibiades 
dragged  the  Athenians  into  a  war  of  aggression,  for 
which  sea  power  is  ill-suited,  and  distant  adventure. 
With  the  Spartan  at  their  gates,  they  were  compelled 
to  use  their  fleets  excentrically,  and  they  underwent, 
in  consequence,  the  disasters  of  Syracuse  and  ^Egos- 
potami.  After  the  ruin  which  fell  upon  their  sea  power 
in  consequence  of  the  latter  defeat,  Athens  itself  was 
taken,  and  the  Athenians,  having  lost  command  of 
the  sea,  had  no  means  of  repairing  the  disaster  as  pre¬ 
viously  they  had  done  by  the  victory  of  Salamis.  The 
strategy  which  led  to  .Egospotami,  fought  just  above 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  37 


the  Narrows  of  the  Dardanelles,  was  correct  enough. 
Alcibiades  and  Conon  followed  the  main  force  of  the 
enemy  to  bring  it  to  battle.  They  were  defeated,  not 
because  their  plan  was  bad,  but  because  its  execution 
was  grossly  faulty,  owing  to  carelessness.  The  disaster 
might  still  have  been  repaired,  for  Conon  escaped 
from  the  battle  with  his  squadron  “in  being.”  The 
position  was  not  much  worse  than  that  of  Britain 
after  Torrington’s  defeat  off  Beachy  Head  in  1690, 
when  the  army  of  James  II.  in  Ireland  represented  the 
threat  to  Athens  of  the  land  power  of  Sparta.  But 
James  was  defeated  at  the  battle  of  the  Boyne  twelve 
days  later,  while  the  army  of  Sparta  remained  intact, 
and  the  Athenians  had  lost  the  power  to  harry  the 
coast  of  the  Peloponnesus.  So  they  were  subjected 
to  the  humiliation  of  digging  down  the  Long  Walls 
which  connected  Athens  and  the  Piraeus  at  the  behest 
of  their  enemies. 

The  walls  were  destined,  however,  to  be  rebuilt  by 
Conon,  who,  with  the  assistance  of  Evagoras,  the  so- 
called  “tyrant”  of  Cyprus  and  Pharnabazus,  the 
Persian  satrap,  won  a  great  victory  at  sea  over  the 
Spartans  at  Cnidus,  with  a  mixed  fleet  of  Athenians 
and  Phoenicians.  Henceforward,  the  history  of  Greece, 
to  the  foundation  of  the  Empire  of  Alexander  the  Great, 
is  one  long  struggle  of  contending  States,  in  turn  sup¬ 
ported  by  the  Persian  power,  for  the  mastery  of  Hellas. 
Of  all  these  it  may  be  said  that  the  State  which  had 
command  of  the  sea  was  master.  Inevitably;  for, 
by  command  of  the  sea  alone  could  the  Persian  aid 
be  enjoyed. 

In  the  meantime,  the  power  of  Carthage  and  of 
Rome  was  ripening  in  the  Western  Mediterranean  for 
their  decisive  struggle.  The  common  estimation  that 


38 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Carthage  was  a  great  sea  power  is  somewhat  unaccount¬ 
able.  It  is  true  that  the  Carthaginians  have  consider¬ 
able  maritime  achievements  to  their  credit.  They 
spread  colonies  over  northern  Africa,  and  they  overran 
Spain  to  the  Ebro.  They  certainly  sailed  to  the  North 
and  had  trading  relations  with  Britain,  perhaps  also 
with  Scandinavia.  But  the  analogy,  of  which  the 
Germans  are  particularly  fond,  which  compares  Car¬ 
thage  with  Britain,  is  superficial.  The  Carthaginians, 
of  the  era  of  the  Punic  Wars,  had  ceased  to  be  a  maritime 
nation.  They  deserved  that  title  only  so  long  as  they 
maintained  their  connection  with  the  mother  States 
of  Phoenicia,  and  these  had  by  now  been  absorbed  into 
the  Alexandrine  Empire.  It  was  said  of  the  Cartha¬ 
ginians — and  it  was  meant  as  a  compliment — that 
“they  chose  to  live  in  Libya  and  not  in  Phoenicia.” 
That  is,  they  cut  themselves  off  from  the  maritime  con¬ 
federation  of  their  race,  as  the  United  States  cut  them¬ 
selves  off  from  ours.  They  fitted  out  great  fleets,  and 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Punic  Wars,  before  the  Romans 
had  developed  their  navy,  they  won  several  battles. 
But  that  they  should  have  been  worsted  on  what  was 
supposed  to  be  their  own  element  by  a  people  which 
had  to  copy  a  wrecked  trireme  as  a  model  for  their 
ships  and  taught  their  sailors  to  row  on  dry  land, 
proves  that  they  had  not  the  real  “sea-sense.”  The 
pure-blooded  Carthaginian  of  this  period,  enervated 
by  riches  and  the  command  of  mercenary  armies  of 
this  race,  had  ceased  to  learn  war.  In  this  Carthage 
differed  utterly  from  Venice,  where,  to  the  very  end 
of  her  period  of  power,  the  commercial  nobility  took 
their  own  part  in  the  fighting  by  land  and  sea.  Only 
a  few  of  the  great  Carthaginian  houses,  notably  the 
Barca  family,  gave  personal  service  in  the  wars.  Their 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  39 


hired  or  impressed  Libyans,  Numidians,  Spaniards, 
when  led  by  a  Hannibal  or  a  Hasdrubal,  could  be 
formidable  enough  as  soldiers,  as  the  Romans  learned. 
But  sea  power  rests  securely  only  on  the  character 
and  sea  sense  of  the  race  which  is  dominant  in  the 
State,  and  on  the  personal  service  of  its  sons.  Great 
Britain  has  this  indispensable  qualification;  Carthage 
had  not.  The  German  analogy,  built  on  the  German 
view  that  all  volunteers  are  ‘  ‘  mercenaries,  ’  ’  is  therefore 
unsound.  Great  Britain  is  no  more  comparable  to 
Carthage  than  is  modern  Germany  to  republican 
Rome. 

The  course  of  events  had  been  such  that,  when  Rome 
and  Carthage  came  into  conflict,  there  was  no  great 
sea  power  any  longer  existing.  Alexander,  for  his 
own  ends,  had  broken  the  strength  of  Tyre,  and  the 
tradition  of  the  Macedonian  Empire,  as  represented 
by  Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  was  not  naval.  His  alliance 
with  the  Carthaginians  brought  them  no  effective  aid. 
Hellas,  in  the  thrall  of  the  Macedonians,  had  ceased 
to  count.  In  the  country  of  the  blind,  therefore,  the 
one-eyed  was  king,  and  the  one-eyed  proved  to  be 
Rome.  Mahan  has  made  the  naval  lessons  of  the 
Punic  Wars  the  starting-point  of  his  most  famous 
work,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History.  He 
points  out  that,  although  many  people  have  held, 
because  there  was  cross-raiding,  and  the  Carthaginians 
occasionally  won  a  battle  at  sea  and  sent  supplies  and 
reinforcements  to  Hannibal,  that  the  command  of  the 
sea  remained  in  doubt,  this  opinion  is  erroneous.  No 
navy,  however  superior,  can  reckon  on  being  able 
entirely  to  prevent  occasional  incursions  by  its  enemy. 
The  crucial  fact  which  shows  the  supremacy  of  Rome 
is  this:  that  the  Carthaginians  elected  to  use  the  long 


40 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


and  perilous  land  route  into  Italy  by  Spain  and  the 
Alps  instead  of  the  direct  sea  route,  making  use  of  their 
Sicilian  bases,  and  that  Scipio,  grasping  the  supreme 
importance  of  maritime  communications,  struck  un¬ 
hindered,  at  the  Carthaginian  base  in  Spain  by  means 
of  an  oversea  expedition.  Hannibal,  one  of  the  three 
superlative  military  geniuses  of  the  world’s  history, 
lost  two-thirds  of  his  army  on  its  march  to  Italy,  and 
his  brother,  Hasdrubal,  made  the  toilsome  journey 
only  to  be  cut  to  pieces  at  the  Metaurus,  owing  to  the 
disorganisation  and  exhaustion  of  his  troops.  It  is 
impossible  to  believe  that  Hannibal  did  not  grasp  the 
advantage  of  the  shorter  line  of  communications,  and 
would  not  have  used  it  if  he  could  have  done  so  with 
safety.  The  campaign  of  Zama,  like  that  of  Waterloo, 
clinched  a  business  which  had  been  already  settled  by 
sea  power. 

The  ruin  of  Carthage  was  quickly  followed  by  the 
Roman  conquest  of  Hellas,  and  that,  in  turn,  by  the 
overthrow  of  the  Ptolemies.  Rome  was  mistress  of 
the  Mediterranean  and  its  shores.  The  dominion  of 
the  world  was  yet  to  be  settled  by  sea  power,  but  in  a 
fight  between  Roman  and  Roman.  Octavianus  beat 
Anthony  at  Actium,  almost  on  the  scene  of  Lepanto 
and  Navarino,  and  but  a  short  distance  from  Salamis, 
the  region  where  contests  between  East  and  West  are 
fated  to  be  settled.  Thus  the  Empire  of  the  Caesars 
came  into  being.  But  the  Romans  can  hardly  be 
counted  among  the  races  which  have  been  great  at  sea. 
They  depended  rather  upon  the  subjects  over  whom 
their  land  power  gave  them  dominion,  the  Liburnians, 
Illyrians,  and  so  forth,  than  upon  themselves.  The 
ponderous  galleys  of  the  regular  Roman  fleet  were 
simply  platforms  from  which  soldiers  were  to  fight,  as 


SEA  POWER  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD  41 


were,  much  later,  the  galleys  of  the  Venetians,  the 
ships  of  the  Armada,  and,  indeed,  the  vessels  of  all 
the  navies  designed  primarily  for  service  in  the  closed 
waters  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  Romans  met  the 
Carthaginians  when  the  latter  had  forgotten  the 
habit  of  the  sea  and  were  morally  and  politically  de¬ 
generate.  That  was  the  determining  factor,  and  not 
any  special  aptitude  for  sea- warfare  on  either  side. 
The  methods  which  gave  them  victory  were  merely 
extensions  of  the  method  of  land  warfare  to  the  water. 
They  could  not  have  prevailed  against  a  foe  of  real 
maritime  instinct. 


CHAPTER  III 


“a  place  where  two  seas  meet” 

Despite  what  has  been  written  above,  as  to  the 
decadence  of  Carthaginian  sea  power  at  the  time  of  the 
Punic  Wars,  it  has  to  be  recorded  that  this  people 
made  a  notable  contribution  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
world  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  (Ecumene,  if  their 
early  and  scanty  records  are  to  be  believed.  We  are 
the  more  bound  to  notice  this  because  it  is  from  a 
Carthaginian  source  that  we  obtain  our  first  knowledge 
of  Britain.  Accounts  have  come  down  to  us  through 
Pliny  and  the  late  Roman  writer  Rufus  Festus  Avienus, 
of  two  expeditions  which  the  Carthaginians  sent  into 
the  Atlantic  about  the  year  500  B.c.  The  one,  under 
a  leader  bearing  the  common  Punic  name  of  Hanno, 
sailed  south;  the  other,  under  Himilco,  turned  north¬ 
wards.  Hanno’s  expedition  coasted  along  the  east 
of  Africa,  and  reached  the  mouth  of  the  Senegal,  or 
of  the  Gaboon.  They  saw  many  wonders  on  their 
way,  including  mountains  and  rivers  which  streamed 
with  fire;  and  they  reached  an  island  “full  of  savage 
people,  the  greater  part  of  whom  were  women,  whose 
bodies  were  hairy,  and  whom  our  interpreters  called 
Gorillae.”  “Though  we  pursued  the  men,”  the  story 
continues,  “we  could  not  seize  any  of  them;  but  all 

fled  from  us,  escaping  over  the  precipices  and  defend- 

42 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET”  43 


ing  themselves  with  stones.  Three  women  were,  how¬ 
ever,  taken;  but  they  attacked  their  conductors  with 
their  teeth  and  hands  and  could  not  be  prevailed 
upon  to  accompany  us.  Having  killed  them,  we  flayed 
them,  and  brought  their  skins  with  us  to  Carthage.” 
One  is  less  surprised  at  the  reluctance  of  the  hairy 
ladies  than  at  the  abrupt  methods  of  their  captors. 

Himilco  sailed  northwards,  as  has  been  said,  and 
reached  a  promontory  which  he  called  (Estrymnis, 
near  the  tin-bearing  isles  known  as  the  Cassiterides. 
(Estrymnis  was  two  days’  sail  from  the  Holy  Island, 
identified  with  Ierne,  or  Ireland,  “near  which  is  the 
large  island  of  Albion.”  If  this  be  really  the  genuine 
account  of  Himilco  and  not  a  late  gloss  of  Avienus,  as 
the  name  Albion  leads  one  to  suspect,  we  have  the 
earliest  certain  mention  of  our  islands.  Estrymnis 
may  be  Point  St.  Matthieu,  in  Ushant,  or  it  may  be 
Le  Croisic.  But  the  mention  of  Ierne  as  being  two 
days’  sail,  and  of  the  large  island  of  Albion  lying  “near 
it,”  is  strange.  For,  if  Estrymnis  be  Ushant,  Cornwall, 
and  not  Ireland,  would  be  the  nearest  landfall  after 
the  Scillies,  if  we  take  the  latter  to  be  the  Cassiterides. 
But  Himilco ’s  mention  of  our  islands  is  probably 
from  hearsay.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  Carthaginian 
explorer  trusted  himself  to  the  open  sea.  If  he  visited 
Albion,  it  would  probably  have  been  after  coasting 
along  the  northern  shore  of  France  and  reaching  the 
Straits  of  Dover.  Himilco,  however,  seems  to  have 
seen  the  coracles  of  the  British  and  Irish,  who,  no 
doubt,  came  over — hardy  fellows! — to  northern  France 
to  trade,  as  they  did  five  hundred  years  later  in  Julius 
Caesar’s  time.  It  was  probably  from  them  that  he 
heard  of  the  islands  lying  to  the  northwards,  and 
formed  an  extremely  hazy  idea  of  their  geographical 


44 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


position.  It  is  rather  strange  that  either  Himilco  or 
his  supposed  informants  should  have  known  that 
Albion  and  Ierne  were  islands,  and  it  must  be  confessed 
that  it  looks  as  if  the  more  recently  acquired  knowledge 
of  Pliny  and  Avienus  has  been  interwoven  with  the 
Carthaginian’s  tale.  Be  this  as  it  may,  we  are,  per¬ 
haps,  entitled  to  conclude  that  the  Britons,  penitus 
toto  divisos  orbe,  came  into  contact  with  the  civilisation 
of  the  Mediterranean  as  early  as  500  B.c. 

Himilco  says  that  the  sea  through  which  he  sailed 
to  reach  (Estrymnis  was  sluggish,  with  the  winds  so 
light  that  they  would  scarce  drive  the  ship;  that  it 
was  full  of  weed,  which  held  the  vessel  back,  and  shal¬ 
low  withal,  so  that  the  water  sometimes  barely  covered 
the  land.  Nevertheless,  it  abounded  in  sea  monsters. 
Some  people  have  conjectured,  from  the  mention  of 
the  weed,  that  Himilco  reached  the  Sargasso  Sea. 
But  the  rest  of  the  description,  and  especially  the 
shallowness  of  the  water,  forbid  this  interpretation. 
It  must  be  remembered  that,  coming  from  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean,  he  was  unacquainted  with  the  phenomena  of 
the  tides.  His  voyage  was  a  coasting  voyage,  and, 
therefore,  at  low  water,  he  would  be  liable  to  find 
himself  aground,  or  almost  aground,  in  the  shallow 
seas  off  the  western  coast  of  France.  The  sea  monsters 
were,  no  doubt,  the  whales  of  the  Bay  of  Biscay. 

With  Himilco,  the  period  of  Phoenician  exploration 
closes,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  goes.  The  next 
explorer  is  a  much  more  important  person,  namely 
Pytheas  of  Massalia,  a  Phocean,  who  undertook  one 
or  more  voyages  to  the  North  between  330  and  325 
B.c.  This  was  just  before  the  defeat  of  the  Greeks 
by  the  Phoenicians  off  Corsica  gave  the  latter  control 
of  the  communications  between  southern  France  and 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET”  45 


Spain.  Pytheas  was  an  astronomer  of  some  repute, 
and  seems  to  have  been  the  first  who  had  the  idea  of 
dividing  the  world  into  degrees  of  latitude.  He  left 
an  account  of  his  adventures  which,  though  doubted 
by  writers  like  Polybius  and  Strabo,  is  much  better 
authenticated  than  that  of  Himilco.  He  added  no 
little  to  the  store  of  geographical  knowledge.  But 
the  first  interesting  point  about  his  voyage  is  that  he 
appears  first  to  have  established  intercourse  with  the 
Northmen,  through  Britain. 

He  sailed  round  Cape  St.  Vincent  and  up  the  coast 
of  Iberia  and  Gaul.  He  circumnavigated  Britain, 
and  gives  a  measurement  of  the  circumference  of  the 
island  which,  unfortunately,  is  just  twice  too  great. 
He  discovered  the  Orkney  Islands  and  passed  thence  to 
a  land  still  further  to  the  north,  which  is  identified 
with  the  Thule  of  the  Romans.  Here  he  saw  the  mid¬ 
night  sun,  and  came  upon  the  fringe  of  the  arctic  ice 
in  what  he  speaks  of  as  ‘‘a  sluggish  and  congealed 
sea”  {mare  pigrum  et  concretum).  He  calls  Britain 
Brettanice ,  which  seems  to  confirm  the  opinion  that 
he  had  first-hand  dealings  with  the  inhabitants. 

Thule  is  generally  identified  with  Iceland;  but,  for 
many  reasons,  it  is  practically  certain  that  Iceland  was 
not  the  country  which  Pytheas  reached.  It  is  more 
plausibly  identified  with  Norway.  He  places  it  “six 
days’  sail  north  of  Brettanice.”  The  Phoceans,  like 
the  Phoenicians,  were  coastwise  sailors,  and  it  is  very 
unlikely  that  Pytheas  would  have  launched  out  into 
the  unknown  where,  according  to  the  geographical 
ideas  of  his  time,  there  was  no  land,  unless  he  had  some 
positive  evidence  that  land  existed.  It  is  therefore 
concluded  that,  even  at  this  remote  date,  there  was 
communication  between  the  Scandinavian  countries 


46 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


and  Britain.  If  this  be  so,  there  was  already  a  race 
of  seafaring  men  in  the  North  who  used  the  sea  at  least 
as  boldly  as  the  Phoenicians  and  the  Greeks.  More 
boldly,  in  fact,  for  the  voyage  across  the  open  and 
stormy  waters  of  the  North  Sea  was  more  perilous 
than  a  coasting  voyage  along  the  shores  of  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean.  It  may  be  asked  how  it  came  about,  if  this 
were  so,  that  the  subjugation  of  the  Britons  by  the 
northern  tribes  did  not  take  place  many  centuries 
sooner  than  it  did;  for  our  woad-painted  forerunners 
could  hardly  have  resisted  the  invaders  in  their  coracles. 
The  only  reply  which  can  be  given  is  that,  so  far  as 
we  can  gather  from  the  accounts  which  have  reached 
us  of  the  writings  of  Pytheas  (it  must  be  remembered 
that  his  book,  On  the  Ocean ,  is  not  extant),  those 
northern  peoples  had  already  reached  the  agricultural 
stage  of  development.  They  were  not  yet  pressed 
by  the  more  powerful  tribes  from  the  East,  and  they 
perhaps  found  little  to  tempt  them  in  forest-covered 
Britain,  especially  as  its  inhabitants  were  not  yet 
enervated  by  Roman  rule  and  protection.  The  pur¬ 
pose  for  which  the  Northmen  came  can  only  be  con¬ 
jectured.  But,  as  there  was  trade  between  the  Britons 
and  the  inhabitants  of  north-western  France,  it  is 
possible  that  the  amber  of  the  Baltic  actually  found 
its  way  to  the  Mediterranean  through  Britain,  which 
was  thus  already  an  entrepot. 

If  we  accept  the  evidence,  such  as  it  is — and  it 
cannot  be  given  in  detail  here — for  early  intercourse 
between  Britain  and  the  North,  it  was  in  these  islands 
that  the  sea  power  of  the  North  and  the  Mediterranean 
first  met,  in  peace,  not  in  war,  engaged  in  exploration 
and  in  trade.  It  was  for  Britain  that  they  were  de¬ 
stined  to  contend,  and  it  was  to  Britain  that  the  sea 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET ”  47 


power  of  both  was  eventually  to  pass.  The  facts  of 
geography  decided  the  matter.  When  once  the  race 
fit  to  wield  sea  power  was  established  and  the  incentive 
to  adventure  was  present,  the  supremacy  of  Great 
Britain  at  sea  was  a  natural  growth,  and  not  an  artifi¬ 
cial  development  fostered  by  policy.  But,  in  the  era 
of  Pytheas,  the  Viking  age  was  yet  a  thousand  years 
distant,  and  the  eagles  had  not  yet  flown  over  Britain. 

The  Romans,  by  nature  and  tradition,  were  an 
agricultural  and  military,  not  a  trading  and  maritime, 
people.  Their  legions  conquered  the  races  round  them 
by  their  incomparable  soldierly  spirit  and  discipline. 
The  provinces  so  acquired  were  held  by  garrisons  to 
whom  grants  of  land  were  given,  and  who  settled 
down  and  intermarried  with  the  subject  peoples.  Our 
Allies,  the  Rumanians,  for  instance,  boast  themselves 
descended  from  the  coloni  of  Trajan.  When,  therefore, 
Rome  became  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean ;  when  the 
engineering  skill  of  the  Romans  had  opened  up  the 
highways  of  Europe,  it  is  the  coracles  of  Britain  and 
the  ships  of  Frisia  which  bring  the  tin  and  amber  to 
the  markets  of  the  Continent,  not  the  galleys  of  the 
Greeks  and  Phoenicians  which  fetch  it  thence,  as  afore¬ 
time.  Rome  is  only  in  appearance  an  exception  to  the 
rule  that  the  peoples  which  have  need  of  the  neces¬ 
saries  of  life  send  and  fetch  them.  It  is  true  that,  in 
the  time  of  the  Caesars,  the  city  was  fed  by  corn  from 
Egypt,  brought  in  ships  of  Adramyttium.  But  these 
all  owned  the  sovereignty  of  Rome.  They  represented 
the  seafaring  portions  of  her  Empire.  In  the  North 
the  rule  worked.  Long  sea  trade,  by  way  of  the  Atlan¬ 
tic,  almost  ceased  from  the  beginning  of  the  Roman 
dominion,  and  was  never  really  revived  till  the  dis¬ 
covery  of  the  New  World. 


48 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Small  claim  as  the  Romans  had  to  be  considered 
a  great  maritime  people,  our  naval  history  opens  with 
a  defeat  at  their  hands.  Julius  Caesar,  in  his  victorious 
march  through  Gaul,  in  the  first  century  b.c.,  reached 
the  western  coast,  and  there  came  into  contact  with 
the  Veneti,  a  seafaring  tribe  which  dwelt  about  the 
mouth  of  the  Loire.  Caesar  ordered  that  a  fleet  should 
be  built  on  the  river,  and,  when  it  was  completed, 
marched  his  soldiers  on  board  and  attacked  the  Veneti 
off  the  rocky  coast,  which,  many  hundreds  of  years 
later,  was  to  be  the  scene  of  Hawke’s  great  victory  of 
Quiberon  Bay.  At  this  time,  as  for  many  centuries 
later,  the  Mediterranean  peoples  relied  on  oars  as  the 
prime  means  of  propulsion;  the  Northerners  rather 
upon  sails.  The  former  remained  soldiers  on  ship¬ 
board;  the  latter  were  destined  to  evolve  a  system  of 
real  naval  war.  In  this  action,  however,  fought  in  the 
narrow  waters  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  their  reliance 
on  sails  was  the  bane  of  the  Veneti.  They  had  two 
hundred  and  twenty  ships,  of  which  a  proportion  were 
British,  probably  small  trading  ships  which  happened 
to  be  in  the  river,  as  was  their  wont,  on  “their  lawful 
occasions.”  The  following  is  Caesar’s  own  account 
of  the  first  recorded  sea  battle  in  which  Britons  took  ■ 
part.  He  says: 

About  two  hundred  and  twenty  of  the  ships  of  the 
Veneti,  fully  equipped  and  appointed  with  every  kind  of 
naval  implement,  sailed  forth  from  the  harbour  and  drew 
up  opposite  ours;  nor  did  it  appear  clear  to  Brutus  who 
commanded  the  fleet,  nor  to  the  tribunes  of  the  soldiers 
and  the  centurions  to  whom  the  several  ships  were  assigned, 
what  to  do,  or  what  system  of  tactics  to  adopt;  for  they 
knew  that  damage  could  not  be  done  by  their  beaks;  and 
that  though  turrets  were  built  on  their  decks,  yet  the  height 


Statue  of  Alfred  the  Great  at  Winchester,  England 


' 


4  . 


'  ' 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET"  49 


of  the  stems  of  the  barbarian  ships  exceeded  these,  so  that 
the  weapons  could  not  be  cast  up  from  our  lower  posi¬ 
tions  with  sufficient  effect,  and  those  cast  by  the  Gauls 
fell  more  forcibly  upon  us.  One  thing  provided  by  our 
men  was  of  great  service:  namely,  sharp  hooks  inserted 
into  and  fastened  upon  poles.  When  the  ropes  which 
fastened  the  sail-yards  were  caught  by  them  and  pulled, 
and  our  vessels  vigorously  impelled  by  the  oars,  the  ropes 
were  severed,  and  the  yards  necessarily  fell  down,  so  that, 
as  all  the  hope  of  the  Gallic  vessels  depended  upon  their 
sails  and  rigging,  the  entire  management  of  the  ships 
was  taken  from  them  at  the  same  time. 

Eventually,  the  Veneti  turned  to  fly — such  of  them, 
presumably,  as  retained  their  sails  intact — but  the 
wind  suddenly  dropped  and  a  flat  calm  prevailed,  in 
which  the  Romans  annihilated  their  enemy.  The 
battle  is  an  instructive  contrast  to  that  which  was 
fought  when  “Hawke  came  swooping  from  the  West,” 
taking  “the  foe  for  pilot  and  the  cannon-glare  for  light.” 
If  such  conditions  had  prevailed,  Caesar  would  have 
got  “the  father  and  mother  of  a  batin’.”  He  won 
by  means  of  a  landsman’s  device,  comparable  with  the 
use  of  the  “corvi,”  or  spiked  gangplanks  which  enabled 
the  Romans  to  swarm  on  board  the  Carthaginian  ships. 
Hawke,  on  the  other  hand,  dashed  in  from  seaward 
and  annihilated  the  foe  among  the  rocks.  The  stormy 
wind  and  tempest,  dreaded  by  soldiers  on  shipboard, 
are  ever  the  allies  of  the  true  seaman.  Therefore, 

“Thank  him  who  isled  us  here  and  roughly  set 
His  Briton  in  blown  seas  and  storming  showers.” 

Marching  eastwards  again,  Caesar  looked  across  the 
Channel  to  the  white  cliffs  of  Dover,  whence  comes  the 


50 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


name  of  Albion.  In  55  B.C.,  Gaul  was  sufficiently 
settled  for  him  to  lead  his  legionaries  across  the  Strait. 
The  Britons  gathered  in  such  numbers  to  resist  him 
that  the  attempt  to  land  at  Dover  was  abandoned, 
and  the  transports  sailed  on  to  Deal,  where  the  Roman 
eagles  for  the  first  time  were  borne  on  British  soil. 
If  the  Veneti  and  their  British  allies  had  won  in  Quibe- 
ron  Bay,  Caesar  might  never  have  crossed  to  Britain. 
But  the  silver  streak  of  stormy  water  was  no  protec¬ 
tion  in  itself.  Rather  the  contrary.  Had  the  cliffs 
of  Dover  guarded  a  Pass  of  Thermopylae,  Caesar  might 
not  have  been  able  to  turn  the  flank  of  the  British 
defence.  As  it  was,  it  was  easier  for  him  to  sail  to 
Deal  than  it  was  for  the  defenders  to  transfer  their 
army  thither  by  land.  He  was  ashore  before  their 
levies  could  come  up  with  his  forces.  “Far  distant, 
storm-beaten  ships”  are  a  defence,  whether  they  lie 
off  Brest,  off  Toulon,  or  at  Scapa  Flow;  stormy  water 
without  the  ships,  is  none.  A  second  landing  was 
made  the  next  year,  but  affairs  recalled  Caesar  to  the 
East,  and  the  conquest  of  Britain  was  left  to  Claudius, 
a  hundred  years  later.  The  Roman  occupation  of 
Britain  lasted  three  hundred  years.  Rome  reached 
her  zenith  and  fell  into  decay  during  that  period.  But 
Roman  Britain  never  learned  that  her  future  lay  upon 
the  water.  The  Norsemen  were  passing  from  Norway 
and  Denmark  to  Iceland,  and  then  to  Greenland,  and, 
eventually,  to  “Wineland  the  Good,”  inden tiffed  with 
Labrador.  The  mysterious  “Eruli,”  the  pirate  tribe 
whose  name  is,  perhaps,  a  Latinised  form  of  Jarl,  or 
Earl,  were  sailing  south  and  east,  even  as  far  as  Lucca. 
The  Viking  age,  with  all  its  consequences,  was  begin¬ 
ning;  but  the  Britons  were  content  to  be  defended  by 
the  legions  of  their  Roman  masters.  The  latter  built 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET”  51 


the  great  Wall  of  Hadrian,  to  keep  out  the  Piets,  and 
they  appointed  a  Count  of  the  Saxon  Shore,  to  keep 
out  the  Northmen.  But  as,  generally  speaking,  they 
gave  him  no  fleet  to  assist  him  in  his  task,  the  poor 
gentleman  must  have  had  a  sorry  time  of  it.  Perhaps, 
however,  they  were  wise  in  their  generation,  for,  when 
they  set  a  thief  to  catch  a  thief,  by  appointing  a  noted 
pirate,  one  Carausius,  Count  of  the  Saxon  Shore,  he 
incontinently  entered  into  a  compact  with  the  pirates 
he  was  set  to  catch,  shared  their  gains  with  them,  and 
used  the  money  to  invest  himself  with  the  Imperial 
purple.  He  sacked  Boulogne,  and  played  havoc  with 
the  Roman  communications  with  Britain  before  he 
was  finally  suppressed. 

The  disciplined  legionaries  of  the  Romans  sufficed 
to  protect  Britain  from  serious  invasion,  so  long  as  they 
remained.  But  when  the  number  was  far  greater  than 
Rome  could  spare  with  the  Visigoth  thundering  at  the 
gates  of  the  city,  the  legions  were  withdrawn,  and  the 
Britons,  spoon-fed  and  un warlike,  left  to  their  fate. 
The  Northmen  attacked  the  flanks  of  the  Wall  from 
east  and  west;  the  Piets  broke  through  and  marched 
almost  to  London;  the  Britons  were  fain  to  call  in 
the  Saxons  and  other  marauders  along  their  coasts  to 
defend  them.  They  came;  they  chased  the  Painted 
People  home  again — and  they  stayed.  Hengist  landed 
at  Ebbsfleet  in  449  A.D.,  and  for  the  next  hundred  and 
fifty  years  there  was  a  continual  influx  of  Saxons, 
Jutes,  and  Angles.  The  latter  people  migrated  in  a 
body  from  their  homes  in  Frisia  and  Schleswig,  driven 
out  by  the  pressure  of  still  stronger  and  fiercer  races 
behind  them.  All  Britain  east  of  Seven  Sea  and  south 
of  the  Forth  became  Saxon,  Jute,  or  English,  eventually 
to  be  unified  under  Egbert.  It  seems  difficult  to  ac- 


52 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


count  for  the  fact  that  these  sea-wolves,  as  we  have 
been  taught  to  consider  them,  had  no  sooner  settled 
in  the  conquered  land  than  they  drew  up  their  long 
keels  on  the  beach  and  forgot  the  habit  of  the  sea. 
It  is,  however,  the  case,  certainly  so  far  as  the  Angles 
are  concerned,  that  they  came  as  settlers,  not  as  rovers, 
while  the  other  tribes,  no  doubt,  found  Britain  a  pleas¬ 
anter,  more  sunny,  and  more  fertile  land  than  their 
own,  and  were  glad  to  put  what  they  regarded  as  the 
barrier  of  the  sea  between  themselves  and  the  warrior 
peoples  which  were  pressing  upon  them  from  the  East. 
They  brought  their  own  social  customs  and  political 
system  with  them ;  they  were  used  to  the  life  of  a  com¬ 
munity.  They  were  not  Vikings  like  the  Norse  and 
the  Danes.  They  hoped  to  be  able  to  pursue  their 
peaceful  occupations  of  husbandry  and  herdsmanship 
in  the  new  land  which  they  had  made  theirs.  Only 
Offa  of  Mercia  seems  to  have  maintained  a  navy,  prior 
to  the  days  of  Alfred. 

If  such  were  the  hope  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  it  was 
writ  in  water.  Already,  before  the  end  of  the  reign  of 
Egbert,  the  Danes  had  harried  the  coast,  landing  not 
only  in  East  Anglia,  but  even  at  the  mouth  of  the  Dart, 
and,  finally,  in  Cornwall,  where  they  were  joined  by 
the  revolted  Britons.  Egbert  gained  a  decisive  victory 
at  Hengist’s  Down  in  836  a.d.  But  the  Danes  came 
in  ever-increasing  numbers  during  the  next  three  reigns, 
and,  though  often  defeated,  made  East  Anglia  a  Dan¬ 
ish  kingdom,  and  penetrated  into  Wessex  as  far  as 
Reading.  The  history  of  the  Danish  incursions  shows 
us  how  hopeless  is  the  defence  of  an  island  without  a 
navy  superior  to  all  possible  assailants.  The  invaders 
attacked  at  all  points,  from  Bamborough  in  Northum¬ 
bria  to  Cornwall,  and  the  task  of  marching  and  counter- 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET  ”  53 


marching  an  army  to  resist  them  wherever  they  might 
land  was  a  hopeless  one.  This  was  realised  by  one 
alone  of  our  Saxon  kings,  the  great  Alfred,  who  began 
his  glorious  reign  in  871  A.D.  He  has  been  called 
“The  father  of  the  British  Navy,”  and,  so  far  as  the 
realisation  of  the  meaning  and  function  of  sea  power 
is  concerned,  he  has  considerable  title  to  the  honour. 
Five  years  after  his  accession,  he  built  a  small  flotilla 
of  ships  and  fell  upon  the  Danes  on  the  coast  of  Dorset, 
routing  a  squadron  of  seven  ships  and  taking  one.  The 
effect  of  this  victory  on  a  small  scale  was  as  remarkable 
as  that  of  Salamis  on  a  large.  The  Danes  became 
nervous  about  their  communications  and  swore  a 
peace  with  Alfred — which  they  immediately  and 
treacherously  broke.  Both  fleets  were  reinforced,  and 
the  Danes,  landing  at  the  mouth  of  the  Exe,  laid  siege 
to  Exeter.  They,  in  their  turn,  were  blockaded  by 
Alfred’s  fleet  in  the  river.  A  formidable  Danish  fleet 
sailed  from  the  mouth  of  the  Thames  to  raise  the  block¬ 
ade;  but  a  storm  scattered  the  ships  and  destroyed 
half  of  them.  The  rest  were  met  by  Alfred’s  fleet  and 
utterly  defeated.  Guthrum,  meanwhile,  had  taken 
Exeter,  and  Alfred  had  invested  him  there.  Hearing 
of  the  destruction  of  his  fleet,  the  Danish  king  capitu¬ 
lated,  and  marched  out  of  Wessex  into  Mercia.  Since 
the  Danes  had  been  allowed  to  settle  in  large  numbers, 
however,  the  war  continued  by  land,  terminating  in 
Alfred’s  great  victory  at  Ethandune,  and  the  Treaty 
of  Wedmore,  which  established  the  Danelagh  and 
brought  Guthrum  to  Christianity. 

The  races  with  which  we  are  now  dealing,  however, 
were  not  traders  or  agriculturists.  They  had  no  idea, 
as  the  Phoenicians  had,  of  making  the  sea  the  great 
pathway  for  commerce.  They  were  out  for  plunder. 


54 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


The  sea  was,  for  them,  a  broad  line  of  military  com¬ 
munications  by  which  one  swarm  succeeded  another. 
No  treaty  which  Guthrum  could  make  could  keep 
new-comers  from  pouring  in  and  overrunning  the 
boundaries  which  had  been  allotted  to  the  Danelagh, 
though  these  were  ample  enough,  the  Danelagh, 
extending  well  into  the  Midland  shires  and  having 
for  its  western  limit  a  chain  of  forts  built  at  Derby, 
Leicester,  Nottingham,  and  Stamford 

Seven  years  later  came  the  invasion  of  Hasting, 
which  overran  the  greater  part  of  the  country,  and  was 
at  last  scotched,  though  not  killed,  by  the  ingenious 
device  of  Alfred,  who  dug  channels  from  the  Lea,  in 
which  Hasting’s  fleet  was  lying,  to  the  Thames,  and 
so  lowered  the  level  of  the  water  that  the  ships,  left 
high  and  dry,  were  captured  by  the  rejoicing  London¬ 
ers,  and  were,  doubtless,  used  in  the  ensuing  years 
in  the  encounters  which  took  place  with  Northumbrian 
pirates  and  the  lawless  Danes  of  the  Danelagh.  Alfred 
died  in  901  a.d.  In  the  concluding  years  of  his  reign 
the  land  had  peace,  and  this  was  entirely  due  to  his 
grasp  of  the  essential  condition  on  which  the  defence 
of  his  realm  was  founded.  The  Danes  settled  ashore 
became  helpless  when  cut  off  from  succour  by  the  way 
of  the  sea.  The  peace  lasted  for  nearly  eighty  years 
after  Alfred’s  death,  thanks  in  part  to  Athelstan’s 
great  victory  of  Brunanburh.  But  his  successors 
forgot  the  lesson  of  his  reign,  and  allowed  the  sea  power 
of  the  country  to  decline.  Now  came  Sweyn  and  Olaf 
of  Norway,  and  to  the  Danelagh  was  added  the  de¬ 
grading  burden  of  the  Danegeld,  or  tribute  paid  to 
the  marauders.  Ethelred  the  Unready  did,  indeed, 
bufld  a  great  fleet  of  eight  hundred  vessels,  after  he 
had  aroused  the  mortal  anger  of  Sweyn  by  the  mas- 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET ”  55 


sacre  of  the  Danes  on  St.  Brice’s  Day.  But  it  was 
destroyed  by  internal  dissensions  among  its  leaders. 
Sweyn  subdued  the  country,  and  England  had  Danish 
kings  for  twenty-six  years. 

It  was  not  only  into  Britain  that  the  Northmen 
poured.  About  the  time  that  Alfred  made  his  treaty 
with  Guthrum,  Rolf  Ganger  and  his  men  established 
themselves  in  the  north  of  France,  in  what,  thence¬ 
forward,  became  the  Duchy  of  Normandy.  The  Franks, 
like  the  Saxons,  were  unable  to  meet  them  at  sea  for 
want  of  a  navy,  and  found  it  impossible  to  drive  them 
from  the  land  when  they  had  the  way  of  the  sea  open 
behind  them.  So  Charles  the  Simple  made  over  the 
Duchy  of  Normandy  to  Rolf  Ganger,  to  hold  as  a  fief 
of  the  Frankish  Crown. 

Rolf,  or  Rollo,  had  taken  part  in  the  piratical  forays 
which  sailed  up  the  Seine  and  sacked  Paris  in  the  reign 
of  Charles  the  Fat.  But  the  invasion  which  resulted 
in  the  settlement  of  the  Norsemen  in  Normandy  was 
no  mere  piratical  raid.  A  whole  population  had 
migrated  from  Norway  under  the  leadership  of  Rolf, 
to  escape  loss  of  liberty,  when  the  whole  of  the  North¬ 
land  was  united  under  the  rule  of  Harold  Harfagar, 
the  Dane.  The  Norse,  in  particular,  could  not  brook 
this  incursion  into  their  tribal  freedom,  and,  in  this 
exodus  of  Rolf  Ganger  and  his  followers,  we  have  an¬ 
other  instance  of  one  of  the  prime  motives  which  lead 
to  sea  power:  the  claim  of  men  of  independent  spirit 
to  live  their  own  lives.  Probably  Rolf’s  following  con¬ 
tained  Danes  as  well  as  Norsemen,  as  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Danelagh  contained  Norsemen  as  well  as  Danes. 
The  names  were  somewhat  indiscriminately  used. 
But,  in  contradistinction  to  their  compeers,  the  Nor¬ 
mans  remained  warriors  and  seamen.  It  is  said  that 


56 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


they  introduced  into  Brittany  the  Norse  method  of 
catching  whales  with  the  harpoon,  and  thus  set  up  a 
lucrative  trade  on  the  Biscayan  coast.  Their  sea 
power  took  them  to  the  Mediterranean,  where  they 
founded  the  kingdom  of  Sicily,  and  were  for  centuries 
a  thorn  in  the  flesh  of  Venice,  and  the  stoutest  of 
Crusaders. 

The  influence  of  the  Norman  power  on  the  history 
of  the  West  can  hardly  be  over-estimated.  For  the 
conquest  of  England  by  the  Normans  and  the  mastery 
of  the  Channel  demanded  by  the  necessity  to  main¬ 
tain  communications  between  the  kingdom  and  the 
duchy  led  to  a  realisation  of  the  function  of  sea  power, 
and  to  the  welding  of  all  the  elements  of  the  English 
nation.  If  the  claim  of  the  Angevin  kings  to  the  crown 
of  France  gave  rise  to  centuries  of  warfare  between  the 
French  and  the  English,  the  fact  that  the  Norman 
families  were  for  so  long  the  leaders  of  political  and 
social  life  in  this  country  is  the  main  reason  why 
Teutonic  Kultur  has  not  altogether  prevailed  with  us, 
and  why  we  are  not,  at  this  moment,  members  of  a 
Germanic  confederation  for  the  enslavement  of  the 
world,  instead  of  being  ranged  with  the  peoples  which 
are  fighting  for  its  liberties.  No  wonder  the  Germans 
furiously  rage  together  at  seeing  their  “cousins”  the 
backbone  of  the  opposition  to  their  ambitions. 

On  the  other  hand,  supposing  the  Romans  had 
understood  the  meaning  and  functions  of  sea  power, 
and  the  Romano-British,  after  the  withdrawal  of  the 
legions,  had  been  able  to  keep  their  island  free  from 
the  assaults  of  the  Barbarians,  there  would  have  grown 
up  in  these  islands  a  Celto-Latin  race  which  would 
naturally  have  linked  itself  with  Gaul,  and,  thrown 
like  a  barrier  across  the  path  of  the  northern  nations, 


“A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET”  57 


would  certainly  have  barred  the  way  of  discovery  and 
expansion  to  the  west.  The  contrast  between  Latin 
America  (so-called)  and  Anglo-Saxon  America,  with 
all  the  limitations  which  must  be  made  in  the  use  of 
such  terms,  will  serve  to  indicate  what  the  result  might 
have  been  on  the  history  of  the  world. 

Britain  is  fashioned  by  nature  to  be  the  seaman’s 
prize,  and  only  in  the  hands  of  a  race  inured  to  the 
habit  of  the  sea  could  she  have  taken  any  considerable 
part  in  the  world’s  affairs.  Had  the  invasion  of  Sax¬ 
ons,  Angles,  and  Jutes  been  postponed  until  there  had 
risen  a  great  and  highly  organised  kingdom  in  the 
North,  she  would  have  been  the  mere  annexe  of  that 
kingdom.  Had  the  Norman  Conquest  not  been 
achieved  until  the  realm  of  the  Capets  was  unified, 
an  event  which  would  have  happened  much  earlier, 
save  for  the  fact  that  the  dukes  of  Normandy  were 
kings  of  England,  she  would  have  been  an  annexe  of 
France.  We  have  reason,  then,  to  be  thankful  for 
the  slowness  of  vision  which  prevented  our  Saxon 
kings  from  recognising  that  sea  power  was  the  back¬ 
bone  of  their  strength.  Had  they  done  so,  one  or  more 
of  the  valuable  elements  which  make  up  our  nation 
would  have  been  wanting. 

Britain  is,  indeed,  the  “place  where  two  seas  meet.” 
The  early  civilisation  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
rude  barbarian  of  the  North  found  in  her,  the  one  its 
latest,  the  other  its  earliest  goal.  We  have  seen  how 
the  floods  of  Romans,  Saxons,  Angles,  Jutes,  Danes, 
and  Normans  poured  in  upon  her.  When  the  ingre¬ 
dients  of  the  English  people  were  ready  for  the  mixing, 
the  flood  was  stayed  by  the  rise  of  sea  power.  When 
mixed,  they  came  forth,  a  peculiar  people,  to  fulfil 
their  mission  in  the  world,  with  an  audacity,  tenacity, 


58 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


flexibility,  and  adaptiveness  which  are  not  found  in  the 
same  degree  elsewhere.  We  English,  of  course,  have 
the  defects  of  our  qualities.  The  Continent  sneers 
at  our  “  insularity,  ”  as  if  an  island  people  could,  or 
ought,  to  avoid  being  “insular.”  But  his  insularity 
does  not  prevent  the  Englishman  from  being  first 
without  a  second  in  the  art  of  handling  the  less  ad¬ 
vanced  races  of  mankind  over  which  it  is  his  destiny 
to  rule.  Whatever  he  may  be  at  home,  in  the  dark 
places  of  the  earth  he  is,  if  insular,  not  narrow-minded, 
but  tolerant,  inflexibly  just,  with  a  happy  way  of  fitting 
the  means  to  the  end.  Moreover,  when  the  ingre¬ 
dients  which  make  the  English  people  were  mixed, 
there  was  added  to  them  the  gifted  Celtic  races  which 
fringe  the  land,  in  a  union  which,  we  trust,  will  soon 
be  rendered  complete  by  the  true  reconciliation  of 
Ireland. 

Of  what  elements  is  an  Englishman  really  made? 
The  descendants  of  the  Britons,  we  know,  survive 
among  us  in  the  inhabitants  of  Wales  and  Cornwall. 
Danish  blood  there  unquestionably  is  in  the  men  of 
the  East  Coast  and  almost  throughout  Lincolnshire. 
In  all  probability,  our  great  Nelson  was  of  Danish 
descent.  It  used  to  be  held  for  gospel,  however,  that 
the  two  ingredients  of  the  English  nation  which  so 
entirely  swamped  all  others  as  to  make  them  negligible 
were  the  Anglo-Saxon  masses  and  the  Norman  aristo¬ 
cracy.  The  idea  that  any  strain  of  the  old  Roman 
blood  remained  was  laughed  at.  That  opinion  is  no 
longer  dogmatically  held,  nor  is  it  likely  to  be  correct. 
The  Roman  legions  were  here  for  three  hundred  and 
fifty  years.  They  were  not  changed  every  ten  or  fifteen 
years,  as  are  our  regiments  in  India.  One  legion  at 
least  remained  in  Britain  for  over  two  hundred  years. 


11 A  PLACE  WHERE  TWO  SEAS  MEET  ”  59 


The  legionaries  were  not  all  of  Roman  race,  it  is  true. 
Many  were  Iberians  and  Gauls,  Dacians,  and  other 
subject  races  of  Rome.  But,  at  any  rate,  there  was  a 
large  element  which  settled  permanently  in  the  land 
and  took  wives  of  the  daughters  of  the  people.  When 
the  Saxons  came,  they  plundered  and  massacred  as 
the  Romans  never  did.  But,  in  the  beginning,  at 
any  rate,  they  were  warriors  who  came  without  their 
women,  and  they  stayed  and  settled.  The  complete 
subjugation  of  the  country  was  a  long  business,  spread 
over  a  hundred  and  fifty  years.  In  that  time  there 
must  have  been  intermarriage.  That  the  idea  was 
familiar  to  both  the  Romano-Britons  and  the  Saxons 
is  shown  by  the  story  of  the  marriage  of  Vortigern 
to  the  daughter  of  Hengist.  Moreover,  the  persistence 
of  Roman  place-names  in  a  Saxonised  form  seems  to 
show  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  were  neither 
entirely  exterminated  nor  driven  out.  Chester,  Leices¬ 
ter,  Lancaster  survive  and,  in  other  cases,  the  present 
names,  while  of  Latin  derivation,  differ  from  those 
by  which  the  cities  were  known  in  Roman  times. 
Camalodunum  became  Colchester  at  some  period; 
Venta  Belgarum,  Winchester;  Calleva  Atrebatum,  Sil- 
chester.  These  bear  the  appearance  of  folk-names, 
bestowed  by  a  Latinised  people.  But  the  question  is, 
How  did  the  names  survive  at  all,  if  those  who  gave 
them  were  exterminated? 

Then  there  is  the  survival  of  old  tradition,  and  the 
glorification  of  British  heroes.  At  Silchester  there 
lingers  to  this  day  the  legend  of  a  certain  giant,  whom 
the  country  folk  call  Onion.  He  threw  a  great  stone 
a  mile  from  the  city,  and  there  it  stands  unto  this  day. 
It  is  called  the  Imp-stone,  from  the  letters  I.M.P. 
inscribed  upon  it,  doubtless  the  first  syllable  of  Im- 


6o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


perator.  But  the  interesting  point  is  that,  when  the 
exploration  of  Silchester  was  systematically  undertaken, 
an  inscription  was  found  which  proved  “Onion”  to 
have  been  a  historical  personage.  He  was  an  ancient 
British  king  or  chieftain.  In  accordance  with  the 
usual  growth  of  myth,  he  has  become  a  giant.  But 
who  made  him  a  giant?  The  Saxons  would  not  have 
extolled  his  prowess.  There  must  have  been  a  surviv¬ 
ing  population  by  whom  the  story,  growing  into  legend, 
was  passed  down.  There  is  no  question  here  of  the 
story  having  been  carried  to  the  hills  of  Scotland  and 
Wales  and  there  cherished  among  an  undoubtedly 
British  population,  as  the  legend  of  Arthur  may  have 
been.  It  grew  and  survives  on  the  spot  among  the 
country  folk.  It  may  be  claimed,  surely,  that  there 
is  evidence  here  that  the  Romano-British  survived  in 
parts  of  the  country  other  than  Wales  £nd  Cornwall. 

The  events  and  the  elements  which  have  contributed 
to  the  making  of  the  nation  which  has  wielded  sea 
power  as  no  other  nation  has  in  history;  which  has 
made  of  it  a  tempered  and  a  balanced  weapon  with 
which  to  carry  out  its  destiny,  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  germane  to  the  study  of  sea  power.  We  are  the 
heirs  of  all  our  past.  If  we  owe  our  turbulent  love  of 
liberty  and  adventure  to  the  Saxons  and  the  Danes, 
our  stubbornness  of  purpose  to  the  Normans,  may  it 
not  be  that  the  inflexible  love  of  law  and  justice  and 
the  practical  aptitude  which  drives  the  road  and  bridges 
the  ford  descend  to  us  from  that  great  people  who  were 
the  first  conquerors  of  Britain,  and  left  these  same 
marks  as  their  most  enduring  monument  in  the  world? 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 

We  now  reach  the  point  at  which  the  last  of  the 
essential  elements  which  went  to  the  making  of  the 
English  nation  was  added  to  it;  at  which  strong  cen¬ 
tral  government  was  substituted  for  the  chaos  of  Saxon 
times,  tempered  in  turn  by  the  gradual  growth  of 
civil  and  political  liberties  which  were  won  by  struggles 
oft-repeated  between  king,  Church,  baronage,  and 
people.  These  forces  were  grouped  in  different  ways, 
from  time  to  time,  but  were  gradually  welded  and 
fused  by  the  fires  of  strife  behind  the  closed  door  which 
was  guarded  by  sea  power.  It  was  but  slowly  that 
the  meaning  of  that  vital  bulwark  began  to  dominate 
the  minds  of  monarchs  and  statesmen;  still  more 
slowly  those  of  the  people.  But  the  days  of  tribal 
incursions  are  henceforward  at  an  end.  Progress  in 
freedom  coincided  with  development  of  maritime 
greatness.  The  two  things  are  inseparable  in  the 
British  conception  of  the  State. 

Homer,  we  are  told,  sometimes  nods.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  our  great  Shakespeare  should  occa¬ 
sionally  follow  his  example.  The  noble  rhapsody  of 
John  of  Gaunt  in  Richard  II.  was  written  a  very  few 
years  after  the  defeat  of  *  the  Armada.  When  Shake¬ 
speare  wrote  of 

6l 


62 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


“This  precious  stone  set  in  a  silver  sea, 
Which  serves  it  in  the  office  of  a  wall, 
Or  as  a  moat  defensive  to  a  house, 
Against  the  envy  of  less  happier  lands,” 


he  must  have  had  the  great  deliverance  in  his  mind. 
He  speaks  of  England  “bound  in  with  the  triumphant 
sea”;  but  there  is  not  the  faintest  allusion  to  the  men 
and  ships  which  secured  her  safety.  Of  course  Shake¬ 
speare  was  not  writing  a  naval  treatise.  But  the 
description  of  the  sea  as  “a  moat  defensive  to  a  house” 
is  a  very  bad  comparison  save  on  the  supposition  that 
the  enemy  has  no  ships  in  which  to  cross  it.  The  bold, 
bad  baron  who  attacked  his  neighbour’s  moated  keep 
did  not,  as  a  rule,  drag  a  flotilla  with  him,  and  an  at¬ 
tempt  to  swim  the  moat  in  casque  and  hauberk  would 
naturally  lead  to  a  visit  to  the  freshwater  equivalent 
of  Davy  Jones’s  locker.  With  drawbridge  up  and  port¬ 
cullis  down,  the  besieged  could  sleep  as  soundly  in  his 
bed  as  did  Sir  Robert  de  Shurland  when  his  stronghold 
was  attacked  by  the  Posse  Comitatus  of  Kent,  though 
counter-attack  eventually  became  necessary  in  that 
historic  instance. 

But  the  aggressor  from  over-sea  is,  ex  hypothesis 
provided  with  a  fleet.  Being  able  to  move  in  secret, 
he  can  choose  his  point  of  attack.  The  total  defending 
force  may  be  ten  or  twenty  times  that  of  the  invaders, 
but  it  cannot  watch  the  whole  coast  at  one  and  the 
same  time  and  hope  to  be  able  to  concentrate  in  suffi¬ 
cient  force  at  the  point  where  the  attempt  at  landing 
is  to  be  actually  made.  We  saw  this  when  Julius 
Caesar,  finding  a  great  concentration  of  Britons  to 
oppose  his  landing  at  Dover,  moved  his  point  of 
attack  to  Deal,  and  got  ashore  there  before  the  de- 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


63 


fenders  could  bring  up  their  forces.  No  frontier  is  so 
unsafe  as  a  sea  frontier,  unless  the  defender  is  in  supe¬ 
rior  strength  at  sea,  for  almost  all  land  frontiers  have 
natural  or  artificial  strong  places  which  can  be  held 
with  a  minimum  of  force,  while  the  invader  is  tied  to 
the  roads  or  railroads  for  his  line  of  advance.  To  prove 
this,  it  is  only  necessary  to  look  at  the  war  map  of 
to-day,  and  to  consider  the  effect  of  the  Carpathians, 
the  Alps,  the  Pripet  Marshes,  the  inundations  of  the 
Yser,  the  Wilderness  of  Sin,  and  the  floods  of  the 
Tigris,  alternating  with  the  drought  of  Mesopotamia. 
So  many  lines  of  advance  are  closed  by  natural  obsta¬ 
cles  that  the  defenders  can  foresee  the  points  of  attack 
and  concentrate  their  forces  accordingly.  But  the  sea 
has  no  natural  obstacles.  It  is  a  broad,  level  highway, 
and  the  army  which  can  use  the  sea  unopposed  is  free 
from  the  great  bane  of  all  armies  moving  by  land: 
that  they  have  to  defend  and  maintain  long  trains  of 
transport.  Even  when  it  is  placed  on  shore,  an  army 
carried  by  sea  can  often  shorten  its  lines  of  communi¬ 
cation  by  judicious  co-operation  with  the  fleet. 

But  a  defending  navy  does  not  best  fulfil  its  function 
by  hugging  the  shore  and  waiting  to  be  attacked.  That 
is  a  fallacy  which  has  persisted  since  Salamis.  It 
has  given  rise  to  such  monstrosities  as  coast-defence 
ships,  on  which  we,  like  other  nations,  have  wasted 
millions.  Coast-defence  ships  are  merely  the  Martello 
tower  idea,  transferred  from  the  land  to  the  water. 
Drake  pleaded  in  vain  for  leave  to  “ impeach”  the 
Spaniards  off  their  own  ports.  Nelson  laid  down 
the  golden  rule  that  “our  first  line  of  defence  is  close 
to  the  enemy’s  coast.”  But  the  delusion  is  not  yet 
dead.  It  cropped  up  after  the  German  bombardment 
of  East  Coast  towns. 


64 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


A  third  delusion  is  that  defence  can  be  secured  with 
an  inferior  navy.  That,  in  some  mysterious  way,  a 
“fleet  in  being”  which  is  not  strong  enough  to  fight 
will  keep  the  enemy  away  from  the  shore.  Under 
certain  geographical  conditions,  it  is  true  that  an  in¬ 
ferior  navy  may  exercise  considerable  influence.  It 
would  be  foolish,  for  instance,  to  ignore  the  influence 
which  the  German  fleet  has  exercised.  The  short 
coast-line  of  Germany,  and  the  possession  of  a  back 
door  at  Kiel,  together  with  the  difficulty  of  forcing  an 
entrance  into  the  Baltic,  make  the  position  of  our  chief 
enemy  to  resemble  rather  a  land-position  than  the 
broad  and  accessible  path  of  the  sea.  The  “wet 
triangle”  and  the  narrow  passages  of  the  Sound  and 
the  Belts  are  comparable  to  river  estuaries.  The 
value  of  the  German  fleet  rests  upon  the  possibility 
that,  under  conceivable  circumstances,  it  might  obtain 
a  local  and  temporary  superiority  in  one  sea  or  the 
other.  Moreover,  in  estimating  superiority  or  in¬ 
feriority,  it  is  unsafe  to  reckon  numbers  only.  The 
question  cannot  be  determined  until  it  has  been  put 
to  the  test  of  war.  Efficiency,  the  habit  of  the  sea, 
superior  resources,  may  make  up  for  lack  of  numbers. 
The  Japanese  were  inferior  to  the  Russians  in  1904, 
by  the  book.  Yet  the  Russian  squadron  in  Port  Arthur 
was  powerless  to  prevent  them  from  landing  both  in 
Korea  and  the  Shan-tung  Peninsula.  But  such  modi¬ 
fications  as  have  been  here  noted  do  not  affect  the 
general  principle.  If  a  nation  elects,  or  is  compelled, 
to  place  its  faith  in  sea  power  for  its  defence,  then  it 
must  see  to  it  that  its  navy  remains  indisputably 
supreme  in  all  respects  to  any  possible  assailant  or 
probable  combination  of  enemies. 

If  Harold,  the  son  of  Godwin,  had  grasped  these 


James  Watt  Hogue  Edinburgh  Ajax  D.  of  Wellington  Blenheim  Magicenne 

Basilisk  Caesar  Colossus 

The  Baltic  Fleet  Leaving  Spithead 

From  a  drawing  by  E.  Weedon,  in  the  Illustrated  London  News,  1855 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


65 


points,  the  last  great  invasion  of  this  country,  nearly 
nine  hundred  years  ago,  might  never  have  taken  place. 
He  had  a  fleet,  and,  at  other  times,  made  good  use  of  it. 
For  instance,  he  beat  back  the  first  attempt  of  his  re¬ 
bellious  brother,  Tostig,  on  the  sea.  But  when  the 
crisis  came  in  1066,  his  fleet  kept  its  ports,  thinking, 
perhaps,  to  defend  England  off  her  own  shores,  instead 
of  “impeaching”  the  Norman  Duke  off  his.  Nor  was 
any  attempt  made  to  meet  the  armada  of  Harald 
Hardrada  and  Tostig  by  sea.  It  is  likely  enough  that 
the  Saxon  fleet  was  not  strong  enough  to  fulfil  the 
double  task.  But  it  was  employed  on  neither.  The 
army  was  made  the  first  line  of  defence.  Harold 
marched  north  to  give  battle  to  Harald  Hardrada  and 
Tostig,  apparently  in  the  hope  that  William  would 
remain  weather-bound  until  his  return.  He  accom¬ 
plished  his  immediate  purpose  at  the  battle  of  Stam¬ 
ford  Bridge,  where  both  the  invaders  were  slain.  But 
ere  he  could  reach  London  again  the  Normans  were 
ashore  in  Sussex.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Harold’s 
fleet  was  not  a  royal  navy.  The  ships  were  furnished 
by  London  and  what  were  afterwards  known  as  the 
Cinque  Ports.  Their  owners  were  not  required  to  give 
continuous  service,  but  only  for  a  certain  number  of 
days  in  the  year.  Very  possibly,  these  had  expired 
before  William  got  a  fair  wind  which  brought  him  to 
Pevensey  and  the  field  of  Senlac. 

Being  now  both  King  of  England  and  Duke  of  Nor¬ 
mandy,  William  learned  of  necessity  something  of 
the  function  of  sea  power.  The  rebellion  of  his  son, 
Robert  Curt-hose,  and  other  disturbances  in  his  Duchy 
alternated  with  outbreaks  both  of  the  Saxons  and  of 
his  own  barons  in  England.  The  constant  passage  of 
large  bodies  of  men  between  the  two  countries  became 


s 


66 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


an  imperative  necessity,  and  so  continued  during  the 
reigns  of  all  the  Norman  and  Angevin  kings.  Sea 
power,  at  first  a  matter  of  transport  only,  now  became 
a  serious  preoccupation  to  the  rulers  of  England.  The 
use  of  the  sea,  however,  was  not  all  on  one  side.  There 
was  much  cross-raiding.  Sometimes  an  English  army 
was  conveyed  to  France ;  sometimes  a  French  army  was 
landed  in  this  country.  But  gradually,  as  the 
true  English  nation  was  formed  and  became  conscious 
of  itself,  it  tended  to  realise  that  its  own  shores  might 
be  rendered  inviolate  by  predominance  at  sea.  The 
Anglo-Normans  began  to  regard  the  Channel  as  their 
highway  and  the  opposite  coast  as  their  frontier. 

The  centre  of  power  soon  shifted  from  Normandy 
to  England.  It  was  on  the  island,  not  on  the  conti¬ 
nent,  that  the  descendants  of  William  the  Conqueror 
consolidated  their  strength  for  the  great  struggle  with 
their  Frankish  suzerains.  And  thus  they  made  a 
nation.  An  English  party  arose,  led  by  the  Norman 
barons  themselves.  Stephen  Langton,  the  Church¬ 
man,  and  Simon  de  Montfort,  the  Frenchman,  stood 
boldly  for  the  rights  of  Englishmen  against  intrigues 
to  make  of  England  a  province  of  Rome  or  a  satrapy 
of  France.  The  greatest  of  our  early  English  kings 
had  to  meet  the  opposition  of  his  feudal  vassals  when  he 
wished  to  use  English  power  to  further  his  designs  on 
France  without  the  consent  of  Englishmen.  It  has 
never  been  the  right  of  the  Kings  of  England,  said 
Bigod,  Earl  of  Norfolk,  to  force  their  vassals  to  serve 
in  Flanders.  “By  God,  Sir  Earl,”  exclaimed  the  King, 
with  a  profane  pun,  “you  shall  either  go  or  hang!” 
“By  God,  Sir  King,”  replied  the  Earl,  “I  will  neither 
go  nor  hang!”  And  he  neither  went  nor  was  hanged. 
Eventually  the  kings  themselves  came  to  rely  on  the 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


67 


English  bowmen  rather  than  upon  the  Norman  chivalry 
for  their  armies,  for  the  latter  had  kindred  whom  they 
would  not  harm  and  estates  on  which  they  feared  re¬ 
prisals,  among  the  king’s  enemies.  It  was  the  cloth- 
yard  shafts  of  the  English  which  gave  victory  to  Edward 
III.  and  Henry  V.  The  English  kings,  no  longer  dukes 
of  Normandy,  thanks  to  the  merciful  incompetence  of 
John  Lackland,  yet  held  a  bridgehead  at  Calais.  The 
long  struggle  was  fought  out  upon  the  soil  of  France, 
while  the  English  nation  consolidated  itself  behind  the 
fleets  and  the  armies.  In  the  end,  fortunately  for 
our  future,  the  hopeless  attempt  to  subdue  the  French 
nation  failed.  All  France  was  lost  save  Calais,  and 
then  Calais  itself.  But  England  was  ready  for  her 
mission  in  the  world.  She  was  ready  to  expand, 
first  into  Great  Britain,  then  into  the  British  Empire. 

But  as  yet  her  sea  power  was  insecurely  based.  In 
Norman  and  Plantagenet  times,  the  sailor  was  scarcely 
more  than  a  ferryman.  His  function  was  to  carry 
armies,  though  his  came  to  involve  the  corollary  that 
he  should  prevent  the  carriage  of  the  enemy’s  armies. 
The  impulse  of  the  nation,  as  a  whole,  was  not  yet 
towards  the  sea.  Nevertheless,  a  true  conception  of 
naval  strategy  and  tactics  was  beginning  to  emerge. 
In  1215,  Louis  the  Dauphin  was  in  London/called  there 
by  the  barons  who  were  in  revolt  against  John.  But 
the  arrogance  of  the  French  roused  the  spirit  of  the 
English  people,  and  associations  were  formed  which 
equipped  ships  and  continually  raided  the  communica¬ 
tions  of  Louis  in  the  Channel.  John  died  in  the  fol¬ 
lowing  year,  and,  in  1217,  Louis  was  utterly  defeated 
and  his  army  destroyed  under  the  walls  of  Lincoln. 
An  armament  of  eighty  galleys  was  fitted  out  at  Calais 
for  his  relief,  commanded  by  a  noted  pirate,  named 


68 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Eustace  the  Monk.  Hubert  de  Burgh,  the  Justiciary, 
collected  forty  ships  of  the  Cinque  Ports,  with  which 
he  gave  battle.  The  English  manoeuvred  for  the 
“weather  gauge, ”  as  it  came  to  be  called  later:  that 
is  to  say,  they  got  to  windward.  They  then  hurled 
quicklime  into  the  air  and,  thus  blinding  their  enemies, 
fell  on  board  them  with  such  good  will  that  only  fifteen 
of  their  ships  escaped.  Eustace  himself  was  found 
hiding  in  the  hold  of  his  vessel,  and  his  head  was  struck 
off  by  Richard  Fitzroy,  a  bastard  son  of  John.  This 
fight  is  notable  for  the  evidence  it  gives  of  the  insight 
of  Hubert  de  Burgh.  When  he  went  afloat  and  took 
command  of  the  fleet,  he  was  holding  Dover  Castle, 
always  looked  upon  as  the  postern  gate  of  England. 
So  fully  did  he  recognise  the  desperate  chances  against 
him  that  he  gave  orders  before  he  set  forth  that  Dover 
Castle  was  not  to  be  surrendered  even  to  save  his  life, 
should  he  be  taken  prisoner.  But  nothing  blinded 
him  to  the  fact  that,  if  England  was  to  be  saved,  the 
foe  must  be  met  at  sea.  His  was  the  policy  of  the 
wooden  walls  as  against  that  of  the  Martello  towers, 
and  eternal  honour  crowns  the  name  of  Hubert  de 
Burgh  for  this  reason,  though  not  for  this  alone. 
“This  victory,”  it  has  been  said,  “settled  for  ever 
the  question  how  England  could  best  be  defended. 
From  this  time  forward  we  have  produced  no  great 
naval  or  military  leader  who  has  not  placed  his  trust 
in  the  navy  as  the  first  line  of  defence  when  invasion 
threatened  the  country.”  Yet  many  of  our  historians 
do  not  mention  it  at  all. 

Our  two  warrior  kings,  Edward  III.  and  Henry  V., 
both  made  full  and  correct  use  of  sea  power.  In  1340, 
Philip  of  France  lay  at  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt  with  a 
great  armament  consisting  of  nineteen  ships  of  unusual 


The  Capture  of  an  Algerine  Corsair 

From  an  old  woodcut 


The  Baltic  Fleet  in  1855,  “  The  Duke  of  Wellington  ” 

From  a  drawing  by  E.  Weedon,  in  the  Illustrated  London  News,  1855 


■ 


. 


- 


- 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


69 


dimensions,  two  hundred  other  ships  of  war,  and  a  host 
of  smaller  vessels.  His  object  was  the  invasion  of 
England.  Hastily  collecting  all  the  ships  he  could 
from  the  Cinque  Ports  and  the  south  generally,  Edward 
sailed  to  ‘  ‘ impeach  ’  ’  the  enemy  off  his  own  port.  Thus 
early,  the  Scheldt  had  become  a  “pistol  pointed  at  the 
heart  of  England.”  The  whole  of  his  Council  opposed 
Edward  in  this  matter.  “You  are  all  in  a  conspiracy 
against  me!”  he  exclaimed  impatiently.  “I  shall  go. 
Those  who  are  afraid  may  stay  at  home.”  The  battle 
was  fought  off  Sluys,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  The 
French  drew  up  their  array  across  the  passage.  Ed¬ 
ward  at  first  put  out  to  sea  as  if  to  decline  an  engage¬ 
ment.  He  was,  however,  but  manoeuvring  to  avoid 
the  sun,  which  shone  full  in  the  eyes  of  his  men.  His 
purpose  gained,  he  bore  down  on  the  French  with  wind 
and  tide  in  his  favour.  Every  ship  in  the  first  division 
of  the  enemy  was  captured,  and,  at  this  opportune 
moment,  Lord  Morley  arrived  with  a  fleet  from  the 
northern  counties.  Joining  forces,  the  combined  fleet 
fell  upon  the  second  and  third  lines  of  Philip’s  ships. 
The  French  were  seized  with  panic  and  jumped  over¬ 
board.  The  fourth  line,  consisting  of  sixty  ships, 
made  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  overpowered.  With 
the  exception  of  a  few  stragglers,  the  whole  French 
fleet  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  victors.  Edward 
lost  two  ships  which  were  sunk,  and  about  four  thousand 
men.  The  French  losses  in  men  are  said  to  have 
amounted  to  nearly  thirty  thousand. 

This  great  sea  fight,  of  far  more  consequence  to 
England  than  Crecy  or  Poitiers,  is  usually  dismissed 
by  historians  in  a  few  lines  and  treated  merely  as  the 
prelude  of  the  land  campaign.  Nevertheless,  Sluys 
settled  the  question  whether  the  war  should  be  fought 


7  o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


on  the  soil  of  France  or  England.  Edward  grasped  the 
full  significance  of  his  victory  and  claimed  the  title 
of  “The  King  of  the  Sea,”  which  none  disputed  with 
him.  He  insisted  that  foreign  ships  in  the  Channel 
should  vail  their  topsails  to  his  flag  in  acknowledgment 
of  his  sovereignty.  The  custom  prevailed  for  near 
three  hundred  years,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  was  the  overt 
cause  of  the  first  Dutch  War.  Sluys  was  not  the  only 
sea  battle  in  which  Edward  commanded  his  fleet.  In 
1348  he  attacked  a  Spanish  fleet  from  the  Biscayan 
coast  which  had  joined  the  French  and  was  harrying 
his  communications  and  the  English  trade  in  the 
Channel.  The  battle,  which  was  commonly  known  as 
that  of  Espagnols-sur-Mer,  was  fought  within  sight 
of  the  town  of  Winchelsea,  and  resulted  in  a  complete 
victory  for  the  English,  fourteen  of  the  enemy  vessels 
being  sunk. 

The  use  made  by  Henry  V.  of  his  navy  was  strategical, 
and  led  to  no  engagement  of  first-rate  importance. 
But  it  is,  none  the  less,  extremely  interesting.  The 
army  with  which  the  King  embarked  at  Southampton 
on  August  2,  1415,  cannot  have  been  fewer  in  number 
than  20,000  men.  In  six  weeks  it  had  lost  more  than 
half  its  number  from  wounds  and  disease  under  the 
walls  of  Harfleur.  With  9000  men  Henry  set  out  to 
march  from  Harfleur,  which  had  surrendered,  to  Calais. 
It  was  a  piece  of  bravado,  for  his  intention  was  to  re¬ 
embark  his  weakened  army  at  Calais  and  carry  it  home. 
This  extraordinary  flank  march  through  a  hostile 
country,  in  face  of  an  enemy  at  least  ten  times  his 
strength,  was  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  his  fleet 
moved  parallel  with  him  along  the  coast  and  that  he 
was  supplied  from  it.  All  went  well  until  he  was 
strongly  opposed  at  Abbeville  at  the  mouth  of  the 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


7 1 


Somme.  He  was  then  compelled  to  turn  inland  and 
to  follow  the  course  of  the  river  along  its  left  bank  until 
he  could  find  a  ford.  He  crossed  near  Peronne,  in  the 
heart  of  the  great  battlefield  of  1916,  and  then,  turning 
northward  again,  he  met  and  utterly  defeated  the 
French  at  Agincourt  on  the  Ternoise,  where  the  Dau¬ 
phin  and  the  Constable  of  France  attempted  to  bar 
his  way  to  Calais.  His  strategy  may  be  compared 
with  that  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  in  the  Peninsular 
War,  when,  marching  from  Lisbon  to  the  Pyrenees,  he 
shifted  his  base  from  the  former  port  to  San  Sebastian. 
Little  British  armies  have  often  been  made  to  go  a 
long  way  by  the  skilful  use  of  sea  communications. 
Henry,  of  course,  had  complete  command  of  the  Chan¬ 
nel,  though,  in  the  following  year,  the  French  disputed 
it  with  him.  They  blockaded  the  mouth  of  the  Seine 
and  nearly  reduced  the  English  garrison  of  Harfleur 
by  starvation.  But  they  were  defeated  by  the  Duke 
of  Bedford  and  the  siege  was  raised. 

What  was  the  Navy  which  stood  Edward  III.  and 
Harry  of  Monmouth  in  such  good  stead?  The  ques¬ 
tion  is  not  very  easily  answered.  It  has  been  asserted 
that  Henry  V.  was  the  first  king  to  establish  a  war- 
navy,  which  now  became  separated  from  the  merchant 
service.  This  is  certainly  not  the  case.  The  separation 
from  the  merchant  service  did  not  take  place  till  many 
years  later.  England,  indeed,  had  very  little  sea-borne 
trade  at  this  time.  The  carriers  of  the  world  were  the 
Hanseatic  cities  (of  which  later),  the  Venetians  and 
the  Genoese.  England  was  still  in  the  agricultural 
stage,  feeding  her  own  people,  and  using  the  surplus 
and  the  products  of  her  fisheries  to  purchase  luxuries 
from  abroad.  London  was  a  great  entrepot ,  but  the 
entrepot  trade  was  carried  on  in  foreign  ships.  The 


72 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


establishment  of  the  Staples  and  the  grant  of  Charters, 
such  as  the  Charter  of  Merchants  by  Edward  I.  in  1303, 
which  were  devices  to  enable  the  kings  to  get  money 
without  appealing  to  the  Estates,  acted  in  restraint 
of  foreign  trade.  On  the  other  hand,  the  navy  was  not 
yet  the  King’s  Navy.  At  least,  the  kings  maintained 
no  permanent  fleet.  The  feudal  idea  prevailed  that 
the  dwellers  by  the  seashore  should  give  service  by  sea, 
as  the  tenants  in  capite,  their  sub-tenants  and  retainers 
gave  it  by  land.  In  return,  those  who  provided  ships 
and  men  had  certain  privileges.  The  most  famous  of 
these  corporations  was  the  Cinque  Ports,  originally 
the  five  ports  of  Sandwich,  Dover,  Hythe,  Romney, 
and  Hastings.  Afterwards  the  number  increased  to 
seven  by  addition  of  Rye  and  Winchelsea.  The  de¬ 
fence  of  the  realm  by  sea,  and,  more  especially  of  the 
communications  with  Normandy,  thus  centred  in 
the  narrow  gate  of  the  Straits  of  Dover,  a  strategical 
position  which  has  maintained  its  importance  ever 
since.  Whether  the  threat  has  come  from  the  South 
or  the  North,  the  fleet  in  the  Downs  has  always  been 
one  of  the  bulwarks  of  England. 

The  first  Charter  of  the  Cinque  Ports  was  granted 
by  Edward  I.  Under  it  the  five  towns  were  bound  to 
furnish  fifty-seven  ships  for  fifteen  days  in  the  year, 
and  victualling  for  others.  They  received  in  exchange 
their  own  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction,  exemption 
from  taxation  and  tolls,  and  the  right  to  assemble  in 
their  own  parliament,  which  sat  at  Shepway,  near 
Hythe.  To  this  day  the  Corporation  has  its  Courts 
of  Guestling  and  Brotherhood,  though  their  functions 
are  ornamental.  (In  point  of  fact,  however,  the  Cinque 
Ports  possessed  special  rights  and  owed  special  duties 
long  before  the  date  of  their  first  Charter.  In  Domes- 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


73 


day  Book  the  contingent  of  Dover  is  fixed  at  twenty 
ships,  and  those  of  other  towns  in  proportion.  There 
are  even  traces  of  their  obligation  to  furnish  a  fleet 
as  far  back  as  the  reign  of  Edward  the  Confessor.  By 
the  Charter  of  Edward  I.  the  Warden  of  the  Cinque 
Ports  was  Admiral  of  the  Coast  from  Dover  to  Cornwall. 
This,  however,  was  subsequently  modified,  and  Ports¬ 
mouth  was  made  a  separate  command. 

There  were,  besides,  other  Admiralties  and  other 
obligations  to  furnish  ships.  London,  for  instance, 
was  required  to  furnish  a  contingent,  known  as  “ships 
of  the  Tower.”  This  was  the  nearest  approach  to  a 
Royal  Navy  in  existence  in  pre-Tudor  times.  The 
Lord  Mayor  was  Admiral  of  the  Thames.  One  stout 
fellow,  Sir  John  Philpot,  after  whom  Philpot  Lane  is 
named,  actually  commanded  at  sea.  A  notable  Scot¬ 
tish  pirate,  one  John  Mercer,  was  ravaging  the  traffic 
in  the  North  Sea,  and  Richard  II.,  who  was  busy  with 
his  own  none  too  prosperous  affairs,  made  no  attempt 
to  put  an  end  to  his  depredations.  Said  sturdy  Sir 
John,  “We  must  catch  the  wasp  which  stings  us,  and 
do  our  best  to  smoke  his  kindred  from  their  nest.  The 
nobles  who  should  defend  us  are  laggers  and  excuse- 
makers.  They  do  not  feel  the  prick  of  this  thorn  as 
we  merchants  do,  and  so  they  neglect  to  pull  it  out. 
But,  an  they  like  it  or  not,  the  thorn  shall  out,  and, 
if  they  will  not  attempt  it,  why,  we  must.”  Despite 
its  confused  metaphor,  this  eloquent  passage  puts  the 
interrelation  of  sea  power  and  commerce  in  a  nutshell. 
Sir  John  collected  a  fleet  of  fourteen  ships  and  manned 
it  with  a  thousand  picked  men.  He  found  the  pirate 
cruising  in  the  Channel  with  twenty-one  ships;  fought 
him  to  a  standstill;  captured  or  destroyed  sixteen 
vessels,  and  brought  three  hundred  prisoners,  including 


74 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Mercer  himself,  back  to  London.  The  King,  however, 
considered  that  Philpot  had  taken  too  much  upon  him¬ 
self  and  placed  him  on  his  trial.  He  was  honourably- 
acquitted;  the  King  kept  his  prisoners,  and  eventually 
pocketed  their  ransom.  The  King’s  sovereignty  was 
vindicated  and  his  pockets  filled;  the  merchants 
traded  in  peace,  and  “Box  and  Cox  were  satisfied.” 
Sir  John  afterwards  placed  his  fleet  at  the  King’s 
disposal,  as  was  his  bounden  duty  and  service. 

Besides  the  Warden  of  the  Cinque  Ports  and  the 
Lord  Mayor,  there  were  Admirals  of  the  North  and  * 
the  West.  The  functions  of  these  officials  appear  to 
have  been  less  to  command  at  sea  than  to  exercise 
the  administrative  and  judicial  functions  which  now 
belong  to  the  Admiralty.  They  had,  however,  to 
furnish  a  contingent  of  ships  to  the  King’s  service 
as  Lord  Morley  did  at  Sluys. 

The  idea  of  local  defence  runs  strongly  through  all 
these  arrangements:  an  idea  which  is  unsound  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  more  developed  strategical  theories  of  our 
own  times.  But  the  enemy  to  be  met  was  less  often 
a  national  enemy  than  one  or  other  of  the  pirates  which 
then  infested  the  seas.  Moreover,  the  communication 
of  intelligence  was  slow  and  uncertain,  and  prompt 
action  often  necessary.  Nevertheless,  we  can  see  the 
strong  tendency  towards  centralisation  and  the  firm 
hold  which  our  English  kings  kept  over  the  abuses  of 
the  feudal  system  in  the  repression  of  private  war, 
as  evidenced  in  the  case  of  Sir  John  Philpot.  If  the 
ships  were  not  the  King’s  ships,  he  was,  nevertheless, 
as  effectively  the  Overlord  of  their  owners  as  he  was  of 
the  tenants  in  capite  to  whom  he  forbade  the  practice 
of  sub-inf eudation. 

The  forces  wielded  by  these  subordinate  Admiralties 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


75 


no  doubt  consisted  largely  of  small  craft,  manned  by 
the  hardy  fishermen  of  the  coast.  But  the  contingents 
of  ships  furnished  by  the  Cinque  Ports  must  have 
included  bigger  vessels,  some  engaged  in  trade  with  the 
Continent  in  time  of  peace,  and  some  laid  up  for  the 
King’s  use.  There  is,  however,  ground  for  the  sus¬ 
picion  that  they  were  occasionally  used  on  enterprises 
not  easily  distinguishable  from  piracy,  which  were 
disguised  under  the  specious  name  of  “reprisals.” 
In  such  days  as  those  of  Henry  III.,  Edward  II.,  and 
Richard  II.,  when  the  central  power  was  loosened, 
“Pirates  of  Penzance”  may  have  had  an  actual 
existence. 

The  feudal  obligations  of  the  Cinque  Ports,  the 
City  of  London,  and  the  Admiralties  of  the  North  and 
West  do  not,  however,  account  for  the  whole  of  the 
great  armaments  which  our  kings  sometimes  took  to 
sea.  The  numbers  vary  from  the  two  hundred  ships 
with  which  Edward  III.  fought  the  Battle  of  Sluys  to 
the  twelve  hundred  which  he  mustered  in  the  Channel 
four  years  later.  The  ships  can  hardly  have  been 
men-of-war  as  we  understand  the  term.  They  had 
certain  distinctive  features,  it  is  true,  such  as  the  fore¬ 
castle  from  which  the  men-at-arms  fought,  of  which 
the  name  survives,  though  the  thing  itself  has  vanished, 
and  fighting-tops  for  archers  on  the  masts.  These 
were  fitted  on  ships  hired  for  the  purpose  of  war,  and 
often  from  abroad.  But  the  ship  herself  only  became 
a  real  instrument  of  warfare  when  she  became  a  float¬ 
ing  gun-carriage.  Artillery  was  first  used,  so  far  as 
our  own  waters  were  concerned,  by  the  Spaniards  in 
an  engagement  fought  by  them  and  the  French  against 
an  inferior  English  force  off  La  Rochelle  in  1377.  The 
Venetians  used  it  about  the  same  time  in  the  Mediter- 


76 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


ranean.  It  was  more  easily  adapted  to  oared  galleys 
than  to  sailing  ships.  It  had  not  been  generally  adopted 
by  the  English  even  in  Henry  V.  ’s  time,  and  it  was  not 
made  the  primary  armament  of  warships  till  the  Tudor 
era.  That,  then,  must  be  regarded  as  the  epoch  when 
the  Royal  Navy  really  had  birth. 

At  this  point  it  is  convenient  to  say  something  about 
that  famous  institution  the  Hansa,  or  Hanseatic 
League,  through  which  the  Germanic  peoples  made 
their  first  bid  for  sea  power.  It  has  been  mentioned 
that  Edward  I.  granted  a  Charter  of  Merchants  in 
1303.  The  Hansa  was,  at  that  date,  already  estab¬ 
lished  in  London  in  the  Steelyard,  where  Cannon 
Street  Station  now  stands.  The  Easterlings,  as  the 
merchants  were  called,  had  begun  to  acquire  those 
privileges  which  eventually  gave  them  an  alderman 
of  their  own  and  the  right  to  follow  immediately  after 
the  Lord  Mayor  and  Corporation  in  all  civic  processions. 
They  had  establishments  also  in  Boston  and  elsewhere. 
They  were  fostered  by  the  kings,  to  whom  they  lent 
money  or  paid  toll.  Their  trading  system  was  similar 
to  that  of  the  Phoenicians  in  earlier  days  and  to  that 
of  the  English  and  the  Dutch  in  the  East  Indies  after¬ 
wards.  That  is  to  say,  they  ewStablished  what  were 
later  called  “factories”  in  England,  in  Flanders,  and 
in  the  Scandinavian  countries.  The  parent  cities 
were  scattered  throughout  the  Germanic  Empire, 
and  they  were  not  all  maritime,  for  Cologne  and  even 
Cracow,  Dinant,  and  Gottingen  were,  at  one  time  or 
another,  Hanse  towns.  But  the  majority  were  situated 
on  the  shores  of  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic,  and  of 
these  Lubeck  and  Hamburg  were  the  most  considerable. 
Their  prosperity  was  founded  upon  the  herring.  They 
bought  the  greater  part  of  the  catch  off  our  shores; 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


77 


but  the  main  part  of  their  supply  came  from  the  Sound, 
where  herring  swarmed  during  the  fourteenth  and 
fifteenth  centuries  so  that  at  certain  seasons,  it  is  said, 
“they  raised  boats  out  of  the  water.”  The  Ltibeck 
merchants  set  up  establishments  for  catching  and 
curing  the  fish  at  Skanor  and  Falsterbo,  on  the  south¬ 
ern  tip  of  the  Swedish  Peninsula.  They  had  another 
important  establishment  at  Wisby  in  the  island  of 
Gothland. 

So  far,  the  Hansa  were  peaceful  traders,  collecting 
the  merchandise  of  northern  Europe  in  exchange  for 
their  catch  of  herring,  and  selling  it  in  England,  France, 
Spain,  and  the  Netherlands.  But  in  1248  the  herring 
involved  the  League  in  war.  Lubeck,  in  retaliation 
for  some  alleged  infringement  of  fishing  rights,  attacked 
Denmark  and  plundered  Copenhagen.  A  century 
later,  the  great  conflict  between  the  League  as  a  whole 
and  the  Danes  under  King  Waldemar  IV.  occurred. 
Wisby  was  sacked  by  the  Danes,  and  a  fleet  of  fifty- 
two  Hanseatic  ships,  incautiously  denuded  of  their 
men  to  take  part  in  the  siege  of  Helsingor  (Elsinore) 
was  attacked  by  Waldemar  and  destroyed.  However, 
in  1367  the  Hansa  met  in  Cologne  and  agreed  to  raise 
a  new  fleet  and  army.  Making  alliance  with  the 
Swedes,  they  again  seized  Copenhagen  and  ravaged  the 
islands  of  Laaland,  Moen,  and  Falster.  Norway  sup¬ 
ported  Denmark,  but  the  superior  sea  power  of  the 
Hansa  enabled  the  Swedes  to  bring  their  military  force 
to  bear,  and  the  Danes  were  forced  to  sign  the  humili¬ 
ating  Peace  of  Stralsund  in  1370.  The  Danish  realm 
consists  in  the  main  of  islands,  and  we  see  once  more 
that  islands  can  only  be  successfully  defended  by  a 
fleet  strong  enough  to  keep  open  sea-communications 
and  to  deny  their  use  to  the  enemy.  For  lack  of  this 


78 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


power,  the  aid  of  the  Norwegians  was  useless  to  Den¬ 
mark,  while  that  given  by  the  Swedes  to  the  Hansa 
was  decisive. 

After  the  Peace  of  Stralsund,  the  Hansa  took  to 
piracy.  Bodies  were  formed,  known  as  the  “Victual¬ 
ling  Brothers”  or  the  “Equal  Sharers”  (the  Germans 
have  always  been  pastmasters  of  the  art  of  finding 
fair  names  for  rank  iniquity).  These  established 
strongholds  at  Wisby  and  Emden,  and  plundered  all 
and  sundry.  Complications  with  England  followed, 
in  which  the  whole  League  was  involved.  It  was  noted 
that,  in  the  negotiations,  the  League  endeavoured  “to 
get  everything  and  give  nothing,”  the  right  of  the 
German  to  possess  the  earth  being  already  a  Teutonic 
article  of  faith.  Matters  culminated  in  an  actual 
conflict  in  1417,  when  the  English  seized  a  number  of 
Hanse  ships  returning  from  the  Bay  of  Biscay.  Again, 
in  1451,  a  fleet  fitted  out  by  the  East  Coast  ports  took 
one  hundred  and  eight  ships  in  the  Channel.  A  long 
and  desultory  conflict  followed  during  the  years  when 
the  central  Power  in  England  was  embarrassed  by  the 
Wars  of  the  Roses.  It  is  hardly  distinguishable  from 
piracy  on  either  side.  The  Steelyard  was  stormed  by 
the  Londoners;  but  the  Hansa  was  too  useful  to  the 
kings  to  allow  of  the  expulsion  of  the  Easterlings  for 
the  present.  Their  privileges  were  confirmed  by 
Edward  IV.  and  Henry  VII.  However,  in  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth,  they  filled  up  the  cup  of  their  iniquity  by 
trading  with  the  enemy  during  the  war  of  the  Spanish 
Armada.  Drake  and  Norris  seized  sixty  of  their  ships 
in  the  Tagus.  Philip  of  Spain  retorted  by  obtaining 
a  decree  from  the  Emperor  expelling  all  Englishmen 
from  Germany,  so  the  masterful  Elizabeth  bundled 
the  Easterlings  out  of  London  bag  and  baggage.  But 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


79 


a  worse  misfortune  awaited  the  Hansa.  About  the 
same  time,  the  wayward  herring,  for  some  reason, 
deserted  the  Sound  for  the  waters  of  the  English  and 
Dutch  coasts.  The  foundation  of  Hanseatic  prosperity 
was  cut  away,  and,  in  its  place  Amsterdam,  as  has 
been  said,  was  “founded  upon  the  herring.”  It  may 
be  noted,  as  bearing  upon  German  complaints  to-day, 
that  the  Hansa,  in  the  heyday  of  its  power,  insisted  on 
the  principle  that  “hostile  ships  make  hostile  goods, 
and  hostile  goods  make  hostile  ships.” 

The  first  great  naval  Power  of  northern  Europe, 
subsequent  to  Viking  times,  was  German.  It  was 
built  upon  trade  and  it  vanished  with  the  chief  source 
of  its  trade,  just  when  the  maritime  stars  of  England 
and  Holland  were  rising.  But  it  had  an  instructive 
history.  Politically,  the  Hansa  was  a  loose  confedera¬ 
tion  of  cities,  united  for  trade  and  defence,  though 
separated  from  each  other  geographically.  It  was  held 
together  by  the  sea,  the  power  to  use  which  was  secured 
by  the  maritime  towns,  supported  by  subsidies  from 
the  rest.  It  dispensed  with  any  rigid  political  bond, 
though  it  had  its  own  Parliament,  where  common 
policy  was  discussed  from  time  to  time  as  necessity 
arose.  It  was  driven  to  fight  for  one  reason,  and  for 
one  only:  to  maintain  its  sea-communications  with  the 
lands  with  which  it  traded  and  its  right  to  use  the  sea. 
The  Hansa  navy  was  in  no  sense  the  arm  of  an  organised 
Power.  Yet  it  obtained  so  complete  an  ascendency 
in  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  that  Gustavus  Vasa,  the 
great  King  of  Sweden,  declared  that  the  three  Scandi¬ 
navian  Crowns  “remained  small  wares  of  the  Hansa 
up  to  the  sixteenth  century.  ’ ’  Hanseatic  sea  power  was 
securely  based  on  the  interests  of  the  citizens. 

Perhaps  the  greatest,  though  undesigned,  work  of 


8o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


this  remarkable  Confederation  was  that  it  taught 
England  to  become  a  Sea  Power  in  a  similar  sense. 
The  shrewd,  money-loving  Henry  VII.  did  not  fail  to 
perceive  that  the  Easterlings  were  absorbing  two  profits 
— that  for  trading,  and  that  for  carrying.  The  discovery 
of  America  opened  men’s  eyes  to  the  immense  advant¬ 
age  of  our  geographical  position,  and  the  cessation  of 
civil  strife  set  free  the  minds  of  rulers  to  consider  the 
affairs  of  peace.  The  economic  position  of  the  country 
was  greatly  altered  by  the  Black  Death  and  the  con¬ 
sequent  and  gradual  substitution  of  hired  labour  for 
villeinage.  The  capture  of  Constantinople  by  the 
Turks,  and  other  causes  which  will  be  dealt  with  in  the 
next  chapter,  put  an  end  to  the  monopoly  of  the  Eastern 
trade  which  Venice  had  so  long  enjoyed.  The  result 
was  that  private  adventurers  became  busy  fitting  out 
argosies  for  trade,  and  the  kings  took  in  hand  the 
establishment  of  the  fighting  force  by  which  that  trade 
was  to  be  protected  and  its  opportunities  increased. 
That,  perhaps,  was  not  their  sole  intention.  Dynastic 
considerations,  usually  the  most  powerful  with  more 
or  less  absolute  monarchs,  compelled  this  course. 
The  baronage  had  been  practically  destroyed  by  the 
Wars  of  the  Roses  and  the  proscriptions  and  attainders 
which  followed;  the  feudal  system  as  an  engine  of 
defence  was  at  an  end;  there  were  pretenders  abroad 
who  would  not  look  in  vain  for  assistance  from  enemies 
or  rivals  of  this  country.  So  Henry  VII.  built  him  ships 
of  war.  It  was  about  the  only  thing,  save  architec¬ 
ture,  on  which  he  could  be  induced  to  spend  money. 

But  it  is  rather  his  greater  son,  Henry  VIII.,  who 
deserves  the  title  of  “Father  of  the  British  Navy,” 
claimed  for  so  many.  He  put  the  hoards  extorted 
by  Empson  and  Dudley  to  the  best  use  ill-gotten 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


81 


wealth  has  ever  been  put  to.  Extravagant  as  he  was 
in  his  personal  expenditure,  he  laid  aside  each  year 
a  certain  sum  for  the  building  and  equipment  of  ships. 
He  was  himself  no  mean  navigator,  and  delighted  to 
go  aboard  his  ships  at  Portsmouth  with  the  whistle, 
the  badge,  in  those  days,  of  admiral’s  rank,  hung 
round  his  neck.  He  appointed  a  Controller  of  the 
Navy  under  the  Lord  High  Admiral,  thus  separating 
administration  from  command  and  initiating  the  Navy 
Office  or  Board,  which  long  co-existed  with  the  Board 
of  Admiralty,  after  the  office  of  Lord  High  Admiral 
had  been  placed  in  commission.  He  also  founded 
Trinity  House  at  Deptford,  committing  to  the  care  of 
“the  Brethren  of  the  Sacred  Trinity”  the  supervision 
of  pilotage  and  the  buoying  and  lighting  of  the  coast. 

Among  the  ships  which  King  Henry  built  were  the 
Henri  Grace-ci-Dieu ,  or  Great  Harry ,  of  1500  tons,  the 
Trinity  Sovereign  and  Henry  Imperial ,  each  of  1000  tons, 
the  Gabriel  Royal  of  800  tons,  the  Great  Galley  of  700 
tons,  and  the  Mary  Rose  of  600  tons.  The  fleet  which 
left  Portsmouth  in  Holy  Week  of  1512  for  the  war  with 
France  is  said  to  have  numbered  eighty  vessels  and  to 
have  carried  over  20,000  men.  It  was  well  armed  with 
serpentines,  cannon  and  demi-cannon,  sakers,  culverins, 
murderers,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  quaintly-named 
ordnance  of  the  day,  some  throwing  shot  as  heavy  as 
were  used  at  Trafalgar  nearly  three  hundred  years 
afterwards.  These  ships  were  designed  for  a  regular 
sea-fight,  although  boarding,  then  and  for  many  years 
later,  was  contemplated  as  the  decisive  stage  of  the 
action.  They  were  no  longer  merely  platforms  for 
men-at-arms  to  fight  upon. 

With  this  armament,  Henry  kept  command  of  the 
Channel.  The  French  were  driven  into  Brest  after 


82 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


a  fight  which  was,  tactically,  indecisive.  The  Eng¬ 
lish  followed  them  through  the  Goulet  Passage,  and 
then  occurred  a  strange  incident  which  has  never  been 
satisfactorily  explained,  but  which  cost  the  life  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Sir  Edward  Howard.  He  ap¬ 
pears  to  have  boarded  the  French  flagship  which  was 
lying  inside  the  harbour,  with  the  intention  of  cutting 
her  out.  He  was  left  on  deck  almost  single-handed, 
the  French  throwing  off  the  grappling-chains  before 
his  whole  crew  could  get  on  board.  Howard,  seeing 
himself  doomed,  threw  his  whistle,  the  badge  of  his 
rank,  overboard,  and  was  shortly  afterwards  hurled 
into  the  sea.  His  adversary,  Pregent,  or  “Prior  John,” 
as  the  English  called  him,  a  notorious  corsair,  re¬ 
covered  the  body,  and  salted  the  heart  as  a  “souvenir.” 
His  motive  was  not  “frightfulness,”  as  one  would 
hastily  conclude.  He  honestly  wished  to  honour  a 
doughty  foe. 

Henry  VIII.  had  his  ups  and  downs  by  sea.  The 
English  coast  was  repeatedly  raided,  despite  his  general 
ascendency.  As  Mahan  has  said,  and  as  recent  experi¬ 
ence  has  proved,  no  superiority,  however  great,  can 
wholly  prevent  such  enterprises.  On  one  occasion  the 
fishing  hamlet  of  Brighthelmstone,  not  yet  become 
“Doctor  Brighton,”  was  burned.  In  a  later  war,  the 
French  sent  a  great  fleet  to  the  Isle  of  Wight,  which 
actually  sailed  into  Spithead.  Henry’s  fleet  on  the 
spot  was  much  inferior  in  numbers,  and,  to  make  mat¬ 
ters  worse,  the  Mary  Rose  the  “beauty  ship”  of  the 
squadron,  as  was  our  lost  Queen  Mary ,  capsized  and 
sank.  Loud  was  the  laughter  of  the  French.  But  a 
sudden  shift  of  wind  prevented  them  from  making 
use  of  their  advantage.  Night  came  on,  and,  in  the 
morning,  to  the  astonishment  of  the  English,  the  French 


I  HjHj  I 


Henry  VIII.  Embarking  at  Dover 


. 

*  :  . . 


THE  MAKING  OF  ENGLAND 


83 


fleet  had  disappeared.  So  impressed  were  the  pious 
minds  of  English  churchmen  that  two  suffrages  were 
embodied  in  the  Liturgy  to  keep  the  event  in  remem¬ 
brance  : 

“Give  peace  in  our  time,  0  Lord!” 

“Because  there  is  none  other  that  fighteth  for  us: 
But  only  Thou,  O  God.” 

It  was  to  this  fleet  also  that  the  password,  “God 
Save  the  King!”  with  the  countersign,  “Long  to  reign 
over  us!”  was  given.  Herein  is  supposed  to  be  the 
germ  of  the  National  Anthem. 

It  is  once  more  to  be  noticed  that  the  chroniclers  of 
the  time  and  later  historians  tell  us  very  little  of  the 
means  by  which  the  English  obtained  their  mastery 
at  sea.  The  battle  off  Brest  was  an  indecisive  affair, 
in  which  we  lost  the  Regent ,  one  of  the  most  powerful 
vessels  of  the  fleet.  But  the  French  sought  refuge  in 
their  harbours,  and,  during  the  rest  of  the  war  of  1512- 
13,  only  essayed  “tip-and-run”  raids.  The  moral 
appears  to  be  that  the  side  which  will  not  fight  is 
beaten,  and  that  all  the  advantages  go  to  that  which 
seeks  battle,  even  without  a  struggle.  In  other  words, 
sea  power  is  power  over  communications  at  sea. 

With  Henry  VIII. ’s  reign  began  the  real  era  of  Eng¬ 
land’s  maritime  greatness.  Kings  and  people  had 
learned  their  lesson  as  to  the  true  basis  of  defence. 
The  introduction  of  cannon,  the  discoveries  of  new 
lands  and  of  new  sea  routes,  the  altered  economic 
condition  of  the  country,  the  abolition  of  restraints  on 
trade,  even  the  personal  rule  of  the  Tudors,  all  helped 
to  foster  the  growing  disposition  of  the  English  people 
to  turn  towards  the  sea.  The  use  of  sea  power  by  the 
earlier  kings  to  maintain  their  communications  with 
France  had  accustomed  the  public  mind  to  the  idea  of 


84 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


a  fighting  navy.  The  real,  solid  foundation  of  sea 
power  was  now  supplied.  The  growth  of  commerce 
went  hand  in  hand  with  efficiency  in  naval  war.  Each 
supported  the  other.  The  King’s  ships  kept  the  Nar¬ 
row  Seas  secure ;  but  the  merchantman  went  armed  on 
his  great  adventures  beyond.  Therefore,  in  time  of 
peril,  he  was  a  valuable  auxiliary  to  the  naval  force. 
The  English  became  in  greater  and  greater  degree  a 
seafaring  people.  And  there  was  soon  to  come  a  wave 
of  enthusiasm,  partly  bom  of  religious  antagonisms, 
partly  of  intolerance  of  restraint,  which  lent  weight 
and  vigour  to  these  impulses.  These  things,  and  much 
else,  came  to  fruition  in  the  Elizabethan  age. 


mm 


The  Man-of-War  “  Great  Harry” 

The  Largest  Ship  in  the  World  in  the  Reign  of  Henry  VIII.,  Contrasted  with  the  “  Prince  Albert,”  of  131  Guns, 

Launched  at  Woolwich  in  1854 

From  a  drawing  by  G.  W.  Terry,  engraved  by  T.  Sherratt 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  IN  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 

It  has  been  truly  said  that  the  shores  of  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean  are  strewn  with  the  wreckage  of  Empire.  The 
Pharaohs,  the  Phoenicians,  the  Carthaginians,  the 
Greeks  and  Macedonians,  the  Romans,  Vandals, 
Saracens  have  in  turn  borne  sway  and  vanished.  The 
Turks  are  in  a  fair  way  to  vanish.  Some  have  left 
their  monuments,  some  their  literature  and  art,  and 
all  have  left  abiding  lessons  to  those  who  study  the 
meaning  and  the  function  of  sea  power.  The  period 
we  now  have  to  trace  is  one  in  which  ancient  civilisa¬ 
tions  were  impinged  upon  by  Barbarism  from  the 
North  and  from  the  East;  in  which  religious  zeal  or 
fanaticism  moved  the  nations  to  almost  continuous 
war,  and  in  which  Christendon,  divided  against  itself, 
gave  ground  before  the  fierce  onslaughts  of  Islam. 
Thence  emerged  a  new  contest  between  East  and  West 
which  ended  in  the  bounds  of  the  East  being  set  further 
to  the  westward  than  in  the  last  great  incursion  in  the 
days  of  Xerxes.  Nevertheless,  the  tide  was  stemmed, 
and  stemmed  mainly  by  sea  power.  The  bounds  of 
the  Turkish  Empire  in  northern  Africa  were  set  where 
the  bounds  of  Cambyses’  Empire  were  set,  for  Ottoman 
control  beyond  the  borders  of  Egypt  was  little  more 
than  nominal.  On  the  European  side,  however,  the 

85 


86 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


sword  of  the  Faithful  bit  deeper.  It  was  only  under 
the  walls  of  Vienna  that  the  plague  was  stayed.  The 
failure  of  the  Byzantine  Empire  and  of  the  other  States 
which  should  have  supported  it  in  the  task  of  holding 
back  the  Turkish  onslaught  are  at  the  root  of  the  troubles 
of  to-day,  for  it  is  the  heritage  of  the  Turk,  derived 
by  conquest  from  Byzantium,  which  has  stirred  most 
deeply  the  cupidity  of  the  Teutonic  rulers. 

The  history  of  sea  power  in  the  Mediterranean 
during  the  Middle  Ages  can  best  be  understood  by 
following  the  long,  tortuous,  but  withal  glorious, 
history  of  Venice.  It  is  the  story  of  perhaps  the  most 
completely  organized  naval  State  the  world  has  ever 
seen.  Everything  in  that  paradise  of  merchant  princes 
gave  way  to  trade.  All  policy  was  founded  on  the 
acquisition  of  wealth,  and  had  that  for  its  end.  And 
the  Venetians,  in  consequence,  had  both  the  virtues 
and  vices  of  traders.  They  were  punctilious  in  keep¬ 
ing  the  letter  of  a  bargain,  but  not  equally  scrupulous 
about  its  spirit.  They  indulged  in  little  idealism.  It 
was  impossible  to  sway  them  by  sentiment.  But, 
being  sea-traders,  they  were  of  high  spirit  and  tena¬ 
cious  of  their  ends.  At  last,  they  lapsed  into  the 
torpor  of  wealth,  and  allowed  themselves  to  be  undone 
by  circumstances  which  they  would  have  overcome, 
had  they  retained  their  early  stiffness  of  purpose — 
namely,  the  discovery  of  America  and  the  route  to 
India  round  the  Cape. 

Venice  was  founded  in  the  fifth  century  of  our  era 
by  a  band  of  fugitives  who  fled  from  the  Huns.  They 
were  of  the  most  stiff-necked  breed  of  the  Italian  peoples, 
and  they  found  among  the  lagoons  at  the  head  of  the 
Adriatic  an  abode  easily  defensible  and  as  easily 
adapted  to  the  acquisition  of  wealth  and  power.  From 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  87 


small  beginnings,  merely  punting  from  island  to  island, 
carrying  fish  and  other  produce ;  then  gradually  extend¬ 
ing  their  range  to  fetch  corn  and  wine  from  Apulia; 
afterwards,  pushing  their  trade  down  the  narrow^  waters 
of  the  Adriatic,  the  people  of  Venice  built  up  their 
great  navy,  trusting  their  all  to  the  sea,  and  living  by 
it  alone.  Protection  was  needed  from  the  pirates  of 
Illyria  and  the  northern  coast  of  Africa,  and  thus  arose 
the  war  navy.  It  was  the  deliberate  creation  of  the 
State  for  the  protection  of  its  merchantmen.  The 
Venetians  started  at  the  right  end.  The  first  Doge, 
Paolo  Lucio  Anafesta,  little  more  than  two  hundred 
years  after  the  small  beginnings  of  Venice,  enforced 
the  building  of  merchant  ships  and  provided  for  the 
fortification  of  the  shipyards,  and  Doge  Orso  Ipato, 
in  726,  definitely  set  himself  to  create  a  war  navy 
for  use  against  the  Lombards.  Fourteen  years  later, 
the  Venetians  won  their  first  smashing  victory,  taking 
Ravenna,  crushing  a  serious  rival,  and  thus  winning 
the  supremacy  of  the  Adriatic. 

Venice  became  later  the  “Safeguard  of  the  West.” 
But  at  this  time  she  was  fairly  constantly  on  the  side 
of  the  Empire  of  the  East.  Charlemagne  attempted 
to  win  her  over.  His  policy  was  brimstone  and  treacle. 
He  sent  his  son,  Pepin,  to  sack  the  town.  But  Pepin 
met  with  a  great  disaster — so  great  that  the  scene  of 
the  battle  was  known  as  the  Canale  d’Orfani.  Charle¬ 
magne  then  tried  propitiation,  opening  the  doors  of  his 
empire  to  Venetian  trade.  The  Venetians  took  his  gifts 
and  used  them  as  a  lever  to  secure  similar  concessions 
from  Alexius,  Emperor  of  the  East.  Thus  Venice  be¬ 
came  the  entrepot  of  trade  between  East  and  West,  a 
position  she  was  to  maintain  till  the  sixteenth  century. 
Her  power  and  wealth  grew  by  leaps  and  bounds. 


88 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Attention  has  been  often  called  to  the  configuration 
of  the  Adriatic  coasts  during  the  war.  On  the  Italian 
Peninsula  there  are  few  good  harbours,  until  the  Gulf 
of  Taranto  is  reached.  On  the  other  side,  there  is 
not  only  the  Peninsula  of  Istria,  with  the  three  naval 
ports  of  Trieste,  Fiume,  and  Pola,  but  also  a  rugged 
coast  along  Illyria,  Dalmatia,  and  Epirus,  fringed 
with  islands  and  provided  with  the  ports  of  Cattaro, 
Sebenico,  Durazzo,  Ragusa,  San  Giovanni  di  Medusa, 
Prevesa,  Valona,  and  others.  To  develop  full  sea 
power  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  the  masters  of 
Italy  must  be  masters  also  of  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
Adriatic.  All  these  ports  were,  from  time  immemorial, 
nests  of  pirates,  and  it  was  the  first  task  of  the  Vene¬ 
tians  to  clear  them  out.  The  first  condition  of  the 
profitable  use  of  sea  power  is  the  establishment  of  law 
and  right  at  sea.  Throughout  the  latter  part  of  the 
ninth  and  the  early  part  of  the  tenth  century,  Venice 
fought  for  her  life  against  a  combination  or  succession 
of  enemies — Saracens,  Slavs,  Huns,  Naren tines.  Some¬ 
times  she  received  a  half-hearted  backing  from  the 
Empire  of  Byzantium.  But,  on  the  whole,  it  was  her 
arm  alone  which,  in  the  end,  made  her  the  mistress  of 
almost  the  whole  of  the  eastern  shore.  Her  very  mis¬ 
fortunes  turned  to  her  advantage,  for,  being  defeated 
in  a  naval  battle  at  Taranto,  which  they  fought  in 
alliance  with  the  Greeks  in  839,  the  Venetians  were 
unable  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  sacking  Ancona. 
A  disaster  thus  befell  a  formidable  commercial  rival, 
at  which  the  Venetians  did  not  show  themselves 
inconsolable. 

So  long  as  the  Greeks  in  Constantinople  were  strong, 
Venice  clave  to  them  and,  through  her  friendship 
and  the  maritime  help  she  was  able  to  afford,  sucked 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  89 


out  no  small  advantage.  Her  eyes  were  always  on 
the  commercial  opportunities  afforded  by  Constanti¬ 
nople.  She  constrained  successive  emperors  to  reduce 
the  dues  in  her  favour,  so  that,  at  last,  she  obtained 
pretty  nearly  the  monopoly  of  trade  with  the  Levant. 
She  adopted  the  same  policy  as  did  the  Phoenicians, 
the  Hansa,  and,  later,  the  English  and  Dutch,  of 
establishing  settlements  or  factories  in  the  ports  with 
which  she  traded,  winning  many  valuable  privileges, 
political,  commercial,  and  also  ecclesiastical.  One 
of  her  first  demands  on  any  State  to  which  she  sold 
her  help  was  the  site  for  a  church — and  the  tithes 
appurtenant  thereto. 

This  policy  of  peaceful  trade  led  her  into  almost 
continuous  war.  For  this  there  were  several  reasons. 
In  the  first  place,  she  had  to  purchase  the  continuance 
and  extension  of  favours  from  the  effete  Empire  of 
Byzantium  by  armed  help.  In  the  second  place,  she 
had  to  contend  with  the  jealousy  of  commercial  rivals, 
such  as  Genoa,  that  other  great  trading  Republic  of 
Italy,  which  did  not  by  any  means  consent  to  take 
the  supremacy  of  Venice  “lying  down.”  In  the  third 
place,  the  Crusades  led  to  a  demand  for  her  services 
to  carry  the  warriors  of  the  Cross  to  the  Holy  Land, 
and  she  inevitably  got  embroiled  in  the  strifes  between 
the  Christian  Powers  which  throw  such  a  dark  shadow 
across  the  picture  of  these  pious  undertakings.  It  was 
the  Crusades  which  finally  detached  Venice  from  the 
East  and  made  her  “The  Safeguard  of  the  West.” 
But  first,  having  made  her  position  secure  in  the  Asi¬ 
atic  and  debouching  into  the  Mediterranean,  she  was 
destined  to  come  into  contact  with  the  Normans, 
who  had  established  themselves  in  Sicily,  Apulia,  and 
Calabria. 


90 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


They  came,  a  band  of  adventurers  in  the  beginning 
of  the  eleventh  century  under  Tancred  of  Hauteville, 
thus  bringing  the  power  of  the  Northman  into  the 
Mediterranean.  Tancred’ s  son,  Roger,  drove  the 
Saracens  out  of  the  greater  part  of  Sicily,  which,  as 
in  the  days  of  the  Carthaginians,  had  been  an  outpost 
of  northern  Africa  and  the  East,  and  established  him¬ 
self  there.  His  brother,  Robert  Guiscard,  completed 
the  subjugation  of  the  southern  states  of  Italy.  By 
the  conquest  of  Salerno  and  Amalfi,  Robert  got  a 
footing  in  Constantinople  itself,  for  Amalfi  had  rich 
possessions  there.  He  set  himself  to  build  up  his  sea 
power,  determined  to  make  himself  master  of  the  East. 
The  resolve  of  the  Normans  to  increase  their  commerce 
and  to  assert  their  right  of  way  into  the  Adriatic  could 
not  fail  to  bring  them  into  collision  with  the  Venetians, 
even  if  the  jealousy  and  fears  of  the  Greek  Empire  had 
not  called  on  the  latter  to  intervene.  Both  Venetians 
and  Normans  aimed  at  an  uncontrolled  and  exclusive 
right  of  way  through  the  Adriatic;  each  people  con¬ 
sidered  its  right  to  supremacy  at  sea  to  be  paramount; 
each  had  interests  to  guard  and  further  in  the  commerce 
of  the  East.  Venice  was  in  possession.  Therefore  she 
stood  in  alliance  with  Byzantium  to  secure  to  herself 
the  use  of  the  sea  routes  and  to  forbid  them  to  her 
rival.  The  primary  function  of  sea  power  could  not 
more  plainly  be  brought  out. 

In  1078,  Duke  Robert  espoused  the  cause  of  the 
dethroned  Emperor,  Michael  VII.,  against  Alexius 
Comnenus.  The  latter  sought  the  aid  of  Venice, 
which  was  granted  on  these  terms:  Alexius  promised, 
whether  successful  or  not,  to  pay  an  annual  tribute  of 
twenty  pounds  of  gold  to  the  church  of  St.  Mark;  to 
compel  the  citizens  of  Amalfi  to  pay  a  yearly  tax  to 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  91 


the  said  church;  to  make  a  free  gift  of  a  warehouse, 
some  houses,  four  landing-stages,  and  a  bakehouse, 
with  its  dues,  to  the  Venetians  resident  in  Constanti¬ 
nople;  to  make  a  gift  to  them  of  the  church  of  St. 
Andrew  in  Durazzo  with  its  tithes  and  to  grant  to  the 
Venetians  absolute  freedom  of  trade  in  all  parts  of  the 
Empire,  except  in  Cyprus  and  Candia.  In  exchange 
for  this  charming  compound  of  piety  and  business, 
the  Venetians  promised  to  arm  every  vessel  in  their 
possession  and  to  lend  the  Greeks  further  help  by  land. 
They  kept  their  promise. 

The  events  of  the  war  need  not  be  recorded  in  detail. 
The  Normans  were  heavily  defeated  in  a  sea  battle 
off  Durazzo.  Nevertheless,  they  took  the  town,  and,  in 
their  turn  annihilated  a  weak  Venetian  fleet  off  Corfu. 
But  Robert  Guiscard  died,  and  the  threat  to  Venice 
and  Constantinople  was  removed.  The  impotence 
of  Byzantium,  which  lacked  sea  power,  despite  the 
foremost  maritime  position  in  the  world,  to  defend  its 
possessions  on  the  seaboard  and  on  the  islands  against 
a  much  smaller  State  which  possessed  an  efficient  navy, 
enabled  Venice  to  extort  what  terms  she  pleased  for 
her  assistance. 

Now,  however,  the  time  had  come  when  Venice  was 
to  abandon  her  close  connection  with  the  Empire  of 
the  East  and,  speaking  generally,  to  take  her  place  as 
“The  Safeguard  of  the  West.”  It  was  the  era  of  the 
Crusades.  The  hosts  of  the  Cross,  drawn  from  all  the 
Christian  lands  of  the  West,  needed  the  services  of 
the  maritime  republics  of  Italy  to  furnish  them  with 
transport,  to  carry  provisions  and  munitions  of  war, 
and  to  keep  the  coasts  and  the  sea  communications 
against  attack  by  the  still-powerful  fleet  of  the  Saracens. 
Genoa  and  Pisa  were  first  in  the  field.  The  former  sent 


92 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


an  expedition  to  the  help  of  Boemond,  the  son  of  Robert 
Guiscard,  who  was  besieging  Antioch  in  1097,  and,  in 
reward,  received  valuable  grants  when  the  city  fell. 
Next  year,  the  Pisans,  attracted  by  the  advantages 
obtained  by  the  Genoese,  also  sent  their  aid  to  Boe¬ 
mond.  This  was  too  much  for  the  Venetians.  Genoa 
and  Pisa,  up  to  now,  had  contented  themselves  with 
trading  with  Sicily  and  the  northern  coast  of  Africa. 
Their  presence  in  the  East  threatened  the  monopoly 
so  carefully  built  up  by  Venice  in  that  quarter.  In 
1099,  Baldwin,  the  Frankish  King  of  Jerusalem,  ap¬ 
plied  to  the  Republic  for  assistance,  and  the  Doge, 
Vitale  Michiel,  pressed  the  project  of  the  willing  Vene¬ 
tians.  The  expedition  was  got  ready  and  sailed  for 
Rhodes,  where  it  wintered.  But  the  reality  of  the 
crusading  spirit  which  animated  the  Venetians  was 
shown  by  a  bloody  quarrel  which  broke  out  between 
them  and  the  Pisans  who  formed  part  of  the  armament. 
The  Venetians  were  victorious,  but  restored  to  their 
foes  all  the  ships  and  prisoners  they  had  taken,  on  con¬ 
dition  that  the  Pisans  bound  themselves  not  to  trade 
with  any  places  in  the  Levant.  The  dear  allies  then 
sailed  off  amicably  together  and  arrived  off  Jaffa  in 
June,  1 100,  in  time  for  a  conference  with  the  dying 
Godfrey  de  Bouillon,  from  whom  the  Doge  extracted 
an  agreement,  giving  Venice  the  third  part  of  every 
city  captured  and  other  privileges  as  the  price  of  her 
assistance.  In  conjunction  with  Tancred  the  Norman, 
the  Venetians  captured  Haifa;  but  the  victors  fell  out 
over  the  spoil,  and  Vitale  Michiel  took  his  fleet  home. 

The  events  of  the  next  two  years  are  instructive  as 
showing  the  motives  which  swayed  Venice,  and  the 
sure  grasp  she  had  on  the  principle  that  command  of 
the  Adriatic  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  her.  She 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  93 


made  an  alliance  with  the  King  of  Hungary  to  curb 
the  Norman  power  on  the  Dalmatian  coast.  Brindisi 
was  sacked,  and  the  object  of  the  allies  on  the  whole 
obtained.  Next,  Boemond,  now  Prince  of  Antioch, 
finding  himself  sore  beset  by  the  Turks,  Greeks,  and 
Saracens  who  were  besieging  that  town,  escaped  to 
Europe  and  raised  a  new  army  with  which,  instead 
of  returning  at  once  to  the  Holy  Land,  he  besieged 
Durazzo.  Venice  at  once  entered  into  a  league  with 
Byzantium,  harassed  Boemond’s  communications,  and 
forced  him  to  raise  the  siege.  This  done,  they  set  out 
for  Palestine  to  the  assistance  of  Baldwin  of  Jerusalem. 
There  they,  indirectly,  at  any  rate,  assisted  the  Nor¬ 
mans  against  the  Greeks  who  had,  a  few  months  pre¬ 
viously,  obtained  their  aid  against  the  Normans. 
To  complicate  matters  still  further,  Cal  Oman  of  Hun¬ 
gary  deemed  the  moment  favourable  to  break  his 
treaty  with  Venice  and  to  possess  himself  of  some  towns 
in  Dalmatia.  The  Venetians  applied  for  aid  to  the 
Emperor  Alexius;  but  their  need  of  Byzantine  help 
by  land  did  not  prevent  the  fleet,  which  had  been  sent 
to  the  Syrian  coast  and  had  taken  part  in  the  capture 
of  Sidon,  from  paying  a  visit  to  Constantinople  and 
showing  its  friendliness  to  the  Greeks  by  carrying  off 
the  body  of  St.  Stephen  from  one  of  the  basilicas. 
Alliances  and  enmities  alike  sat  lightly  on  the  business 
men  of  Venice. 

In  all  this,  however,  there  is  a  clear  and  definite  line 
of  policy,  though  the  rape  of  the  saint’s  body  was  not 
essential  to  it.  The  Venetians  lived  by  the  trade  of 
the  sea,  and  they  realised  that,  to  enjoy  that  trade  and 
its  fruits,  they  must  be  in  undisputed  command  of  the 
sea  communications,  since,  according  to  the  economic 
thought  of  that  time  and  of  long  afterwards,  successful 


94 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


trade  required  monopoly.  They  were  so  placed  geo¬ 
graphically  that  they  could  act  both  as  a  barrier  and  a 
channel  of  intercourse  between  East  and  West,  so  long 
as  they  maintained  their  sea  power.  While  the  Nor¬ 
mans,  Genoese,  Pisans,  and  Saracens  were  kept  in  a 
state  of  comparative  weakness,  these  communications 
and,  with  them,  their  valuable  monopolies,  were  secure. 
Nay,  more,  they  could  be  increased  almost  indefinitely 
by  the  sale  of  Venetian  aid,  first  to  one  claimant  and 
then  to  another.  It  was  not  very  noble,  but  it  paid. 
And  the  patrician  of  Venice  would  have  been  the  first 
to  tell  you  that  “business  is  business.” 

Moreover,  in  justice  to  the  Venetians,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  at  this  time  there  was  no  vestige  of  a 
law  which  ran  at  sea,  and  also  that  their  position  was 
not  entirely  insular.  Situated  as  they  were  at  the 
head  of  a  narrow  sea,  they  were  compelled  by  necessity 
to  keep  control  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  so  far  as  they 
could,  and  this  necessity  brought  them  into  direct 
contact  with  great  Land  Powers.  A  land  frontier 
with  powerful  States  on  the  other  side  of  it  is  always  a 
dire  complication  for  a  maritime  State,  rendering  in¬ 
complete  the  advantage  of  sea  power.  Holland  is 
another  instance  of  the  same  embarrassment. 

The  position  of  Venice  at  the  time  of  the  Crusades 
is  thus  summed  up  by  Gibbon : 

The  policy  of  Venice  was  marked  by  the  avarice  of  a 
•  trading,  and  the  insolence  of  a  maritime,  Power;  yet  her 
ambition  was  prudent.  Nor  did  she  often  forget  that, 
if  armed  galleys  were  the  effect  and  safeguard,  merchant 
vessels  were  the  cause  and  supply,  of  her  greatness. 

Venice  had  now  entered  upon  the  policy  of  planting 
colonies  or  settlements  abroad.  The  first  was  in 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  95 


Sidon.  Others  were  shortly  to  follow,  both  on  the 
coast  of  Syria  and  in  the  islands  of  the  Levant.  Her 
colonies  brought  her  wealth;  but,  as  in  the  case  of 
Phoenicia  of  old,  they  taxed  her  strength  both  by  the 
demand  for  settlers  and  the  need  of  providing  for 
their  defence.  Moreover,  the  Venetians  had  not  the 
art  of  ruling.  They  exploited  their  colonies  for  the 
advantage  of  the  Mother  City.  They  were  cordially 
disliked  by  their  subjects.  Sea  power  easily  permits 
of  the  foundation  of  an  oversea  empire;  but  whether 
that  empire  is  to  be  a  source  of  strength  or  weakness 
to  the  Mother  Country  depends,  first  on  geographical 
position;  secondly,  and,  perhaps,  mainly,  on  the  char¬ 
acter  of  the  race  and  its  capacity  for  government. 
Gibbon,  in  the  passage  quoted  above,  talks  of  the 
“insolence”  of  a  maritime  Power.  He  probably 
intended  a  back-handed  cut  at  his  own  country  in 
so  doing.  But,  although,  from  time  to  time  in  our 
history,  we  have,  without  doubt,  displayed  arrogance 
towards  other  nations  and  even  to  people  of  our  own 
flesh  and  blood,  it  is  the  absence  of  insolence  and 
the  large  tolerance  which  Britain  has  displayed;  her 
respect  for  the  rights  and  interests  of  others,  which 
have  made  the  British  Empire  a  source  of  strength  to 
the  Mother  Country  and  not  of  weakness.  We  have 
not  exploited  the  lands  over  which  our  flag  flies;  we 
have  not  exacted  tribute  from  any,  at  any  rate  for  the 
last  century  and  a  half.  We  have  freely  extended  to 
all  the  protection  of  the  navy  and  have  sought  no 
monopoly  in  return.  Therefore,  each  Colony  and 
Dependency  has  developed  normally,  if  slowly,  under 
the  British  flag,  and  the  strain  which  was  felt  by 
Phoenicia  and  Venice,  as,  later,  by  Spain  and  Portugal, 
has  been  avoided.  A  vein  of  idealism  and  a  strong 


96 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


sense  of  justice  and  freedom  are  necessary,  if  sea  power 
is  to  lead  to  Empire.  Enterprise  and  commercial 
capacity  are  not  in  themselves  enough. 

The  Fourth  Crusade  witnessed  the  final  breach 
between  Venice  and  the  Empire  of  the  East  and  the 
passing  of  Constantinople  itself  into  the  hands  of  the 
Western  Powers.  Enrico  Dandolo,  one  of  the  great¬ 
est  names  in  Venetian  history,  was  elected  Doge  in 
1192,  at  the  age  of  eighty-four.  In  his  youth  he  had 
been  taken  prisoner  to  Byzantium  and  cruelly  treated, 
his  eyes  being  held  so  close  over  white  hot  steel  that 
the  sight  was  almost  destroyed.  To  him  came  an 
embassy  ten  years  after  his  election  from  Louis  Count 
of  Blois,  Thibaud  Count  of  Champagne,  and  Baldwin 
Count  of  Flanders  and  Hainault,  to  negotiate  for  the 
hire  of  transport  ships  for  an  expedition  they  proposed 
to  undertake  against  Egypt.  Dandolo  not  only  readily 
agreed  to  hire  them  the  ships,  but  proposed  himself, 
though  ninety-four  years  of  age  and  nearly  blind,  to 
take  the  Cross,  with  a  great  host  of  Venetian  nobles. 
The  terms  were,  of  course,  favourable  to  Venice.  But 
the  extraordinary  thing  is  that,  in  the  document  which 
ratified  the  agreement,  no  destination  is  named  for 
the  expedition.  Dandolo,  in  haranguing  the  ambas¬ 
sadors  on  its  conclusion  said:  “All  these  conditions 
which  we  have  explained  to  you  will  last  a  year,  dating 
from  the  day  when  we  leave  the  port  of  Venice  to  per¬ 
form  the  service  of  God  and  Christianity  in  whatever 
place  it  be .” 

The  Venetians  were  soon  ready,  but  the  Knights  of 
the  Cross  tarried,  nor  could  those  who  assembled 
find  sufficient  money  to  pay  the  agreed  sum  to  their 
hosts.  So  Dandolo  made  a  proposal.  If  the  Crusaders 
would  help  the  Venetians  to  recover  Zara,  a  possession 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  9 7 


of  Venice  on  the  Dalmatian  coast  which  was  then  in 
revolt,  the  latter  would  consent  to  defer  the  payment 
of  the  money  to  a  more  convenient  season.  The 
Crusaders  agreed  reluctantly  and  Zara  was  reduced 
in  November,  1201.  The  Knights  now  expected  to 
push  on  to  Egypt,  but  Dandolo  explained  that  it  was 
too  late  in  the  year.  Then  came  young  Alexius,  son 
of  Isaac  II.,  Emperor  of  Byzantium,  who  had  been 
dethroned  and  blinded  by  his  brother,  another  Alexius, 
six  years  before.  He  implored  the  aid  of  the  Crusaders, 
promising,  among  other  things,  that,  if  his  father  were 
restored,  he  would  promote  the  reunion  of  the  churches 
of  the  East  and  the  West.  The  bait  took.  The 
Crusade  became  a  crusade  of  the  Western  Church 
against  the  Eastern,  instead  of  one  against  the  Infidel. 
Constantinople  fell ;  Baldwin  of  Flanders  and  Hainault 
became  Emperor  of  the  East.  The  triumph  was  com¬ 
plete  but  short-lived.  Baldwin  fell  in  battle  with  the 
Bulgarians,  and  old  Dandolo  died  shortly  afterwards 
at  the  age  of  ninety-six,  having  set  his  country  on  her 
highest  pinnacle  of  greatness.  He  bequeathed  to  his 
successors  the  title  of  “Master  of  a  fourth  and  an 
eighth  of  the  whole  Empire  of  Rome.”  But  his  success, 
by  destroying  the  power  of  the  Empire  of  Byzantium, 
was  fatal  to  the  cause  of  Christendom  in  the  East. 

The  story  of  the  Fourth  Crusade  marks  an  epoch 
in  the  history  of  the  Mediterranean.  We  now  come 
to  the  long  struggles  between  Venice  and  Genoa  for 
the  mastery  of  that  sea,  which  had  for  its  consequences, 
first,  the  destruction  of  the  Frankish  Empire  in  Con¬ 
stantinople;  secondly,  the  restoration  of  the  Greek 
Empire  in  the  house  of  the  Palaeologi  and  the  alliance 
of  the  latter  with  the  Genoese;  thirdly,  the  delivery 
of  Venice  from  destruction  by  the  heroism  of  Vettor 


7 


98 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Pisani,  and,  finally,  the  decay  and  overthrow  of  the 
sea  power  of  Genoa.  There  were  intervals  of  peace; 
but  from  first  to  last  the  war  lasted  nearly  one  hundred 
and  fifty  years,  from  1238  to  the  Peace  of  Turin  in 
1382.  Venice  was  forced  to  cede  the  coast  of  Dalmatia 
to  the  King  of  Hungary,  to  hand  over  Tenedos  to  the 
Count  of  Savoy,  and  to  give  up  Treviso  to  the  House 
of  Carrara.  Her  sea  power  was  hampered  much  by 
attacks  from  the  land  side;  but,  in  the  end,  she  emerged 
not  visibly  weaker,  since  a  powerful  rival  had  been 
destroyed.  But  the  seeds  of  decay  were  sown.  More¬ 
over,  Tyre,  Sidon,  and  Acre  were  now  lost  to  the  Christ¬ 
ian  cause  by  the  advance  of  the  Turks,  and  the  bulwark 
of  Christendom  was  weakened  by  the  establishment 
of  several  feeble  States  across  the  path  of  the  Ottoman 
instead  of  a  single  strong  Power.  Venice  was  the  true 
Safeguard  of  the  West  as  long  as  she  lent  the  support 
of  her  sea  power  to  the  East,  or  was  herself  supreme  in 
the  vital  position  of  Constantinople.  She  was  yet 
to  offer  a  splendid  resistance  to  the  oncoming  Turk; 
but  neither  her  navy,  nor  the  armies  of  Greek,  Serb, 
Hungarian,  or  Rumanian  could  now  prevent  him  from 
blighting  the  east  of  Europe  with  his  presence  for 
five  hundred  years  and  more.  Had  the  Turk  not  mas¬ 
tered  the  European  shore  of  the  Dardanelles — and  he 
could  not  have  done  so  had  the  Venetian  sea  power 
been  predominant  in  Greece  and  in  the  islands — he 
would  no  more  have  established  himself  firmly  in 
Europe  than  Xerxes  did. 

The  folly  and  blindness  of  the  Venetian  leaders 
during  the  ensuing  century  are  almost  past  belief. 
With  the  threat  of  the  Osmanli  power  to  all  Europe, 
and  to  themselves  in  particular,  growing  greater  and 
greater  every  year,  they  forsook  the  sea,  the  only  ele- 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  99 


ment  on  which  they  could  hope  to  resist  it,  allowed 
their  fleet  to  decay,  and  devoted  themselves  to  con¬ 
quest  on  the  mainland  of  Italy.  They  possessed  them¬ 
selves  of  a  great  part  of  Lombardy  and  of  Padua  and 
other  places,  by  which  means  they  drew  down  upon 
themselves  the  hostility  of  the  Florentines,  who  in¬ 
trigued  with  the  Turks  incessantly,  and  finally  banded 
a  great  part  of  Europe  against  themselves  in  the 
League  of  Cambrai.  They  lost  their  continental 
possessions  thereby,  and  also  their  pride  of  place  as 
the  foremost  bulwark  of  Europe  against  the  Turk. 
But  long  before  this  date  they  had  lost  much  else.  In 
1453,  Mahomet  II.  stormed  Constantinople,  a  cata¬ 
clysm  which  shook  Europe  to  its  foundations.  The 
Greek  Empire  crumbled  to  the  dust,  never  to  revive. 
Venice  attempted  to  make  terms  with  the  conqueror, 
humbly  congratulating  him  upon  his  success,  and 
accepting  at  his  hands  renewal  of  her  commercial 
privileges  at  the  cost  of  her  honour.  The  feeble  efforts 
of  the  King  of  Cyprus  and  the  Knights  of  Rhodes 
utterly  failed  to  stay  the  progress  of  Mahomet.  He 
possessed  himself  of  the  Morea;  yet  the  League  of  the 
Powers  of  Europe,  formed  in  1493  at  Peterwaradin, 
which  the  Venetians  joined,  failed  to  act.  The  Pope  and 
Venice  were  left  to  face  the  Turks  alone.  The  Pope 
wrote  to  the  Doge,  Cristoforo  Moro,  urging  him  to 
remember  the  example  of  Dandolo  and  to  put  himself 
at  the  head  of  the  Venetian  armament.  The  poor 
oM  man,  however,  though  he  had  nigh  reached  Dan- 
dolo’s  years,  lacked  everything  of  his  spirit  He 
pleaded  his  infirmities  and  his  ignorance  of  nautical 
matters.  But  the  Senate  was  determined  that  the 
head  of  the  nation  should  lead  the  national  forces. 
“Serene  Prince,”  said  Vettor  Capello,  one  of  the  ducal 


100 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


counsellors,  “if  your  Excellency  will  not  go  willingly, 
you  shall  be  made  to  go  forcibly,  for  we  hold  the  honour 
of  our  country  above  any  consideration  for  your  person.” 
The  Doge  went  accordingly,  but  by  the  time  the  expedi¬ 
tion  had  reached  Ancona  Pius  II.  was  dead,  and  the 
Venetians  faced  the  fury  of  the  Turks  alone. 

The  latter  revealed  themselves  to  an  astonished 
Europe  as  a  great  naval  Power.  Secure  within  the 
Straits  of  the  Dardanelles,  they  had  built  up  their 
strength,  and  the  Ottoman  Admiral  confronted  the 
Venetian  leader  Antonio  Canale,  with  an  armada  of 
three  hundred  ships  to  which  he  could  oppose  but 
sixty.  Mahomet  in  person  marched  into  Greece  by 
the  old  route  of  the  Persians,  while  the  Venetians  lay 
off  Euboea,  where  they  hesitated  to  try  conclusions 
with  the  Turks.  Negropont  was  taken  and  sacked 
with  the  most  appalling  horrors,  and  Canale  was 
brought  back  to  Venice  in  irons  and  banished. 

The  two  invasions  of  Greece  which  bear  so  remark¬ 
able  a  likeness — that  of  Mahomet  and  that  of  Xerxes 
— may  be  compared.  Themistocles,  like  Canale,  lay 
off  Euboea  in  inferior  force.  After  the  defeat  of  Leoni¬ 
das  at  Thermopylae,  the  Persians,  like  the  Turks, 
marched  into  Greece.  Themistocles,  however,  showed 
fight,  and,  though  the  actions  he  fought  were  both 
indecisive,  they  saved  Euboea,  and  enabled  him  to 
withdraw  his  fleet  in  safety  to  Salamis,  where,  in 
victorious  battle,  he  forced  the  withdrawal  of  Xerxes, 
who  became  nervous  about  his  communications. 
Command  of  the  sea  saved  Greece  then ;  now  the  Greeks 
had  no  fleet  of  their  own,  and  the  succouring  fleet  of 
Venice  was  inferior.  Therefore,  Greece,  under  pre¬ 
cisely  similar  strategical  circumstances,  was  lost. 
Mahomet,  holding  both  shores  of  the  Dardanelles, 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  ioi 


moreover,  had  no  need  to  be  anxious  for  his  communica¬ 
tions,  had  the  event  proved  less  favourable  to  him 
than  it  actually  was. 

After  Euboea,  Scutari — the  Albanian  Scutari,  for 
which  the  Montenegrins  fought  so  hard  in  1912 — was 
taken  by  the.  Turks,  and,  ere  long,  the  burghers  of 
Venice  could  see  the  fires  of  destruction  from  their 
city.  Nothing  remained  for  them  but  to  make  peace, 
and  the  Queen  of  the  Adriatic,  crowned  with  shame, 
paid  tribute  to  the  infidel.  It  is  a  ghastly  lesson  to 
all  those  who,  having  the  gift  of  the  sea  for  their  pro¬ 
tection,  misuse  that  gift  through  sloth  or  penury,  or 
indulge  in  ambitions  of  aggrandisement  on  another 
element. 

Now  there  begin  to  appear  in  the  Mediterranean 
European  Powers  which  had  not  hitherto  made  their 
weight  felt  there  by  sea.  In  1499,  Venice  declared 
war  on  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  alliance  with  King  John 
of  France.  This  venture  was  no  more  prosperous  than 
the  preceding  one,  chiefly  owing  to  the  supineness,  if 
not  the  cowardice,  of  the  Venetian  Commander, 
Grimani.  The  Venetians  lost  Modon,  Coron,  Navarino, 
and  Nauplia,  and  had  to  put  up  with  insults  both 
from  French. and  Turks.  “You  Venetians  are  wise 
in  councils  and  abound  in  riches,”  said  the  French 
King.  “But  so  fearful  are  you  of  death  that  you  have 
neither  spirit  nor  manliness  in  war.”  “You  have 
wedded  the  sea  till  now,”  said  Mahomet’s  Grand 
Vizier  to  a  Venetian  envoy.  “For  the  future  that 
belongs  to  us  who  have  more  on  it  than  you.”  Bitter 
words  for  Venetian  ears  to  hear! 

After  the  French,  the  Spaniards  put  in  an  appear¬ 
ance  in  1509,  but  proved  of  little  more  avail.  The 
Venetians,  however,  under  Benedetto  Pesaro,  gained 


102 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


some  victories,  which  enabled  them  to  conclude  a 
peace  by  which  Cephalonia  and  Nauplia  were  restored 
to  them.  Soon,  however,  worse  things  befell  them 
than  any  which  had  gone  before.  War  broke  out 
again  in  1538,  when  Venice  joined  a  new  League  pro¬ 
moted  by  the  Pope  after  the  fall  of  Rhodes.  The 
League  was  utterly  defeated  at  Prevesa  by  the  Otto¬ 
mans  under  the  famous  corsair,  Hairredin  Barbarossa, 
whose  name  and  fame  were  fitly  perpetuated  in  one  of 
the  battleships  bought  from  Germany  by  the  Turks 
and  sunk  in  1915  by  a  British  submarine  in  the  Mar¬ 
mora.  Selim  the  Drunkard,  who  had  succeeded 
Solyman  the  Magnificent,  himself  the  great-grandson 
of  the  conqueror  of  Constantinople,  made  ready  to 
attack  Cyprus.  Plague  broke  out  in  Venice,  and  the 
Arsenal  was  burned  down.  The  Christian  Powers 
had  their  own  preoccupations  elsewhere,  and  would 
render  no  aid.  Venice  was  left  to  face  the  storm  alone. 
It  did  not  break  till  1570,  when  the  great  Turkish  fleet, 
with  an  army  of  100,000  men,  laid  siege  to  Nicosia. 
Christendom  was  at  last  aroused;  but  Philip  II.  of 
Spain,  of  Armada  fame,  alone  sent  aid.  Even  he  was 
something  less  than  half-hearted.  The  opportunity 
was  thrown  away  in  futile  debate;  Nicosia  was  taken, 
and  then  Famagosta.  The  whole  of  Cyprus  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Turks,  so  to  remain  until  Disraeli 
drove  his  bargain  in  1878  and  placed  it  in  British  hands. 

Next  year  there  came  the  last  brilliant  flash  of  the 
expiring  glory  of  Venice,  which  also  marked  the  definite 
turn  of  the  tide  of  Turkish  conquest.  Philip  roused 
himself  in  earnest.  He  got  together  a  great  armament 
of  Spanish,  Neapolitan,  Papal,  and  Venetian  ships 
under  the  command  of  his  bastard  brother,  Don  John 
of  Austria.  Giannandrea  Doria,  the  Genoese,  was  at 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  103 


the  head  of  the  Spanish  contingent,  Sebastiano  Veniero 
in  command  of  that  of  Venice.  As  usual,  there  were 
dissensions  among  the  allies.  The  Venetian  ships 
were  not  well  found — a  fact  perhaps  excusable,  in  view 
of  the  recent  destruction  of  the  Arsenal — and  there 
was  a  long  relay  at  Messina.  Veniero  and  Don  John, 
moreover,  were  not  on  good  terms.  The  Venetians, 
fallen  from  their  high  estate  at  the  head  of  the  Powers 
of  the  West,  had  to  endure  many  insults.  But  the 
leaders  were  at  least  united  in  their  determination  to 
fight,  and  on  Sunday,  October  7,  1571,  the  Turks  were 
met  off  the  rocky  cluster  of  the  Curzolari,  north  of  the 
Gulf  of  Lepanto.  A  Council  of  War  was  held  on  board 
the  flagship,  and  some  of  the  commanders  were  for 
retiring.  But  Don  John  was  of  a  higher  spirit.  “De¬ 
part,  gentlemen,”  he  said.  “This  is  not  the  time  for 
counsel  but  for  battle.”  The  great  flag  of  the  League, 
bearing  the  image  of  the  Crucified  Redeemer,  was  run 
up  to  the  masthead  of  the  flagship.  Don  John,  catch¬ 
ing  sight  of  Veniero  on  his  quarter-deck,  waved  him  a 
friendly  greeting  which  wiped  out  all  soreness,  and  then, 
to  show  his  joy  in  battle,  danced  the  “gagliarda”  on 
the  poop  of  his  ship  in  the  sight  of  his  whole  fleet. 
Thus  encouraged,  the  Christian  host  fell  on.  The 
galley  of  Don  John  lay  aboard  that  of  Ali  Pasha,  the 
Turkish  Commander-in-Chief,  and  a  desperate  hand- 
to-hand  fight  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  Turk. 
By  nightfall  the  victory  of  the  Christians  was  complete. 
A  hundred  and  seventeen  galleys  and  twenty  galleons 
remained  in  their  hands;  fifty  more  were  sunk;  eighty 
thousand  Turks  were  slain  and  ten  thousand  more 
taken  prisoners.  The  losses  of  the  allies  were  about 
7500,  of  whom  2000  were  Venetians.  Pope  Pius  V. 
eulogised  the  victor  by  quoting:  “There  was  a  man 


104 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


sent  from  God,  whose  name  was  John.”  All  Christen¬ 
dom  agreed. 

Lepanto  is  justly  included  among  the  decisive  battles 
of  the  world.  The  Turks  were  yet  to  add  Crete  to 
their  possessions;  but  Don  John,  on  that  October  day 
in  1571,  pronounced  upon  them  the  sentence:  “Thus 
far  and  no  farther!”  Off  the  indented  coast  of  the 
Morea,  among  the  islands  of  the  Greek  Archipelago 
and  within  a  few  miles  of  Salamis,  Actium,  and  Nava- 
rino,  the  question  whether  East  or  West  should  prevail 
was  again  decided.  It  was  too  late  to  push  the  Turk 
back  from  the  position  he  had  won.  The  control  of 
the  Dardanelles,  which  he  had  acquired  owing  to  the 
jealousies  and  ineptitudes  of  the  Christian  Powers, 
was  too  strong  to  be  forced,  though  the  Venetians 
were,  in  the  next  hundred  and  twenty  years,  to  win 
four  victories  at  the  mouth  of  the  Straits,  thanks 
largely  to  the  genius  of  Francesco  Morosini.  But  the 
Ottoman  advance  in  Europe  was  definitely  stayed. 
The  victory  of  John  Sobieski  under  the  walls  of  Vienna 
a  century  later  followed  Lepanto  as  Waterloo  followed 
Trafalgar.  Yet  the  day  of  Venice  was  at  an  end. 
At  Lepanto,  for  the  first  time  in  all  the  long  struggles 
with  the  Turks,  she  had  been  second,  not  first,  in  the 
armament  of  Christendom.  It  was  significant.  She 
kept  the  shadow  of  her  power  but  the  substance  had 
departed.  The  Spaniards,  the  French,  the  Dutch, 
and  the  English — all  the  maritime  Powers — came  into 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean  in  the  seventeenth  cen¬ 
tury.  If  the  Venetians  failed  to  seize  the  opportunity 
afforded  by  the  discovery  of  America  and  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope  to  extend  her  commerce  beyond  the 
pillars  of  Hercules,  the  Westerners  did  not  miss  theirs 
to  garner  their  share  of  the  lucrative  trade  with  Con- 


The  Battle  of  Lepanto 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  105 


stantinople  and  the  Levant,  so  long  the  monopoly  of 
Venice.  Their  warships  followed  their  merchantmen, 
principally  to  protect  the  latter  from  the  forays  of 
those  strange  pirate  States  which  grew  out  of  the  loosely 
knit  Turkish  Empire  in  North  Africa,  which  its  sea 
power,  broken  by  Lepanto,  could  no  longer  control. 
The  last  was  not  suppressed  until  Lord  Exmouth 
reduced  Algiers  in  1816.  Henceforward,  the  history 
of  sea  power  in  the  Mediterranean  is  interwoven  with 
that  of  the  seas  beyond.  By  the  end  of  the  seven¬ 
teenth  century  there  were  conflicts  between  the  English 
and  the  Dutch  in  its  waters;  in  1704  Gibraltar  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  English. 

Venice  was  great  at  sea  partly  by  reason  of  her 
geographical  position  which,  so  long  as  the  States  which 
lay  behind  her  did  not  become  too  powerful,  so  long 
as  she  did  not  cherish  ambitions  of  continental  con¬ 
quest,  and  so  long  as  she  kept  on  friendly  terms  with 
the  Empire  of  the  East,  gave  her  freedom  to  develop 
her  oversea  trade  and  the  sea  power  which  that  trade 
created.  The  reasons  why  she  nervelessly  dropped  her 
sceptre  when  the  way  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
was  found  are  probably  three:  First,  her  nobles,  grown 
rich  and  luxurious,  were  in  no  mind  for  further  adven¬ 
ture,  involving  hardship.  Secondly,  she  was  led  away 
by  ambition  to  increase  her  realm  by  land,  and  thus 
abandoned  in  some  degree  the  element  which  alone 
had  made  her  great.  Thirdly,  as  a  Mediterranean 
Power,  she  relied  on  the  oared  galley,  and  her  seamen 
were  probably  less  skilled  than  those  whose  coasts 
fronted  the  ocean.  This  limitation  is  not  absolute, 
for  the  Venetians  were  in  the  habit  of  sending  a  galley 
to  Britain  every  year,  and  therefore  had  some  experi¬ 
ence  in  oceanic  voyaging.  But  to  hug  the  shores  of 


io6 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


France  and  Spain,  even  to  cross  the  Bay  of  Biscay, 
was  a  different  thing  from  turning  the  prow  boldly 
to  the  distant  horizon  and  sailing  forth  into  the  un¬ 
known.  Three  of  the  four  great  explorers  of  the  com¬ 
ing  age  were,  of  course,  Mediterranean  seamen — 
Genoese,  not  Venetians — but  they  were  all  in  the  service 
of  foreign  States  and  gained  their  experience  outside 
the  Middle  Sea.  When  the  Venetians  made  an  attempt 
to  contest  the  right  of  way  to  India  with  the  Portu¬ 
guese,  with  the  help  of  the  Turks,  Egyptians,  and 
Arabs,  they  proved  no  match  for  the  ocean-tried 
seamen  of  Vasco  da  Gama. 

Venice  lingered  independent  till  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  but  she  lingered  inglorious.  Then 
Napoleon  put  an  end  to  her  career,  until  she  resumed 
it  with  brighter  hopes  as  part  of  the  kingdom  of  United 
Italy. 

Since  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal  the  Medi¬ 
terranean  has  recovered  the  importance  it  formerly 
held  for  any  Power  aspiring  to  the  command  of  the 
sea.  Indeed,  it  never  really  lost  it,  for  the  Peninsula 
of  Italy,  long  divided  between  Hapsburg  and  Bourbon, 
had  always  a  great  strategical  value  in  the  struggles 
between  those  houses,  and  the  Mediterranean  was 
always  the  shortest  line  of  communication  with  the 
vital  military  position  of  Central  Europe  on  the  middle 
Danube.  Moreover,  Egypt  remained  the  pivot  of 
the  communications  with  the  East,  and  was  therefore 
the  desired  prize  of  any  ruler  with  oriental  ambitions. 
It  is  notable  that,  as  will  be  seen  later,  almost  the 
whole  of  Nelson’s  career  was  bound  up  with  Mediter¬ 
ranean  questions.  We  have  always  found  a  grasp  of 
the  Mediterranean  essential  to  our  policy  of  thwarting 
any  attempt  at  the  domination  of  the  Continent  by  a 


The  Defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada,  1588 

From  a  drawing  by  P.  J.  de  Loutherbourg,  R.  A.,  engraved  by  J.  C.  Allen 


. 

■ 


- 


MEDITERRANEAN  IN  MIDDLE  AGES  107 


single  Power.  As  it  has  been  in  the  past,  so  it  is  still 
to-day.  The  abandonment  of  the  Mediterranean 
has  been  frequently  advocated,  and  by  authorities  of 
deserved  weight.  It  has  never  been  found  a  possible 
policy  in  practice. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 

As  the  Middle  Ages  end,  we  stand  at  the  beginning 
of  that  great  era  when  learning  ceased  to  be  shackled, 
when  man’s  thought  became  free,  and  when  the  horizon 
of  his  vision  was  extended  by  the  discovery  of  new 
lands  and  new  routes  across  the  ocean.  The  world, 
nay,  the  universe,  underwent  a  sudden  expansion, 
and  not  only  the  material  world,  but  the  world  of  the 
mind  and  spirit  also.  A  short  table  of  dates  will  be 
sufficient  to  show  the  magnitude  and  the  suddenness 
of  the  change; 


Constantinople  was  taken  by  the  Turks 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella  succeeded  to  the  thrones 
of  Aragon  and  Castile  ... 

Caxton  set  up  the  first  printing  press  in  England 
Bartholomew  Diaz  sailed  round  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  ...  ...  ...  ... 

Columbus  discovered  the  Bahamas  ... 

Luther  posted  his  Confessions  at  Wittenberg 
Henry  VIII.  broke  with  Rome 
Copernicus  published  his  De  Revolutionibus 
Orbium 


1453 

1474 

1476 

i486 

1492 

I5W 

I529“36 

1543 


In  these  events,  the  product  of  a  single  crowded 

century  of  history,  are  included  almost  all  that  is 

108 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


109 


essential  in  the  great  movements  which  we  call  the 
Renascence  and  Reformation.  There  are  two  political 
events  among  them:  the  taking  of  Constantinople  by 
the  Turks,  which  filled  western  Europe  with  the  treas¬ 
ures  of  Greek  learning,  and  the  accession  of  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella,  who  promoted  the  enterprise  of  Columbus, 
and  thus,  indirectly,  at  any  rate,  brought  about  the 
Spanish  claim  to  the  empire  of  the  New  World,  which, 
being  ratified  by  the  Pope,  brought  religious  antago¬ 
nisms  into  play  as  a  factor  in  the  long  strife  for  the 
freedom  of  the  sea.  Furthermore,  it  was  in  the  reign 
of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  that  Spain  was  unified, 
and  under  their  famous  grandson,  the  Emperor  Charles 
V.,  that  Spain,  Naples,  and  the  Netherlands  became  one 
realm,  while  his  sons,  again,  were  Philip,  the  husband 
of  Mary  Tudor,  and  enemy  of  Elizabeth,  and  Don 
John  of  Austria,  the  victor  of  Lepanto. 

It  seems  the  natural  thing  that  the  boundless  develop¬ 
ment  of  men’s  minds  which  followed  upon  the  revival 
of  learning,  the  collapse  of  feudalism,  and  the  spread 
far  and  wide  of  the  printed  word  should  turn  their 
thoughts  to  the  ocean  and  what  lay  beyond.  We 
have  to  think  of  a  world  enlarged  by  the  whole  of  the 
American  Continent  and  the  islands  adjacent  to  the 
Atlantic  coast  thereof;  by  the  coast-belt  of  Africa 
south  of  a  line  drawn,  roughly,  from  the  Atlas  moun¬ 
tains  on  the  west  to  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Suez 
on  the  east ;  by  the  islands  of  the  Eastern  Archipelago, 
Madagascar,  the  coasts  of  India,  Siam,  Cochin  China, 
Japan,  and,  very  darkly  and  mistily,  Australia.  It  is 
not,  of  course,  the  case  that  all  these  lands,  or  even 
half  of  them,  were  unknown  by  repute,  or  even  that 
they  had  not  had  intercourse  overland  with  Europe 
before.  If  we  believe  ancient  legends,  even  North 


no 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


America  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  were  known  to  the 
Norsemen  and  Phoenicians  respectively,  and  Marco 
Polo  had  visited  China.  But  the  Mohammedan  power 
barred  the  way  to  all  the  East  by  land,  so  that  effective 
intercourse  with  the  regions  named  did,  in  fact,  origin¬ 
ate  in  the  wonderful  century  which  began  with  the 
fall  of  Constantinople  and  ended  with  the  accession  of 
Elizabeth.  Naturally,  the  effect  on  men’s  minds  was 
stupendous.  Is  it  wonderful  that  the  world  was  re¬ 
born,  or  that  the  throes  of  the  new  birth  were  violent, 
devastating  to  old  beliefs  and  systems,  fraught  with 
misery  and  wrong?  They  were  all  that.  But,  never¬ 
theless,  the  age  was  irradiated  with  a  splendour  of 
thought  and  achievement  such  as  no  other  age  in  the 
world’s  history  has  seen. 

To  the  little  kingdom  of  Portugal,  rather  than  to 
her  greater  neighbour,  must  be  given  the  palm  as  the 
pioneer  of  discovery.  In  the  first  place,  whereas  the 
great  explorers  who  gave  the  main  part  of  South  America 
to  Spain,  Columbus  and  Amerigo  Vespucci,  were 
Italians,  the  far  longer  list  of  Portuguese  navigators 
contains  only  the  names  of  the  native-born.  Bar¬ 
tholomew  Diaz,  Vasco  da  Gama,  Tristan  d’Acunha, 
Cabral,  and  Magellan,  though  the  last-named  was 
employed  by  the  Spanish  Government,  were  all  pure 
Portuguese.  With  the  exception  of  Cabral,  who 
discovered  Brazil,  and  added  that  rich  country  to  the 
empire  of  Portugal,  and  Magellan,  who  sailed  round 
Cape  Horn  in  the  service  of  Spain,  the  Portuguese 
navigators  undertook  all  their  voyages  to  the  south 
and  east.  It  is  curious  that  the  chief  preoccupation  of 
King  Manoel  the  Fortunate  in  sending  first  Diaz  and 
then  Vasco  da  Gama  to  discover  the  passage  round  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  should  have  been  to  find  the 


A  Caravel  of  the  Fifteenth  Century 


Columbus’s  Caravels 


% 


* 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


iii 


mythical  realm  of  Prester  John.  It  is  related  that, 
when  the  Portuguese  reached  Calicut,  they  worshipped 
the  image  of  the  Hindoo  goddess  Gauri,  under  the 
belief  that  it  was  a  representation  of  the  Virgin,  and 
that  the  natives  were  the  Christian  subjects  of  Prester 
John.  The  Hindoos,  for  their  part,  worshipped  the 
images  of  the  Virgin  under  the  belief  that  they  repre¬ 
sented  Gauri.  The  Portuguese  were  greatly  disappointed 
to  discover  eventually  that  Prester  John  could  only 
be  identified  with  the  half-savage  monarch  of  Abyssinia. 

They  had  much  to  console  them,  however.  The 
silken  stuffs,  precious  stones,  and  spices  of  the  East 
aroused  their  cupidity.  Expedition  followed  expedi¬ 
tion,  and  what  has  been  rather  magniloquently  called 
the  “conquest  of  India”  took  place.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  Portuguese  did  little  more  than  possess  them¬ 
selves  of  a  few  places  on  the  coast,  of  which  Bombay, 
Goa,  Cochin,  and  Diu  were  the  most  important.  They 
had  to  engage  in  hard  fighting,  in  the  course  of  which 
they  stained  their  hands  with  much  cruelty;  but  they 
fought  rather  against  the  Turks,  Egyptians,  Venetians, 
and  Arabs,  who  were  already  established  as  traders 
with  the  Indian  Rajahs,  than  with  the  natives.  One 
of  the  Governors  sent  out  by  Manoel,  Almeida,  laid 
down  a  policy  which  closely  resembles  that  pursued  later 
by  the  British  in  their  dealings  with  India,  and  which, 
if  it  had  been  followed,  might  have  done  much  to  con¬ 
solidate  Portuguese  power  by  making  oversea  expansion 
a  support  to  the  home  Government  instead  of  a  source 
of  weakness  to  it. 

Let  all  our  strength  be  on  the  sea  [he  says].  Let  us  re¬ 
frain  from  appropriating  the  land.  The  old  tradition  of 
conquest,  the  empire  of  such  distant  lands,  is  not  desirable. 


1 12 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Let  us  destroy  these  new  races  [the  Arabs,  Turks,  etc.], 
and  reinstate  the  ancient  races  and  natives  of  the  coast. 
Then  we  will  go  further.  Let  us  secure  with  our  fleets  the 
safety  of  the  sea,  and  protect  the  natives,  in  whose  name  we 
may  practically  reign  over  India.  There  would  certainly 
be  no  harm  in  our  having  a  few  fortresses  along  the  coast, 
but  simply  to  protect  the  factories  against  surprise,  for 
their  chief  safety  will  lie  in  the  friendship  of  the  native 
Rajahs,  placed  upon  their  thrones  by  us,  and  maintained 
and  defended  by  our  fleets.  What  has  been  done  so  far  is 
but  anarchy,  scarcely  an  outline  of  government,  a  system 
of  murder,  piracy,  and  disorder  which  it  is  necessary  to 
remedy. 

If  the  idea  of  Almeida  be  compared  with  the  practice 
of  Clive  and  Warren  Hastings,  the  likeness  is  certainly 
remarkable.  His  great  contemporary,  Albuquerque, 
however,  thought  differently,  and,  in  Ormuz,  Goa,  and 
Malacca  established  the  limits  of  the  empire,  which, 
in  Almeida’s  judgment,  would  have  floated  securely, 
if  somewhat  vaguely ;  on  the  water. 

The  range  of  that  empire  was  enormous.  From 
Macao,  forty  miles  from  Hong-Kong,  in  the  east,  and 
the  island  of  Timor  in  the  south,  it  spread  over  the 
Portuguese  settlements  in  India  itself  to  the  East 
Coast  of  Africa — Mozambique,  Zanzibar,  and  Lou- 
rengo  Marques — and  round  to  the  west,  embracing 
Angola  and  Portuguese  Guinea,  and  then  across  the 
Atlantic  to  Brazil.  The  Portuguese  nowhere  spread 
across  a  whole  continent  as  did  the  Spaniards  in  South 
America,  but  they  had  their  settlements  on  the  fringes 
of  many  lands;  they  held  dominion  over  countless 
islands.  Their  imprint  to-day  is  as  strong  upon  the 
Malayan  race  as  is  that  of  the  Arabs. 

The  fleets  of  Portugal  were  never  large;  the  riches 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


ii3 

obtained  by  maritime  trade  were  never  great.  Never¬ 
theless  this  little  country  must  be  accounted  one  of 
the  real  Sea  Powers  of  the  world,  for  its  maritime 
ascendancy  was  based  on  that  love  of  adventure  and 
desire  for  achievement  which  is  the  true  foundation 
of  all  maritime  enterprise.  The  Portuguese,  during 
the  short  period  of  their  power,  came  into  conflict 
with  no  European  foe,  save  the  Venetians,  in  the 
Indian  Ocean.  Their  communications  with  their 
oversea  possessions  were  disputed  by  no  other  nation, 
for  the  Dutch  and  the  English  were  but  in  their  in¬ 
fancy  as  sea-faring,  or,  rather,  ocean-faring  peoples, 
and  the  desires  of  the  Spaniards  were  set  in  a  different 
direction.  When  causes  of  quarrel  arose,  which,  how¬ 
ever,  were  not  maritime,  Spain  easily  crushed  her 
smaller  neighbour  on  the  land  side.  Portugal  possessed 
a  fatal  disqualification  for  sea  power.  She  was  a 
small  continental  State,  with  a  powerful  neighbour 
behind  her.  She  suffered  this  inconvenience  in  com¬ 
mon  with  Holland  and  Venice,  and,  in  her  case,  as  in 
theirs,  it  was  instrumental  in  bringing  about  her  fall. 
In  1583,  Portugal  and  all  its  foreign  possessions,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Azores,  passed  into  the  hands  of 
Philip  II.  of  Spain.  Sixty  years  later  independence 
was  recovered,  and,  with  the  help  of  Britain  on  most 
critical  occasions,  has  since  been  maintained.  But 
the  power  of  Portugal  was  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  the 
Dutch  now  succeeded  to  the  position  of  the  Portu¬ 
guese  mariners  as  the  boldest  of  traders  and  explorers. 
One  by  one,  the  Eastern  possessions  of  Portugal,  save 
Macao,  Timor,  and  a  few  towns  in  India,  fell  into  their 
hands.  But  the  African  Empire  was  maintained, 
and  remains  to  this  day  almost  intact.  Brazil  remained 

Portuguese  until  the  nineteenth  century. 

8 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


1 14 

At  the  present  time  the  Empire  of  Portugal  abroad 
consists  of  Macao,  a  part  of  Timor,  Goa  and  Diu,  in 
India,  Mozambique,  and  Delagoa  Bay,  Portuguese 
Guinea,  Angola,  San  Thome,  and  Principe  Islands, 
the  Azores,  and  Cape  Verd  Islands.  It  is  still  consider¬ 
able,  judged  by  area  and  even  by  population.  But 
the  mercantile  marine  consists  of  no  more  than  seventy- 
five  steamers  and  one  hundred  and  eight  sailing  ships, 
altogether  just  over  200,000  tons.  The  war-navy 
consists  of  one  old  coast-defence  ship,  four  light  cruisers, 
a  few  torpedo-boats,  and  one  submarine.  Quomodo 
ceciderunt  validi!  The  power  to  defend  its  sea  com¬ 
munications  has  long  departed.  The  independence 
and  the  Empire  of  Portugal  rest  on  British  defence. 
Consequently,  while  the  flag  of  Portugal  still  floats 
over  many  of  the  possessions  of  our  ancient  Ally,  the 
profit  which  so  great  possessions  might  bring  is  to 
others.  The  alliance  between  Great  Britain  and 
Portugal  is  the  oldest  and  least  interrupted  in  the 
world.  Its  true  basis  will  be  best  explained  hereafter. 

The  sea  power  of  Spain  was  as  suddenly  created  as 
that  of  the  Romans,  and,  like  theirs,  it  was  entirely 
military.  The  caravels  and  carracks  crossed  the 
Atlantic,  not  to  trade,  but  to  bring  home  booty.  If 
the  Portuguese  Empire  in  the  east  rested  on  pepper, 
that  of  Spain  in  the  west  had  the  gold  of  Peru  and  the 
silver  of  Potosi  for  foundation.  And  the  foundation 
proved  rotten.  Nevertheless,  while  it  endured,  the 
dominion  of  Spain  upon  the  ocean  was  remarkable 
enough. 

Until  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  joined  the  two  Crowns 
of  Arragon  and  Castile,  Spain  was  not.  Navarre  still 
owned  a  separate  sovereign,  the  South  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  Moors.  The  taking  of  Granada  in  1492  sealed 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


ii5 

the  unity  of  Spain.  It  was  in  the  self-same  year  that 
Columbus  landed  in  the  Bahamas.  Next  year,  Pope 
Alexander  VI.  granted  the  Bull  by  which  the  Atlantic 
was  magnificently  divided  by  a  line  drawn  down  its 
centre,  all  discoveries  to  the  east  being  given  to  Por¬ 
tugal,  and  all  on  the  west  to  Spain,  in  the  name  of  Holy 
Church.  Forty  years  later,  Cortes  had  conquered  Mexico, 
and  Pizarro  was  master  of  Peru.  The  Spanish  system 
was  in  full  swing;  the  treasure  galleys  were  bringing 
the  golden  store  of  the  Incas  to  the  mother  country. 
At  this  date  the  Netherlands  were  a  province  of  the 
Spanish  Crown,  and  Henry  VIII.  had  not  yet  begun 
that  rupture  of  relations  with  Rome  which  was  the 
first  step  in  the  English  Reformation.  It  is  important 
to  bear  these  facts  in  mind,  for  they  explain  in  part 
why  the  Spaniards  were  able  to  establish  their  empire 
in  the  New  World  unmolested.  The  Bull  of  Pope 
Alexander  VI.  protected  them  against  the  restless  spirit 
which  was  growing  up  in  England,  as  in  other  European 
countries,  thanks  to  the  travellers’  tales  which  were 
passing  from  mouth  to  mouth. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  above  that  the  great  seamen 
who  served  Spain  in  this  epoch  were  not  Spaniards, 
but  Italians  and  Portuguese.  The  great  Spaniards 
were  not  seamen,  but  soldiers.  Their  principle  was  the 
very  opposite  of  that  recommended  by  the  Portu¬ 
guese,  Almeida.  They  set  up  a  vast  empire  on  land, 
and  trusted  to  the  monopoly  given  them  by  the  Papal 
Bull  and  the  restrictive  legislation  of  the  motherland 
to  preserve  to  Spain  the  fruits  of  their  endeavour. 
No  export,  other  than  that  of  the  precious  metals,  was 
at  first  permitted  from  the  new  territories;  the  vine 
and  the  olive  were  not  to  be  cultivated  in  the  New 
World,  lest  they  should  interfere  with  the  Spanish 


Ii6 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


trade  in  oil  and  wine;  commerce  was  confined  to  the 
port  of  Cadiz,  and  might  only  be  carried  on  in  the 
galleons  specially  appointed  for  the  purpose.  Spanish 
America  was  made  the  personal  appanage  of  the  sover¬ 
eign.  Under  such  conditions,  sea  power  could  not 
grow  healthily.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  a  large  num¬ 
ber  of  ships  were  employed;  but,  as  Columbus  said, 
in  the  early  days,  when  once  the  passage  was  made, 
the  course  was  so  easy  that  every  tailor  sought  a  licence 
to  turn  explorer.  The  Spaniards  no  more  acquired 
the  true  habit  of  the  sea,  necessary  to  meet  the  emer¬ 
gencies  soon  to  confront  them,  than  do  the  stewards 
of  a  transatlantic  liner  in  our  own  days.  So  far  as  the 
military  navy  of  Spain  was  concerned,  the  soldiers 
ruled  it,  and  to  the  soldiers’  conception  of  sea  fighting 
it  had  to  conform. 

It  was  essentially  a  Mediterranean,  not  an  oceanic, 
fleet.  It  won  glory  in  that  inland  sea;  little,  if  any, 
outside  it.  But  a  new  conception  of  sea  warfare  was 
arising,  which  was  destined  to  make  it  a  thing  apart 
from  land  warfare.  The  English  mariners,  who  now 
began  to  fare  forth,  seeking  the  North-West  Passage 
to  India,  or  braving  other  stormy  seas  which  called 
for  skill,  resolution,  and  resource,  were,  for  the  most 
part,  private  adventurers.  Their  ships  were  small, 
as  had  been  the  ships  of  Columbus  and  Bartholomew 
Diaz,  and  they  remained  small,  handy,  and  weatherly 
when  the  Spaniards  turned  to  building  their  huge  sea 
castles.  When  the  break  with  Rome  removed  the 
reverence  inspired  by  Pope  Alexander’s  Bull,  and  made 
it  a  pious  duty,  as  well  as  a  profitable  recreation,  to 
“singe  the  beard”  of  his  Catholic  Majesty,  they  neces¬ 
sarily  went  into  forbidden  seas,  and  thus  they  came 
to  evolve  a  system  of  purely  naval  tactics.  They  had 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


n  7 

no  soldiers  to  carry,  and,  if  they  had  possessed  them 
there  was  no  room  for  them  in  their  little  ships,  in 
which  all  available  space  was  needed  for  rich  cargoes. 
So  the  sailors  themselves  learned  to  work  the  guns 
which  the  dangers  of  the  sea  compelled  all  traders  to 
carry.  They  fought  their  ships  as  well  as  sailed  them. 

Finally,  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  the 
Armada,  the  Netherlands  revolted  against  the  Spanish 
Crown.  The  religious  quarrel  was  already  acute,  and 
the  English  instinct,  which  sees  in  Antwerp  a  pistol 
pointed  at  the  heart  of  England,  began  to  take  alarm 
at  the  presence  of  Spanish  armaments  in  the  Flemish 
and  Dutch  ports.  The  “sea-beggars,”  as  the  naval 
forces  of  the  revolutionaries  were  called,  did  not  lack 
volunteers  from  England,  nor  even  direct  aid  from  the 
cautious  Elizabeth,  before  hostilities  were  actually  de¬ 
clared  between  the  Island  State  and  the  great  military 
Power  of  the  Continent. 

Before  entering  upon  the  story  of  the  Armada,  it 
may  be  well  to  describe  briefly  the  part  which  England 
played  in  the  work  of  discovery  and  the  growth  of  the 
sea  spirit  among  our  people.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
the  two  explorers  who  first  brought  fame  to  England 
and  laid  the  foundation  of  her  oversea  empire  were 
Italians,  as  were  those  who  went  forth  for  Spain. 
John  Cabot,  a  Genoese  by  birth,  but  a  citizen  of  Venice, 
was  settled  at  Bristol  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
and  had  become  a  wealthy  merchant.  In  1497,  having 
heard  of  the  exploits  of  Columbus,  he  sought  and  ob¬ 
tained  from  Henry  VII.  the  following  remarkable  licence : 

Henry,  by  the  Grace  of  God  King  of  England  and 
France,  Lord  of  Ireland,  to  our  trusty  and  well-beloved 
subjects,  greeting: 


Ii8 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Be  it  known  to  all  that  We  have  given  and  granted, 
and,  by  these  presents,  do  give  and  grant,  to  Our  well- 
beloved  John  Cabot,  citizen  of  Venice;  to  Lewis,  Sebastian, 
and  Sanctius,  sons  of  the  said  John,  and  to  their  heirs 
and  deputies,  full  and  free  authority,  leave  and  power 
to  sail  to  all  parts,  countries,  and  seas  of  the  East,  of  the 
West,  and  of  the  North,  under  our  banners  and  ensigns, 
with  five  ships  of  whatsoever  burthen  and  quality  they 
shall  choose,  and  as  many  mariners  and  men  as  they  will 
take  with  them  in  the  ships  upon  their  own  proper  costs 
and  charges,  to  look  out,  find,  and  discover  whatsoever 
isles,  countries,  regions,  or  provinces  of  the  Heathen  or 
Infidels,  wheresoever  they  be,  and  in  what  part  soever  of 
the  world,  which  before  this  time  hath  not  been  known  to 
all  Christians. 

He  proceeds  to  give  the  Cabots  authority  to  occupy 
and  possess  all  cities  and  towns,  subject  to  an  obliga¬ 
tion  to  pay  him  one-fifth  of  all  their  profits  on  their 
return  to  Bristol,  at  which  port  only  they  were  bound 
to  arrive,  and  he  bids  all  his  subjects  give  their  aid  to 
furnish  them  forth. 

This  licence  observes  very  strictly  the  Bull  of  Alex¬ 
ander  VI.  Cabot  may  sail  “East,  West,  or  North.” 
He  is  not  empowered  to  sail  south,  the  only  direction 
in  which  he  could  interfere  with  either  Spain  or  Por¬ 
tugal,  and  his  rights  are  limited  to  the  lands  inhabited 
by  heathen  or  infidels  not  hitherto  known  to  Christians. 
So  had  he  discovered  the  North-West  Passage,  and 
reached  India  by  that  route,  he  would  still  have  been 
debarred  from  poaching  on  the  Portuguese  preserve. 
The  conditions  imposed  bear  a  striking  resemblance 
to  those  imposed  later  on  their  subjects  by  the  kings 
of  Spain.  If  British  discovery  had  depended  alto¬ 
gether  on  voyages  made  by  royal  licence  the  British 


A  Galleon  of  the  Fifteenth  Century 

(Jurien  de  la  Graviere) 


A  Galley  of  the  Sixteenth  Century 

(Jurien  de  la  Graviere) 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


119 


system  would  probably  have  prospered  no  better  than 
the  Spanish. 

Cabot  sailed  from  Bristol  in  the  Matthew  in  1497, 
and,  on  June  24th,  discovered  Newfoundland.  He 
then  went  on  to  St.  John’s  and  the  continent  of  North 
America.  He  returned,  bringing  with  him  three  men 
from  Newfoundland,  just  as  Columbus  brought  back 
the  Caribbean  Indians.  He  was  persuaded  that  the 
land  he  had  discovered  was  the  dominion  of  the  Cham 
of  Tartary,  just  as  the  followers  of  Vasco  da  Gama 
imagined  that  they  had  fallen  in  with  the  subjects  of 
Prester  John.  Shakespeare,  in  whose  plays  the  wit, 
wonder,  and  audacity  of  the  time  so  bubble  forth, 
makes  Benedick  profess  his  willingness  “to  bring  you 
the  length  of  Prester  John’s  foot:  fetch  you  a  hair  from 
the  great  Cham’s  beard,’’  rather  than  hold  three  words’ 
conference  with  “my  Lady  Tongue.’’  Shakespeare 
knew  how  England  had  “suffered  a  sea  change,’’  and 
he  knew  it  direct  from  the  men  who  sat  round  the  tavern 
fire  at  Wapping  or  Deptford.  His  large  humanity 
was  not  learned  in  the  Temple.  He  lived  nearer  the 
salt  of  the  sea. 

After  Cabot’s  return,  the  traders  of  Bristol  formed 
the  “Company  of  Merchant  Adventurers,’’  seeking 
the  North-West  and  North-East  Passages  to  India. 
Sir  Hugh  Willoughby,  in  1553,  essayed  to  find  the 
latter,  but  perished  with  seventy  of  his  men  in  the  ice. 
The  rest,  headed  by  Richard  Chancellor,  reached 
Archangel,  and  travelled  thence  to  Moscow.  This  led 
to  the  establishment  of  trade  with  Russia  through  the 
English  Muscovy  Company. 

Thus  we  come  to  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  well  called 
“spacious.”  With  the  loss  of  Calais  in  Mary’s  reign 
went  the  last  physical  link  with  the  Continent,  the 


120 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


last  pretension  to  the  Kingdom  of  France,  save  for  the 
inscription  which  the  kings  retained  on  their  coins, 
in  the  same  spirit  as  the  Spaniards,  to  this  day,  de¬ 
scribe  Gibraltar  as  “in  temporary  occupation  of  the 
English,”  and  send  an  officer  once  a  year  to  inspect  the 
fortress.  Of  all  the  old  Duchy  of  Normandy,  there 
remained  to  the  line  of  William  the  Conqueror  only 
the  Channel  Islands,  the  natural  appanage  of  the  race 
which  had  prevailed  at  sea.  The  fleet  was  no  longer  a 
ferry  to  the  possessions  of  English  sovereigns  abroad, 
but  a  weapon  consciously  maintained  to  defend  the 
shores  of  the  kingdom  and  to  protect  its  ever-growing 
trade  overseas.  English  fishermen  swarmed  to  the 
banks  of  Newfoundland,  and,  though  inferior  in  num¬ 
bers  to  the  French,  yet  claimed  the  mastery  and 
graciously  extended  to  the  others  their  protection.  Fro¬ 
bisher  voyaged  twice  to  the  north  in  search  of  the  fabled 
Eldorado,  which,  had  he  been  able  to  sail  across  a  frozen 
continent,  he  might  indeed  have  found  on  the  Yukon. 
Sir  Humphrey  Gilbert  essayed  the  first  settlement  on 
the  shores  of  the  North  American  Continent,  only  to 
perish  gallantly  at  sea.  Finally,  Hawkyns  and  Drake 
now  began  their  brilliant  filibustering  career,  to  be 
followed  later  by  Raleigh.  Gold  was  still  the  object 
of  their  quest.  But,  unlike  the  Spaniards,  they  sought 
it,  not  on  the  land,  but  by  the  sea,  and  from  the  Span¬ 
iards  themselves.  “ Sic  vos,  non  vobis /”  The  Dons 
laboured,  and  the  English  entered  into  the  fruit  of 
their  labour. 

All  this  is  a  well-known  story.  Despite  the  start 
which  the  Spaniards  and  Portuguese  had  obtained,  it 
was  an  Englishman  who  first  circumnavigated  the  globe, 
for  although  Magellan’s  ship,  the  Victoria ,  accom¬ 
plished  the  voyage,  Magellan  himself  did  not  live  to 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


121 


return.  Drake’s  career  of  adventure  began  in  1567, 
when  he  commanded  the  Judith  in  the  expedition  which 
ended  in  Hawkyns’s  amazing  exploit  at  Vera  Cruz. 
After  harrying  the  Don  in  the  Spanish  Main,  Hawkyns 
cast  anchor  in  the  strongly  defended  harbour  of  that 
port,  and,  under  its  very  guns,  demanded  of  the  Span¬ 
iards  provisions  and  water.  There  were  treasure  ships 
in  the  harbour,  and  of  these  Hawkyns  determined  to 
possess  himself.  Thirteen  Spanish  ships  of  war  ap¬ 
proached,  so  the  Englishman  had  to  abandon  his 
project.  But  he  sent  word  to  the  governor  that  “it 
did  not  suit  his  purpose  that  the  Spanish  ships  should 
enter  the  harbour,”  and  for  three  whole  days  the 
Spanish  Admiral  remained  outside.  Then  it  was  ar¬ 
ranged  that  he  should  enter,  and  that  Hawkyns  should 
hold  the  island  against  which  his  ships  were  moored. 
The  Spaniards,  however,  broke  the  agreement  and 
attacked  the  English  ships  while  Hawkyns  and  most 
of  his  men  were  ashore.  After  a  fierce  engagement 
against  odds,  two  English  ships  succeeded  in  putting 
to  sea,  and  Hawkyns  and  his  surviving  men  rowed  after 
them.  The  other  three  vessels  were  destroyed.  Half- 
starved,  Hawkyns,  Drake,  and  a  few  followers  at  length 
reached  England. 

Nothing  could  daunt  Drake,  however.  Born  in 
Devon  and  nurtured  in  Kent,  the  seafaring  blood  of 
Viking  ancestors  ran  in  his  blood  full  tide.  Two  years 
later,  he  had  fitted  out  two  small  ships,  the  Dragon  of 
seventy  tons,  and  the  Swan  of  twenty-five.  He  shipped 
seventy-three  men  and  boys,  with  whom  he  set  out  to 
harry  the  Don.  He  fell  in  with  another  ship  of  fifty 
tons,  whose  crew  raised  his  force  to  one  hundred  and 
twenty.  He  reached  the  Isthmus  of  Darien,  intend¬ 
ing  to  attack  Nombre  de  Dios.  But  information  that 


122 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


a  train  of  mules  laden  with  treasure  was  on  its  way  to 
the  sea  induced  him  to  alter  his  intention.  He  am¬ 
bushed  the  train,  took  the  treasure,  buried  it,  and  then, 
from  the  peak  in  Darien,  he  beheld  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
His  soul  was  fired  by  the  prospect  thus  presented.  He 
sought  no  more  fighting,  but  returned  to  England  and 
fitted  out  a  new  expedition  of  five  ships.  The  largest 
was  the  Pelican ,  later  called  the  Golden  Hind ,  of  125 
tons,  which  was  Drake’s  flagship.  He  had  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  sixty  gentlemen  adventurers  with  him.  He 
reached  the  Straits  of  Magellan  on  May  20,  1578, 
got  into  fearful  weather,  and  arrived  at  Valparaiso 
with  his  own  ship  only.  Outside  the  port  he  came  upon 
a  great  galleon,  the  crew  of  which,  never  dreaming 
that  an  Englishman  was  in  the  neighbourhood,  greeted 
him  with  cheers.  Drake  ran  alongside,  and,  hoisting 
the  English  flag,  sprang  into  the  chains  sword  in  hand. 
The  Spaniards  recognised  him.  El  Draque,  the 
incarnation  of  the  Evil  One,  was  upon  them.  They 
screamed  with  terror  and  jumped  overboard  without 
so  much  as  drawing  their  swords.  Drake  took  treasure 
to  the  value  of  £80,000.  But  the  comedv  did  not 
end  there.  The  escaped  sailors  spread  the  panic  to 
the  city,  and  the  English  landed  only  to  see  the  in¬ 
habitants,  headed  by  the  governor,  streaming  away  to 
the  mountains. 

From  Valparaiso,  Drake  sailed  to  Tarapaca.  Here 
the  comedy  became  broad  farce.  The  English  found 
piles  of  silver  bars  lying  loose  on  the  wharves,  and 
their  guardians  fast  asleep.  They  removed  the  whole 
lot  without  waking  them,  and  then  lay  in  ambush  while 
another  mule  convoy  approached.  The  muleteers  un¬ 
loaded  their  burdens  and  lay  down  for  a  siesta.  The 
English  had  that  lot  too.  Then  the  Golden  Hind  sailed 


A  Galley  Running  before  the  Wind 

(Jurien  de  la  Graviere) 


An  Admiral’s  Galley 

(Furttenbach,  Architectura  Navalis,  1612) 


. 


. 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


123 


out  of  harbour  and  shaped  her  course  for  Lima.  Here 
there  were  twelve  great  galleons  in  harbour  with  their 
crews  ashore.  But  they  were  empty  of  treasure,  so 
Drake  contented  himself  with  cutting  their  cables  and 
sending  them  adrift  while  he  started  off  after  the 
Cacafuegos ,  a  galleon  which  had  started  two  days  be¬ 
fore,  “her  ribs  abulge  with  bullion  for  the  King  of 
Spain’s  own  treasury.”  Drake  overhauled  her,  and 
the  Spanish  captain,  never  suspecting  the  presence  of 
an  Englishman  in  those  waters,  in  which  he  felt  lonely, 
shortened  sail  in  order  that  the  Golden  Hind  might  come 
up  with  him.  The  galleon  was  taken  almost  without 
a  fight.  With  his  very  ballast  replaced  by  gold  and 
silver,  Drake  sailed  off  across  the  Pacific  in  order  to 
avoid  a  squadron  which  was  now  lying  in  wait  for  him 
near  the  Straits  of  Magellan.  After  a  narrow  escape 
from  shipwreck  off  the  Philippines,  he  arrived  at 
Plymouth  on  September  25,  1580,  with  spoil  worth 
three  millions  sterling  of  our  money.  Mendoza,  the 
Ambassador  of  the  King  of  Spain,  protested  vehemently 
against  Drake’s  insolence  in  daring  to  sail  in  the  Span¬ 
ish  Main.  Said  Elizabeth  in  reply:  “Tell  your  Royal 
Master  that  a  title  to  the  ocean  cannot  belong  to  any 
people  or  private  persons,  forasmuch  as  neither  nature 
nor  public  use  and  custom  permitteth  any  possession 
thereof.”  Thus  Gloriana  asserted  the  principle  of 
the  “Freedom  of  the  Seas.”  The  gauntlet  was  down. 
Philip  slowly,  lethargically,  timidly,  began  to  make 
him  ready  to  take  it  up. 

The  voyage  of  the  Golden  Hind  will  stand  out  for 
all  time  as  a  model  of  the  “joyous  venture.”  Accord¬ 
ing  to  the  ideas  of  our  time,  of  course  it  was  piracy, 
naked  and  unabashed.  But  what  Englishman  is  there 
so  free  from  original  sin  that  he  can  read  the  recital 


124 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


without  glorying  in  the  light-hearted  daring  of  his 
countrymen?  Besides,  it  must  be  remembered  that, 
at  this  time,  and  for  long  afterwards,  it  was  quite  a 
common  occurrence  for  two  nations  to  be  essentially 
at  war  while,  for  political  reasons,  their  governments 
remained  nominally  at  peace.  Elizabeth  herself  was 
aiding  the  rebellious  subjects  of  the  King  of  Spain  in 
the  Low  Countries.  She  had  her  reasons  for  main¬ 
taining  the  pretence  of  peace,  and  Philip  had  his.  But 
the  Spaniards  were  capturing  and  torturing  English 
seamen  whenever  they  could,  as  a  penalty  for  infring¬ 
ing  the  monopoly  granted  by  the  Pope,  and  the  wrath 
of  the  English  was  rising  to  the  boiling  point.  Drake 
himself,  God-fearing  as  he  was  dauntless,  truest  of 
patriots,  though  not  insensible  (any  more  than  was 
Nelson)  to  the  advantages  of  worldly  gain,  believed 
himself  to  be  engaged  in  a  holy  war,  and  we  may  fairly 
adopt  his  view.  The  sensitive  spot  of  the  Spanish 
Empire  was  the  sea  communications  by  which  the 
wealth  on  which  Spain  had  come  to  depend  reached 
her  shores.  To  capture  that  wealth  in  transit  was  the 
surest  means  available  to  the  English,  who  had  no  army 
which  could  hope  to  contend  with  the  famous  Spanish 
infantry,  to  cripple  the  resources  of  Philip,  to  ward 
off  the  menace  from  their  own  land,  and  to  aid  the 
people  of  the  Low  Countries  who  were  struggling  against 
the  greatest  captain  of  the  age,  the  Duke  of  Alva. 
Elizabeth’s  real  opinion  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  she 
knighted  Drake  and  ordered  the  Golden  Hind  to  be 
preserved  at  Deptford  as  a  memorial  of  the  valour  of 
her  seamen.  That  covetousness  had  small  share  in 
prompting  Drake’s  actions  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
he  kept  no  more  than  £10,000  of  the  spoil  for  himself 
and  set  aside  a  like  sum  for  his  crew.  The  rest  was 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


125 


kept  in  the  Tower  until  matter  were  settled  with  Spain, 
and  eventually,  no  doubt,  found  its  way  into  Elizabeth’s 
Treasury. 

Adventures  now  poured  thick  and  fast  upon 
“Frankie.”  Two  or  three  years  later  he  was  off  Vigo 
with  a  fleet  fitted  out  by  the  City  of  London  to  effect 
the  delivery  of  some  British  sailors  who  had  been 
treacherously  made  captive  by  the  Spaniards.  The 
Queen  told  Drake  that,  if  it  suited  her  purpose,  she 
should  disown  him. 

“As  you  will,  Madam,”  he  replied.  “Let  me  have 
a  free  hand,  and  it  may  be  an  affair  of  privateers,  and 
nothing  to  do  with  the  Government  of  England.  My 
plan  is  to  find  the  crews  that  were  caught  and  set  them 
free — and  get  what  else  we  can,  Madam.” 

“I  am  supposed  to  know  nothing  about  that,”  was 
the  Queen’s  cautious  answer. 

In  the  end,  Drake  did  not  succeed  in  rescuing  the 
crews,  nor  did  he  acquire  much  booty.  But  he  sacked 
San  Domingo  and  burned  the  shipping  there,  adding 
to  the  terror  of  his  name.  By  1587,  there  was  sterner 
work  in  hand.  The  news  of  the  Armada  had  reached 
England,  and  Drake  set  forth  to  discover  how  much 
truth  there  was  in  it.  He  arrived  off  Cadiz,  which  was 
crowded  with  ships.  A  great  galleon  was  moored  across 
the  entrance  to  the  harbour,  but  he  fired  on  her  and 
sank  her.  The  crews  of  the  Spanish  ships  leaped  over¬ 
board  at  the  terror  of  his  name.  Drake  sank  no  fewer 
than  thirty-five,  or,  according  to  some  accounts,  eighty 
of  Philip’s  ships  of  war.  He  was  about  to  repeat  the 
exploit  in  the  Tagus  when  imperative  orders  from  the 
Queen  called  him  home. 

Philip  had  at  last  made  up  his  mind  to  war.  A 
stream  of  messengers  from  Rome  urged  him  to  action. 


126 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


The  crown  of  England  was  promised  by  the  Pope  to 
him  who  would  invade  the  country  and  crush  the  heretic 
Queen.  Philip,  an  eldest  son  of  the  Church,  was  un¬ 
able  to  withstand  the  pressure.  He  relied  on  the  aid 
of  a  Roman  Catholic  rising  in  England,  a  hope  which 
was  bitterly  disappointed.  The  nation  had  been  welded 
into  one,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  five  hundred  years 
which  had  passed  since  the  Norman  Conquest.  To 
preserve  his  island  home  inviolate  was  the  first  care 
of  every  Englishman.  His  sovereign,  though  her 
descent  derived  from  the  Norman,  had  in  her  the  blood 
of  Cedric  and  of  Arthur;  she  was  the  daughter  of 
Henry,  who  had  freed  the  realm  from  the  usurped 
authority  of  Rome  in  temporal  matters,  a  thing  welcome 
even  to  those  Englishmen  who  still  looked  upon  the 
Pope  as  the  spiritual  Head  of  Christendon.  Histo¬ 
rians  may  paint  Elizabeth  as  an  elderly  coquette, 
faithless,  fickle,  cruel,  and  miserly.  But  to  her  sub¬ 
jects,  she  was  Gloriana,  worshipped  in  verse  and  prose, 
appealing  to  their  chivalry  by  her  sex,  and  to  their 
manhood  by  her  lion  heart.  She  intrigued;  she 
starved  her  sailors  both  of  food  and  ammunition.  But 
to  one  and  all  who  served  her  she  was  the  embodiment 
of  right  and  liberty,  while  Philip  wTas  the  enemy  of 
mankind.  They  knew  the  gloomy  tyrant.  He  had 
been  husband  to  an  English  Queen. 

The  Royal  Navy  was  made  ready  for  the  fight.  The 
Lord  High  Admiral,  Howard,  had  his  flag  in  the  Ark 
Royal.  Drake,  as  Vice-Admiral,  had  his  in  the  Re¬ 
venge.  The  first  Dreadnought  was  in  the  fleet,  and  the 
first  Swiftsure,  Triumph,  War  spite,  and  Bonaventure; 
the  first  Lion  and  the  first  Tiger.  Elizabeth  was  fond 
of  coining  strange  names  for  her  ships.  Strangest  of 
all,  the  Elizabeth  Jonas ,  so  called  because,  said  the 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


127 


Queen,  she  trusted  the  Lord  to  deliver  her  out  of  her 
present  peril  as  He  delivered  Jonas  from  the  belly  of 
the  fish.  There  were,  besides,  a  crowd  of  armed 
merchantmen. 

Philip’s  plan  for  the  invasion  of  England,  or,  perhaps, 
one  should  say  the  plan  of  Parma  and  Santa  Cruz, 
was,  in  all  essentials,  that  of  Napoleon  in  1803.  The 
fleet,  with  six  thousand  sailors  and  seventeen  thousand 
soldiers  on  board,  was  to  sail  from  sundry  Spanish 
ports  and  rendezvous  off  the  Scilly  Islands.  Parma, 
with  an  army  of  36,000  men,  awaited  it  at  Dunkirk. 
Could  the  Spaniards  maintain  the  command  of  the 
Channel  for  twenty-four  hours,  the  doom  of  England 
would  be  sealed.  Parma,  like  Napoleon,  waited. 
But  everything  went  wrong  with  the  undertaking. 
Santa  Cruz  died  and  the  command  was  given  to  the 
Duke  of  Medina  Sidonia,  a  man  so  incapable  that 
even  his  wife  laughed  when  she  heard  of  his  appoint¬ 
ment,  saying  he  would  be  better  on  a  horse  than  in  a 
ship.  Rascally  contractors  supplied  the  fleet  with 
stinking  provisions  and  foul  water;  many  men  were 
sick  and  died  from  this  cause.  Finally,  when  at  last 
the  Armada  put  to  sea,  it  was  caught  in  a  tempest  and 
driven  into  Corunna  in  a  shattered  condition. 

What,  meanwhile,  were  the  English  doing?  Drake, 
from  a  bold  buccaneer,  now  revealed  himself  as  a  naval 
strategist  of  the  first  order.  His  letters  to  the  Queen 
and  Walsingham  lay  down  the  strategy  on  which 
England  has  ever  since  relied  for  her  safety.  Writing 
to  the  Lords  of  the  Council  on  March  30,  1588,  he  says: 

My  very  good  lords,  next  under  God’s  mighty  protection, 
the  advantage  and  gain  of  time  and  place  will  be  the  only 
and  chief  means  to  our  good,  wherein  I  must  humbly  be- 


128 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


seech  your  good  lordships  to  persevere  as  you  have  begun, 
for  that,  with  fifty  sail  of  shipping,  we  shall  do  more  good 
upon  their  own  coast  than  a  great  many  more  will  do  here 
at  home,  and  the  sooner  we  are  gone,  the  better  we  shall 
be  able  to  impeach  them. 

He  wrote  in  a  similar  sense  to  the  Queen. 

Elizabeth  and  her  counsellors,  however,  would  have 
none  of  it.  Her  Majesty  was  even  incensed  with 
Drake  because  he  wasted  good  powder  at  gun-practice. 
She  still  professed  that  she  did  not  wish  to  give  offence 
to  the  King  of  Spain.  A  great  deal  has  been  said  and 
written  about  the  Queen’s  parsimony  and  about  the 
lack  of  provisions  and  powder.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  both  were  lamentably  short.  When  the  English 
set  out  to  chase  the  Armada  up  Channel,  they  had 
only  two  days’  supply  of  powder  on  board  their  ships. 
But  there  is  this  much  to  be  said  for  Gloriana.  The 
idea  of  making  a  long  sojourn  off  the  enemy’s  ports 
was  new,  just  as  the  whole  theory  of  sea-fighting 
evolved  by  Howard,  Drake,  and  Hawkyns  was  new, 
and  born  of  their  experiences  when  roving  the  Spanish 
Main.  This  had  been  denied  by  good  authorities, 
who  point  out  that,  from  the  time  of  Hubert  de  Burgh, 
it  had  been  the  wont  of  the  English  to  go  forth  and  meet 
the  enemy  at  sea,  or  attack  him  in  his  ports.  Most 
true.  But  these  were  military  expeditions  on  ship¬ 
board.  The  ships  were  regarded  as  transports,  or,  at 
most,  as  fields  of  battle  on  which  soldiers  fought 
according  to  the  rules  of  land-warfare.  The  cannon, 
when  cannon  began  to  be  used,  were  meant  to  mow 
down  the  enemy’s  men-at-arms  and  to  hew  a  way 
through  his  defences — like  the  preparatory  bombard¬ 
ment  of  to-day — in  order  that  the  boarders  might 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


129 


bring  the  affair  to  an  issue  in  a  short  and  sharp  tussle. 
But  that  a  fleet  should  keep  the  sea,  beating  on  and  off 
the  enemy’s  ports;  waiting  for  him  to  come  out  in 
order  to  destroy  him  by  gun-fire  at  long  bowls,  was 
something  new  in  kind,  and  not  merely  an  extension 
of  the  old  theory  of  warfare  to  more  distant  waters. 
Our  own  record  as  to  ammunition  supply  in  the  present 
war  is  not  beyond  criticism,  and  the  story  goes  that 
a  certain  general,  in  apportioning  the  amount  of  shell 
for  a  certain  operation,  was  guided  by  the  precedent 
of  Inkerman.  We  may,  therefore,  judge  the  mis¬ 
calculation  of  Elizabeth  and  her  advisers  lightly.  But 
her  seamen  had  no  choice  save  to  fight  on  the  new 
model.  The  little  English  ships  would  have  stood  no 
chance  against  the  mighty  galleons  of  Spain,  had  it 
come  to  boarding.  They  fought  as  experience  of  the 
sea  had  taught  them  to  fight,  and  against  a  lands¬ 
man’s  navy,  they  proved  themselves  invincible,' despite 
all  the  miscalculations  and  errors  of  the  Queen’s 
Government. 

The  evening  of  the  day  at  the  end  of  July,  1588,  on 
which  Drake  boarded  his  flagship,  after  finishing  the 
famous  game  of  bowls  on  Plymouth  Hoe,  saw  the  Eng¬ 
lish  victory  secure.  A  Spanish  flagship  was  captured; 
two  more  great  galleons  were  sunk.  The  English 
had  suffered  hardly  a  scratch.  All  through  the  week 
the  Spaniards  lumbered  up  the  Channel  with  the 
English  hanging  on  to  them,  but  never  giving  them  a 
chance  to  close.  On  the  Sunday  night  following,  the 
Armada  was  in  Dunkirk  Roads,  and  Howard  loosed 
fireships  against  it.  In  terror,  the  Spaniards  cut  their 
cables.  Seventy  ships  of  war  went  north  and  took 
no  further  part  in  the  fighting.  The  rest  found  them¬ 
selves  on  the  Goodwin  Sands,  where  some  went  aground 


130 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


and  all  were  hotly  attacked,  lying  in  a  huddled  mass, 
by  the  English  fleet.  They  crashed  together;  they 
fired  into  each  other,  and  sank  their  own  ships.  They 
were  not  seamen,  and  they  did  not  understand  the  new 
form  of  sea-fighting  by  which  the  artillery  of  the  ships 
decided  the  battle  instead  of  merely  preparing  the  way 
for  the  assault  of  the  men-at-arms.  But  they  fought 
to  the  bitter  end,  with  a  heroism  worthy  of  the  gallant 
Spanish  infantry,  of  which  the  ship’s  complements 
were  mainly  composed.  At  last  came  dead  silence 
after  the  roar  of  the  fray.  Both  sides  had  expended 
their  powder,  and  the  shattered  remnant  of  the  Span¬ 
ish  fleet  took  the  opportunity  to  follow  their  seventy 
consorts  to  the  northward.  Sixty  ships  and  ten 
thousand  starved  and  scurvy-stricken  men  were  all 
that  found  their  way  home  north-about.  The  English 
lost  no  single  ship,  while  of  men  but  sixty-eight  were 
killed  or  wounded.  The  victors  gave  the  glory  to 
God.  “ Efflavit  Deus ,  et  dissipati  sunt .”  The  words 
stand  to-day  on  the  base  of  Drake’s  statue  on  Ply¬ 
mouth  Hoe.  It  is  the  seaman’s  way.  “These  men 
see  the  works  of  the  Lord  and  His  wonders  in  the  deep : 
For  at  His  word  the  stormy  wind  ariseth  which  lifteth 
up  the  waves  thereof.”  That  sense  of  dependence  on 
Providence  is  not  the  least  of  the  sources  of  strength 
which  attend  sea  power. 

The  ruin  of  the  Armada  ended  the  direct  threat  to 
England;  but  it  by  no  means  ended  the  war.  The 
further  events  and  their  consequences,  however,  will 
be  best  dealt  with  hereafter.  But  there  are  a  few  points 
which  must  be  noticed  here.  First  of  all,  it  should  be 
realised  that  the  fleet  which  won  the  victory  was  by 
no  means  wholly,  or  even  mainly,  composed  of  the 
Queen’s  ships.  Elizabeth  had  increased  her  father’s 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


131 

navy  by  comparatively  few  vessels.  Of  the  forty-nine 
sail  which  followed  Drake  up  Channel,  only  thirteen, 
according  to  some  authorities,  were  Queen’s  ships  of 
four  hundred  tons  and  above.  Including  cutters  and 
pinnaces,  there  were  no  more  than  thirty-eight  ships 
all  told  flying  her  ensign.  The  rest  of  the  fleet  con¬ 
sisted  of  armed  merchantmen  and  ships  fitted  out 
by  private  adventurers.  These  were  very  sparsely 
manned,  some  of  them  having  no  more  than  thirty  men 
all  told.  The  seamen  of  Britain,  therefore,  were,  of  ne¬ 
cessity,  also  the  sea  fighters.  Good  man  as  the  English¬ 
man  was  ashore,  we  had  no  standing  army,  no  body  of 
trained  and  disciplined  infantry  like  the  Spaniards. 
But  our  sailors  had  learned  war  on  the  Spanish  Main. 
In  the  latter  stages  of  the  war,  soldiers  were  embarked 
to  make  descents  on  the  Spanish  coast;  but  sea  fight¬ 
ing  and  land  fighting  were  kept  distinct.  Later  again, 
in  Cromwell’s  time,  the  New  Model  supplied  soldiers 
for  service  afloat.  After  that,  it  became  the  recognised 
rule  that  sea  fighting  was  the  function  of  the  “tar¬ 
paulin.”  The  surviving  exception  is  the  Royal  Regi¬ 
ment  of  Marines. 

The  absence  of  soldiers  on  shipboard  dictated  the 
tactics  of  the  running  fight,  for  the  seamen  had  to  fight 
the  guns  as  well  as  to  work  the  ship.  No  boarding 
parties  could  be  spared,  nor  men  to  repel  boarders. 
The  handiness  of  the  ships  themselves  contributed 
to  dictate  the  advantage  of  the  running  fight.  The 
Spanish  formed  their  line  in  a  crescent,  in  the  hope 
that  the  English  would  run  in  between  the  horns,  which 
would  then  envelop  them  and  bring  them  to  close 
action.  But  Drake’s  fast  and  weatherly  ships  frus¬ 
trated  this  plan.  They  ran  under  the  stern  to  fire 
and  made  off  before  the  Spaniards  could  turn  to  bring 


132 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


their  broadsides  to  bear;  sometimes  coming  so  close 
that  the  enemy  could  not  depress  his  guns  sufficiently 
to  hit  them,  sometimes  “playing  long  bowls,”  which 
their  better  gunnery  enabled  them  to  do  with  effect 
and  impunity. 

When  people  talk  grandiloquently  about  the  English 
loving  to  close  and  disdaining  to  fight  at  long  range, 
they  ignore  the  whole  trend  of  our  naval  history  and 
miss  the  point  which  marks  the  special  aptitude  of  our 
seamen:  namely,  that  they  have  never  for  very  long 
allowed  themselves  to  be.  enslaved  by  a  theory.  They 
have  adapted  their  means  to  their  end.  When  Nelson 
went  into  action,  he  was  wont  to  make  the  signal, 
“Engage  the  enemy  more  closely.”  Drake,  every 
whit  as  brave  a  man  as  he,  played  “long  bowls.”  The 
object  of  all  fighting  is  decisive  victory.  Nelson, 
whose  ships  were  of  equal  or  superior  fighting  weight 
to  those  of  his  opponents  but  who  was  frequently 
outnumbered,  saw  that  decisive  victory  could  best  be 
gained  by  doubling  on  a  part  of  the  enemy’s  line  and 
trusting  to  the  superior  discipline  and  gunnery-training 
of  his  men.  Drake,  whose  ships  were  of  inferior  fight¬ 
ing  force,  saw  that  he  could  best  utilise  that  superior 
fighting  skill,  which  was  his  as  well  as  Nelson’s,  by 
lying  off  and  engaging  at  a  distance.  Of  what  service 
would  bull-dog  bravery  be,  if  the  fleet  on  which  the 
safety  of  England  depended  was  wiped  out?  Each  of 
these  great  seamen  attained  his  end  by  adapting  his 
means  thereto.  That  the  end  was  obtained  is  the 
only  thing  which  matters.  The  lesson  holds  good 
for  to-day. 

In  speaking  of  the  Elizabethan  navy,  one  talks  of 
Drake  as  naturally  as,  two  hundred  years  later,  one 
talks  of  Nelson.  There  were  other  famous  seamen 


THE  AGE  OF  DISCOVERY 


133 


in  the  days  of  each,  and  neither,  as  it  happened,  ever 
held  the  chief  command.  But  their  dazzling  person¬ 
alities  eclipse  all  their  worthy  compeers.  They  had 
little  in  common  save  devotion  to  their  country, 
courage  and  supreme  insight  and  skill.  But  their 
names  stand  out  in  the  eyes  of  their  countrymen  above 
the  Howards,  Rodneys,  Howes,  and  St.  Vincents,  and 
are  only  approached  by  those  of  Blake,  Cromwell’s 
great  general  at  sea,  and  Hawke,  the  victor  of  Quiberon 
Bay. 

Drake  fully  deserves  all  the  fame  which  is  his.  He 
was  the  type  of  that  full-blooded,  sunny,  chivalrous 
Elizabethan  life,  which,  in  other  spheres,  gave  us  Sir 
Philip  Sidney  and  Shakespeare  and  Spenser.  There 
were  meanness  and  cruelty  and  chicanery  in  the  age 
as  in  every  other;  but  the  breath  of  the  salt  sea  blew 
through  the  musty  dungeons  of  the  Middle  Ages; 
eyes  grown  dim  in  the  darkness  rejoiced  in  the  sunlight 
of  the  open  day,  and  cramped  muscles  stretched  them¬ 
selves  in  an  enlarged  world.  The  roll  of  Drake’s  drum 
called  England  to  her  destiny. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 

After  the  Armada  had  been  hounded  by  Howard 
and  Drake  through  the  Channel  and  scattered  by  the 
breath  of  God  in  its  voyage  north-about,  the  war  against 
Philip  changed  its  character.  Elizabeth  and  her  coun¬ 
sellors  had  not  yet  learned  the  full  meaning  and  advan¬ 
tage  of  sea  power.  The  conditions  of  defence  were 
known;  those  of  attack  had  not  yet  been  sufficiently 
studied.  The  Queen  was  immersed  in  continental 
politics  and  concerned  for  her  position  as  the  protector 
of  Protestantism.  Before  the  Armada,  she  had  already 
sent  an  ill-equipped  expedition  under  Leicester  to  the 
Low  Countries  to  assist  the  revolted  subjects  of  Philip. 
In  1589  she  determined  to  give  the  Spanish  King  a 
Roland  for  his  Oliver  by  invading  his  home  territories. 
An  expedition  of  two  hundred  sail  and  twenty-one 
thousand  men  was  quickly  fitted  out  at  Plymouth 
under  the  command  of  Drake  and  Norris,  and  with  it 
went  one  Don  Antonio,  a  Churchman,  who  aspired 
to  the  crown  of  Portugal,  and  was  expected  to  stir  up 
a  revolt  among  the  Portuguese.  The  expedition  sacked 
Corunna  and  then  sailed  for  the  Tagus,  landing  and 
marching  through  Torres  Vedras  to  Lisbon.  It  met 
with  some  success  in  the  fighting,  but  returned  with 
disastrous  loss  from  disease  to  England. 

Two  years  later  occurred  the  heroic  incident  of  the 

134 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


135 


Revenge:  the  fight  of  the  “one  and  the  fifty-three”  off 
the  Azores.  It  was  one  of  those  mad  episodes  in  our 
history  which,  like  the  Balaklava  charge,  are  “mag¬ 
nificent,  but  not  war.”  So  long  as  we  remember  this 
fact  and  do  not  expect  all  British  commanders  to 
behave  in  a  harebrained  fashion  under  all  circum¬ 
stances,  such  incidents  have  a  value  which  is  worth  the 
gallant  blood  shed.  They  are  a  reminder  to  us  and  to 
the  world  that,  in  the  veins  of  the  “nation  of  shopkeep¬ 
ers,”  there  runs  not  the  cold  blood  of  commerce  alone, 
but  a  tide  of  fiery  courage  which  no  so-called  “military 
nation”  has  ever  surpassed. 

Whether  Sir  Richard  Grenville  was  merely  insub¬ 
ordinate  to  his  commander-in-chief,  or  whether,  as 
Tennyson  tells  us,  he  stayed  with  the  consent  of  the 
latter  to  get  his  sick  men  on  board  and  was  then  cut 
off,  his  exploit  and  his  end  warmed  the  courage  of  the 
men  of  his  own  day,  and  have  warmed  the  courage  of 
British  seamen  ever  since.  A  country  cannot  afford 
to  look  coldly  on  such  great  fights  against  odds  if  it 
would  see  the  martial  spirit  of  its  sons  maintained. 
The  fight  of  Drake’s  old  flagship,  however,  was  but  an 
episode  in  one  of  the  usual  raids  on  Spanish  communi¬ 
cations,  and  had  little  real  military  significance,  so 
far  as  the  larger  purposes  of  the  war  were  concerned. 

These  raids  continued  for  two  years  longer,  when 
Elizabeth’s  attention  was  diverted  to  a  new  enterprise. 
She  espoused  the  cause  of  Henry  of  Navarre,  in  her 
character  of  Protestant  champion.  English  troops 
were  sent  to  France  and  fought  bravely,  if  without 
decisive  effect,  against  the  Cardinal  of  Bourbon  and 
the  Catholic  League.  Then,  in  1593,  Henry  decided 
that  “Paris  was  worth  a  Mass,”  and  Elizabeth  lost 
interest  in  him.  Her  main  attention  was  once  more 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


136 

given  to  the  Spanish  War.  In  the  security  given  to 
her  realm  by  her  mastery  of  the  sea,  she  could  afford 
to  indulge  her  feminine  temperament,  varium  et  muta- 
bile  semper ,  as  other  female  sovereigns,  beset  with 
land  frontiers — Maria  Theresa  for  instance — could  not. 

In  1596,  Hawkyns  and  Drake  set  out  once  more  to 
raid  the  Spanish  Main.  The  expedition  proved  to  be 
the  last  undertaken  by  either  famous  seaman.  They 
were  repulsed  from  Porto  Rico,  where  Hawkyns  died. 
Drake  pushed  on  to  Nombre  de  Dios  and  landed  men. 
They  were,  however,  harassed  by  the  Spaniards.  Drake 
caught  a  fever  which  ended  his  glorious  career.  In 
the  same  year,  hearing  that  Philip  was  once  more 
assembling  a  fleet  for  the  invasion  of  England,  Eliza¬ 
beth  sent  a  powerful  armament,  consisting  of  a  hundred 
and  twenty  ships  with  seven  thousand  soldiers  and 
six  thousand  seamen,  besides  some  Dutch  auxiliaries, 
against  Cadiz.  The  army  was  commanded  by  the 
Earl  of  Essex,  the  fleet  by  Lord  Effingham,  with  Lord 
Thomas  Howard  and  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  among  his 
subordinate  commanders.  Cadiz  was  captured  and 
the  Spanish  fleet  destroyed.  Next  year,  a  similar 
expedition  was  sent  against  Ferrol  and  Corunna,  but 
the  attempt  to  capture  these  two  places  was  abandoned, 
the  fleet  proceeding  to  the  Azores,  where  Raleigh 
captured  Fayal. 

In  these  two  last  expeditions  of  Elizabeth’s  reign, 
Drake’s  policy  of  “impeaching  the  enemy  off  his  own 
shores”  is  allowed  to  prevail.  After  his  death,  Eliza¬ 
beth  does  of  her  own  accord  what  he  could  seldom  wring 
consent  from  her  to  do.  The  true  principle  of  the 
naval  defence  of  this  country  is  established,  never 
again  to  be  entirely  dropped.  And,  with  it,  the  seeds 
of  that  system  of  amphibious  strategy  which,  up  to 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


137 


the  present,  we  have  employed  in  all  our  great  wars, 
are  sown.  That  we  have  departed  widely  from  it  in 
the  present  struggle  is  a  fact  which  there  are  many 
reasons  to  regret.  The  circumstances  of  August  and 
September,  1914,  however,  left  us  no  choice  in  the 
matter.  Experience  shows  that  our  insular  position 
does  not  exclude  us  from  the  European  system  and  that 
we  can  never  cut  ourselves  free  entirely  from  Continen¬ 
tal  preoccupations  which,  from  time  to  time,  must 
necessitate  intervention  on  the  scale  of  a  Continental 
Land  Power.  It  must,  however,  always  be  a  disad¬ 
vantage  for  us  to  be  so  compelled. 

Elizabeth  left  England  supreme  in  war  at  sea.  The 
decrepitude  of  the  navy  of  Spain  had  been  fully  ex¬ 
posed;  Spanish  communications  lay  at  the  mercy  of 
the  English  seamen.  Our  country  had  now  a  race  of 
hardy  sailors  who  had  developed  a  method  of  fighting 
which  was  bred  of  the  sea  itself,  and  a  numerous  marine 
which  made  an  end  of  the  necessity  to  hire  ships  from 
Genoa,  Holland,  or  the  Hansa,  as  had  previously  been 
the  custom  with  English  monarchs.  But  for  purposes 
other  than  fighting,  the  sea  power  of  England  was  yet 
in  its  infancy.  There  was  little  trade,  properly  so 
called,  in  the  Atlantic,  save  the  Newfoundland  fisheries. 
The  blame  must  rest  on  the  Spanish  system,  not  on 
the  English;  but  the  fact  remains  that  the  various 
expeditions  fitted  out  by  the  Merchant  or  Gentlemen 
Adventurers  had  buccaneering  for  their  object.  Sea 
trade  was  confined  principally  to  Antwerp  and  the 
north  of  Europe.  The  Turkey  Company  was  founded 
in  1581  and  the  East  India  Company  in  1600.  But  it 
was  only  shortly  before  the  latter  date  that  English¬ 
men  made  the  voyage  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
to  India  which  the  Portuguese  had  made  a  hundred 


138 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


years  before.  Colonisation  had  proved,  so  far,  a 
failure.  Sir  Humphrey  Gilbert  had  taken  possession 
of  Newfoundland  in  the  name  of  the  Queen  in  1583; 
but  the  claim  was  disputed  then  and  many  years 
later  by  the  French.  The  attempt  of  his  step-brother, 
Raleigh,  to  colonise  Virginia  came  to  nought.  The 
sea  spirit,  however,  had  been  aroused  from  top  to 
bottom  of  the  nation.  That  was  the  great  gain  of 
the  Elizabethan  age  to  English  sea  power.  The  full 
fruits  were  to  be  garnered  later. 

The  two  following  reigns  saw  a  change  of  spirit  from 
that  of  the  Tudors  which  was  inimical  to  the  growth 
of  English,  or,  as  we  ought  now  to  call  it,  British,  sea 
power.  James  I.,  “the  wisest  fool  in  Christendom,” 
as  others  called  him,  or  “the  Caledonian  Solomon,” 
which  was  the  title  preferred  by  himself,  had  no  desire 
but  to  be  known  as  “The  Peacemaker.”  The  high 
claims  of  kingship  ever  put  forward  by  the  Stuarts 
made  him  seek  more  intimate  relations  with  Continental 
dynasties.  He  was  completely  under  the  thumb  of 
Gondomar,  the  astute  ambassador  of  the  Court  of 
Spain,  who  dangled  before  him  hopes  of  a  marriage 
between  “Baby  Charles”  and  the  Spanish  Infanta. 
Gondomar  at  any  rate  achieved  his  purpose  of  bringing 
about  a  peace  between  England  and  Spain,  which  left 
the  hands  of  his  master  free  to  prosecute  the  long  war 
against  the  Dutch,  to  separate  the  maritime  Powers 
from  one  another,  and  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  the 
German  Empire  with  such  effect  that  James’s  own 
son-in-law,  the  Elector  Palatine,  was  driven  into  exile. 
Corruption  crept  into  the  administration  of  the  navy 
under  James’s  pacifist  rule,  and  the  exertions  of  Henry, 
Prince  of  Wales,  seconded  by  the  able  ship-designer, 
Phineas  Pett,  who  began  his  career  at  this  time,  availed 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


139 


little  to  check  the  abuses.  Pirates  swarmed  round  the 
coast,  many  of  them  the  stout  English  seamen  of  the 
days  of  Elizabeth,  who,  finding  neither  employment 
nor  pay  in  their  motherland,  took  service  with  the 
Barbary  States.  James  in  vain  offered  pardon  to  all 
who  would  return  to  their  allegiance.  “I  have  no 
intention  of  obeying  the  orders  of  one  king,  when  I  am 
in  a  way  a  king  myself,”  said  the  haughty  pirate,  Eston.  ‘ 
James  was  fain  to  give  leave  to  a  Dutch  squadron 
under  Lambert  to  visit  Irish  harbours  and  root  out  the 
pirates  who  were  sheltering  there. 

The  sea-borne  trade  of  the  country  not  being  as 
yet  upon  a  sure  footing,  the  peace  with  Spain  caused 
mercantile  shipping  to  languish.  The  Venetian  Am¬ 
bassador  noted  with  astonishment  that,  at  one  juncture, 
only  twenty  merchantmen  were  to  be  found  in  the  Port 
of  London.  The  merchants  suffered  losses  so  heavy 
when  they  imported  goods  in  English  ships  which 
received  no  protection  that  they  actually  welcomed 
their  arrival  in  Dutch  bottoms.  The  Hollanders  then 
began  to  emulate  the  example  of  the  Hansa  and  set 
up  mercantile  houses  of  their  own  in  London.  Trade 
languished  because  the  Royal  Navy  was  too  weak  to 
defend  it;  the  Royal  Navy  languished  because  it 
lacked  the  seamen  who  were  its  lifeblood,  and  who 
were  driven  to  seek  service  elsewhere.  So  the  whole 
sea  affair  was  moving  in  a  vicious  circle.  But,  at  the 
root  of  all  the  mischief  were  corruption,  maladminis¬ 
tration,  and  faulty  policy.  Neither  James  nor  Charles 
could  ever  man  a  fleet  completely  during  the  occasional 
bursts  of  energy  they  displayed.  Yet  all  the  time 
it  was  noted  by  envious  foreigners  that  the  British 
warships  were  the  best  in  the  world,  and  that  the  mer¬ 
chantmen  were  built  big  and  strong  like  warships. 


140 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


The  seed  was  germinating;  the  leaven  hid  in  the 
measure  of  meal  was  slowly  but  surely  leavening  the 
lump. 

The  early  Stuarts,  however,  were  not  altogether 
indifferent  to  the  Navy.  That  miserable  creature 
James  I.,  was,  of  course,  intent  upon  nothing  but  his 
disreputable  pleasures  and  the  pedantry  which  he 
‘  mistook  for  wisdom.  But  his  son,  Prince  Henry,  was 
an  enthusiastic  “blue  water”  man,  and  Charles  I., 
when  he  came  to  the  throne,  showed  great  if  misguided 
zeal  in  naval  affairs.  Buckingham,  too,  according  to 
his  lights,  and  to  serve  his  own  ends,  was  not  only  a 
zealous,  but  also  an  intelligent,  supporter  of  the  Navy. 
The  Grand  Commission,  appointed  under  James  I. 
and  continued  under  his  son,  worked  honestly,  hard, 
and  successfully  to  reform  abuses  in  the  department  of 
construction.  It  reduced  the  expenses  of  the  Navy 
by  one-half,  while,  at  the  same  time,  it  increased  both 
its  strength  and  its  efficiency.  At  the  end  of  February, 
1627,  the  year  of  the  disastrous  expedition  to  the  Isle 
of  Rhe,  the  Navy  mustered  seventy-five  ships,  besides 
others  under  repair,  while  the  infant  navy  of  France, 
which  Richelieu  was  fostering,  did  not  amount  to  more 
than  thirty  vessels  and  that  of  Holland  to  about  the 
same.  We  had,  in  fact,  the  “Two  Power  Standard.” 
In  the  following  year  Denbigh  commanded  a  hundred 
and  forty  ships,  many  of  them  merchantmen,  however, 
in  the  attempt  to  relieve  La  Rochelle.  The  “Ship- 
money”  fleets  were  stronger  still,  and,  thanks  to  the 
genius  of  Phineas  Pett,  they  were  more  powerful  and 
better  armed  than  those  of  any  rival  navy. 

But  the  canker  which  ate  the  heart  out  of  the  Stuart 
Navy  was  implicit  in  the  Stuart  system.  James  and 
Charles  were  not  more  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  than 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


141 

Henry  and  Elizabeth.  Yet,  whereas  the  two  former 
could  get  from  Parliament  what  supplies  they  pleased, 
the  latter  were  continually  at  variance  with  the  House 
of  Commons,  and  the  Navy  was  starved  for  lack  of 
funds.  The  Parliamentary  watchword,  ‘'Grievances 
precede  supply,”  had  its  counterpart  in  the  domain  of 
foreign  politics.  In  the  view  of  the  Stuart  kings,  the 
function  of  Parliament  was  simply  to  find  the  money 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  policy  dictated  by  the  will 
of  the  monarch.  The  expenditure  of  the  sums  granted 
was  part  of  the  executive  function  which  belonged 
exclusively  to  the  Crown.  The  Tudor  theory  was 
little  different;  but  it  is  practice,  not  theory,  which 
counts  in  England,  and  their  practice  differed  by  the 
whole  width  of  the  heavens.  The  Tudors,  with  their 
true  insight,  with  their  reliance  on  statecraft  as  distinct 
from  the  kingcraft  of  their  successors,  interpreted  the 
wishes  of  the  nation:  even  its  prejudices  and  passions. 
They  put  themselves  at  its  head,  and  they  led  it. 
Hence  their  wars  were  what  are  called — a  detestable 
phrase — “popular”  wars.  They  furthered  the  reli¬ 
gious  cause  which  the  people  had  at  heart;  they  grati¬ 
fied  their  desire  for  wealth.  The  Stuarts  demanded 
money  and  ships  for  the  furtherance  of  designs  which 
were  hateful  to  the  mass  of  the  nation;  or,  where  the 
undertaking  itself  was  popular,  as,  unquestionably, 
the  expedition  to  Cadiz,  the  attack  at  the  Isle  of  Rhe, 
and  the  attempted  relief  of  La  Rochelle  undoubtedly 
were,  they  entangled  it  with  constitutional  questions 
or  entrusted  the  execution  to  favourites  whom  the 
nation,  which  had  made  Drake  its  darling,  most  justly 
regarded  with  the  utmost  distrust.  The  fleet  was 
allowed  to  become  the  symbol  of  personal  rule. 

That  the  greatest  revolt  of  the  English  people  against 


142 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


their  sovereign  which  our  annals  have  ever  known 
should  have  come  to  a  head  over  the  question  of  pro¬ 
vision  for  the  Navy  is  a  peculiar  irony  of  fate.  There 
was  nothing  outrageous  or  monstrous  about  Charles 
I.’s  demand  for  ship-money.  The  maritime  counties 
had  always  been  liable  to  make  contribution,  in  ships, 
if  not  in  money,  for  the  protection  of  the  coasts.  Lon¬ 
don,  as  we  have  seen,  was  subject  to  a  similar  liability. 
It  was  only  logical  that  this  obligation  should  be  ex¬ 
tended  to  the  inland  shires  at  a  time  when  the  feudal 
provision  for  the  defence  of  the  realm  had  passed  into 
desuetude  and  the  episode  of  the  Armada  had  opened 
the  eyes  of  the  people  to  the  fact  that  their  safety  de¬ 
pended  upon  the  fleet.  Whether  John  Hampden  had 
fully  grasped  the  significance  of  that  fact  when  he, 
the  owner  of  many  manors,  went  to  prison  rather  than 
contribute  one  pound  eleven  shillings  and  sixpence 
to  maintain  the  Navy,  is  a  debatable  point.  But  it 
in  no  way  touches  his  claim  to  be  immortalised  as  a 
type  of  disinterested  patriotism.  One  pound  eleven 
and  six  was  nothing  to  him.  But  that  even  the  odd 
sixpence  should  be  arbitrarily  exacted  was  a  very  great 
matter  indeed. 

There  is  here  a  very  important  lesson  as  to  the 
foundation  upon  which  a  healthy  sea  power  rests.  It 
cannot  be  made  to  serve  the  purposes  of  absolutism. 
A  war-navy,  created  and  maintained  to  support  the 
policy  of  a  monarch  or  of  a  military  clique,  though  it 
may  be  powerful  for  a  time,  will  not  continue  to  main¬ 
tain  its  position  unless  it  has  behind  it  the  conviction 
of  the  people,  of  the  trading  and  commercial  classes  in 
particular,  that  its  existence  and  power  are  necessary 
to  the  furtherance  of  their  prosperity  and  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  their  security.  The  necessity  for  sea 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


143 


power  demands  a  good  deal  of  imagination  from  the 
people.  In  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  when  wealth  was 
pouring  into  the  country  as  a  consequence  of  the  war 
with  Spain,  and  when  the  Armada  was  hourly  ex¬ 
pected  in  the  Channel,  the  necessity  was  plain  enough. 
When  the  Navy  was  being  used  by  the  Stuarts  to 
further  the  personal  policy  of  James  I.  or  to  gratify 
the  private  animosities  of  Buckingham,  while  English 
trade  was  cut  to  pieces  by  pirates,  Dunkirkers,  or  Dutch¬ 
men,  the  advantages  of  sea  power  in  the  abstract  did 
not  appeal.  That  is  to  say,  though  the  men  of  the 
time  may  not  have  formulated  the  doctrine  in  words, 
the  function  which  the  mass  of  the  people  looked  to 
the  Navy  to  perform  was  to  secure  the  communications 
of  the  country  and  the  free  use  of  the  sea. 

There  are  not  many  tridents,  but  one.  When,  as 
at  the  period  we  are  considering,  the  hand  which  has 
held  it  becomes  nerveless  or  paralysed,  or  attempts  its 
misuse,  a  stronger  hand  will  be  found  ready  to  grasp 
it.  The  stronger  hand,  for  the  moment,  was  the 
hand  of  Holland.  The  rise  of  Dutch  sea  power  has 
some  peculiar  features.  It  had  its  beginning  in  the 
herring-fisheries.  The  saying  that  “Amsterdam  was 
built  on  the  herring”  has  already  been  quoted.  Its 
prowess  in  war  was  learned  in  the  struggles  of  the 
“Beggars  of  the  Sea”  against  Philip  II.  Almost 
driven  from  the  land  by  the  Spanish  soldiery,  the 
United  Provinces  maintained  the  struggle  upon  the  sea, 
where  they  hampered  the  communications  of  the 
Spaniards  and  could  reach  the  rather  grudging  hand 
which  Elizabeth  stretched  out  to  aid  them.  But  the 
Dutch  people  were,  by  nature,  a  nation  of  traders. 
Secure  among  their  inundations,  the  burghers  of  Hol¬ 
land  drew  from  the  seas,  not  only  the  means  to  carry 


144 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


on  the  bitter  struggle  for  eighty  years,  but  also  to  grow 
rich  beyond  all  precedent.  This  was  achieved  very 
largely  by  carrying  the  wealth  of  the  Indies  to  Spain 
itself,  at  the  very  time  when  the  Dutch  were  in  revolt 
against  the  sovereign  of  that  country,  who  was  also 
their  own.  The  Dutch  established  themselves  as 
traders  in  the  Portuguese  settlements  in  the  East. 
They  brought  back  the  pepper,  the  sandalwood,  the 
rich  silks  from  India  and  the  Moluccas.  They  took 
the  goods  of  Northern  Europe  to  Spain  and  Portugal, 
and  they  carried  back  in  return  the  “pieces  of  eight,” 
the  product  of  the  mines  of  Mexico,  and  the  gold  of 
Peru.  What  the  Elizabethan  mariners  acquired  by 
violence  the  Dutch  secured  by  trade,  in  virtue  of  the 
prerogative  which  was  theirs  as  subjects  of  Philip, 
though  they  were  a  rebellious  people.  Therefore  their 
sea  power  waxed  while  his  waned,  and  thus  they 
found  the  sinews  to  carry  on  the  war  against  him.  In 
such  strange  topsyturvydom  did  the  economic  and 
political  ideas  of  the  sixteenth  century  land  those  who 
held  them. 

As  the  Dutch  came  to  feel  their  strength,  however, 
conquest  supplemented  trade.  The  Dutch  East  India 
Company  was  formed  in  1602.  A  year  later,  Amboyna, 
the  principal  town  in  the  Moluccas,  fell  to  the  Dutch, 
to  be  followed  a  year  later  by  Malacca.  Java  was 
appropriated  by  the  Company  in  1610,  and  Ceylon 
taken  from  the  Portuguese  in  1658.  In  1614  New 
Amsterdam,  now  New  York,  was  founded,  while  be¬ 
tween  1623  and  1630  the  greater  part  of  Brazil  fell  to 
Holland.  Furthermore,  the  names  of  Tasmania,  or 
Van  Diemen’s  Land,  and  New  Zealand,  both  of  which 
places  were  discovered  in  1642,  point  to  the  growing 
power  of  the  Dutch  upon  the  sea.  But,  extensive  as 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


145 


the  oversea  empire  of  Holland  became  in  this  short 
space  of  time,  the  chief  source  of  Dutch  wealth  is  to 
be  found  in  their  position  as  “the  wagoners  of  the 
world.” 

It  is  wonderful  that  a  collision  between  the  Dutch 
and  the  English  was  delayed  as  long  as  it  was.  There 
are  complaints  of  the  “insolence”  of  the  Hollanders 
throughout  the  reigns  of  the  first  two  Stuart  kings, 
and  the  low  esteem  in  which  they  held  English  sea  power 
is  plainly  enough  shown  by  their  frequent  incursions 
into  English  harbours  to  cut  out  Spanish  ships  or 
“Dunkirkers”  which  had  taken  refuge  there.  But 
the  Dutch  were  shrewd  enough  to  see  that,  until  they 
were  able  to  contest  the  mastery  of  the  sea  on  some¬ 
thing  like  equal  terms  with  the  English,  their  commu¬ 
nications  with  the  sources  of  wealth  were  entirely  at 
the  mercy  of  the  latter.  Until  they  had  made  an  end 
of  Spanish  hostility,  and  until  they  were  assured  of  at 
least  the  sympathetic  neutrality  of  France,  they  had 
everything  to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain  by  falling  out 
with  the  Protestant  Power  over  the  way. 

The  first  clash  came,  not  with  the  Stuart  monarchy, 
but  with  the  Commonwealth,  under  the  masterful 
hand  of  Cromwell.  There  had  been  a  festering  sore 
between  the  two  nations  for  years  on  account  of  the 
murder  of  the  English  factors  at  Amboyna,  for  which 
no  reparation  had  ever  been  made.  The  Dutch,  on 
their  part,  were  irritated  and  perturbed  by  the  passing 
of  the  Navigation  Act.  But  it  is  a  matter  of  dispute 
to  this  day  upon  whom  the  responsibility  rests  for  the 
actual  outbreak.  This  is  commonly  the  case  with 
“inevitable”  wars:  those,  that  is,  which  occur  because 
there  is  no  room  for  both  aspirants  to  walk  side  by  side 
along  their  chosen  path.  Tromp,  in  command  of  a 

xo 


146 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


superior  force,  trailed  his  coat  before  Blake  by  refusing 
the  customary  salute  to  the  English  flag.  Blake  fired 
the  first  broadside.  But  it  is  evident  that  the  Dutch 
Government  did  not,  at  that  moment,  wish  to  fight. 
They  sought  accommodation.  Cromwell  was  anxious 
lest  Holland  should  afford  asylum  to  the  Stuarts,  and 
actually  proposed  a  union  between  the  two  countries. 
He  also  insisted  that  the  Dutch  should  pay  to  the  flag 
of  the  Commonwealth  the  same  respect  which  they 
had  always  paid  to  the  flag  of  the  kings.  There  was 
stubborn  fighting  in  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea 
between  the  fleets  of  the  two  nations,  which  were  about 
equal  in  numbers.  Tromp  won  one  success  and  drove 
Blake  up  the  Thames,  after  which  he  cruised  in  the 
Narrow  Seas  with  a  broom  at  the  masthead,  a  piece 
of  bravado  out  of  keeping  with  his  character  and  that 
of  his  nation,  and  well  calculated  to  provoke  the  English. 
But  the  war,  as  a  whole,  was  completely  unfavourable 
to  the  Dutch,  who  lost  over  twelve  hundred  warships 
and  merchantmen  in  the  course  of  it.  This  was  a 
profound  blow  to  them,  since  their  position  in  the 
world  depended  entirely  on  the  preservation  of  their 
character  as  safe  “wagoners.”  The  causes  of  the 
conflicts  between  the  British  and  the  Dutch  are,  after 
all,  best  summed  up  in  the  blunt,  almost  cynical  speech 
attributed  to  Monk  in  the  ensuing  reign  of  Charles  II. : 
“What  matters  this  or  that  reason?  What  we  want 
is  more  of  the  trade  which  the  Dutch  now  have!” 
That  depended  on  our  success  in  securing  the  position 
of  waywarden  of  the  highway  of  the  nations,  the  sea. 

The  Cromwellian  wars  in  which  Blake  commanded 
are  noteworthy  for  the  fact  that  engagements  were 
fought  in  the  Mediterranean  against  the  Dutch,  the 
heralds  of  a  long  series  of  fights  between  European 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


147 


nations  in  waters  remote  from  their  home  bases;  for 
the  successful  bombardment  of  Algiers — the  only  one 
until  Lord  Exmouth  reduced  the  pirates’’  stronghold 
in  1816;  the  taking  of  Jamaica  and  Barbados  by  Penn, 
and  the  last  great  deed  of  Blake  in  the  bombardment 
of  Santa  Cruz  and  the  sinking  of  the  Spanish  fleet  in 
harbour  there  in  1656.  Blake  died  as  his  ship  entered 
Plymouth  Harbour  on  his  return  from  this  voyage. 
Although  a  soldier,  bearing  the  rank  of  colonel,  he  had 
restored  to  the  British  Navy  all  the  prestige  it  had 
possessed  under  Elizabeth  and  had  lost  in  the  years 
between  1604  and  1650.  There  is  a  passage  in  a  letter 
addressed  by  him  and  Deane  to  the  Speaker  while  they 
were  awaiting  the  Dutch  fleet  which  brings  out  in  a 
noble  light  the  spirit  of  duty  animating  the  sailors  of 
the  Commonwealth. 

“We  dare  not  in  this  great  business  to  promise  any¬ 
thing  for  or  to  ourselves,”  they  say,  “because  it  is  God 
alone  who  giveth  courage  and  conduct  with  opportu¬ 
nity  and  success  in  the  day  of  His  Salvations;  only  we 
desire  the  Parliament  to  believe  that  we  are  deeply 
sensible  of  the  extraordinary  importance  of  the  present 
service  in  hand,  the  high  expectation  raised  of  it,  and 
the  obligation  of  the  great  trust  reposed  in  us.”  Ex¬ 
pressed  in  Puritan  form,  we  have  in  these  words  the 
abiding  spirit  of  the  Navy. 

Whatever  we  may  think  of  the  ethic  of  the  Crom¬ 
wellian  wars  with  the  Dutch,  they  were,  at  any  rate, 
national.  Cromwell  had  the  people  at  his  back.  There 
was  no  difficulty  in  getting  ships,  money,  and  men. 
Blake  summed  up  the  Navy’s  point  of  view  in  a  sen¬ 
tence:  “It  is  not  our  business  to  meddle  in  politics,” 
he  said,  “but  to  keep  the  foreigner  from  fooling  us.” 
The  wars  of  the  Restoration  were  different.  Charles 


148 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


II.,  like  his  father,  was  soon  in  conflict  with  his  Parlia¬ 
ments,  though  his  rooted  determination  not  to  set  out 
upon  his  travels  again  prevented  him  from  openly 
flouting  the  representatives  of  his  people.  But  money 
and  men  were  once  more  scarce,  and  corruption  again 
began  to  appear  in’  the  administration  of  the  Navy. 
Save  for  the  good  work  of  the  estimable  Mr.  Pepys 
and  the  sailor-like  capacity  of  the  Duke  of  York,  the 
safety  of  the  country  might  have  been  worse  en¬ 
dangered  than  it  was.  Charles,  however,  though  care¬ 
less  and  pleasure-loving,  had  a  very  real  idea  of  what 
was  involved  in  the  command  of  the  sea.  When  it  was 
suggested  that  the  British  fleet,  fighting  in  alliance 
with  that  of  France,  should  be  placed  under  the  com¬ 
mand  of  a  French  officer,  he  told  the  Ambassador 
haughtily  that  “it  was  the  custom  of  the  English  to 
command  at  sea,”  adding  that,  if  he  were  to  yield, 
his  subjects  would  not  obey  him.  Charles,  in  fact — 
though  no  doubt  one  object  which  he  had  in  mind  was 
to  free  himself  from  dependence  on  Parliament  by 
receiving  French  subsidies — was  playing  a  game  of 
“diamond  cut  diamond”  with  Louis  XIV.  He  used 
the  French  to  weaken  the  Dutch  by  sea.  Louis,  on 
the  other  hand,  sent  his  naval  contingent  with  orders 
to  take  no  strenuous  part  in  the  fighting,  in  order  that 
the  Dutch  might  weaken  the  English.  But  this  is  to 
anticipate  naval  events.  In  the  first  war  the  English 
engaged  the  Dutch  alone,  the  French  eventually  join¬ 
ing  the  latter.  The  three  nations,  in  fact,  now  entered 
upon  the  long  contest  for  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  in 
which  the  Dutch  were  destined  to  be  eliminated  first, 
while  the  struggle  between  the  other  two  continued  to 
the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  era  before  it  was  finally  de¬ 
cided  in  favour  of  Britain.  The  geographical  position 


The  Bombardment  of  Algiers 

From  a  drawing  by  W.  Chambers,  engraved  by  E.  Chavane 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


149 


of  the  countries  concerned  supplies  the  reason  for  the 
conflict.  Holland  was  the  man  in  possession;  the 
other  two  fought  for  the  pathway  to  her  front  door. 
Unfortunately  for  Holland,  she  had  a  back  door  also, 
and  the  way  of  it  was  overland.  The  English,  having 
obtained  the  mastery  of  her  by  sea,  would  have  been 
only  too  pleased  to  aid  her  in  defending  the  back  door 
against  the  French.  They  tried  to  do  so,  with  varying 
success,  during  the  next  hundred  and  twenty  years. 
But  in  the  upshot  the  Dutch  were  drawn  into  the 
French  orbit  and  were  crushed,  so  far  as  their  maritime 
power  went,  between  the  hammer  and  the  anvil. 

On  June  3,  1665,.  the  English  and  Dutch  fleets  met 
off  Lowestoft.  The  Duke  of  York,  who  was  in  com¬ 
mand  of  the  English,  put  into  practice  his  new  system 
of  tactics — that  of  fighting  in  a  close  line.  The  result 
was  a  magnificent  victory.  The  French  then  joined 
the  Dutch,  and  Monk,  now  in  command,  committed 
the  blunder  of  dividing  his  fleet,  with  the  consequence 
that  he  was  defeated  in  the  four  days’  battle  off  the 
North  Foreland.  There  was  no  disgrace  in  the  defeat, 
however.  The  English  seamen  won  the  respect  of 
their  foes.  “You  can  kill  these  English;  you  cannot 
beat  them,”  said  a  Dutch  captain.  On  July  21st, 
the  reverse  was  retrieved  off  the  mouth  of  the  Thames, 
where  Monk  gave  de  Ruyter  a  sound  drubbing.  Then 
followed  the  days  of  shame.  Charles  argued  that,  as 
the  Dutch  were  dependent  upon  trade,  there  was  no 
need  to  keep  an  expensive  fleet  of  ships-of-the-line 
in  commission.  He  laid  up  his  fleet  in  ordinary,  and 
de  Ruyter  came  and  burned  it  where  it  lay  at  its 
anchorage  between  Sheerness  and  Chatham. 

The  real  importance  of  this  episode  has  been  much 
exaggerated.  It  was  of  the  nature  of  a  “tip-and-run 


i5o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


raid.”  It  had  small  effect  on  Britain’s  command  of  the 
sea.  But  it  shook  her  prestige  to  its  foundations,  and 
it  stands  for  all  time  a  monument  to  the  folly  of  think¬ 
ing  that  naval  warfare  can  be  carried  to  a  successful 
issue  by  mere  commerce-raiding  against  an  enemy  who 
possesses  a  fleet  of  capital  ships.  The  Peace  of  Breda 
followed,  by  which  three  West  Indian  islands,  taken 
by  Holland,  were  returned  to  Britain,  Nova  Scotia 
was  restored  to  France,  and  the  Navigation  Acts  were 
modified  in  favour  of  the  Dutch. 

That  Act,  which  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  first 
Cromwellian  war  with  the  Dutch,  decreed  that  foreign 
goods  should  only  be  brought  to  English  ports  in  Eng¬ 
lish  ships,  or  ships  of  the  country  of  their  origin.  It, 
of  course,  struck  a  deadly  blow  at  the  “wagoner” 
trade  of  the  Dutch.  The  relief  obtained  by  the  Treaty 
of  Breda  did  not  long  avail  them,  for,  in  1672,  the  new 
Navigation  Act  of  Charles  II.  imposed  regulations  more 
stringent  still,  especially  with  regard  to  Colonial  trade, 
which  had  all  to  be  brought  to  London,  and,  of  course, 
in  British  bottoms.  The  Navigation  Acts  were  finally 
repealed  in  1842-9,  in  the  sacred  name  of  Free  Trade, 
although  Adam  Smith  himself  had  defended  them  as 
the  one  legitimate  form  of  protective  legislation,  in 
conformity  with  his  principle  that  “defence  is  greater 
than  opulence.” 

In  the  war  of  1672-4,  to  which  reference  has  before 
been  made,  in  which  Britain  was  allied  with  the  French 
against  the  Dutch,  tactical  victory  rested  with  the 
latter  in  all  three  of  the  pitched  battles  fought,  namely 
Solebay,  Schoneveld,  and  The  Texel.  This  was  due  in 
part  to  the  deficiencies  of  Prince  Rupert  as  a  naval 
commander,  and  in  part  to  the  unwillingness  of  the 
French  to  risk  their  ships.  “You  fools!”  said  a  Dutch 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


151 

commander  to  his  men,  when  they  expressed  surprise 
at  the  small  part  D’Estrees  bore  in  the  fight,  “you 
fools!  The  French  have  hired  the  English  to  fight 
for  them,  and  they  are  here  to  see  that  they  earn  their 
wages!”  It  was  a  bitter  sarcasm,  the  bitterer  because 
it  was  exactly  true.  But  sarcasm  could  not  help 
Holland.  She  experienced  in  this  war  the  weakness 
of  her  position,  for  she  was  attacked  on  land  as  well 
as  by  sea,  and,  though  her  sea  power  brought  her 
through  on  the  whole  the  victor,  the  damage  to  her 
trade  was  such  that  she  never  recovered  it.  The  Dutch, 
though  in  all  the  stout  fighting  of  the  last  twenty-five 
years  they  had  never  suffered  a  decisive  defeat  at  sea, 
had  definitely  lost  the  game.  Britain  withdrew  from 
the  struggle  in  1679,  and,  during  the  next  four  years, 
reaped  a  rich  harvest  as  a  neutral,  while  the  Dutch 
suffered  disaster  in  the  Mediterranean.  English  ships 
were,  henceforward,  preferred  to  Dutch,  as  they  had 
proved  themselves  the  safer  carriers. 

Great  Britain  had  now  laid  the  foundations  of  her 
oversea  Empire.  On  the  mainland  of  North  America, 
she  held  the  New  England  States,  the  Carolinas,  Mary¬ 
land,  Virginia,  New  York,  and  New  Jersey.  Jamaica, 
Barbados,  and  other  islands  in  the  Caribbean  were  hers, 
as  well  as  Bermuda  and  Newfoundland,  though  her 
claim  to  the  latter  was  still  disputed  by  the  French. 
In  the  East,  Bombay  had  passed  to  Charles  II.  in  right 
of  his  wife,  Catherine  of  Braganza.  Supremacy  at 
sea,  therefore,  had  become  vital,  not  only  for  the  de¬ 
fence  of  the  islands,  but  for  safe  intercourse  between 
the  King’s  possessions.  Victory  was  assured  to  the 
English  in  the  wars  with  the  Dutch,  not  by  any  military 
superiority,  but  by  natural,  or  geographical  causes. 
If  the  English  ships  were  slightly  more  powerful  than 


152 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  Dutch,  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  sailors  was  as 
great  on  one  side  as  on  the  other,  and,  on  the  whole, 
it  must  be  conceded  that,  in  the  later  wars,  at  any  rate, 
the  Dutch  were  the  better  led.  Blake  and  Monk  were 
great  commanders,  and  James  was  at  least  respectable. 
But  de  Ruyter,  the  two  Tromps,  and  Evertsen  were 
something  more  than  equals  of  any  but  Blake.  Under 
Cromwell,  the  discipline  of  the  English  was  the  better; 
but  they  lost  this  advantage  under  Charles  II.  The 
Government  of  Holland  lacked  unity  of  direction ; 
that  of  Charles  was  corrupt.  But  Holland,  liable  to 
attack  on  the  land  side,  and  with  the  British  Islands 
lying  like  a  breakwater  across  her  path  to  the  ocean, 
had  no  chance  to  maintain  herself  against  a  Sea  Power, 
her  equal  in  might,  stubborness,  and  almost  in  wealth, 
unless  she  could  seize  a  favourable  opportunity  to  sub¬ 
due  it  on  land  as  well  as  on  sea.  Had  she  been  able 
to  invade  with  a  sufficient  army  when  de  Ruyter  lay 
at  Sheerness,  she  might  have  altered  the  history  of  the 
world.  But,  even  had  her  land  forces  been  sufficient, 
the  weakness  of  her  land  frontier  and  the  presence  of 
jealous  enemies  on  the  Continent  would  have  forbidden 
the  attempt.  When  the  Dutch  did  invade,  it  was  with 
the  consent  of  the  great  majority  of  the  English  people. 
Dutch  William  came  in  peace.  When  he  came,  it  was 
to  become,  like  William  the  Conqueror,  rather  King  of 
England  than  lord  of  his  own  continental  dominions. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  Dutch  Wars,  the  first 
struggle  against  the  first  modern  aspirant  to  universal 
sovereignty  arose.  Louis  XIV.  was  now  on  the  throne 
of  France,  and  great  ministers,  who  saw  better  than  he 
did  himself  the  way  to  achieve  his  end,  were  striving 
to  build  up  the  sea  power  of  France  upon  a  solid  basis. 
Richelieu  first  made  the  French  formidable  upon  the 


An  Engagement  between  the  English  and  Dutch  Fleets  at  the  Mouth  of  the  Thames,  1666 

From  an  old  print 


i  i 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


153 


water.  But  it  is  to  Colbert  that  the  credit  must  be 
given  for  working  out  a  complete  plan  by  which  not 
only  was  the  war-navy  to  be  made  strong  enough  to 
dominate  the  sea,  but  the  colonies  and  maritime  trade 
necessary  to  give  sea  power  an  assured  foundation 
were  to  be  established  and  fostered.  Two  things  lay 
open — or  seemed  to  lie  open — to  Louis  at  this  time. 
He  might  seize  the  mastery  of  Europe,  with  its  welter 
of  discords,  dynastic,  religious,  and  political;  or  he 
might  aim  at  the  dominion  of  the  East  and  of  the  New 
World.  The  way  to  the  first  lay  across  the  Rhine, 
the  Meuse,  and  the  Scheldt ;  the  way  to  the  second  lay 
across  the  Channel.  If  he  achieved  the  second,  what 
stood  in  his  way  from,  hereafter,  seizing  the  first  also  ? 

Leibnitz  counselled  him  to  possess  himself  of  Egypt. 
France,  he  said,  wanted  peace  in  the  West  and  war  in 
the  East.  The  Turkish  power  was,  in  reality,  feeble, 
and  he  who  possessed  Egypt  would  possess  also  the 
islands  and  coasts  of  the  Red  Sea  and  Indian  Ocean. 
It  was  Napoleon’s  policy  a  hundred  years  and  more 
before  Napoleon’s  time.  It  could,  at  that  juncture, 
have  been  much  more  easily  carried  into  effect,  for 
the  position  of  France  for  achieving  supremacy  at 
sea  was,  on  the  whole,  more  favourable  than  that  of 
England.  The  latter  had,  as  yet,  no  foothold  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  was,  moreover,  not  yet  deeply 
interested  in  India.  France,  on  the  contrary,  looked 
on  to  the  Atlantic  from  Brest  and  Bordeaux,  and  on  to 
the  Inland  Sea  from  Toulon  and  Marseilles.  By  her 
position  in  the  Channel  Ports,  she  could  hold  a  great 
part  of  the  British  Navy  in  home  waters.  She  had, 
in  Nova  Scotia,  a  foothold  on  the  North  American 
Continent,  while  there  was  a  good  chance  of  the  Span¬ 
ish  crown  falling  to  Louis,  with  the  whole  of  the  Ameri- 


154 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


can  dominions  of  Spain,  and  the  vitally  important 
Mediterranean  positions  of  Gibraltar  and  the  Balearic 
Islands.  To  secure  this  goodly  heritage,  he  needed 
sea  power,  and  this  Colbert  was  ready  to  give  him. 

Colbert’s  plan,  as  described  by  himself,  was  as  follows: 

To  organise  producers  and  merchants  as  a  powerful 
army  subjected  to  an  active  and  intelligent  guidance,  so 
as  to  secure  an  industrial  victory  for  France  by  order  and 
unity  of  efforts,  and  to  obtain  the  best  products  by  imposing 
on  all  workmen  the  processes  recognised  as  best  by  com¬ 
petent  men.  ...  To  organize  seamen  and  distant  com¬ 
merce  in  large  bodies  like  the  manufactures  and  internal 
commerce,  and  to  give  as  support  to  the  commercial 
power  of  France  a  navy  established  on  a  firm  basis  and  of 
dimensions  hitherto  unknown. 

It  was  an  ambitious  undertaking,  and  it  almost 
succeeded.  Colbert’s  work  in  the  dockyards  was  so 
efficient  that  an  English  officer,  prisoner  at  Brest,  de¬ 
clared  that  ships  were  got  ready  for  sea  in  half  the  time 
which  was  required  in  England.  A  ship  of  one  hundred 
guns  had  all  her  guns  removed  in  five  hours  with  the 
greatest  ease  and  with  less  hazard  than  in  England 
where  the  same  work  would  have  taken  twenty-four 
hours.  Colbert  enacted  something  like  our  Navigation 
Laws;  he  caused  great  bonded  warehouses  to  be  built, 
in  the  hope  of  thus  securing  the  entrepot  trade  of  the 
world;  he  reorganised  the  finances  of  France,  and,  for 
the  purpose  of  interesting  all  classes  of  society  in  his 
schemes,  he  obtained  a  decree  from  Louis  that  the 
nobility  might  engage  in  oversea  commerce  without 
loss  of  status,  so  long  as  they  abstained  from  retail 
trade.  This  was  necessary  because  it  was  the  ambition 
of  merchants  to  secure  patents  of  nobility.  When  these 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


155 


were  obtained,  they  were  compelled  by  the  laws  of  their 
order  to  retire  from  business. 

Such,  in  bare  outline,  was  Colbert’s  plan — a  plan 
which  very  nearly  resembles  that  pursued  in  Germany 
since  the  accession  of  William  II.,  to  which  the  world 
owes  those  priceless  possessions,  the  Ballins,  the  Helf- 
ferichs,  and  their  like.  It  had  one  weakness.  It  rested 
on  the  capricious  will  of  an  absolute  monarch.  Louis 
was  offered  a  choice,  and  he  chose  wrongly.  The  war, 
undertaken  in  1672,  in  alliance  with  England  against 
the  Dutch,  ruined  Colbert’s  plans  and  broke  his  heart. 
In  the  six  years’  struggle,  the  equilibrium  of  the  finances 
so  carefully  established  for  the  furtherance  of  the  greater 
aims  was  destroyed;  the  springs  of  commerce  and  of  a 
peaceful  shipping  were  exhausted.  The  military  navy 
was  maintained  in  efficiency  for  some  years;  then  it 
too  began  to  dwindle.  Like  the  seed  sown  in  stony 
places,  “having  no  root  in  itself,  it  withered  away.” 
Louis  was  committed  to  those  continental  plans  which 
brought  his  realm  to  the  verge  of  ruin  and  established 
Great  Britain  instead  of  France  as  the  mistress  of  the 
sea.  Sea  power  is  too  slow  in  its  operation  for  the 
would-be  master  of  the  world;  its  instruments  too  far 
removed  from  his  hand.  Its  aims  are  the  prosperity 
of  the  many  rather  than  the  exaltation  of  the  one. 

Yet  we  may  doubt  whether  Louis  XIV.  rather  than 
Colbert  was  not  the  true  interpreter  of  the  genius  of 
France.  The  sunny  and  pleasant  land;  the  intense 
love  of  home;  the  thrifty  nature  of  the  people  which 
rejects  speculative  enterprise  in  favour  of  the  has  de 
laine,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  Colbert’s  magnificent 
scheme  would  have  been  a  plant  of  hothouse  growth; 
that  the  history  of  France  as  a  world-empire  might 
not  have  differed  greatly  from  that  of  Spain.  But, 


156 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  character  of  the  people  apart,  and  as  a  matter  of 
pure  policy,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  Louis  took  the  wrong 
course.  The  great  struggle  between  Britain  and  France 
began  when  James  II.  lost  his  throne  and  Dutch  Wil¬ 
liam  succeeded.  Louis  supported  the  cause  of  the 
exiled  King.  The  defeat  of  Torrington  off  Beachy 
Head,  which  took  place  twelve  days  before  William’s 
victory  at  the  Boyne,  plunged  England  into  consterna¬ 
tion  which  was  only  allayed  by  the  firmness  of  the 
Queen  and  the  favourable  news  from  Ireland.  The 
old  English  spirit  of  the  Armada  time  then  once  more 
took  fire.  Russell,  who  succeeded  Torrington  in  com¬ 
mand  of  the  Channel  Guard,  and  who  was  known  to 
have  Jacobite  sympathies,  declared  roundly  that  pro¬ 
fessional  honour  required  him  to  fight  as  stoutly  for 
the  king  he  hated  as  for  the  king  he  loved,  and  his 
officers  assented  to  this  declaration.  The  .hope  that 
the  fleet  might  rally  to  its  old  commander  was  utterly 
disappointed.  Russell  attacked  Tourville  off  the  Race 
of  Alderney  with  a  superior  force,  routed  him,  and 
chased  him  into  the  harbour  of  La  Hogue,  where  the 
British  seamen  in  a  boat  attack  destroyed  a  number  of 
French  ships  at  anchor.  James  II.  watched  the  fight 
from  the  battlements,  exclaiming  eagerly,  and  in  his 
own  despite,  “They’ll  never  beat  my  English.” 

The  victory  of  La  Hogue,  secondary  in  importance 
as  a  naval  encounter,  had  the  effect  of  shattering  the 
belief  in  the  superiority  of  the  French  at  sea,  engendered 
by  Tourville ’s  success  off  Beachy  Head,  not  less  in  the 
eyes  of  Louis  himself  than  in  the  eyes  of  European 
nations.  Spain  joined  in  the  war  on  the  side  of  the 
allies,  and  the  French  King  withdrew  his  grand  fleets 
from  the  sea,  electing  to  depend  on  a  war  against  com¬ 
merce.  He  hired  out  ships  to  privateers,  and  lent  his 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


157 


best  captains  and  crews.  Jean  Bart,  Forbin,  and 
Duguay-Trouin,  famous  privateersmen,  wrought  enor¬ 
mous  havoc  on  British  and  Dutch  shipping;  but  the 
wealth  of  Britain  and  Holland  was  always  increasing, 
nevertheless,  and  kept  the  League  of  Augsburg  on  foot 
until  the  Treaty  of  Ryswick  closed  the  war.  France, 
on  the  other  hand,  despite  her  great  internal  resources, 
became  more  and  more  exhausted.  “Nations,  like 
men,”  says  Mahan,  “however  strong,  decay  when  cut 
off  from  the  external  activities  which  at  once  draw 
out  and  support  their  internal  powers.  A  nation  can¬ 
not  live  indefinitely  off  itself,  and  the  easiest  way  in 
which  it  can  communicate  with  other  people  and  renew 
its  own  strength  is  upon  the  sea.”  The  moral  for 
to-day  is  obvious. 

Six  years  after  the  Peace  of  Ryswick,  the  War  of  the 
Spanish  Succession  broke  out.  The  contest  was  be¬ 
tween  Philip,  grandson  of  Le  Roi  Soleil ,  and  Charles, 
brother  of  the  Emperor,  for  the  crown  of  Spain.  The 
Sea  Powers,  Britain  and  Holland,  were  determined  that 
the  House  of  Bourbon  .should  not  wield  the  resources 
of  the  whole  vast  Empire  of  Spain  in  conjunction  with 
the  might  and  vigour  of  France.  The  titular  sovereignty 
of  decrepit  Spain  in  the  New  World  might  be  tolerated, 
for  the  wealth  of  the  Indies  was  carried  in  British  and 
Dutch  bottoms,  despite  the  nominal  monopoly  which  the 
kings  of  Spain  still  maintained.  But  such  a  foundation 
for  French  sea  power  could  not  be  tolerated.  Portugal, 
likewise,  dreaded  the  nearness  of  France,  and  sought 
the  protection  of  her  old  ally  England.  The  Empire, 
Britain,  and  Holland  were  thus  arrayed  against  Louis 
and  that  part  of  Spain  which  favoured  the  cause  of 
Philip.  William  III.,  the  strong  ruler,  and  able  com¬ 
mander,  in  whose  person  the  British  and  Dutch  realms 


158 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


had  been  united,  was  now  dead,  and  Queen  Anne  sat 
on  the  throne  of  Britain,  herself  ruled  by  the  imperi¬ 
ous  Sarah,  Duchess  of  Marlborough,  whose  husband, 
fortunately  a  man  of  shining  military  genius,  took 
command  of  the  British  and  Dutch  forces  upon  the 
Continent.  The  policy  of  subsidies  which  Britain 
was  to  pursue  for  the  next  century  was  now  adopted, 
and  the  wealth  which  command  of  the  sea  gave  was 
poured  into  the  coffers  of  the  Germanic  States  to  sup¬ 
port  the  land  war. 

At  sea,  the  allies  at  first  contemplated  action  in  the 
West  Indies.  But,  on  the  Emperor  putting  forward 
Charles  definitely  as  a  candidate  for  the  throne  of 
Spain,  the  plan  was  changed,  and  the  naval  forces  were 
employed  chiefly  in  the  Mediterranean  and  off  the  coast 
of  Portugal.  Supported  by  British  sea  power,  the 
Portuguese  Government  permitted  Charles  to  land  at 
Lisbon  and  undertake  the  conquest  of*  Spain  from  that 
base.  The  great  and  abiding  feature  of  the  sea  cam¬ 
paign  was  the  capture  of  Gibraltar  by  Sir  George  Rooke. 
That  event  came  about  almost  by  inadvertence.  Rooke 
had  failed  in  an  attempt  on  Cadiz,  and,  despite  a  bril¬ 
liant  affair  in  which  he  cut  out  the  Spanish  treasure 
galleons  in  Vigo  Bay,  he  was  ill-content  to  go  back  to 
England  without  more  substantial  success.  The  Brit¬ 
ish  Admiralty,  then  as  ever  afterwards,  allowed  a  very 
free  hand  to  its  commanders  afloat,  so  Rooke  deter¬ 
mined  to  attack  the  mighty  fortress,  which  he  first 
bombarded  and  then  stormed  with  the  boats  of  his  fleet. 
Never  did  place  of  such  importance  fall  with  such 
ridiculous  ease.  The  Count  of  Toulouse  attempted  to 
retrieve  its  loss,  attacking  Rooke  off  Malaga  on  his 
return.  The  battle  was  indecisive.  But  the  British 
retained  Gibraltar,  and  have  retained  it  ever  since, 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


159 


despite  several  attempts  to  induce  Spain  to  receive  it 
back  again.  Next  to  the  taking  of  Gibraltar,  the  most 
important  event  at  sea  was  the  capture  of  Minorca, 
with  its  harbour,  Port  Mahon,  which  the  British  held 
for  fifty  years. 

It  is,  however,  the  silent,  unseen  pressure  exercised 
by  sea  power,  so  hard  to  estimate  in  words,  which 
dominates  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  as  it 
dominates  other  struggles,  both  before  and  since.  It 
contributed  more  to  the  final  success  of  the  allies  than  all 
the  victories  of  Marlborough  and  Eugene.  Lifeblood 
flowed  into  Holland  and  Germany  through  the  ports 
of  Flanders;  the  breath  of  France  was  gradually 
choked  out  of  her  by  the  strangle-hold  which  forbade 
her  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  1710, 
Louis  was  ready  to  offer  almost  abject  terms  of  peace. 
The  allies,  at  the  instigation  of  Great  Britain,  rejected 
them,  thinking  to  achieve  the  complete  overthrow  of 
the  French.  Then,  with  the  death  of  the  Emperor 
and  the  accession  of  Charles  to  the  Imperial  Crown,  the 
situation  changed.  Britain  was  no  more  ready  to 
welcome  an  omnipotent  Hapsburg  than  an  omnipotent 
Bourbon.  England  and  Holland  withdrew  from  the 
war,  and  the  Emperor  had  no  choice  but  to  make  peace, 
for  the  lifeblood  of  sea-borne  wealth  was  cut  off  from 
him.  Historians  who  habitually  omit  the  factor  of 
sea  power  from  their  appreciations  are  wont  to  con¬ 
trast  the  terms  which  might  have  been  imposed  in  1710 
with  those,  apparently  less  favourable,  ultimately 
accepted  in  1713.  They  comment  freely  on  the  ter¬ 
giversations  and  intrigues  of  Whig  and  Tory,  on  the 
treachery  of  Marlborough  and  the  displacement  of  his 
spouse  in  the  royal  favour  by  Mrs.  Abigail  Masham. 
But  they  obstinately  miss  the  point  that  the  terms  of 


i6o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


1713  suited  Britain,  now  the  supreme  Sea  Power,  far 
better  than  those  offered  at  the  earlier  date.  Our 
statesmen,  whatever  their  demerits  of  wisdom  and 
character,  had  now  begun  to  realise,  consciously  and 
clearly,  in  which  direction  the  destiny  of  the  country 
lay. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  Great  Britain  gained  a 
definite  recognition  of  her  claim  to  Newfoundland. 
Nova  Scotia  and  the  Hudson  Bay  Territory  were 
ceded  to  her  by  France,  Gibraltar  and  Minorca  by 
Spain.  Her  position  on  the  great  sea  routes  was  thus 
infinitely  strengthened.  Holland  gained  possession  of 
the  Barrier  Fortresses  of  Flanders  with  the  exception  of 
Lille.  The  respective  acquisitions  of  the  two  Powers 
show  the  trend  of  events.  The  Dutch  gained  positions 
requisite  for  their  defence  on  land,  the  British,  outposts 
for  their  expansion  by  sea.  After  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht, 
the  last  pretension  of  Holland  to  rival  her  neighbour 
at  sea  vanished. 

But  the  advantages  won  by  Britain  are  not  to  be 
measured  in  terms  of  territory,  important  as  these  are. 
To  quote  Mahan  again: 

The  sea  power  of  England  was  not  merely  in  the  great 
navy  with  which  we  too  commonly  and  exclusively  asso¬ 
ciate  it;  France  had  had  such  a  navy  in  1688,  and  it  had 
shrivelled  like  a  dry  leaf  in  the  fire.  Neither  was  it  in  a 
prosperous  commerce  alone;  a  few  years  after  the  date  at 
which  we  have  arrived,  the  commerce  of  France  took  on 
fair  proportions,  but  the  first  blast  of  war  swept  it  off  the 
seas  as  the  navy  of  Cromwell  had  once  swept  that  of  Hol¬ 
land.  It  was  in  the  union  of  the  two,  carefully  fostered, 
that  England  made  the  gain  of  sea  power  over  and  beyond 
all  other  States;  and  this  gain  is  distinctly  associated  with, 
and  dates  from,  the  War  of  Spanish  Succession.  Before 


THE  MASTERY  TO  BRITAIN 


161 


that  war,  England  was  one  of  the  Sea  Powers;  after  it,  she 
was  the  Sea  Power,  without  any  second.  This  power  also 
she  held  alone,  unshared  by  friend  and  unchecked  by  foe. 
She  alone  was  rich,  and  in  her  command  of  the  sea  and  her 
extensive  shipping  had  the  sources  of  wealth  so  much  in 
her  hands  that  there  was  no  present  fear  of  a  rival  on  the 
ocean.  Thus  her  gain  of  sea  power  and  wealth  were  not 
only  great,  but  solid,  being  entirely  in  her  own  hands; 
while  the  gains  of  other  States  were  not  merely  inferior  in 
degree,  but  weaker  in  kind,  in  that  they  depended  more 
or  less  on  the  goodwill  of  other  people. 

Thus  ended  the  first  great  struggle  of  Great  Britain 
to  prevent  a  Colossus  from  striding  over  the  globe. 
What  follows  from  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  Jenkins’s 
Ear  to  Trafalgar  forms,  in  its  ultimate  meaning,  a 
continuous  story:  the  story  of  one  long  struggle  be¬ 
tween  sea  power  and  land  power  for  ascendancy.  The 
maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  on  the  Continent 
of  Europe  henceforward  is  a  conscious  policy,  and  it 
has  been  so  ever  since.  The  first  victims  of  a  Napo¬ 
leon  or  a  William  II.  are,  necessarily,  the  small  and 
weak  States  which  fringe  the  seaboard  of  the  Continent. 
To  uphold  the  independence  of  these  States,  so  that 
no  great  military  Power  shall  obtain  the  advantage  of 
their  maritime  position,  is  vital  to  British  supremacy 
at  sea.  Thus  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  in 
the  logical  sequence  of  events,  led  straight  to  the  great 
struggle  of  to-day. 

XX 


CHAPTER  VIII 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 

The  Peace  of  Utrecht  was  shortly  followed  by  two  » 
events  which  had  a  profound  influence  on  the  history 
of  Europe  for  the  next  seventy  years.  Shakespeare 
has  told  us,  through  the  mouth  of  Caesar,  that, 

When  beggars  die  there  are  no  comets  seen; 

The  heavens  themselves  blaze  forth  the  death  of  princes. 

But  it  must  be  confessed  that,  often  enough,  changes 
in  the  occupancy  of  thrones  is  a  matter  of  profound 
unimportance.  Kings  run  their  course.  They  do  that 
which  is  right  or  evil  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord  and  sleep 
with  their  fathers.  According  to  the  power  and  author¬ 
ity  of  the  individual,  he  leaves  a  greater  or  a  less  im¬ 
print  on  the  course  of  events.  But  the  tide  of  history 
sweeps  on,  and  kings  are  more  often  corks  on  its  bosom 
than  breakwaters  controlling  or  diverting  its  course. 

This  could  fairly  be  said  of  the  life  of  Queen  Anne, 
though  not  of  the  event  for  which  she  is  chiefly  famous: 
her  death.  It  could  not  be  said  either  of  the  life  or 
death  of  Le  Roi  Soleil ,  for  both  profoundly  influenced 
events.  Anne  passed  from  this  world  in  August, 
1714,  and  Louis  almost  exactly  a  year  later,  both  at 
a  time  when  peace  reigned  between  the  nations  over 
which  they  had  ruled.  Louis  was  succeeded  by  his 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


163 

grandson,  a  child  of  five,  and  the  Regency  was  exer¬ 
cised  by  the  Due  d’Orleans,  who  sacrificed  the  late 
King’s  policy  of  a  close  family  union  with  Spain  to  his 
private  enmity  towards  Philip  V.  Orleans  sought  and 
obtained  an  English  alliance,  which  he  purchased  with 
concessions  to  England,  the  most  important  of  which, 
from  the  British  point  of  view,  was  a  guarantee  of  the 
Hanoverian  Succession.  Holland  joined  the  alliance, 
and  thus  the  peaceful  occupancy  of  the  throne  of  Great 
Britain  was  confirmed  to  George  I.,  so  far  as  the  Powers 
of  the  Continent  could  guarantee  it.  Had  the  Jacobite 
rising  in  1715  been  supported  by  the  combined  sea 
power  of  France  and  Holland,  the  return  of  the  Stuarts 
might  well  have  been  accomplished. 

George  I.  was,  of  course,  a  Stuart,  upon  the  distaff 
side.  In  all  other  respects  he  was  just  a  dull  German 
boor.  Such  Stuart  qualities  as  he  had  were  akin  to 
those  of  James  I.,  and  not  of  the  more  engaging  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  House.  His  accession  is  chiefly  important, 
so  far  as  he,  personally,  is  concerned,  from  the  fact 
that  he  was  Elector  of  Hanover  as  well  as  King  of 
England,  and  that,  unlike  our  previous  royal  importa¬ 
tions,  voluntary  or  constrained,  he  remained  rather 
Elector  of  Hanover  than  King  of  Great  Britain.  He 
and  his  immediate  successor,  at  any  rate,  strove  to 
make  the  foreign  policy  of  this  country  Hanoverian 
and  Continental,  rather  than  British  and  maritime. 
The  country  was  involved  in  dynastic  struggles  abroad 
in  which  it  must  seem  that  it  was  but  slightly  con¬ 
cerned.  The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  was  also 
a  dynastic  struggle ;  but  the  prospect  of  a  close  connec¬ 
tion  between  the  crowns  of  France  and  Spain,  and  the 
possible  union  of  the  extended  Spanish  Empire  with 
the  kingdom  of  France,  was  a  matter  which  touched  the 


164 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


welfare  of  Britain  far  more  nearly  than  the  accession 
of  Maria  Theresa  to  the  Imperial  Crown.  The  pos¬ 
session  of  the  Low  Countries  by  France  was  a  matter 
of  the  first  concern;  that  of  Silesia  by  Frederick  the 
Great  of  no  concern  at  all,  unless  the  statesmen  of  the 
time  could  project  their  vision  into  the  yet  far  distant 
future — in  which  case  they  would  have  no  doubt 
been  less  willing  to  serve  the  King  of  Prussia.  It  says 
much  for  these  same  statesmen,  whom,  with  a  few  excep¬ 
tions,  such  as  the  great  Chatham  and  Lord  Hardwicke, 
we  do  not  hold  in  very  high  esteem,  that,  while  spend¬ 
ing  British  blood  and  British  treasure,  the  former 
sparingly,  the  latter  lavishly,  on  the  Continental  neces¬ 
sities  of  the  House  of  Hanover,  they  kept  the  destiny 
of  this  country  as  a  Sea  Power  continually  before  their 
eyes,  and  made  the  Continental  wars  and  alliances  to 
subserve  the  true  ends  of  British  policy. 

An  example  of  this  occurred  two  years  after  the 
death  of  Queen  Anne.  Spain  had  recovered  a  consider¬ 
able  measure  of  her  former  power  under  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  Cardinal  Alberoni.  But  one  of  the  fixed 
objectives  of  British  policy  was  that  Spain  should  not 
recover  her  former  power.  The  end  was  justifiable 
enough,  seeing  that  the  Spanish  system  was  still  main¬ 
tained  in  the  Spanish  possessions  abroad.  For  the 
moment,  the  policy  of  Orleans  kept  the  two  branches 
of  the  House  of  Bourbon  apart;  but  the  danger  of  the 
union  of  the  two  Powers,  which  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  had  been  fought  to  prevent,  might  recur 
at  any  time.  It  happened  that,  in  pursuance  of  his 
German  policy,  George  I.  was  anxious  to  secure  the 
Island  of  Sicily  for  the  Emperor,  giving  the  House  of 
Savoy  Sardinia  in  exchange  and  compensating  Spain 
in  Parma  and  Tuscany.  George  went  so  far  as  to  offer 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


165 

to  restore  Gibraltar,  but  the  offer  was  not  accepted. 
Alberoni  would  not  consent  to  the  arrangement  upon 
which  George  had  set  his  heart,  and  tried  to  occupy 
Sicily  by  force.  Byng,  afterwards  Lord  Torrington, 
the  father  of  the  ill-fated  admiral  of  that  name,  fell 
upon  the  Spanish  fleet  off  Cape  Passaro  and  completely 
destroyed  it.  It  was  of  this  battle  that  an  English 
captain,  W alton  by  name,  wrote  the  oft-quoted  despatch : 
“Sir,  We  have  taken  or  destroyed  all  the  Spanish  ships 
upon  this  coast,  the  number  as  per  margin.”  The 
morality  of  Torrington ’s  attack  need  not  be  discussed. 
The  incident  is  quoted  to  show  how  affairs  purely 
continental  in  their  origin  were  used  to  serve  the  mari¬ 
time  purposes  of  Britain,  one  of  which  was  to  stereo¬ 
type  the  naval  weakness  of  Spain.  If  defence  be  thought 
necessary,  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  Law  of 
Nations  did  not  yet  run  on  the  sea,  and  that  encounters 
on  that  element  continued  to  be  of  frequent  occurrence 
while  nations  remained  formally  at  peace  with  each 
other. 

The  death  of  Alberoni  shortly  afterwards  put  an 
end  to  the  immediate  prospect  of  a  Spanish  revival. 
But,  at  the  same  time,  the  death  of  the  Due  d’Orleans 
put  an  end  to  the  friction  between  France  and  Spain. 
The  old  gentleman  with  the  scythe  used  his  implement 
with  notable  impartiality  just  then.  France  and 
Spain  must  be  regarded  as  standing,  at  this  time,  and, 
indeed,  up  to  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  in  much  the  same 
relation  to  one  another  as  Germany  and  Austria-Hun¬ 
gary  do  to  each  other  to-day.  That  gives  the  key  to 
British  policy  during  the  next  hundred  years.  For  the 
moment  a  troubled  peace  was  preserved,  which  lasted 
till  1739.  Cardinal  Fleury,  a  pacific  old  man,  assumed 
the  conduct  of  affairs  in  France,  while  those  of  Britain 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


1 66 

were  in  the  hands  of  Robert  Walpole,  no  less  a  lover  of 
peace  than  he. 

Britain  was  now  in  possession  of  the  thirteen  colonies 
in  North  America,  which  were  to  constitute  the  nucleus 
of  the  United  States;  of  Nova  Scotia,  Newfoundland, 
Jamaica,  and  other  West  Indian  Islands,  while,  in  the 
East,  she  already  held  Bombay,  Calcutta,  and  Madras. 
In  the  Mediterranean,  she  had  possession  of  the  two 
strongholds,  of  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon.  But,  on 
the  route  to  India,  she  had,  at  present,  no  half-way 
house,  the  Cape  being  in  the  hands  of  the  Dutch. 
Neither  East  nor  West,  however,  was  her  position 
undisputed.  The  French  held  the  valley  of  the  St. 
Lawrence,  with  Cape  Breton  Island  at  the  mouth  of 
the  river,  and  they  claimed  all  the  back-country  of 
North  America  behind  the  thirteen  colonies,  down  to 
Louisiana,  which  was  also  in  their  possession.  They 
had  Guadeloupe,  Martinique,  and  half  Hayti  in  the 
West  Indies.  Spain  had  the  other  half  of  Hayti,  and 
Cuba  and  several  other  islands,  besides  Florida,  Mexico, 
and  the  whole  of  South  America,  except  Brazil.  In  the 
East,  France  had  Chandernagore,  Pondicherry,  and 
Mahe  in  India,  besides  the  Isle  of  Bourbon  and  the 
Isle  of  France;  these  last  two  even  more  important 
than  possessions  on  the  mainland,  as  providing  fleet 
bases  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  France  was  decidedly  more 
favourably  situated  for  acquiring  the  Empire  of 
India  than  Great  Britain.  The  great  Dupleix  on  the 
mainland  and  La  Bourdonnais  in  the  islands  were 
building  up  French  power.  Happily  for  our  future, 
neither  they  nor  their  methods  agreed.  La  Bourdon¬ 
nais  saw  that,  if  the  French  were  to  hold  India,  it  must 
be  by  sea  power.  His  ideas  were  the  counterpart  of 
those  held  by  Almeida,  the  Portuguese,  and,  it  may  be 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


167 


added,  by  the  British  also,  who  were  to  succeed  even¬ 
tually  where  he  failed.  Dupleix  followed  the  policy 
of  land  dominion  favoured  by  Albuquerque.  Sea 
power  was  destined  to  thwart  him  in  the  end,  and  he 
returned  to  France,  to  die  impoverished  and  disgraced, 
just  as  Clive  was  setting  out  upon  his  victorious  career. 

With  three  Powers  competing  for  the  dominion  of 
the  West,  and  two  for  that  of  the  East,  there  could  be 
no  lasting  peace,  especially  in  face  of  the  prevailing 
ideas  of  the  day  on  economics.  Distant  possessions 
were  regarded  as  monopolies  of  the  Mother  Country. 
The  attempt  on  the  part  of  any  other  country  to  trade 
with  them  was  a  violation  of  right.  The  sea  routes 
which  linked  the  Mother  Country  to  them  must  there¬ 
fore  be  protected,  both  by  armed  vessels  and  by  bases 
where  these  could  obtain  shelter  and  refreshment. 
Islands  especially  were  sought  for  this  purpose.  In 
the  oversea  possessions  of  the  three  nations  there  was 
an  almost  incessant  state  of  war,  and  this  state  of  war 
of  necessity  existed  also  on  the  routes  leading  thereto. 
While,  therefore,  the  object  of  all  the  countries  in¬ 
volved  was  the  increase  of  commerce  and  the  wealth 
which  commerce  brings  by  developing  the  resources 
of  the  new  countries  and  turning  them  to  their  own 
advantage;  by  increasing  the  number  of  ships  and 
seamen  who  were  the  wagoners  of  the  ocean  highway, 
this  spread  of  commerce  and  wealth  brought  not  peace 
to  the  earth  but  a  sword.  The  tangible,  intelligible 
history  of  the  world’s  expansion  is  the  history  of  the 
activities  of  its  war  navies.  In  a  later  chapter  it  will 
be  shown  how,  with  the  establishment  of  the  undoubted 
supremacy  of  Great  Britain  on  the  seas,  the  outlook 
changed ;  how  the  highway  was  made  safe  to  all  nations 
alike,  and  how  all,  in  the  common  interest,  were  invited 


1 68 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


to  have  a  share,  in  the  good  things  offered  by  the  earth 
and  the  fulness  thereof.  Another  chapter  of  history 
is  now  being  written.  It  is  the  chapter  which  tells  of 
the  latest,  and  we  hope  the  last,  attempt  to  secure 
monopoly  of  the  earth’s  fulness  by  military  power 
and  universal  dominion.  When  the  inevitable  ‘ ‘Finis 
is  written  to  that  chapter,  mankind,  in  brotherhood, 
may  at  last  reap  in  the  fruit  of  all  the  toils  and  perils 
endured  by  seafaring  men  from  the  time  of  the  Phoeni¬ 
cians  to  the  present. 

A  separate  word  must  here  be  said  about  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Mediterranean  at  the  period 
of  our  history  now  reached.  The  struggle  for  a  share 
of  the  trade  of  the  Spanish  dominions  in  South  America 
and  the  Caribbean  is  easily  intelligible,  and  so  is  the 
ceaseless  contest  with  the  French  on  the  mainland  of 
America  and  of  India  and  the  consequential  activities 
of  the  sea  routes  leading  to  either.  But  it  is  less  evi¬ 
dent  why,  before  the  Suez  Canal  was  made,  our  states¬ 
men,  granting  that  they  had  a  clear  idea  of  the  interests 
of  Great  Britain  as  a  maritime  State,  should  have 
shown  such  insistent  concern  to  achieve  and  maintain 
a  predominant  position  in  the  Mediterranean.  The 
trade  with  the  Levant,  it  is  true,  was  large  and  valu¬ 
able.  But  its  protection  was  not  the  real  reason  why, 
as  in  the  instance  recorded  above,  and  more  particu¬ 
larly  later  in  Nelson’s  time,  we  should  have  concerned 
ourselves  so  deeply  about  the  fate  of  Sicily,  for  instance. 
Toulon  could  be  watched  from  Gibraltar  and  Port 
Mahon,  both  of  which  places  were  in  our  hands.  Some 
further  reason  is  required  to  account  for  the  deeply 
rooted  instinct  which  caused  us  to  cling  so  tenaciously 
to  the  Mediterranean  position.  The  true  answer 
sounds  almost  paradoxical.  It  was  in  the  Mediter- 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


169 


ranean  that  we  defended  our  age-long  interest,  the 
freedom  of  the  Low  Countries.  The  vital  spot  of  mid- 
European  strategy  lies  on  the  Middle  Danube.  It  was 
there  that  the  contest  between  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
and  the  House  of  Bourbon  must  be  fought  out,  and  the 
easiest  route  for  the  French  thereto  lay  through  Italy, 
much  of  which  at  this  time  was  a  Bourbon  possession. 
But  Italy  is  a  peninsula,  and  the  route  could  never  be 
safe  for  the  French  unless  they  possessed  command  of 
the  sea.  It  was,  then,  to  prevent  the  French  from 
enjoying  the  command  of  the  Mediterranean  and  thus 
securing  their  communications  with  the  Middle  Danube, 
that,  almost  at  any  cost,  we  held  on  to  a  position  so 
remote  from  our  home  bases.  Here  our  objects  were, 
in  the  main,  political.  Here  we  used  sea  power  to 
thwart  plans  of  universal  domination.  There  have 
been  many  suggestions  since  that  time  that  we  should 
abandon  the  Mediterranean.  With  some  naval  writers, 
the  idea  has  been  almost  an  obsession.  But  a  sounder 
instinct  has  always  prevailed  against  their  logic.  In 
later  days,  since  we  became  the  masters  of  India  and 
the  importance  of  Egypt  has  been  grasped,  the  reasons 
for  holding  on  in  the  inland  sea  have,  of  course,  become 
more  obvious.  The  more  credit  to  the  statesmen  of 
a  former  date  that  they  should  have  obeyed  the  instinct 
at  a  time  when  it  was  little  more  than  prophetic.  Nor 
must  the  fact  be  overlooked  that  the  instinct  of  those 
who  have  sought  to  grasp  world  dominion  has  always 
led  them  to  turn  their  eyes  to  the  East.  Egypt  was 
the  prize  of  Cambyses,  of  Alexander,  of  Antony,  and 
Octavianus.  Liebnitz  urged  Louis  XIV.  to  seize  it 
with  a  view  to  becoming  the  master  of  India;  Napo¬ 
leon’s  grandiose  schemes  all  turned  on  eastern  empire, 
and  the  pan-Germanic  megalomania  has  led  William 


170 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


II.  in  the  same  direction.  It  has  been  a  true  instinct, 
therefore,  which  has  led  the  nation  which  depends  on 
sea  power  and  which,  by  and  for  the  sake  of  sea  power, 
has  stubbornly  resisted  all  attempts  at  world-dominion, 
to  keep  firmly  in  its  hands  the  control  of  the  pivotal 
region  from  which  radiate  the  routes  by  which  the 
would-be  conqueror  must  go. 

To  return  to  the  narrative  of  events.  A  policy  of 
pin-pricks,  pursued  both  by  England  and  by  Spain, 
led  to  open  war  in  1739.  The  English  had  acquired 
the  right  to  send  a  ship  a  year  to  trade  in  Spanish- 
America.  They  took  full  advantage  of  this  privilege, 
loading  the  ship  with  Spanish  produce  on  one  side  and 
unloading  it  into  other  ships  on  the  other.  This 
peculiar  method  had  the  connivance  of  the  Spanish 
colonists  themselves,  as  had  the  bold  system  of  smug¬ 
gling  which  was  carried  on.  Only  in  this  way  could 
they  acquire  the  wealth  denied  to  them  by  the  narrow 
and  selfish  policy  of  the  Home  Government.  Spain, 
too  weak  to  make  a  national  question  of  the  mat¬ 
ter,  attempted  to  deal  with  these  irregularities  locally, 
resorting  to  the  capture  of  English  ships  by  her  gar  da- 
costas,  and,  it  is  said,  inflicting  torture  and  mutilation 
on  her  captured  English  crews.  One  Jenkins,  a  mer¬ 
chant  skipper,  returned  to  England  with  a  complaint 
that  his  ear  had  been  cut  off,  and  that  he  was  told  to 
take  it  to  England  and  to  tell  his  royal  master  that  he 
would  be  treated  the  same  way  if  he  dared  to  voyage  to 
the  Spanish  Main.  An  impudent,  but  perfectly  safe 
threat.  One  can  as  well  imagine  George  I.  in  Elijah’s 
chariot  as  on  the  Spanish  Main.  Jenkins  attended  at 
the  bar  of  the  House  of  Commons  and  showed  the 
members  what  was  alleged  to  be  his  ear.  It  was  said 
afterwards  that  the  ear  was  made  of  india-rubber. 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


171 

Asked  what  he  did  in  the  unpleasant  circumstances 
which  had  overtaken  him,  he  replied:  “I  commended 
my  soul  to  God  and  my  cause  to  my  country.”  The 
words  bear  the  stamp  of  an  origin  nearer  Westminster 
than  the  Spanish  Main;  but  they  set  England  on 
fire.  Walpole  was  unable  to  stand  against  the  storm. 
Knowing  that  France  would  join  Spain,  covertly,  if 
not  openly,  and  that  the  Navy  was  in  no  condition 
for  war,  he  entertained  the  gloomiest  forebodings. 
When  peals  of  joy  rang  out  from  the  steeples  of  London, 
he  remarked:  “They  are  ringing  the  bells  now.  Soon 
they  will  be  wringing  their  hands.”  Thus  began  the 
War  of  Jenkins’s  Ear,  soon  to  be  merged  into  the 
greater  struggle  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 

In  its  earlier  stages,  the  war  was  carried  on  in  waters 
remote  from  Europe,  in  the  Elizabethan  spirit,  but 
without  the  success  which  attended  the  Elizabethans. 
The  Navy  was  ill-found  and  worse  manned.  The  men 
died  like  flies  in  the  West  Indies.  The  islands,  now  a 
health  resort,  were  then  a  veritable  pest-house.  At 
one  period,  it  is  on  record  that  a  hundred  thousand 
British  soldiers  and  sailors  died  of  disease  in  a  single 
year.  Combined  naval  and  military  operations  which 
were  undertaken  against  the  Spanish  possessions  met 
with  a  failure  which  brought  about  the  fall  of  Walpole, 
who  resigned  office  in  1742  and  died  three  years  later. 
That  the  peace-loving  minister  had  neglected  the  Navy, 
there  is  no  doubt.  But  the  total  number  of  British 
ships  available  was  respectable,  and  superior  to  that 
of  France  and  Spain  combined.  The  lack  of  men  was 
very  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the 
prime  seamen,  of  whom  Great  Britain  now  possessed 
large  numbers,  were  absent  on  distant  voyages.  In 
this  respect,  the  very  increase  of  trade  which  the 


172 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Navy  existed  to  protect  militated  against  the  power 
of  the  Navy  to  carry  out  its  primary  duty.  Another 
remarkable  feature  of  the  war  was  the  position  of  the 
French,  who  remained  at  peace  with  Britain,  but,  under 
treaty,  supplied  the  Spaniards  with  a  contingent  of 
ships.  It  was  argued  that  the  provision  of  this  pledged 
help  did  not  involve  a  state  of  war,  and  did  not  even 
justify  the  British  in  capturing  French  ships.  French 
writers  complain  bitterly  about  such  captures. 

Vernon — old  Grogram,  from  whose  nickname  the 
word  “grog”  is  said  to  be  derived — captured  Porto 
Bello  by  a  daring  assault;  but  he  failed  in  conjoint 
expeditions  against  Cartagena  and  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
mainly  owing  to  disagreements  with  the  military 
commander.  The  one  notable  feat  of  the  war  was  the 
voyage  of  Anson  round  the  world  in  1740,  in  the  course 
of  which  he  captured  the  Acapulco  galleon  off  Manila, 
and  returned  with  a  million  and  a  quarter  of  treasure. 
The  exploit,  in  very  many  respects,  recalls  that  of 
Drake.  Like  Drake,  Anson  lost  all  his  ships  but  one, 
the  Centurion ,  his  flagship.  Unlike  Drake,  however, 
who  had  picked  a  crew  of  gentlemen  adventurers  with 
him,  Anson’s  men  were  the  sweepings  of  the  gaols  and 
the  hospitals,  old,  bad,  and  decrepit.  His  voyage  was 
thus  a  great  feat,  showing  that  the  spirit  of  seaman¬ 
ship  was  alive  in  the  British  Navy,  despite  the  evil 
influences  of  Court  favouritism  and  corruption.  It 
awoke  all  the  old  terror  of  the  English  name  in  the 
American  and  Eastern  possessions  of  Spain. 

In  the  year  that  Anson  started  on  his  voyage,  the 
Emperor  Charles  VI.  died,  and  the  War  of  the  Austrian  * 
Succession  began,  France  supporting  the  claim  of 
the  Elector  of  Bavaria  against  Maria  Theresa,  and 
Frederick  the  Great  fighting  against  the  latter  for  his 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


173 


own  hand.  The  English  supported  the  Empress  with 
contingents  of  troops,  in  order  to  secure  the  Low  Coun¬ 
tries,  but  issued  no  declaration  of  war  against  France. 
The  complicated  welter  of  alliances  and  enmities  is, 
however,  no  part  of  our  subject.  It  is  enough  to  record 
that  the  Spaniards  made  an  attempt  to  support  France 
against  the  Empress  in  Italy,  and  that,  the  considera¬ 
tion  before  referred  to  operating,  the  British  Navy 
was  employed  in  the  Mediterranean  to  thwart  them, 
and  employed  with  success.  The  result  was  curious. 
The  Spanish  fleet,  inferior  to  the  British,  was  shut  up 
for  months  in  Toulon,  still  a  neutral  port,  and  was 
then  escorted  thence  by  a  French  squadron  under 
Admiral  de  Court,  which  had  orders  not  to  fight  un¬ 
less  it  was  attacked.  In  February,  1744,  an  indecisive 
engagement  was  fought  outside  Toulon,  France  and 
Britain  being  still  nominally  at  peace,  though  the 
French  had  signed  a  treaty  binding  themselves  to 
declare  war  a  few  months  previously. 

The  action  did  not  redound  to  the  credit  of  any  of 
those  engaged,  with  the  solitary  exception  of  Captain 
Edward  Hawke,  destined  to  become  famous  as  the 
victor  of  Quiberon  Bay.  Matthews,  the  British 
admiral,  with  twenty-nine  ships-of-the-line,  attacked 
the  French  and  Spanish  fleet  of  twenty-seven.  The 
misconduct  of  his  second  in  command  and  of  most  of 
his  captains  robbed  Matthews  of  victory.  He  was 
tried  and  condemned  by  court-martial,  on  the  curious 
ground  that  he  had  broken  his  own  line  of  battle,  the 
truth  being  that  his  captains  had  refused  to  follow  his 
course.  The  second  in  command,  who  was  Matthews’s 
personal  enemy,  was  also  tried  but  acquitted,  on  the 
grounds  that  Matthews’s  signals  were  contradictory. 
Seeing  that  he  had  failed  to  come  into  action  at  all, 


174 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


it  is  plain  that  there  was  yet  a  long  way  to  travel 
before  we  reach  the  spirit  of  Nelson’s  fighting  instruc¬ 
tions:  ‘‘No  captain  can  do  very  wrong  who  lays  his 
ships  alongside  an  enemy.” 

This  reprehensible  failure  was  partly  redeemed, 
after  the  declaration  of  war  by  France,  by  two  actions 
fought  by  Anson  and  Hawke  respectively  in  the 
Atlantic.  The  latter  officer  won  a  decided  victory, 
taking  six  ships  out  of  a  squadron  of  nine  commanded 
by  Admiral  L’Entenduere,  who  sacrificed  himself 
in  order  to  protect  his  convoy  of  two  hundred  and 
fifty  ships,  with  which  he  was  bound  for  the  West 
Indies.  Hawke  was  himself  too  much  shattered  to 
attempt  to  capture  the  convoy,  but  he  sent  a  fast  sailing 
sloop  to  give  warning  of  its  approach  to  the  admiral 
on  the  West  Indies  station,  with  the  consequence  that 
it  was  dispersed  and  the  greater  number  of  the  ships 
taken.  Thus  the  communications  of  the  enemy  were 
disturbed  by  sea,  and  the  superiority  of  the  British 
sea  power  asserted.  To  present  the  other  side  of  the 
picture,  the  British  Channel  Guard  foiled  an  attempt 
by  Marshal  Saxe  to  invade  the  country  from  Dunkirk, 
and,  although  the  Young  Pretender  landed  in  Scotland 
in  1745,  he  could  bring  but  few  men  with  him,  and 
owed  such  success  as  his  adventure  won  to  the  sympathy 
with  his  cause  which  was  widespread  in  the  northern 
kingdom.  Had  he  been  accompanied  by  ten,  or  even 
five  thousand  French  veterans,  the  story  might  have 
been  differently  written.  If  the  War  of  the  Austrian 
Succession  was  not  very  glorious  to  Great  Britain,  her 
sea  power  at  any  rate  achieved  the  main  object  of  its 
existence.  It  maintained  the  use  of  the  sea  routes  to 
herself  and  denied  it  to  her  enemies.  The  war  navies 
of  France  and  Spain  were  swept  from  the  ocean,  and 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


175 


their  sea-borne  trade  was  shattered.  It  was,  however, 
due  to  the  weakness  of  her  enemies  rather  than  to  her 
own  strength  that  Great  Britain  came  through  un¬ 
scathed.  The  Navy  did  not  rise  to  the  height  of  the 
expectations  formed  of  it.  Jealousies  between  it  and 
the  Army  fettered  its  action.  There  was,  however,  a 
very  significant  outcome  of  sea  power  which  holds  a 
lesson  for  us  to-day,  and  must  now  be  mentioned. 

The  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  which  closed  this  war, 
settled  none  of  the  questions  for  which  it  had  been 
fought.  Especially,  the  western  boundaries  of  the 
French  and  English  in  North  America  were  still  left 
indeterminate.  The  American  Colonists,  however, 
had  taken  Louisburg  in  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence, 
and  thus  had  got  a  sure  lever  for  future  pressure  upon 
the  French  in  Canada.  But  the  English  had  lost 
Madras,  and,  in  the  Treaty,  the  American  gain  was 
bartered  for  the  return  of  the  English  loss.  Little  as 
the  Colonists  liked  the  loss  of  their  capture,  they  knew 
that  they  could  always  retake  it,  so  long  as  Britain 
held  command  of  the  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
shock  to  the  prestige  of  Dupleix  in  India  when  the 
natives  saw  his  resounding  victory  rendered  fruitless 
was  something  from  which  it  could  not  recover.  Such 
was  the  result  of  sea  power  acting  on  opposite  sides  of 
the  world,  but  still  all  one.  Naturally,  however,  there 
was  discontent  among  the  Colonists,  and  this  is  the 
first  instance  of  a  difficulty  which  may  be  expected  to 
recur  when  those  who  share  the  fighting  have  no  voice 
in  the  policy  which  makes  war  or  concludes  peace. 
It  is  a  question  of  urgent  and  growing  importance  to 
the  Ocean  Empire. 

Besides  the  question  of  the  North  American  boundary, 
that  of  the  right  of  search  in  South  American  waters, 


176 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  very  starting  point  of  the  war  with  Spain,  was  also 
left  unsettled.  It  is  not,  therefore,  surprising  to  learn 
that,  while  Europe  was  nominally  at  peace,  an  irregu¬ 
lar  war  continued  between  France  and  Britain  in  more 
remote  parts  of  the  world,  or  that  Spain  was  ready  to 
join,  as  far  as  her  weakness  would  permit.  Despite 
the  recall  of  Dupleix,  the  struggle  for  primacy  in  India 
continued  by  means  of  alliances  with  native  princes 
who  were  continually  at  war  with  one  another  in  the 
tottering  Empire  of  the  Great  Mogul.  The  way  of 
the  sea  being  barred  to  French  reinforcements,  it  was 
a  matter  of  course  that  British  power  should  wax  and 
theirs  wane,  though  it  was  long  yet  before  the  struggle 
was  entirely  abandoned.  In  the  West,  Boscawen 
actually  stopped  a  squadron,  in  May,  1755,  which  was 
carrying  reinforcements  to  the  garrison  of  Canada, 
and,  in  the  same  year,  Sir  Edward  Hawke  was  sent 
to  cruise  between  Ushant  and  Finisterre,  with  orders 
to  seize  any  French  ships,  line-of -battleships,  or  other, 
that  he  might  come  across.  The  French  made  osten¬ 
tatious  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  this  country; 
but  were  all  the  while  preparing  a  coup  in  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean.  A  force  under  the  Due  de  Richelieu,  supported 
by  a  fleet  under  La  Gallissoniere,  suddenly  made  a 
descent  on  Minorca,  and  laid  siege  to  Port  Mahon. 

This  led  to  the  fatal  engagement  for  which  Admiral 
John  Byng  was  tried  and  shot.  He  had  been  hurried 
from  Portsmouth  on  the  first  news  of  the  French  move 
with  ten  sail-of-the-line,  and  picked  up  another  three 
on  the  way.  With  this  force  he  was  about  equal  to 
La  Gallissoniere.  The  French  were  not  seeking  a  deci¬ 
sive  engagement,  and  tried  to  avoid  close  action,  while 
damaging  the  British  ships  aloft  as  much  as  possible. 
Byng  could  not  get  his  whole  force  into  action.  It 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


1 77 


seems  that  the  unfortunate  man  was  oppressed  by  the 
sentence  on  Matthews  for  his  action  in  the  battle  off 
Toulon,  mentioned  above.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  he  was  condemned  for  breaking  his  own  line  of 
battle.  The  rearmost  ships  of  Byng’s  fleet  being  late 
in  coming  into  action,  and  two  vessels,  Louisa  and 
Trident ,  owing  to  damage  to  their  spars  being  behind 
him  instead  of  ahead,  he  would  not  bear  down  alone 
and  delay  the  French  ships  in  order  to  bring  them 
into  action.  “You  see,  Captain  Gardiner,”  he  said 
to  his  flag  captain,  “that  the  signal  for  the  line  is  out, 
and  that  I  am  ahead  of  the  ships  Louisa  and  Trident. 
You  would  not  have  me,  as  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  run 
down  as  if  I  were  about  to  engage  a  single  ship.  It  was 
Mr.  Matthews’s  misfortune  to  be  prejudiced  by  not 
carrying  down  his  line  together,  which  I  shall  endeavour 
to  avoid.”  He  avoided  Mr.  Matthews’s  “error”  at 
the  cost  of  his  life.  A  Council  of  War  decided  not  to 
fight  again,  but  to  return  to  Gibraltar.  Port  Mahon 
fell,  and  Byng  was  recalled  to  England,  to  be  tried  for 
his  life.  He  was  acquitted  of  cowardice  and  active 
misconduct,  but  was  found  guilty  of  not  doing  all  he 
might  have  done  to  secure  success.  The  only  penalty 
decreed  by  the  Articles  of  War  for  his  offence  was 
death,  and,  accordingly,  death  was  the  sentence.  A 
particularly  unscrupulous  political  intrigue  was  set  on 
foot  to  prevent  the  King  from  exercising  his  prerogative 
of  mercy,  and  B}mg  was  shot,  less  “to  encourage  the 
rest,”  as  Voltaire  remarked,  than  to  gratify  the  spite 
of  his  political  enemies.  Nevertheless  the  effect  of 
the  execution  was  to  give  the  officers  of  the  Navy  a 
better  perspective  of  their  duty,  and,  if  hard  measure 
was  meted  out  to  the  man  himself,  it  must  be  owned 
that,  after  the  discreditable  affair  of  Matthews,  stern 


12 


178 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


action  was  required  to  restore  the  spirit  of  the  Navy. 
War  was  declared  by  France  three  days  after  the  action 
off  Minorca. 

After  this  inauspicious  beginning,  the  rest  of  the 
war  was  almost  wholly  glorious  to  our  arms.  The  year 
1757  saw  the  victory  of  Plassey,  and  the  foundation 
of  the  British  Empire  in  India.  The  “wonderful  year,” 
1759,  saw  the  taking  of  Quebec,  the  battle  of  Minden, 
Boscawen’s  victory  over  De  La  Clue  in  Lagos  Bay, 
and,  finally,  Hawke’s  great  triumph  at  Quiberon. 
Clive’s  work  in  India  was  helped  by  the  tenacity  with 
which  Admiral  Pocock  clung  to  the  French  squadron 
under  Commodore  d’Ache.  Three  desperate,  though 
indecisive,  battles  were  fought,  and  then  the  general 
superiority  of  British  sea  power  told  its  tale.  Despite 
the  possession  of  the  Isles  of  France  and  Bourbon, 
d’Ache  could  get  no  proper  support  or  supplies  for  his 
ships,  and,  eventually,  naval  aid  was  withdrawn  from 
the  French,  and  the  British  were  left  to  consolidate 
their  position  unmolested,  save  by  such  forces  as  the 
French  had  already  in  the  Peninsula.  Wolfe  owed 
his  success  at  Quebec  largely  to  the  fleet  which  accom¬ 
panied  him  up  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  enabled  him  to 
surprise  the  enemy  at  the  Heights  of  Abraham,  besides 
preventing  reinforcements  from  reaching  Montcalm. 
The  land  advance  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain  failed; 
that  up  the  St.  Lawrence,  assisted  by  the  Navy,  suc¬ 
ceeded.  The  capture  of  Canada  is,  perhaps,  the  best 
monument  to  the  success  of  the  peculiarly  British 
strategy  of  the  conjoint  use  of  naval  and  military  forces. 
On  the  Continent  of  Europe,  where  the  French  had 
been  led  into  war  with  Prussia  in  an  unwonted  alliance 
with  Austria,  owing  to  the  resentment  of  Madame  de 
Pompadour  at  the  sneers  of  Frederick,  the  arms  of 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


179 


that  monarch  were  sustained  in  his  desperate  struggle 
against  French,  Austrians,  and  Russians  by  the  sub¬ 
sidies  which  flowed  from  the  overwhelming  sea-borne 
wealth  of  Britain.  Moreover,  the  strength  of  France 
was  eventually  diverted  from  the  mid-European 
struggle  to  an  attempt  to  invade  this  country  through 
desperation  at  the  ruin  which  was  coming  upon  her. 
The  two  conflicts  were  rather  parallel  than  identical. 
The  British  share  in  the  land  conflict  was,  once  more, 
dictated  by  anxiety  for  the  Low  Countries.  Louis 
XV.,  like  his  grandfather,  was  in  a  cleft  stick.  He  had 
to  make  up  his  mind  whether  he  would  be  a  “wet-bob” 
or  a  “dry-bob.”  He  elected  to  be  the  latter,  and  then 
changed  his  mind,  under  pressure  of  circumstances, 
too  late.  A  great  armament  was  assembled  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Loire,  while  fleets  were  collected  at  Brest 
and  Toulon,  which  were  intended  to  make  junction 
and  convoy  the  armies  across — fifty  thousand  men  for 
England,  twelve  thousand  for  Scotland.  It  was  an 
earlier  example  of  Napoleon’s  plan  of  1803,  and  a  late 
copy  of  Santa  Cruz’s  scheme  for  the  Armada. 

The  British  seamen  met  the  threat  in  the  same 
manner  as  it  was  met  at  the  later  date.  Hawke 
watched  the  squadron  in  Brest,  Boscawen  that  at 
Toulon.  It  was  not  a  “blockade,”  though  it  is  often 
so  described.  The  object  was,  not  to  shut  the  French 
in,  but  to  bring  them  to  action,  if,  or  when,  they  should 
come  out.  It  was  a  defensive  measure  which  had 
offence  for  its  ultimate  object.  And  it  was  combined 
with  direct  action  which  was  purely  offensive,  having 
for  its  object  to  force  the  hands  of  the  French  by  con¬ 
tinual  irritation  and  to  compel  them  to  withdraw  or 
withhold  forces  from  the  campaign  against  Frederick. 
The  British  waged  a  relentless  war  against  French 


i8o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


trade,  made  descents  with  conjoint  naval  and  military 
forces  on  various  points  of  the  French  coast,  and,  one 
by  one,  wrenched  the  colonies  of  France  from  her. 
The  Toulon  squadron  attempted  to  get  to  sea  while 
Boscawen  was  at  Gibraltar  carrying  out  repairs.  It 
was  driven  into  Lagos  Bay  and  scattered  or  destroyed. 
Five  ships  alone  managed  to  escape  into  Cadiz.  The 
Brest  fleet  was  ordered  to  put  to  sea  and  fight  a  fleet 
action  with  Hawke,  in  order  to  clear  the  way  for  the 
transports.  Hawke  was  driven  off  his  station  into 
Torbay  by  a  heavy  westerly  gale,  which  kept  the  French 
in  port  but  enabled  them  to  receive  as  reinforcement 
a  small  squadron  which  was  returning  from  the  West 
Indies.  When  the  wind  shifted  to  easterly,  M.  de 
Conflans,  who  commanded  the  French,  put  to  sea  and 
cruised  to  the  southward.  Hawke,  released  from  Torbay, 
crowded  all  sail,  and  came  up  with  him  on  November 
20th.  A  gale  was  again  blowing  from  west-north- west, 
and  Conflans,  who  was  in  slightly  inferior  force,  made 
for  Quiberon  Bay,  thinking  that  Hawke  would  not 
dare  to  follow  him  on  that  iron-bound  lee  shore.  He 
mistook  the  mettle  of  the  man.  Hawke  was  a  con¬ 
summate  seaman,  and  he  knew  the  coast.  He  ordered 
a  general  chase.  The  flying  spray  was  seen  dashing 
over  the  rocks,  which  showed  black  in  the  winter 
twilight  through  it.  Hawke’s  master  remonstrated 
with  him  on  the  rashness  of  the  attempt  to  follow  the 
French  in.  “You  have  done  your  duty  in  pointing 
out  the  danger,”  replied  Hawke.  “Now  lay  me  along¬ 
side  the  enemy’s  flagship!”  That  could  not  be,  for 
M.  de  Conflans  led  the  flight.  Hawke’s  van  dashed  in, 
hot  on  the  track  of  the  French  rear.  The  thunder  of 
guns  mingled  with  the  roar  of  the  surf,  and  the  flashes 
lit  up  the  darkness  which  had  by  now  fallen.  The 


The  Battle  of  Quiberon  Bay,  November  20,  1759 

From  an  old  print 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


181 


foam-covered  rocks  alone  buoyed  the  fairway.  A 
French  74,  pressed  by  superior  force,  opened  her  lower- 
deck  ports  in  order  that  she  might  reply  more  effec¬ 
tively  to  the  hostile  fire.  The  sea  poured  in,  and  she 
foundered.  Two  more  struck  their  colours;  several 
were  wrecked.  Fifteen  made  for  the  mouth  of  the 
Vilaine,  got  in  over  the  bar,  and  were  left  there  helpless 
for  fifteen  months.  The  flagship  Le  Roi  Soleil  found 
herself  when  morning  broke  in  the  middle  of  the 
British  fleet.  She  was  run  ashore,  where  Hawke 
destroyed  her.  Five  ships  only  succeeded  in  making 
their  way  to  Rochefort.  The  Navy  of  Louis  XV. 
was  out  of  action  for  the  remainder  of  the  war. 

Such  was  this  great  victory,  for  boldness  and  skill 
perhaps  greater  even  than  Trafalgar,  and  matched  only 
by  the  Nile.  Henceforth  Britain  wrought  her  will  on 
every  sea.  The  threat  of  invasion  was  at  an  end. 
Spain  joined  in  the  war  shortly  afterwards,  only  to 
be  rewarded  by  the  loss  of  Havana,  which  was  cap¬ 
tured  by  Pocock,  and  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  Im¬ 
mense  sums  in  specie  were  also  taken,  and  Spain  soon 
sued  for  a  humiliating  peace.  The  war  was  ended  by 
the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  signed  on  February  3, 
1763.  By  it,  France  ceded  all  claim  to  Nova  Scotia 
and  Canada,  the  Valley  of  the  Ohio,  and  all  her  terri¬ 
tory  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Mississippi,  except  the 
town  of  New  Orleans.  Spain  surrendered  Florida 
in  exchange  for  the  return  of  Havana.  She  was 
leniently  dealt  with  otherwise,  for  she  recovered  the 
Philippines.  In  the  West  Indies,  the  islands  of  Guade¬ 
loupe  and  Martinique  were  returned  to  France,  and 
her  claim  to  Santa  Lucia  was  allowed,  while  Britain 
kept  St.  Vincent,  Tobago,  Dominica,  and  Grenada  in 
the  Lesser  Antilles.  The  former  possessions  of  the 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


182 

French  in  India  were  restored  to  them;  but  the  right 
to  fortify  or  keep  troops  in  Bengal  was  surrendered. 
Britain  recovered  Minorca. 

The  losses  of  British  trade  during  the  Seven  Years’ 
War  were  great.  The  French  took  to  privateering  after 
1759,  and,  in  one  year,  captured  fourteen  hundred 
merchantmen  out  of  a  total  of  about  eight  thousand. 
The  national  debt  had  risen  to  the  sum  of  £122,000,000 
—an  immense  burden  for  that  day,  though  one  at 
which  we  may  well  look  with  envy  now.  But  the  new 
resources  which  India  and  the  Colonies  yielded  amply 
compensated,  and  the  debt  was  really  a  source  of 
wealth  rather  than  of  embarrassment.  It  meant  a 
distribution  of  comfort  among  the  middle-classes,  and 
a  consequent  plenitude  of  employment  for  those  de¬ 
pendent  upon  them.  The  military  navy  of  France 
lost  nearly  half  its  strength  in  the  war,  while  that  of 
Britain  was  strengthened  by  the  capture  of  fine  ships 
of  a  better  model  than  she  herself,  at  this  time,  con¬ 
structed.  Moreover,  the  superiority  of  the  British 
officers  and  seamen  was  enhanced  by  the  policy  of 
watching  the  enemy’s  ports.  Facing  all  weathers,  they 
became  in  an  increasing  degree  hardy  and  resource¬ 
ful,  while  the  French,  condemned  to  sojourn  in  port, 
rapidly  deteriorated  in  efficiency,  though  not  in  courage. 
At  no  time  in  the  world’s  history  was  the  maritime 
superiority  of  any  Power  so  firmly  established  as  was 
that  of  Britain  at  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years’  War. 
And,  at  the  same  time,  the  Continent  was  exhausted 
by  the  terrific  struggle  to  subdue  Frederick  the  Great, 
and  fell  into  torpor,  until  the  thunder-clap  of  the  French 
Revolution  aroused  it.  On  this  fact  the  foundation 
of  our  industrial  prosperity  was  also  laid. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  sea-borne  trade  at  this 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


183 


time  did  not  involve  the  free  coming  and  going  of 
merchant  ships  into  foreign  ports  freely  open  to  them, 
as  we  understand  it  nowadays,  when  the  right  is  subject 
only  to  the  payment  of  dues  required  by  municipal 
law.  The  mercantile  system  prevailed  almost  univer¬ 
sally,  and  the  privilege  of  entering  foreign  ports  was 
only  conceded  as  the  outcome  of  negotiations  between 
governments.  Colonial  trade,  in  particular,  was  very 
closely  preserved  to  the  Mother  Country.  The  pro¬ 
ducts  of  the  French  Colonies  might  be  conveyed  only 
to  France,  and  only  in  French  ships.  The  French, 
however,  being  unable  to  carry  on  this  trade  themselves 
during  the  Seven  Years’  War,  owing  to  the  pressure 
of  the  British  Navy,  opened  it  to  the  Dutch.  Great 
Britain  replied  with  “The  Rule  of  1756,”  which  is  the 
basis  of  all  our  Orders  in  Council  and  Prize  Court 
regulations. 

The  British  Government  gave  orders  that  all  neutral 
ships  laden  with  cargoes  from  the  Colonies  of  the  enemy 
should  be  captured  and  brought  before  the  Prize  Courts. 
.  .  .  This  was  done  on  the  principle  that  during  war  the 
commercial  dealings  of  neutrals  ought  to  be  kept  within 
their  accustomed  limits,  and  that  they  have  no  right  to 
enjoy  a  trade  which  is  closed  to  them  in  time  of  peace, 
and  thus  help  one  belligerent  by  incorporating  their  mer¬ 
chantmen  with  his,  thus  identifying  themselves  with  his 
interests  (G.  W.  T.  Omond,  The  Law  of  the  Sea ,  A.  C. 
Black,  Ltd.,  pp.  7,  8). 

In  essence,  this  meant  that  French  colonial  trade 
went  to  enrich  Britain,  even  if  the  Colonies  did  not 
themselves  fall  to  her.  The  grinding  power  of  supre¬ 
macy  at  sea  is  thus  shown,  and  one  of  the  reasons  also 
why  trade  flourished  in  war-time  in  the  case  of  a  mari- 


184 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


time  Power  like  Great  Britain,  which,  with  the  mastery 
of  the  sea,  held  control  of  the  sea  routes.  She  was, 
moreover,  in  a  position  to  exact  conditions  favourable 
to  her  trade  from  neutrals.  The  Treaty  with  Portugal, 
negotiated  by  Paul  Methuen  in  1703,  which  reduced 
the  duties  on  Portuguese  wines  to  two-thirds  in  ex¬ 
change  for  the  free  importation  of  English  woollen 
manufactures,  and  is  thus,  perhaps,  responsible  for 
half  the  gout  in  the  country,  is  a  case  in  point.  It 
gave  Great  Britain  a  practical  monopoly  of  the  trade 
in  Portugal,  and  sent  the  gold  of  Brazil  to  London  by 
way  of  Lisbon.  Politically,  it  made  Portugal  depen¬ 
dent  for  her  defence  on  England,  and  made  the  defence 
of  Portugal  one  of  the  first  of  British  interests.  Trade 
acquired  as  the  result  of  general  maritime  superiority 
soon  outbalanced  all  the  damage  done  by  enemy 
cruisers  and  privateers. 

Two  years  after  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Fon¬ 
tainebleau,  the  North  American  Colonists  began  their 
struggle  for  independence  by  resistance  to  the  Stamp 
Act.  It  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event,  and  to 
condemn,  as  the  Whigs  by  whom  history  was  com¬ 
monly  written  up  to  the  time  of  Macaulay,  have  unan¬ 
imously  condemned,  the  King  and  his  successive 
ministers  for  crass  folly.  Experiment  had  not  yet 
shown,  as  it  has,  happily,  since,  that  a  commonwealth 
of  nations,  each  enjoying  the  most  complete  rights  of 
self-government,  could  yet  remain  a  united  if  loosely 
compacted  empire.  No  better  system  of  administer¬ 
ing  the  government  of  Colonies  had  as  yet  been  devised 
than  that  which  Britain  pursued  up  to  1765.  The 
Colonists  themselves  made  no  move  for  greater  liberty 
until  the  threat  involved  in  the  French  possession  of 
Canada  and  Louisiana  and  their  claim  to  the  country 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


185 


west  of  the  Alleghanies  had  been  removed  in  the  Seven 
Years’  War.  Still,  sapiens  qui  prospicit!  There  was 
a  lesson  which  had  to  be  learned,  and  our  statesmen 
learned  it  too  late.  The  European  enemies  of  Great 
Britain  were  not  slow  to  seize  the  opportunity  to  rub 
it  in. 

The  fourteen  years  which  elapsed  between  the  Treaty 
of  Fontainebleau  and  the  adhesion  of  France  to  the 
cause  of  the  revolted  Colonists  were  spent  by  the  French 
in  a  resolute  attempt  to  build  up  their  navy  and  to 
strengthen  the  family  compact  which  united  the  Royal 
Houses  of  France  and  Spain.  The  efforts  of  Choiseul, 
the  French  Minister,  were  heartily  backed  by  the 
people,  who  furnished  the  King  with  ships  by  voluntary 
subscription.  A  thorough  scheme  of  training  for 
French  naval  officers  was  instituted,  and  the  science 
of  naval  warfare  was  diligently  studied.  Nor  was  the 
British  Navy  allowed  to  decay  at  this  time,  as  it  had 
so  often  been  before  in  time  of  peace.  A  regular 
standard  of  naval  strength  was  maintained:  namely, 
equality  to  the  combined  navies  of  the  House  of 
Bourbon.  That  standard  prevailed,  at  least  nominally, 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Nevertheless,  Great 
Britain  entered  upon  the  struggle  under  circumstances 
very  unfavourable  to  her.  The  merchant  shipping  of 
the  North  American  Colonies  amounted  to  very  nearly 
half  her  own,  and  the  reservoir  of  trained  seamen 
which  she  had  thus  possessed  was  now  cut  off  from  her. 
In  addition,  she  was  committed  to  a  war  far  from  her 
own  shores,  while  her  principal  enemies  at  sea  were 
close  to  them,  and,  in  the  distant  sphere,  had,  more¬ 
over,  a  great  part  of  the  resources  of  the  Colonies  to 
rely  on.  The  prosecution  of  the  land  war  against 
the  revolted  Colonists  demanded  the  presence  of  great 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


1 86 

fleets  upon  their  coasts  to  secure  the  communications 
of  her  armies.  For  the  first  time  in  her  history  she 
fought  at  a  serious  disadvantage  in  geographical  posi¬ 
tion.  As  a  further  embarrassment,  the  Dutch,  dis¬ 
loyal  to  their  ancient  treaties,  resisted  the  application 
of  the  rule  of  1756  to  the  point  of  declaring  war.  Ant¬ 
werp  and  the  Scheldt  were  at  the  disposal  of  the  enemy. 
And  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark  joined  in  the  armed 
neutrality,  which  aimed  at  asserting  the  right  of  neutrals 
to  trade  with  belligerents  in  all  articles  save  contraband 
of  war,  and  denied  the  right  of  blockade.  Since  naval 
stores  then  chiefly  came  from  the  Baltic,  and  these 
were  denied  to  Great  Britain,  the  armed  neutrality 
scarcely  differed  from  actual  war. 

Twice  over  great  French  and  Spanish  fleets  were 
in  the  Channel,  while  a  large  army  of  invasion  lay  on 
the  opposite  shore.  Three  times  Gibraltar  was  on  the 
point  of  starvation  when  it  was  relieved,  first  by 
Darby,  secondly  by  Rodney,  and  lastly  by  Howe. 
Two  British  armies  were  compelled  to  lay  down  their 
arms  in  America,  chiefly  owing  to  the  local  and  tem¬ 
porary  superiority  of  the  enemy  at  sea.  Yet,  with  it 
all,  when  peace  came  in  1783,  the  sea  power  of  Britain 
was  substantially  unshaken.  The  American  Colonies 
were  gone,  and  a  couple  of  West  Indian  islands,  and 
Minorca.  But  all  except  the  first  could  be  recovered, 
provided  that  the  real  command  of  the  sea  were  main¬ 
tained,  and  that  was  still  not  in  doubt.  The  sea-sense 
of  the  race  was  never  better  exemplified  than  in  this 
struggle,  which  ought  to  have  seen  the  end  of  Britain’s 
greatness.  The  Royal  Navy  of  France  was  never  so 
formidable.  But  it  completely  failed  against  the 
inherited  instinct  which  led  men  like  Hood,  Kempen- 
feldt,  and  Rodney  to  do  the  right  thing,  even  when  in 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


187 


inferior  force.  Even  in  the  East  Indies,  where  Hughes, 
as  a  commander,  was  plainly  overmatched  by  the 
real  genius  of  the  Bailli  de  Suffren,  the  latter  never 
beat  him  decisively,  and  Britain  retained  her  position, 
despite  the  struggle  which  she  was  forced  to  carry  on 
at  the  same  time  against  the  formidable  power  of 
Mysore,  under  Hyder  Ali.  The  French  Navy,  as  a 
military  implement,  was  in  a  high  state  of  perfection, 
and,  if  the  principles  of  sea-fighting  were  the  same  as 
those  of  land  warfare,  might  have  overmatched  its 
opponent.  But  it  lacked  the  true  instinct  for  the  sea; 
it  was  not  backed  by  a  strong  maritime  system,  or  a 
people  whose  destiny  really  lay  upon  the  water.  It 
failed  to  seize  its  opportunities,  and,  therefore,  it  failed 
to  inflict  any  permanent  injury  on  its  great  rival.  This 
was  seen  plainly  enough  when  the  issue  was  next  fought 
out,  for,  by  then,  the  Revolution  had  shattered  the  old 
Royal  Navy  of  France,  and  revolutionary  ardour  could 
not  replace  discipline  at  sea  as  it  did  on  shore. 

The  operations  in  the  West  Indies,  which  form  the 
main  naval  interest  in  the  War  of  American  Indepen¬ 
dence,  are  anything  but  easy  to  follow.  Hood  and 
Byron,  d’Estaing  and  de  Grasse  checked  and  counter- 
checked  each  other  by  strategic  moves  which  rarely 
resulted  in  actual,  and  never  in  decisive,  action.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  follow  these  in  detail.  So  long  as  the 
land  war  on  the  American  continent  continued,  British 
naval  operations  were  hampered  by  the  necessity  of  sup¬ 
porting  the  land  forces  and  maintaining  the  communi¬ 
cations  of  the  different  detachments  with  one  another. 
But  after  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis  in  Yorktown, 
the  cause  of  the  United  States  was  won,  and  the  struggle 
was  between  Great  Britain  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
allied  Bourbon  Powers  on  the  other.  The  capture  of 


1 88  SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 

“sugar  islands”;  the  re-establishment  of  France  and 
Spain  in  their  predominating  position  in  the  West 
Indies  became  the  objective.  De  Grasse  left  the 
Chesapeake  to  capture  St.  Kitts,  followed  by  Hood  with 
inferior  force.  Rodney  was  expected  from  England 
with  reinforcements,  and  de  Guichen  from  France. 
Rodney  duly  arrived;  but  de  Guichen  was  brought 
to  action  by  Kempenfeldt  off  Brest,  and  his  fleet  and 
convoy  were  beaten  and  dispersed.  This  was  the 
turning  point.  Hood  foiled  de  Grasse  by  a  brilliant 
stroke  of  strategy,  and,  although  he  could  not  prevent 
the  capture  of  St.  Kitts,  he  joined  Rodney  with  his 
fleet  intact,  and  the  combined  force  became  superior 
to  that  under  de  Grasse.  Nevertheless,  the  latter 
proceeded  with  his  preparations  for  the  reduction  of 
Jamaica,  collecting  a  great  convoy  with  twenty  thou¬ 
sand  troops.  The  expected  Spanish  reinforcements, 
however,  did  not  arrive,  and,  on  April  12,  1782,  de 
Grasse  was  brought  to  action  off  The  Saints  by  Rodney, 
and  defeated,  with  the  loss  of  five  ships  captured, 
including  his  own  flagship,  the  Ville  de  Paris ,  the  gift 
of  the  people  of  the  French  capital.  Peace  was  signed 
in  the  following  January,  and  it  left  Great  Britain  still 
supreme  at  sea.  She  lost  a  couple  of  West  Indian 
islands  and  Minorca.  Spain  regained  Florida;  but 
this  was  of  more  consequence  to  the  United  States 
than  to  Britain.  Gibraltar  was  saved,  and,  in  the  East 
Indies,  her  position  was  untouched. 

The  British  Government  of  the  day  is  censured  by 
Mahan  for  not  concentrating  its  force  on  the  decisive 
point,  namely,  off  the  enemy’s  ports.  The  criticism 
is,  in  the  abstract,  justified.  But  it  omits  to  take 
account  of  the  fact  that,  before  the  intervention  of 
France  and  Spain — an  intervention,  however,  which 


PRIDE  AND  A  FALL 


189 

was  admittedly  likely — Great  Britain  was  committed 
to  a  struggle  with  the  Colonists  which  demanded  the 
support  of  a  large  fleet  on  the  scene  of  action.  Naval 
co-operation  on  the  further  side  of  the  Atlantic  was 
essential,  and,  indeed,  the  Colonies  were  mainly  lost, 
because,  in  one  or  two  instances,  it  failed  to  be  effective. 
The  division  of  the  total  naval  strength  of  Britain  was, 
therefore,  inevitable.  Subject  to  this  limitation,  the 
expedient  of  watching  the  enemy’s  ports  was  resorted 
to  as  far  as  possible,  and,  indeed,  with  such  success 
that  one-half  of  the  French  expedition  detailed  for  the 
assistance  of  the  Americans  was  locked  up  in  Brest  till 
the  end  of  the  war.  This  division  of  force  compelled 
the  abandonment  of  the  Mediterranean.  Port  Mahon, 
left  to  itself,  necessarily  fell.  But  its  voluntary 
abandonment  would  have  relieved  the  British  of  little 
of  their  embarrassment.  The  obligation  to  relieve 
Gibraltar  would  have  remained.  The  additional  troops 
would  have  been  useless  for  the  defence,  and  would 
only  have  meant  so  many  more  mouths  to  feed.  Again, 
it  was  imperative  to  maintain  local  naval  forces  in 
the  East  Indies.  It  is  fairer  to  say  that  Great  Britain, 
thrown  by  faulty  policy  into  a  false  strategical  position, 
held  on  tenaciously  to  all  essential  points,  and  that 
her  unshaken  grip  upon  the  sea  routes  brought  her 
safely  through,  despite  the  numerical  inferiority  to 
which  she  was  reduced  in  almost  every  theatre  of  war. 

The  disadvantage  of  the  strategical  defensive  forced 
upon  us  was  corrected  by  a  tactical  offensive  whenever 
possible.  Keppel  attacked  the  French  fleet  off  Ushant 
at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.  The  action  failed 
of  decisive  result,  owing  to  the  misconduct  of  his  cap¬ 
tains,  or  some  of  them.  Rodney  twice  attacked  the 
Spaniards,  in  one  instance  under  conditions  which 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


190 

recall  Quiberon  Bay,  and,  on  both  occasions,  inflicted 
a  heavy  defeat  upon  them.  The  victory  of  Kempen- 
feldt,  one  of  our  very  great  seamen,  whose  premature 
fate  in  the  Royal  George  is  better  known  than  his  meri¬ 
torious  services  at  sea,  over  de  Guichen  off  Brest  has 
already  been  mentioned.  Only  two  ships-of-the-line 
out  of  seventeen  and  five  merchantmen  out  of  a  hun¬ 
dred  and  fifty  reached  the  West  Indies.  The  distant 
issue  was  decided  in  European  waters — a  telling  instance 
of  the  working  of  sea  power. 

Great  Britain  emerged  from  a  contest  in  which  the 
whole  world  was  engaged,  actively  or  passively,  against 
her,  chastened  but  not  killed.  Everything  which  she 
had  lost,  save  only  the  North  American  Colonies,  was 
recoverable,  as  the  not  distant  future  was  to  show. 
The  war  of  1778-83  was,  of  course,  one  of  the  most 
momentous  for  the  future  of  mankind  that  has  ever 
been  fought..  The  thirteen  colonies,  now  become 
independent  were  freed  from  the  restrictions  of  the 
Colonial  system.  The  enormous  expansion  which  the 
next  hundred  years  were  to  witness  in  the  United  States 
had  a  most  powerful  influence  on  the  freedom  of  trade 
and  freedom  of  the  seas  which  it  was  the  work  of  Brit¬ 
ain  chiefly  to  foster  after  1815.  Nor  is  that  all.  By 
the  independence  of  the  United  States,  the  hegemony 
of  the  New  World  passed  to  a  nation  speaking  the 
English  tongue  and  imbued  with  the  ideals  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  culture,  freedom,  and  law.  The  pride  of  Great 
Britain  was  rudely  humbled;  but  the  lesson  taught  her 
by  the  successful  revolt  of  her  Colonists  bore  fruit. 
And  its  fruit  is  nothing  less  than  the  Ocean  Empire  of 
which  she  is  now  the  head — not  the  mistress,  but 
prima  inter  pares . 


CHAPTER  IX 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 

In  supporting  the  revolted  Colonists,  the  House  of 
Bourbon  fought  for  their  own  hand,  and  sealed  their 
own  doom.  The  young  and  brilliant  Lafayette,  who, 
at  the  age  of  twenty,  placed  his  sword  at  the  service  of 
the  Americans,  lived  to  propose  to  the  National  As¬ 
sembly  a  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  founded 
upon  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  to  com¬ 
mand  the  National  Guard  in  the  Revolution  of  1830. 
Great  Britain  was  a  reluctant  opponent  of  the  Revolu¬ 
tion,  with  the  principles,  but  not  the  excesses,  of  which 
a  large  number  of  British  people  were  in  sympathy. 
But  when  the  revolutionists  offered  assistance  to  any 
nation  desirous  of  freeing  itself  from  monarchial  rule, 
and  proceeded  to  fit  the  Cap  of  Liberty  on  to  the  re¬ 
luctant  heads  of  the  Dutch,  then  the  old  concern  for 
the  Low  Countries  and  the  mouths  of  the  Scheldt 
was  reawakened.  The  murder  of  Louis  XVI.  and  Marie 
Antoinette  perhaps  shocked  the  Court  more  than  the 
people,  though  the  godlessness  and  blasphemy  of  the 
Jacobins  roused  a  sense  of  horror  in  the  masses.  The 
British  people  had  liberty,  but  liberty  of  their  own 
brand.  They  were  not  prepared  to  exchange  it  for 
that  of  revolutionary  France.  So  Britain,  the  first 
Sea  Power  and  the  representative  of  constitutional 


192 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


freedom,  made  common  cause  with  Hapsburgs  and 
Hohenzollerns.  War  was  declared  in  1793;  the  sword 
of  Britain  was  not  sheathed  again,  save  for  two  short 
intervals,  till  Waterloo  delivered  “the  Spoiler”  into 
her  hands  in  1815. 

The  war  divides  itself  naturally  into  three  parts. 
The  first,  which  may  be  called  the  Revolutionary  period, 
is  that  in  which  Napoleon  established  and  consolidated 
his  power  in  France  and  on  the  Continent.  This 
lasted  from  1793  to  the  Peace  of  Amiens  in  1801. 
The  second  period  is  that  of  the  duel  between  France 
and  Great  Britain,  from  1803  to  the  victory  of  Trafal¬ 
gar,  on  October  21,  1805.  The  third,  from  Trafalgar 
to  Waterloo,  is  the  period  which  covers  the  military 
effort  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Peninsula  and  Flanders, 
and  the  economic  struggle  consequent  on  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  Napoleon’s  “Continental  System.”  A  direct 
consequence  of  this  was  the  War  of  1812  with  the 
United  States.  Many  volumes  have  been  written 
concerning  this  titanic  period  in  the  world’s  history, 
and  to  follow  its  infinite  ramifications  in  a  chapter 
would  be  an  impossible  task.  No  more  can  be  at¬ 
tempted  than  to  indicate  the  working  of  sea  power  and 
to  show  its  decisive  influence  on  the  great  conflict, 
exercised  often  most  strongly  when  defeat  seemed 
most  certain.  Napoleon,  the  soldier,  had  command 
of  the  whole  resources  of  France.  It  has  been  said  of 
him,  with  truth,  that  he  lacked  ille  sentiment  exact  des 
difficultes  de  la  marine .”  This  was  shown  most  clearly 
in  the  period  between  1803  and  1805,  after  which  he 
abandoned  his  hopes  of  maritime  supremacy,  and 
devoted  himself  to  the  effort  to  “make  the  land  con¬ 
quer  the  sea.”  In  that  he  failed  utterly,  as  every  other 
conqueror  has  failed;  and  he  not  only  failed  but  he 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


193 


was  drawn  into  false  strategical  moves  by  land  which 
eventually  sapped  the  strength  of  France  and  caused 
his  own  downfall.  Two  names  stand  out  predominantly 
during  this  period:  those  of  Nelson  and  Napoleon. 
The  record  of  the  sailor  is  emblazoned  with  three  great 
fights,  in  the  third  of  which  he  fell:  the  Nile,  Copen¬ 
hagen,  and  Trafalgar.  On  the  colours  of  the  soldier 
shine  the  names  of  Rivoli,  Lodi,  Areola,  Marengo, 
Austerlitz,  Jena,  Friedland,  Ulm,  Wagram,  to  name 
only  the  most  famous  of  his  triumphs.  But  each  of 
Nelson’s  battles  was  a  deadly  thrust,'  involving  the 
failure  of  one  of  Napoleon’s  grandiose  plans.  The 
soldier’s  triumphs,  despite  the  military  glory  ensuing, 
were  but  ropes  of  sand. 

In  the  first  period  of  the  war,  the  tasks  which  the 
Navy  of  Great  Britain  had  to  perform  were,  briefly, 
as  follows:  To  protect  the  country  from  invasion, 
always,  and  necessarily,  the  first  preoccupation.  This 
involved,  not  only  the  time-honoured  watch  on  the 
French  ports,  especially  Brest  and  Toulon,  but  also 
the  no  less  customary  measures  to  render  a  threat  from 
the  Low  Countries  harmless.  We  had  the  Dutch  as 
allies  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  But  the  French 
overran  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  defeated  a  British 
army  which  was  laying  siege  to  Dunkirk,  and  overthrew 
the  House  of  Orange,  which  was  favourable  to  Britain. 
Thus  the  Dutch  were  thrown  into  the  arms  of  the  Revo¬ 
lution,  and,  without  much  stomach  for  it,  joined  the 
ranks  of  our  enemies.  The  Dutch  fleet  was  immedi¬ 
ately  blockaded  in  the  Texel  by  Admiral  Duncan,  who 
brought  it  to  action  and  completely  defeated  it,  with 
the  loss  of  nine  ships-of-the-line  out  of  sixteen,  on 
October  11,  1797.  An  invading  force  intended  for 
Ireland  lay  behind  the  shelter  of  the  Dutch  warships. 


13 


194 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


But,  after  the  disaster  of  Camperdown,  the  project  was 
abandoned.  Hoche’s  unsuccessful  attempt  had  occurred 
the  year  before,  and  Humbert’s  followed  the  year  after. 
The  latter  succeeded  in  landing  a  small  body  of  troops, 
which  was  quickly  forced  to  surrender.  An  attempt 
to  send  reinforcements  to  Humbert  failed  ignomini- 
ously,  the  flagship,  Hoche ,  and  three  frigates  being 
taken,  and  Wolfe  Tone,  the  leader  of  the  disaffected 
Irish,  taken  with  them.  The  direct  threat  to  the  se¬ 
curity  of  the  British  islands  was  thus,  for  the  time  be¬ 
ing,  brought  to  an  end  before  the  close  of  the  century. 
The  French  continued  to  control  the  Dutch  ports 
throughout  the  war.  But  Dutch  sea  power  rose  no 
more  after  Camperdown.  The  oversea  possessions  of 
Holland  fell  one  by  one  into  the  hands  of  the  British, 
though  most  of  them  were  restored  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Ceylon,  and  Demerara 
being  the  most  important  of  those  retained. 

^  In  the  conditions  under  which  the  war  opened, 
assistance  to  the  elements  in  France  which  resisted  or 
revolted  against  the  Revolution  was  obviously  indicated 
as  the  second  duty  of  the  possessors  of  sea  power.  Such 
attempts  were  duly  made,  in  La  Vendel,  in  Provence, 
and  in  the  West  Indies,  where  Hayti,  in  particular, 
under  the  leadership  of  the  negro,  Toussaint  L’Ouver- 
ture,  was  in  revolt.  Little  came  of  these  endeavours, 
however,  and  the  only  one  possessing  any  interest  is 
the  occupation  of  Toulon,  where  the  Mediterranean 
fleet,  under  Lord  Hood,  supported  the  inhabitants  who 
had  raised  the  White  Flag  of  the  Bourbons.  The  shore 
works  were  seized  and  manned ;  but  the  counter-revolu¬ 
tion  failed  at  Marseilles  and  Lyons,  and  Toulon  was 
besieged  by  the  Revolutionary  forces,  whose  artillery 
was  directed  by  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  then  a  captain. 


Admiral  Duncan’s  Victory  over  the  Dutch  Fleet 
(In  the  North  Sea,  October  n,  1797) 

From  a  drawing  by  P.  J.  de  Loutherbourg,  R.  A.,  engraved  by  J.  Rogers 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


195 


The  works  proved  untenable,  and  Hood  retired,  burn¬ 
ing  some  and  taking  others  of  the  French  warships  in 
the  port.  Thus  early  the  future  Emperor  came  into 
contact  with  sea  power,  and  his  first  encounter  ended 
favourably  for  him. 

If,  however,  he  imbibed  any  hopes  from  this  inci¬ 
dent  in  his  later  reflections,  knowledge  of  the  fate  of 
France  at  this  time  should  have  checked  them.  The 
“stranglehold”  of  the  British  Navy,  combined  with 
the  effects  of  internal  disorder,  was  already  telling. 
The  wheat  cargoes  from  Sicily  and  the  Barbary  States 
were  cut  off.  The  French  were  already  in  need  of 
bread.  It  was  to  secure  the  safe  arrival  of  a  great  con¬ 
voy  from  America  that  the  Admiral  commanding  at 
Brest,  Villaret-Joyeuse,  was  ordered  to  sea,  and  thus 
the  first  great  naval  engagement  of  the  war  was  brought 
on,  namely,  the  battle  which  is  known  as  The  Glorious 
First  of  June.  The  fleets  were  in  contact  four  days 
before  the  issue  was  finally  joined,  and  each  suffered 
some  losses  in  the  earlier  encounters.  Those  of  the 
French  were  made  good  by  the  joining  of  a  detached 
squadron  under  Nielly.  On  the  morning  of  the  First, 
Howe,  the  British  commander,  had  twenty-five  of  the 
line  against  twenty-six  French.  Four  prizes  were 
taken  and  several  more  ships  were  disabled.  But 
Howe’s  fleet  was  too  severely  damaged  to  renew  the 
action,  and  Villaret-Joyeuse  drew  off  the  rest  of  his 
fleet  to  Brest,  where  he  met  the  convoy  which  his  action 
had  saved.  But  the  battle  proved  the  superiority  of 
the  British  at  sea.  The  escape  of  the  convoy  was,  more 
or  less,  a  fluke,  and  the  grip  of  superior  sea  power  was 
confirmed,  not  weakened,  by  the  event.  Our  own  com¬ 
munications,  both  with  the  Mediterranean  and  America, 
were  better  assured  after  the  defeat  of  Villaret-Joyeuse. 


196 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


The  consequence  is  clearly  seen  in  the  inability  of 

the  French  to  re-equip  their  fleet.  Naval  stores  from  the 

Baltic  could  not  be  obtained.  The  British  also  com- 

« 

manded  the  resources  of  the  Mediterranean.  When 
the  French  commander  put  to  sea  for  a  winter  cruise 
early  in  1795,  he  had  to  take  with  him  ships  whose 
masts  and  spars  had  been  wounded  in  the  First  of  June, 
there  being  no  material  to  replace  them.  The  cruise 
cost  the  French  five  ships-of-the-line,  though  they  never 
fell  in  with  the  British  fleet.  Nevertheless,  owing  to 
the  policy  of  the  Admiralty  and  of  Lord  Bridport, 
whojhad  succeeded  Howe  in  command  of  the  Channel 
Fleet,  which  kept  the  British  force  in  the  harbours 
of  the  South  Coast  and  left  the  French  un watched,  a 
detachment  was  able  to  slip  through  to  Toulon,  which, 
for  the  time  being,  left  the  British  fleet  under  Hotham 
in  a  position  of  inferiority.  A  small  action  off  the  lie 
Croix,  in  which  Bridport  took  three  French  ships  and 
let  nine  escape  him,  was  the  only  incident  worth  noting 
in  the  Atlantic  during  the  year  1795. 

In  the  West  Indies,  meanwhile,  islands  had  been 
changing  and  re-changing  hands,  wTith  the  result  that, 
for  all  essential  purposes,  the  two  sides  were  practically 
as  they  were  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  French 
retaining  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe,  strategically  the 
most  important.  The  position  had  greatly  changed 
to  the  disadvantage  of  Great  Britain,  since  the  United 
States  became  independent  and  were,  therefore,  no 
longer  subject  to  her  Colonial  system.  The  French 
islands  became  not  only  nests  of  privateers,  as  they 
had  always  been,  but  great  centres  of  trade,  to  which 
American  produce  was  brought  for  shipment  to  France 
under  convoy.  The  trade,  being  carried  on  in  a  num¬ 
ber  of  small  vessels,  was  not  easily  stopped.  It  was 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


197 


not  till  after  Trafalgar,  when  the  main  fleets  of  France 
no  longer  kept  the  sea,  that  the  islands  fell  into  British 
hands  and  this  source  of  support  for  the  French  was  put 
an  end  to. 

The  first  act  of  the  great  sea  drama,  however,  was 
played  out,  for  the  most  part,  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Great  Britain,  as  usual,  was  supporting  the  Land  Pow¬ 
ers  with  subsidies  and  the  aid  of  her  fleet  wherever  diffi¬ 
culties  could  be  raised  for  the  French  on  or  in  proximity 
to  blue  water.  We  have  seen  how  she  supported 
the  insurrectionary  party  of  Toulon.  Hood  retired 
from  there  to  the  Salins  d’Hyeres,  where  he  kept  watch 
on  the  French  fleet  and  did  his  best  to  harry  the  enemy’s 
communications  with  Italy  and  the  Barbary  States, 
whence  the  South  of  France  was  mainly  supplied  with 
com.  A  base,  however,  was  needed.  Gibraltar  was 
too  far  off,  and  Port  Mahon  had  been  lost  in  the  last 
war.  The  disaffection  of  the  Corsicans  with  French 
rule  offered  the  opportunity,  and  the  British  seized 
San  Fiorenzo,  Bastia,  and  Calvi.  Nelson’s  name  first 
becomes  prominent  in  these  operations.  So  based,  the 
British  were  in  a  position  to  interfere  with  the  com¬ 
munications  of  the  French  army  in  Italy  along  the 
Corniche  Road,  and  to  influence  the  small  States  of 
Italy,  Naples,  Genoa,  and  the  rest  in  favour  of  Austria 
and  the  Alliance.  The  French  were  once  more  aiming 
at  the  control  of  the  Middle  Danube  through  Italy,  for 
which  purpose  they  required  secure  communications 
by  sea.  The  joint  enterprise,  however,  did  not  prosper, 
partly  owing  to  the  supineness  of  the  Austrian  generals, 
and  partly  to  the  brilliant  campaign  of  Napoleon,  who 
entered  Northern  Italy  by  way  of  the  Alps.  Partly, 
also,  it  must  be  owned,  owing  to  the  incapacity  of 
Hotham,  who  detached  Nelson  to  the  aid  of  the  Aus- 


198 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


trians,  but  with  insufficient  force.  Napoleon  compelled 
the  submission  of  Genoa,  Parma,  Tuscany,  Naples,  and 
the  Papal  States.  It  looked  as  if  the  Land  had  won  the 
first  round  in  the  contest  for  mastery  with  the  Sea. 

Spain  joined  the  French  in  1796,  with  the  result  that 
the  British  Government  ordered  the  evacuation  of 
Corsica  and  Elba,  which  had  been  seized  later,  and  the 
British  fleet  evacuated  the  Mediterranean,  a  course 
imposed  on  it  by  the  disobedience  to  orders  of  Admiral 
Mann,  who,  on  being  driven  from  before  Cadiz  by  the 
junction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  with  a  French  squadron 
which  he  was  watching  in  that  port,  sailed  for  home 
instead  of  joining  Sir  John  Jervis,  who  was  now  com¬ 
mander-in-chief.  The  disappearance  of  the  British 
flag,  however,  was  not  for  long,  for  on  the  14th  of  the 
following  February  Jervis  won  the  great  victory  of  St. 
Vincent.  Nelson’s  share  in  the  triumph  is  well-known. 
He  there  showed  for  the  first  time  in  a  fleet  action  that 
swift  tactical  insight  in  which  he  excelled  all  other 
naval  commanders  of  his  own,  or  perhaps  of  any  other 
time.  His  action  in  leaving  the  line  without  orders 
— the  very  fault  for  which  Matthews  had  been  con¬ 
demned — was  commented  upon  by  Calder  on  board  the 
flagship  afterwards.  “He  certainly  disobeyed  orders,  ” 
Jervis  replied,  “and  if  ever  you  are  guilty  of  a  like  dis¬ 
obedience,  I  will  forgive  you,  too.”  No  one  less  likely 
than  Calder  to  sin  by  too  great  initiative  could  possibly 
be  imagined.  The  battle  of  St.  Vincent  showed  the 
worthlessness  of  the  Spanish  navy,  of  which,  however, 
Nelson  was  fully  convinced  beforehand.  When  he 
heard  that  the  King  of  Spain  had  given  five  fine  three- 
deckers  to  the  French,  “Not  with  their  crews,  I  presume, 
for  that  would  be  the  surest  way  to  lose  them  again,  ” 
was  his  pungent  comment. 


SEA  PQWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


199 


In  the  next  year  Nelson  was  back  again  in  the  Medi¬ 
terranean.  Bonaparte  was  evidently  planning  some 
great  enterprise,  the  nature  of  which  was  carefully  con¬ 
cealed,  even  from  his  own  people.  All  the  signs  pointed 
to  an  attempt  to  invade  England  or  Ireland.  But  the 
British  Government  were  not  wholly  misled,  and,  when 
the  preparations  could  no  longer  be  concealed,  St.  Vin¬ 
cent  was  ordered  to  send  ten  of  the  line,  under  the 
officer  whom  he  should  select,  to  observe  and  follow 
the  movements  of  the  expedition.  He  selected  Nelson, 
who  had  just  rejoined  his  fleet  after  recovery  from  the 
wound  by  which  he  lost  his  arm  at  the  unsuccessful 
attempt  on  Vera  Cruz.  Napoleon  seized  Malta,  and 
then  sailed  for  Egypt,  where  he  landed  with  thirty 
thousand  men.  The  French  were  already  in  possession 
of  Corfu,  Cerigo,  and  Cephalonia,  which  they  had 
acquired  at  the  expense  of  Venice  by  the  Treaty  of 
Campo  Formio.  The  Porte,  for  the  present,  made  no 
attempt  to  defend  its  possession  of  Egypt,  fearing  the 
sea  power  of  France,  which  then  seemed  predominant 
in  the  Mediterranean.  Nelson  chased  to  Alexandria, 
but  got  there  before  the  French.  In  a  fever  of  anxiety, 
he  returned  to  Sicily,  but  could  get  no  information  of 
their  whereabouts.  Still  convinced  in  his  own  mind 
that  their  destination  was  Egypt,  he  started  off  again, 
and  discovered  the  French  at  anchor  in  Aboukir  Bay. 
Nelson’s  fleet  now  consisted  of  thirteen  ships,  twelve  of 
the  line,  and  one  of  fifty  guns,  while  the  French  had 
the  same  number  under  Admiral  Brueys,  with  his  flag 
in  LSOrient.  Two  of  Nelson’s  ships  had,  however,  been 
away  reconnoitring,  thanks  to  his  lack  of  frigates,  and 
were  late  in  getting  into  action.  A  third,  the  Culloden , 
under  Troubridge,  ran  aground.  The  attack,  therefore, 
opened  with  ten  ships  against  the  thirteen  of  the  enemy. 


200 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


The  French,  however,  were  at  anchor,  and  so  badly 
were  they  placed  that  they  were  open  to  attack  on 
both  sides  at  once.  Nelson  observed  that  they  lay  at  a 
single  anchor,  and  his  acute  mind  at  once  seized  upon 
the  opportunity  offered.  “Where  there  is  room  for  a 
Frenchman  to  swing,  ”  he  exclaimed,  “there  is  room  for 
an  Englishman  to  anchor,  ”  and  he  ordered,  or  allowed, 
Foley,  in  the  Goliath ,  to  lead  into  action  on  the  inshore 
side.  The  British,  in  turn,  anchored  by  the  stern  oppo¬ 
site  the  French  van,  and,  having  disposed  of  their 
immediate  opponents,  passed  on  to  the  centre  and  rear. 
The  action  raged  furiously  all  night,  the  damage  done 
being  great  on  both  sides,  but  far  greater  on  that  of  the 
French.  Towards  midnight  the  flagship,  L’Orient, 
blew  up  with  a  fearful  explosion,  the  awe  of  which 
caused  a  suspension  of  the  firing  for  nearly  ten  minutes. 
In  the  end,  the  French  fleet  was  destroyed  more  thor¬ 
oughly  than  any  fleet  in  history  has  been  before  or  since, 
with  the  single  exception  of  the  Russian  at  Tsu-shima. 
Two  ships  only,  Genereux  and  Guillaume  Tell ,  escaped, 
and  both  were  captured  in  the  following  year. 

The  sea  communications  of  Napoleon’s  army  were 
thus  destroyed.  Napoleon  himself  met  the  disaster 
with  characteristic  spirit.  “Seas  which  we  do  not 
command,”  he  said,  “separate  us  from  home;  but  no 
seas  divide  us  from  Africa  and  Asia.  We  will  found 
here  an  Empire.”  Events  proved  him  wrong.  Sea 
power  commanded  the  only  practicable  route  to  Asia. 
The  Porte,  encouraged  by  the  destruction  of  the  French 
fleet,  determined  upon  resistance.  Following  the  old 
historic  road  of  invasion,  Napoleon  reached  Acre. 
There  the  British  met  him  once  more,  in  the  shape  of  the 
seamen  from  Sir  Sidney  Smith’s  squadron.  He  could 
not  take  the  place,  with  sea  power  at  its  back.  Slaugh- 


The  Battle  of  the  Nile 

From  a  drawing  by  P.  J.  de  Loutherbourg,  R.A.,  engraved  by  J.  Rogers 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


201 


tering  his  prisoners  and  poisoning  his  own  wounded, 
he  fell  back  to  Egypt.  Next  year,  in  a  daring  manner, 
he  made  his  escape  to  France.  But  the  misfortunes  of 
the  army  he  left  behind  him  were  not  at  an  end.  A 
British  expedition  under  Sir  Ralph  Abercrombie  landed 
at  Aboukir,  defeated  the  French  under  General  Menou, 
and  forced  a  capitulation,  under  the  terms  of  which 
the  French  army  was  allowed  to  re-embark  for  France. 
Malta  was  blockaded  and  fell  on  September  5,  1800. 

Sea  power  had  won  the  second  round  handsomely. 
A  French  writer,  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  says  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Nile: 


Our  navy  never  recovered  from  this  terrible  blow  to  its 
consideration  and  its  power.  This  was  the  combat  which 
for  two  years  delivered  the  Mediterranean  to  the  English 
and  called  thither  the  squadrons  of  Russia;  which  shut  up 
our  army  in  the  midst  of  a  rebellious  population,  and  decided 
the  Porte  to  declare  against  us ;  which  put  India  out  of  the 
reach  of  our  enterprise,  and  brought  France  within  a  hair’s 
breadth  of  her  ruin ;  for  it  rekindled  the  scarcely  extinct  war 
with  Austria,  and  brought  Suvarof  and  the  Austro-Russians 
to  our  very  frontiers. 

The  trade  of  Britain  advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
The  total  of  exports  and  imports,  which  had  been 
£44,500,000  in  1792,  rose  to  £73,000,000  in  1800. 
Such  a  result  of  seven  years  of  war  might  well  be 
described  by  Pitt  as  “  a  spectacle  at  once  paradoxical, 
inexplicable,  and  astonishing.”  By  her  command  of 
the  sea,  Great  Britain  centred  the  trade,  finance,  and 
industry  of  the  world  upon  her  own  shores.  The  seas 
were  free  to  her  alone,  and  to  such  neutrals  as  she  chose 
to  extend  the  freedom.  The  wealth  of  the  tropical 


202 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


world  and  the  great  granaries  from  which  the  nations 
drew  their  supplies  were  hers  also. 

The  military  genius  of  Napoleon  and  the  selfishness 
and  short-sightedness  of  the  monarchs  of  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  were,  however,  to  postpone  the  golden 
dreams  of  a  victorious  peace  for  many  years  yet.  The 
great  captain,  returned  from  Egypt,  restored  the  affairs 
of  France  in  the  campaign  of  Marengo.  The  Northern 
States  became  restive  under  the  British  restrictions  on 
trade.  Prussia,  as  usual,  pursued  a  selfish,  treacherous, 
though  short-sighted,  policy.  The  half-mad  Tsar, 
Paul,  incensed  by  what  he  considered  to  be  the  faith¬ 
lessness  of  Austria,  listened  to  the  machinations  of 
Napoleon.  The  consequence  was  that  Austria  was 
forced  to  accept  the  disastrous  Treaty  of  Luneville,  and 
that  a  fresh  armed  neutrality  was  formed  in  Northern 
Europe,  by  means  of  which  Napoleon  hoped  to  dispute 
once  more  the  command  of  the  sea  with  the  help  of 
the  united  navies  of  Russia,  Denmark,  and  Sweden. 
Nelson  was  once  more  the  stumbling-block  in  his  path. 
There  are  few  incidents  in  the  history  of  their  country 
on  which  the  British  people  look  back  with  more  sincere 
regret  than  the  Battle  of  Copenhagen.  But  regret 
springs  solely  from  the  sentiments  of  friendship  and 
admiration  they  feel  for  the  gallant  Danes  and  from  no 
doubts  as  to  the  justice  or  expediency  of  the  course  taken 
by  the  British  Government.  If  Europe  was  to  be  saved 
from  the  threatened  dominion’ of  Napoleon,  the  smaller 
maritime  States  had  to  be  taken  out  of  his  hand.  How¬ 
ever  justified  intrinsically  the  complaints  of  the  Danes 
might  have  been,  the  greater  issues  at  stake  demanded 
that  they  should  be  laid  on  one  side,  forcibly  if  need 
be. 

Copenhagen  was  considered  by  Nelson  to  be  the 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


203 


greatest  feat  of  his  life,  and,  if  we  regard  not  only  the 
skill  and  boldness  of  the  attack,  but  also  the  generous 
and  adroit  diplomacy  with  which  he  won  peace  out  of 
strife,  there  is  little  reason  to  dispute  his  conclusion. 
The  incidents  of  the  battle  are  so  well  known  that  they 
need  no  re-telling.  The  Danes,  to  this  day,  claim  that 
they  repulsed  the  attack,  and  we  may  be  content 
to  leave  it  at  that,  for  we  grudge  such  brave  foemen 
nothing  which  may  cause  their  honour  to  shine  more 
brightly.  The  glory  of  the  furious  onslaught  on  ships 
and  batteries  is  sufficient  for  our  arms.  Moreover, 
the  result  of  the  battle,  and  of  the  ensuing  death  of  Tsar 
Paul,  was  to  break  up  the  northern  coalition.  Our 
object  was  attained.  The  danger  passed  away.  If  the 
Continent  lay  at  Napoleon’s  feet,  and  seemed  destined 
to  be  the  appanage  of  the  Imperial  Crown  he  was  now 
about  to  assume,  the  dominion  of  the  seas  and  the  tri¬ 
bute  of  the  world  beyond  was  now  confirmed  to  Great 
Britain.  So  affairs  stood  when  the  short  and  troubled 
Peace  of  Amiens  closed  for  a  period  the  doors  of  the 
Temple  of  Janus. 

That  short  peace  was  broken  on  May  16,  1801, 
when  Great  Britain  declared  war  in  consequence  of  the 
dispute  about  Malta.  At  once  began  that  “sustained 
watch,”  of  which  Mahan  speaks  in  his  most  famous 
passage.  On  the  17th,  Cornwallis  left  Plymouth  with 
ten  sail-of-the-line  to  resume  the  watch  over  Brest;  on 
the  1 8th,  Nelson  hoisted  his  flag  in  the  Victory ,  and 
sailed  to  take  command  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet. 

Napoleon  came  to  the  water’s  edge  wherever  it  was 
possible  to  him.  He  occupied  Hanover,  and  also  Cux- 
haven  on  the  Elbe.  Great  Britain  replied  by  blockad¬ 
ing  the  mouths  of  that  river.  If  the  ports  of  the 
Continent,  so  far  as  the  First  Consul  controlled  them, 


204 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


were  closed  to  British  trade,  Great  Britain  replied 
by  re-imposing  in  its  most  rigorous  form  the  Order  of 
1756.  As  yet  no  one  could  foresee  the  end.  The 
Continent  remained  at  peace.  Napoleon  himself  be¬ 
lieved  Great  Britain  to  be  incapable  of  waging  war  single- 
handed  against  him.  Although  the  outbreak  of  war 
had  come  sooner  than  he  desired,  and  before  he  had  had 
time  to  rehabilitate  his  navy,  yet  the  golden  opportunity 
presented  itself  to  crush  his  most  relentless  enemy. 
Audacious  schemes  formed  themselves  in  his  brain; 
yet  not  more  audacious  than  the  invasion  of  Egypt. 
Could  he  command  the  Channel  for  twenty-four  hours, 
the  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  men  he  had  assembled 
at  Boulogne,  Ambleteuse,  Wimereux,  and  Etaples  and 
trained  with  the  minutest  care  might  embark  in  their 
thousand  flat-bottomed  boats — and  then,  Plus  d' Angle- 
ten  e!  To  bring  about  the  desired  state  of  affairs,  he 
made  elaborate  preparations  for  a  renewed  expedition  to 
the  East.  Latouche  Treville,  at  that  time  in  command 
of  the  Toulon  fleet,  was  to  feint  to  the  eastward  and  then 
slip  out  through  the  Straits.  Ganteaume,  with  twenty 
ships  and  five  and  twenty  thousand  troops,  was  to  pre¬ 
pare  ostentatiously  for  an  attempt  on  Ireland,  in  order 
to  keep  Cornwallis  close  up  to  Brest.  The  Rochefort 
squadron  was  to  join  Latouche  Treville  off  Cadiz,  and 
the  combined  fleet  of  sixteen  of  the  line  was  to  bear 
up  for  the  Channel.  This  plan  was  afterwards  modi¬ 
fied,  owing  to  the  death  of  Latouche  Treville  and  the 
succession  of  Villeneuve,  whom  Napoleon,  with  reason, 
distrusted,  to  the  command. 

British  seamen  never  had  a  fear  that  the  plan  would 
succeed,  whatever  apprehensions  may  have  been  excited 
among  the  populace  ashore.  “As  to  the  possibility  of 
the  enemy  being  able  to  pass  through  our  blockading  and 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


205 


protecting  squadron,  with  all  the  secrecy  and  dexterity, 
and  by  those  hidden  means  which  some  worthy  people 
expect,”  said  Pellew,  afterwards  Lord  Exmouth,  “I 
really,  from  anything  I  have  seen  in  the  course  of  my 
professional  experience,  am  not  much  disposed  to  con¬ 
cur  in  it.”  The  squadrons  of  Britain -took  the  old 
central  position,  watching  closely  every  port  where 
the  enemy  had  a  detachment  of  his  force:  Brest,  Roche¬ 
fort,  and  Toulon  at  first,  and,  when  Spain  joined  France 
in  1804,  Ferrol  and  Cadiz  as  well.  Should  any  of  the 
French  get  to  sea,  then  the  squadron  watching  the  port 
from  which  they  emerged  fell  back  on  the  next  on  the 
way  to  Brest,  or,  if  necessary,  on  the  squadron  watching 
Brest  itself.  Thus,  whatever  concentration  Napoleon 
might  achieve,  his  fleets  must  always  be  confronted  with 
an  equal  concentration  of  the  British.  Moreover,  there 
was  kept  a  fleet  in  the  North  Sea,  watching  the  Dutch 
and  the  Flemish  ports,  a  squadron  under  Lord  Keith  in 
the  Downs,  and  a  reserve  of  five  ships,  fully  manned,  at 
Spithead.  Blow  east,  blow  west,  a  British  fleet  could 
get  at  the  enemy  and  delay  his  plans  until  the  larger 
detachments  could  arrive.  The  hardships  and  trials  of 
two  years’  watch,  keeping  the  sea  in  all  weathers,  in 
accordance  with  the  ideas  of  tough  old  St.  Vincent,  were 
enormous.  “Admirals  need  not  be  made  of  iron,  ”  said 
Collingwood.  But  the  fleets  of  Britain  were  never  more 
perfectly  manned  than  by  the  toughened  and  experi¬ 
enced  seamen  of  this  time.  The  French,  for  the  most 
part  confined  to  port,  steadily  deteriorated.  Moreover, 
while  both  fleets  were  inactive,  so  far  as  fighting  was 
concerned,  all  the  advantages  of  command  of  the  sea 
flowed  to  Britain.  If  the  French  battle  fleets  could  not 
get  out  without  fighting,  neither  could  traders  get  in. 
France  was  cut  off  from  the  world  across  the  seas. 


206 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Even  her  coasters  enjoyed  no  immunity.  The  world 
was  behind  Britain. 

So  complete  was  the  confidence  of  the  British  Govern¬ 
ment  in  their  command  of  the  sea  that  they  did  not  hesi¬ 
tate  to  send  a  military  expedition  to  the  Mediterranean 
behind  the  watching  squadrons,  to  join  the  Russians 
in  an  attempt  to  drive  the  French  from  Southern  Italy. 
It  has  even  been  asserted  that  this  expedition,  rather 
than  the  threat  of  invasion,  prompted  the  elaborate 
strategical  distribution  of  their  squadrons.  It  was  cer¬ 
tainly  an  essential  part  of  the  gigantic  European  com¬ 
bination  which  Pitt  designed  and  supported  with  money. 
Its  departure  almost  coincided  with  Villeneuve’s 
evasion  of  Nelson  and  voyage  to  the  West  Indies;  its 
safe  arrival  in  Sicily  even  more  closely  coincided  with 
his  return,  and  with  the  abandonment  of  Napoleon’s 
plan  of  invasion  in  favour  of  an  attack  on  Austria. 
Sea  power  in,  this  way  made  itself  felt  on  Continental 
politics,  and  a  small  body  of  British  troops,  disposed 
in  the  right  place  through  its  agency,  once  more  exer¬ 
cised  an  influence  altogether  out  of  proportion  to  their 
numbers. 

The  culminating  point  of  the  great  battle  of  wits  was 
reached  early  in  1805,  when  Napoleon  ordered  Missiessy, 
with  five  sail-of-the-line  from  Rochefort,  and  Villeneuve, 
with  ten  from  Toulon,  to  rendezvous  in  the  West  Indies, 
in  the  hope  of  drawing  after  them  such  a  British  force 
that  Ganteaume  might  break  the  blockade  off  Brest. 
Missiessy  duly  got  away,  followed  by  Cochrane  and  six 
of  the  line.  But  Villeneuve  failed  owing  to  boisterous 
weather,  after  having  thrown  Nelson,  whose  mind 
was  obsessed  with  the  vision  of  a  renewed  attack  on 
Egypt,  off  the  scent.  The  Emperor  then  modified  his 
plan,  and,  in  March,  ordered  a  concentration  of  the 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


207 


fleets  of  Ganteaume,  Villeneuve,  and  Missiessy  at 
Martinique.  Ganteaume,  Villeneuve,  and  Missiessy 
sailed  in  the  following  month,  just  as  Missiessy,  having 
waited  in  vain,  started  homewards.  Nelson,  at  first 
deceived  once  more,  got  positive  news  that  Villeneuve 
had  passed  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  and  at  once  made 
preparation  to  fall  back  on  Cornwallis,  in  pursuance  of 
the  general  plan  of  campaign.  But,  receiving  authori¬ 
tative  news  that  his  enemy  had  been  seen  heading 
across  the  Atlantic,  he  immediately  set  out  in  pursuit, 
though  the  latter  had  thirty  days’  start  of  him.  After 
a  fruitless  search  among  the  islands,  he  learned  that  his 
opponent  had  sailed  for  Europe  on  June  9th.  On 
receiving  this  news  three  days  later,  he  at  once  sent  off 
Captain  Bettes  worth  in  the  brig  Curieux  to  convey  tid¬ 
ings  to  England,  ordering  him  to  keep  a  certain  course 
which  his  instinct  told  him  would  bring  him  within 
sight  of  Villeneuve.  He  himself  set  out  for  the  Straits 
on  June  13th,  and  he  actually  arrived  in  European 
waters  before  the  French  squadron. 

Bettesworth  reached  Plymouth  on  July  7th,  and,  by 
the  1  ith,  the  orders  issued  by  Lord  Barham,  the  wonder¬ 
ful  veteran  of  eighty  who  was  now  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  had  reached  Cornwallis.  The  blockade 
of  Rochefort  was  raised,  and  the  five  ships  composing 
the  squadron  were  sent  to  join  Calder  off  Ferrol.  The 
latter,  now  with  fifteen  ships  under  his  command,  was 
ordered  to  cruise  one  hundred  miles  west  of  Finisterre 
to  intercept  Villeneuve.  The  fleets  met  on  the  after¬ 
noon  of  July  22nd,  and  Calder  captured  two  Spanish 
ships-of-the-line,  but  did  not  press  home  his  advantage, 
for  which  fault  he  was  tried  by  court-martial,  and  sen¬ 
tenced  to  be  severely  reprimanded  for  the  same  fault 
as  that  for  which  Byng  was  shot.  But  the  court-martial 


208 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


did  not  take  place  until  Trafalgar  had  relieved  the 
country  from  all  anxiety.  The  check  received,  and  the 
evidence  that  the  British  were  ready  for  any  emergency, 
were,  however,  sufficient  to  cause  Villeneuve,  never  very 
firm  of  purpose,  to  abandon  the  intention  of  joining 
Ganteaume,  and  to  drive  him  into  Ferrol.  He  oscillated 
between  that  port  and  Cadiz,  until  Napoleon’s  angry 
order,  and  the  news  that  Rosily  was  on  his  way  to  super¬ 
sede  him,  drove  him  out  to  meet  disaster  on  October 
2  ist  at  Trafalgar.  Napoleon  recognised  that  the  game 
was  up,  and  issued  the  orders  which  led  to  Ulm  and 
Austerlitz. 

The  story  of  Trafalgar,  so  often  told,  need  not  be 
repeated  here.  Victory  and  a  glorious  death  were  the 
rewards  which  God  gave  to  Nelson  for  a  life  devoted  to 
duty  and  the  service  of  his  country.  Had  he  not  fought 
and  fallen,  the  chaplet  of  immortal  fame  with  which  he 
is  crowned  in  the  eyes  of  his  countrymen  might  never 
have  been  his.  The  human  frailty  which  does  but 
throw  his  glory  into  brighter  relief  might,  when  the 
stimulus  of  action  had  gone,  have  prevailed  to  bring 
his  life  to  a  sordid  close.  He  passed  from  life  to  become 
the  pattern  and  inspiration  of  every  British  boy  who 
has  in  his  veins  the  sea  spirit  by  which  Britain  lives. 
The  cockpit  of  the  Victory  became  the  holiest  shrine  of 
our  race.  But,  great  as  were,  materially  and  spiritually, 
the  fruits  of  Trafalgar,  every  serious  student  of  naval 
history  now  realises  that  the  Great  Deliverance  was 
wrought  before  the  guns  spoke.  And  the  fame  of  Nel¬ 
son  should  not  be  allowed  to  eclipse,  though  it  rightly 
overshadows,  the  merit  of  others  who  shared  that  weary 
and  tenacious  watch  from  1803  to  1805.  Cornwallis, 
Collingwood,  Cochrane,  Calder,  and  Pellew  all  deserve 
their  share,  nor  must  the  skill  and  energy  with  which 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


209 


Lord  Barham  met  the  crisis  be  left  out  of  the  account. 
Blunders  there  were  inevitably,  and  an  occasional  fail¬ 
ure,  as  in  Calder’s  case,  to  make  the  most  of  opportunity. 
But  the  Trafalgar  campaign,  to  include  the  whole  period 
in  that  convenient  description,  shows  that  the  whole 
Navy  was  permeated  by  a  correct  understanding  of 
strategical  conditions.  The  seamen  never  lost  their 
grip  of  the  essential  point  that  the  main  force  of  the 
enemy  was  their  true  objective,  and  that,  whatever 
combinations  he  might  make,  it  was  their  business  to 
meet  him  with  superior  force  at  the  decisive  point. 
All  the  dispositions  of  the  Admiralty  and  the  Admirals 
were  directed  towards  that  end,  and,  though,  counting 
by  numbers,  the  end  was  not  attained,  numbers  were  by 
no  means  all  that  mattered.  Napoleon  himself  did  not 
regard  the  French  as  equal  to  the  British,  ship  for 
ship,  and  his  admirals  showed  again  and  again  that 
they  were  of  his  opinion.  The  Spanish  were  greatly 
inferior  to  the  French:  so  greatly  that  the  Emperor, 
in  making  his  calculations,  invariably  reckoned  two 
Spaniards  as  one  French. 

The  oft-quoted  “Nelson  touch”  had  for  its  purpose 
no  more  than  the  common  aim  of  all  commanders  to 
isolate  a  portion  of  the  enemy’s  fleet  so  that  it  could 
be  dealt  with  before  the  rest  could  come  to  its  assistance. 
This  result  was  generally  achieved  by  manoeuvring  for 
the  weather  gage,  which,  if  secured,  gave  choice  of  the 
point  of  attack.  But  so  much  time  was  frequently  lost 
in  these  manoeuvres  that  the  longest  day  did  not  suffice 
for  a  decisive  action.  Where  Nelson  improved  upon 
the  tactics  of  his  predecessors  was  in  making  his  order 
of  sailing  his  order  of  battle.  The  equinox  was  well 
past ;  light  airs  prevailed.  If  he  had  first  waited  to  form 
the  line  when  he  sighted  the  enemy  at  daybreak,  Tra- 


14 


210 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


falgar  might  have  proved  one  of  the  ordinary  in¬ 
decisive  battles.  But  Nelson  had  it  firmly  in  his  mind 
that  what  his  country  required  was  not  an  ordinary 
battle,  with  four  or  five  of  the  enemy  taken,  but  the  com¬ 
plete  annihilation  of  the  combined  fleet  as  a  fighting 
force.  It  was  therefore  his  plan  to  go  down  to  the 
enemy  in  the  ordinary  cruising  formation  of  double 
column  of  line  ahead,  to  break  their  formation  in  two 
places,  to  leave  Collingwood  to  deal  with  their  rear, 
thus  isolated,  while  he  held  his  own  division  free  to 
manoeuvre  against  any  attempt  of  the  van  to  come  to 
its  assistance.  The  plan  involved  the  exposure  of 
the  leading  ships  of  his  columns  to  a  concentrated  fire 
without  support — a  fire  to  which,  being  head-on  to  the 
enemy,  they  could  not  effectively  reply  for  a  long  time. 
Collingwood’s  flagship,  the  Royal  Sovereign ,  was,  indeed, 
for  half  an  hour  under  the  fire  of  five  ships  before  her 
next  astern  got  into  action.  She  was,  however,  greatly 
ahead  of  station,  having  been  freshly  coppered,  and 
therefore  able  to  outsail  her  consorts.  The  plan  was 
audacious  to  the  point  of  rashness.  But  Nelson 
knew  the  enemy  he  was  fighting.  He  knew  the  ineffi¬ 
ciency  of  the  Spanish  contingent,  and  he  took  the  risk 
in  order  to  obtain  a  more  complete  victory.  In  the 
result,  twenty- two  of  the  enemy  were  taken  or  destroyed 
out  of  thirty-three,  and  all  but  two  of  the  remainder 
surrendered  in  Cadiz  harbour  three  years  later.  The 
annihilation  which  Nelson  sought  was  gained. 

It  is  worth  noting,  perhaps,  that  Nelson  reserved  for 
himself  at  Trafalgar,  on  a  larger  scale,  the  part  which  he 
had  played  in  the  first  fleet  action  in  which  he  took 
part,  that  of  St.  Vincent.  As  he  then  flung  himself 
across  the  path  of  the  Spanish  weather  division  in  order 
to  prevent  it  bearing  down  to  the  relief  of  the  detached 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


21 1 


lee  division,  so  at  Trafalgar  he  purposed  to  engage 
the  allied  van  to  prevent  it  coming  to  the  assistance  of 
the  threatened  rear.  To  do  this,  he  had  to  break 
through  the  enemy’s  centre,  cutting  off  four  ships 
between  himself  and  Collingwood  as  he  did  so.  The 
accident  of  the  Redoubtable  getting  across  his  bows 
as  he  went  through  prevented  the  completion  of  the 
movement  and  brought  about  his  death.  But  his  pur¬ 
pose  was  achieved  by  the  other  ships  of  his  division. 
The  effect  of  his  death  on  his  fleet  is  quaintly  told  by  a 
bluejacket  of  the  Royal  Sovereign ,  who  wrote  to  his 
father  after  the  action : 

Our  dear  Admiral  Nelson  is  killed,  so  we  have  paid 
pretty  sharply  for  licking  ’em.  I  never  set  eyes  on  him,  for 
which  I  am  both  glad  and  sorry;  for,  to  be  sure,  I  should 
have  liked  to  have  seen  him — but  then  all  the  men  in  our 
ship  who  have  seen  him  are  such  soft  toads,  they  have  done 
nothing  but  blast  their  eyes  and  cry  ever  since  he  was  killed. 
God  bless  you!  Chaps  that  fought  like  the  devil  sit  down 
and  cry  like  a  wench. 

What  manner  of  man  must  he  have  been  whose 
death  so  affected  the  rough  tarpaulins  of  1805? 

So  ended  the  second  act  of  the  great  drama  of  sea 
power.  How  much  had  been  accomplished  towards  the 
final  victory,  not  even  Ministers  themselves  in  Britain 
realised.  The  land  campaign  had  already  opened  dis- 
.  astrously  for  the  Austrians.  Mack  with  twenty  thou¬ 
sand  men  surrendered  at  Ulm  on  the  day  before 
Trafalgar  was  fought.  The  Austrians  and  Russians  were 
overthrown  at  Austerlitz  on  December  5th  following. 
The  news,  it  is  said,  killed  Pitt.  But  Austerlitz  was, 
none  the  less,  the  first-fruits  of  Trafalgar.  France,  her 
trade  cut  off,  was  in  dire  misery,  which  could  only  be 


212 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


relieved  by  victories  on  the  Continent  and  the  spoils  of 
conquered  nations.  Napoleon  was  to  know  no  respite 
during  which  he  might  consolidate  his  power.  The 
European  nations,  besides  the  plentiful  financial  help 
which  victorious  and  wealthy  Britain  could,  and  did, 
afford  them  with  lavish  hand,  always  found  a  fulcrum 
of  resistance  to  the  universal  tyrant  in  her  might  upon 
the  element  where  his  genius  for  war  could  not  rule. 
If  the  land  was  to  conquer  the  sea,  land  and  sea  forces 
must  touch  at  some  point.  Since  Napoleon  could  make 
no  effective  effort  on  the  sea  itself,  that  point  must  be 
on  the  coast — in  the  ports.  Hence  he  was  compelled  to 
dissipate  his  strength  in  excentric  efforts.  He  endeav¬ 
oured  to  exclude  British  trade  from  the  Continent  by  the 
decrees  of  Berlin  and  Milan.  Yet  British  goods  poured 
into  the  ports  of  Northern  Europe,  and  Great  Britain, 
retaliating  with  the  Orders  in  Council,  took  toll  of  every¬ 
thing  which  went  to  feed  and  clothe  the  people  of 
France,  and  the  very  armies  of  Napoleon  himself. 
He  tried  to  revive  the  project  of  1801,  and  to  combine 
the  navies  of  the  smaller  Powers  with  the  remnants  of 
his  own  and  that  of  Spain.  Great  Britain  seized  the 
Danish  fleet  in  1807.  Portugal  resisted  the  peremptory 
demands  made  upon  her,  both  to  lend  the  use  of  her 
fleet  and  to  prohibit  British  trade.  Napoleon  sent 
Junot  with  an  army  corps  to  bring  pressure,  upon  her, 
and  this  was  the  first  irritation  which  set  up  the  ‘  ‘  Spanish 
ulcer.  ” 

To  grapple  with  the  resistance  of  the  little  State,  the 
staunch  and  age-long  Ally  of  Great  Britain,  it  was  neces¬ 
sary  to  Napoleon  to  have  secure  communications. 
These  could  not  be  had  by  sea,  but  only  through  Spain. 
If  he  could  not  control  the  sea,  he  was  determined  to 
control  the  coasts,  which,  apparently,  he  thought 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


213 


amounted  to  the  same  thing.  He  occupied  Madrid, 
and,  taking  advantage  of  a  quarrel  between  the  King  of 
Spain  and  his  eldest  son,  he  set  his  brother  Joseph  on  the 
throne.  The  Portuguese  Court  fled  to  Brazil.  But 
the  British  were  now,  since  the  danger  of  invasion  had 
passed  away,  prepared  to  play  a  stronger  part  in  the 
land  campaign.  An  expedition  was  sent  to  Lisbon 
under  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  which  defeated  Junot’s 
army  at  Vimiero.  Just  previously,  the  Spanish  gueril- 
leros  had  compelled  the  surrender  of  a  French  army 
corps  at  Baylen,  and,  in  the  upshot,  the  whole  French 
army  in  Portugal  was  forced  to  capitulate,  and  was  sent 
back  to  France  in  British  transports  under  the  Conven¬ 
tion  of  Cintra. 

It  was  the  worst  blow  the  Emperor  had  ever  suffered. 
The  Power  of  the  Sea  had  foiled  him  once  more.  The 
arm  of  Great  Britain  was  stretched  out  to  aid  the 
Spanish  irregulars  in  fighting  against  his  despotism 
when  none  other  but  she  could  aid.  The  ally  which 
had  been  subservient  to  him  when  under  the  Bourbon 
dynasty  was  now  in  revolt  against  his  own  brother. 
Sea  power  was  once  more  exercised  on  behalf  of  liberty. 
Napoleon  readily  appreciated  what  this  uprising  of  a 
minor  State  against  his  authority  might  mean.  He 
recalled  his  first-line  army  from  Germany,  took  com¬ 
mand  of  it  himself,  reoccupied  Madrid,  and  crushed 
the  Spanish  rising  almost  completely  for  the  time. 
Then  Sir  John  Moore,  with  some  twenty  thousand 
British  troops,  made  an  audacious  movement  against 
his  communications  with  France.  The  Emperor’s  plans 
were  entirely  dislocated,  and  he  himself  never  caring  to  be 
associated  with  failure,  returned  to  Paris  under  the  plea 
of  the  threatening  condition  of  affairs  in  mid-Europe. 
Soult  marched  against  Moore,  and  cut  him  off  from 


214 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Lisbon,  which  was  easy  for  him  to  do.  But  he  could 
not  cut  him  off  from  the  sea.  Moore  retreated  north¬ 
wards  to  Corunna,  where,  in  a  battle  fought  to  cover 
the  embarkation  of  his  army,  he  lost  his  life.  But  the 
army  escaped  to  fight  again.  The  mighty  Emperor’s 
power  ended  at  high-water  mark. 

Corunna  was  fought  on  January  9,  1809.  It  was 
the  year  of  Eckmuhl,  Essling,  and  Wagram.  In  less 
than  twelve  months  more,  Napoleon  was  to  humiliate 
the  proud  Hapsburg  by  taking  his  daughter  to  his  bed. 
But  Essling  was  the  most  definite  defeat  he  had  yet 
experienced,  Wagram  was  a  pyrrhic  victory,  and  the 
troops  employed  in  the  campaign  were  less  the  veterans 
of  France  than  the  levies  of  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  Poland. 
The  legions  of  Austerlitz,  Jena,  and  Friedland  were,  for 
the  most  part,  in  Spain,  where  they  were  exhausting 
their  energies  against  the  Spanish  guerilleros,  supported 
by  thirty  thousand  elusive  Britons.  Nor  was  this  all, 
or,  perhaps,  the  worst.  The  national  spirit  was  rising 
all  over  Europe,  stimulated  by  the  example  of  Spain. 
Schill,  in  North  Germany,  and  Andreas  Hofer,  in  the 
Tyrol,  were  in  arms  against  the  would-be  tyrant  of 
the  world.  North  and  south  he  was  forced  to  excentric 
movement ;  wherever  the  resistance  to  him  touched  the 
sea  it  was  sure  of  support  from  the  ships  of  Britain.  It 
is  interesting  to  note  that  Heligoland  came  into  our 
hands  in  1807  as  a  depot  whence  trade  with  the  Elbe 
could  be  carried  on  in  defiance  of  Napoleon’s  Berlin 
Decree. 

Napoleon’s  career  had  now  certainly  passed  its  high- 
water  mark,  whatever  date  may  be  properly  assigned 
to  that  epoch.  Perhaps  he  reached  the  pinnacle  of  his 
fame  on  the  raft  at  Tilsit,  where  the  young  and  impulsive 
Tsar,  Alexander  I.,  vowed  friendship  to  him  and  Frederick 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


215 


William  of  Prussia  was  his  dog?  Austerlitz,  Jena,  and 
Friedland  lay  immediately  behind  him — but  so  did 
Trafalgar.  No,  Tilsit  was  not  his  real  zenith.  It  was 
the  first  glory  of  the  after-glow.  The  sun  of  Austerlitz 
had  set  before  its  rising.  He  had  the  Continent  at  his 
feet  before  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  A  just  and  equitable 
use  of  his  military  triumph  could  then  have  established 
the  peace  of  Europe  upon  a  firm  foundation.  Peace 
at  home  might  have  set  him  upon  the  throne  of  an 
unexhausted  and  contented  realm.  But  while  the  sea 
power  remained  unsubdued  to  his  arms,  peace  was  to 
him  but  gall  and  wormwood.  His  dreams  of  empire 
were  unfulfilled.  “Capax  imperii,  nisi  imper asset"  is 
more  true  of  Napoleon  than  of  the  Caesar  against  whom 
the  crushing  irony  was  first  launched.  To  many  that 
verdict  may  seem  a  paradox.  But  it  is  just. 

Great  Britain  was  now  committed  to  Continental  war 
with  an  army  inadequate  in  numbers,  but  of  tougher 
material  than  any  other  army  in  the  field,  a  general  of 
capacity  only  second  to  that  of  Napoleon  himself, 
officers  who  were  then  to  prove,  for  the  first  time  in 
Europe,  their  power  of  training  and  leading  brave  men 
of  another  race,  and  the  sea,  her  own  undisputed  high¬ 
way,  at  the  back  of  all  her  effort.  Napoleon  learned, 
as  Philip  II.  and  Philip  V.  had  learned,  each  in  turn, 
that  Lisbon  was  nearer  to  London  than  to  Madrid. 
Heavy  as  was  the  blow  struck  by  Nelson  at  Trafalgar, 
there  could  be  no  greater  mistake  than  to  suppose 
that  the  navy  of  France  was  absolutely  destroyed. 
The  greatest  of  her  fleets,  that  of  Ganteaume  in  Brest, 
remained  untouched.  British  seamen  were  still  com¬ 
pelled,  all  through  the  ensuing  years,  to  spend  them¬ 
selves  in  maintaining  a  sleepless  watch  on  French  ports. 
Actions  between  single  ships,  and  even  small  squadrons, 


216 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


were  frequent.  Yet  all  this  time  communications  were 
maintained  between  the  Mother  Country  and  the 
Peninsular  army,  a  thousand  miles  distant  along  a  line 
which  passed  by  each  of  the  enemy’s  chief  military 
ports  in  turn.  The  safe  withdrawal  of  Sir  John  Moore’s 
army  from  Corunna  was  the  first  instance  of  the 
advantage  conferred  on  a  small  land  force  by  the  adroit 
use  of  sea  power.  The  years  following  show  to  those 
who  have  eyes  to  see  that  on  the  same  basis  the  whole 
of  Wellington’s  success  in  the  Peninsula  was  built. 
His  impregnable  fortress  of  Torres  Vedras  was  flanked 
by  the  sea  and  supplied  from  the  sea.  The  French  army, 
with  its  communications  stretched  over  the  element  its 
master  was  supposed  to  command,  starved.  Welling¬ 
ton’s  army  lacked  for  nothing  save  that  which  the 
ineptitude  of  the  authorities  at  home  failed  to  supply. 
He  advanced  or  he  retreated,  according  to  the  effort 
which  the  Emperor  was  able,  or  was  compelled,  to  put 
forth  to  check  him.  But  whether  he  advanced  or 
retreated,  his  army  was  always  secure  against  disaster, 
and  the  drain  of  the  “Spanish  ulcer”  upon  his  oppo¬ 
nent’s  resources  became  greater  and  greater.  At  last, 
when  the  hour  of  final  victory  struck  and  he  was  able  to 
move  forward  from  the  field  of  Vittoria  to  the  Pyrenees, 
he  let  go  his  hold  on  Lisbon,  shortened  his  line  of  com¬ 
munications  by  establishing  his  base  at  San  Sebastian, 
and  moved  his  small  army  forward  to  Toulouse  and 
Bordeaux.  It  took  six  hundred  thousand  Continental 
soldiers  to  wrest  victory  from  Napoleon  in  the  “Battle 
of  the  Nations”  at  Leipsic.  Even  that  mighty  effort 
might  have  been  unsuccessful  but  for  the  handful  with 
which  Wellington  was  supporting  the  resistance  of  the 
Spanish  nation  and  forcing  his  way  up  to  southern 
France. 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


217 


Sea  power  triumphant  exerted  its  influence  from  the 
Vistula  to  the  Douro;  from  the  Elbe  to  the  Bosporus. 
Alexander  I.,  sated  with  the  acquisition  of  Finland,  and 
exasperated  by  the  rigours  of  the  Continental  system, 
became,  first  a  lukewarm  friend,  and  then,  in  1812,  an 
open  foe.  The  elaborate  plan  of  Napoleon  to  keep 
Turkey  as  “a  mask”  to  cover  his  right  flank  failed, 
owing  to  the  predominance  of  British  influence  in 
Constantinople.  This  influence  predominated,  partly 
owing  to  the  impression  made  by  Sir  Sidney  Smith’s 
assistance  in  the  defence  of  Acre,  and  partly  owing  to 
that  made  by  Duckworth’s  passage  of  the  Dardanelles 
in  1807.  The  huge  disaster  of  the  Russian  campaign 
completed  what  the  “Spanish  ulcer”  had  begun,  and  it 
was  the  march  of  Tchitschakoff,  released  from  the 
Turkish  campaign,  on  Minsk  which  turned  the  retreat 
of  the  Grand  Army  into  a  debacle.  Germany  rose 
in  arms  from  end  to  end.  The  position  of  Marie  Louise 
as  Empress  was  insufficient  deterrent  to  keep  Austria 
from  joining  the  new  coalition.  The  defection  of  the 
Bavarians  at  Lobau  completed  the  desertion  of  the 
falling  Emperor  by  his  vassals  and  allies.  He  became 
for  the  first  time  the  prisoner  of  Great  Britain,  and  was 
sent  to  rule  the  island  of  Elba,  guarded  by  the  force 
which  alone  he  had  failed  to  overcome.  After  the 
Hundred  Days,  he  returned  to  that  captivity  from 
which  he  was  to  escape  no  more: 

How  far  is  St.  Helena  from  the  Capes  of  Trafalgar? 

A  longish  way — a  longish  way — with  ten  year  more  to  run. 
It’s  south  across  the  water  underneath  a  setting  star. 

( What  you  cannot  finish  you  must  leave  undone!) 

There  we  may  leave  Napoleon.  Sea  power,  reso¬ 
lutely  and  unflinchingly  used,  had  fulfilled  its  task, 


2 18 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


though  not  without  much  harm  being  wrought  to  the 
nation  which  wielded  it.  For  all  her  command  of  the 
sea,  Great  Britain  was  at  one  period  brought  to  scarcity 
by  the  operation  of  the  Continental  system,  and  that 
although  she  was  still  to  a  great  extent  self-supporting, 
so  far  as  the  necessaries  of  life  were  concerned.  Worst 
of  all,  the  methods  she  was  compelled  to  adopt  led  to 
war  with  the  great  offshoot  of  her  race  across  the 
Atlantic,  and  kept  the  sore  created  by  the  War  of 
Independence  open  for  many  years.  It  is,  perhaps, 
only  within  the  last  few  happy  months  that  Great  Brit¬ 
ain  and  the  United  States  have  at  last  been  able  to 
realise  their  common  destiny  in  the  service  of  the  liberty 
of  mankind.  It  is  difficult  for  an  Englishman  to  find 
justification  for  the  action  of  the  American  Government 
in  making  a  casus  belli  of  commercial  grievances  at  a 
time  when  every  nerve  was  strained  to  grapple  with 
the  enemy  of  all  liberty.  But  the  dead  may  now  bury 
its  dead.  It  is  a  common  belief  that  the  British  Navy 
showed  some  deterioration  from  the  standard  of 
Trafalgar  days  when  the  issue  was  joined  with  the 
Americans.  There  is  some  truth,  but  not  much,  in  the 
belief.  Between  1805  and  1812,  there  was  much  weary 
watching  and  but  little  fighting.  Seamanship  was 
more  studied  because,  for  the  moment,  more  important 
than  gunnery.  If  the  enemy  was  met  at  all  he  was  an 
enemy  vastly  deteriorated  in  efficiency.  But  the  loss  of 
frigates  to  the  well-found  and  highly  trained  American 
ships  really  proves  very  little.  The  British  Navy 
was  still  undergoing  a  most  anxious  time  in  European 
waters,  with  the  communications  of  Wellington’s  army 
in  its  charge,  and  the  great  blockade  to  maintain. 
The  ships  and  captains  who  could  be  spared  were,  for 
the  most  jpart,  not  among  the  best  in  the  service. 


SEA  POWER  SAVES  EUROPE 


219 


Losses  were,  in  such  circumstances,  inevitable.  But, 
despite  the  showy  successes  gained  by  the  American 
frigates,  the  United  States  were  strangled  by  the  sea 
power  of  Britain,  which  upheld  all  the  objects  for  which 
she  fought.  British  statesmen  had  no  desire  to  push 
matters  with  the  United  States  to  extremities,  and  an 
easy  peace  was  concluded  at  Ghent. 

The  attempt  to  make  the  land  conquer  the  sea  failed 
utterly,  even  in  the  strong  hands  of  Napoleon.  It  has 
never  yet  succeeded  in  history,  and  it  is  permissible  to 
believe  that  it  never  will.  Great  Britain  emerged  from 
the  struggle  with  her  great  Imperial  future  before  her. 
How  she  used  her  opportunity  it  will  be  the  purpose  of 
the  next  chapter  to  outline. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 

The  Peace  of  1815  left  Great  Britain  with  the  fol¬ 
lowing  places  in  her  hands,  besides  those  she  possessed 
before :  In  Europe,  Malta,  the  Ionian  Islands,  and  Heli¬ 
goland;  in  Asia,  Mauritius,  and  Ceylon;  in  Africa,  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope;  and  in  the  New  World,  the  islands 
of  Trinidad,  Tobago,  and  Santa  Lucia,  with  the  old 
Dutch  colony  of  Demerara.  She  had,  moreover,  defi¬ 
nitely  made  good  her  claim  to  Australia  and  had  begun 
to  settle  it;  she  had  “blazed  the  trail”  across  the  North 
American  Continent  to  Vancouver.  Her  territorial 
gains,  therefore,  were  not  small,  and  were  even  more 
important  by  reason  of  their  position  than  of  their  ex¬ 
tent.  Almost  absent-mindedly  (though  the  statement  is 
a  rash  one,  in  view  of  the  highly  developed  sea-sense  of 
which  the  statesmanship  of  Britain  had  given  evidence), 
the  British  came  to  possess  those  “gates  of  the  world,  ” 
which  were  to  acquire  such  great  consequence  in  the 
coming  age  of  steam.  For  the  sake  of  clearness,  the 
enumeration  of  the  naval  positions  acquired  between 
the  close  of  the  war  against  Napoleon  and  that  against 
William  II.  will  be  here  continued. 

New  Zealand,  which  had  been  incorporated  in  the 
State  of  New  South  Wales  in  the  early  nineteenth  cen¬ 
tury,  was  formally  annexed  to  the  British  Crown  by 

220 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


221 


the  Treaty  of  Waingari  in  1840.  The  island  of  Singa¬ 
pore  was  acquired  by  purchase  from  the  Sultan  of 
Johore  in  1824,  and  this  was  followed,  little  by  little, 
by  the  development  of  the  Straits  Settlements  and  the 
Federated  Malay  States.  In  1839,  a  dispute  with  the 
Arab  Sultan  of  Aden,  who  had  taken  prisoner  and  mal¬ 
treated  some  British  sailors,  resulted  in  the  annexation 
of  that  renowned  “cinder  heap,”  one  of  the  most 
powerful  naval  fortresses  in  the  world.  Two  years 
later,  as  the  result  of  the  first  Chinese  War,  we  took  and 
held  Hong -Kong.  The  Mediterranean  position  of  the 
Empire  was  strengthened  by  the  occupation  of  Cyprus 
in  1878  and  of  Egypt  in  1882.  Towards  the  end  of  the 
century,  the  Soudan  was  recovered  from  barbarism, 
giving  us  the  port  of  Suakim  on  the  Red  Sea,  and  large 
acquisitions  were  made  in  East  Africa.  In  South 
Africa,  Natal  was  made  a  British  possession  in  1843, 
while  the  enclave  of  Walfisch  Bay  was  secured  in  1878. 
To  continue  the  list  would  be  tedious.  The  develop¬ 
ment  of  submarine  telegraphy,  in  which  we  naturally 
led  the  world,  necessitated  the  acquisition  of  islands  in 
every  sea:  places  in  themselves  of  little  account,  such  as 
Easter  Island.  Strategical  value,  or  the  fear  that  they 
might  pass  into  the  hands  of  rivals,  compelled  us  to 
“peg  out  a  claim”  to  other  places  of  actual  or  potential 
strength,  such  as  Perim,  Socotra,  Wei-hai-wei,  and 
Koweit,  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  Thus  we  have  acquired 
“the  gates  of  the  world,”  with  the  single  exception  of 
Constantinople,  the  eventual  possession  of  which  is  at 
present  in  doubt.  We  have  given  the  Ionian  Islands  to 
Greece,  and  Heligoland  to  Germany,  graceful  conces¬ 
sions  for  which  it  seems  unlikely  that  we  shall  receive 
any  mundane  reward. 

With  Gibraltar  and  Egypt  in  our  hands,  reinforced 


222 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


by  Malta  as  a  central  pivot,  we  control  the  passage  of 
the  Mediterranean.  Aden  and  Perim  lock  the  door  of 
the  Red  Sea  and  Indian  Ocean,  from  the  south  and  north 
respectively;  Singapore  controls  the  Straits  of  Malacca 
and  the  road  to  the  Far  East.  The  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  is  the  ‘  ‘  nodal  point  ’  ’  on  the  long  sea  route  both  to 
India  and  to  Australasia.  The  Falkland  Islands  watch 
the  passage  round  the  Horn,  while  Jamaica  is  as  well 
placed  as  Cuba  for  controlling  the  exit  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  Finally,  in  the  Straits  of  Dover  we  hold  the 
key  to  the  Channel,  and  from  Scapa  Flow,  control  the 
passage  north-about.  The  British  Islands  lie  like  a 
breakwater  off  the  mainland  of  Central  Europe.  The 
hard  facts  of  geography,  and  not  British  jealousy  or 
ill-will,  forbid  the  development  of  an  oversea  Empire 
of  Germany,  unless  Great  Britain  can  first  be  subdued. 
If  the  Germans  cherished  such  ambitions,  war  was, 
from  the  first,  inevitable.  We  could  not  clear  our¬ 
selves  out  of  the  way,  even  if  we  would. 

Strictly  speaking,  of  course,  a  fortress  or  a  naval 
station  no  more  “controls ”  a  sea  route  than  the  stations 
on  the  Tube  “go”  east  or  west,  as  the  placards  quaintly 
announce.  It  is  the  fleet  based  on  such  places,  or  draw¬ 
ing  its  supplies  from  them,  which  controls  the  route; 
the  fleet  or  the  ships  which  at  once  guard  the  station 
and  are  sheltered  or  succoured  by  it.  If  such  bases 
are  to  be  adequate  to  their  purpose,  however,  they 
must  be  sufficiently  strong,  in  a  military  sense,  to 
defend  themselves  against  attack  in  the  absence  of  the 
fleet  on  its  lawful  occasions ;  otherwise  the  fleet  becomes 
a  mere  defence  of  the  fortress  and  suffers  all  the  dis¬ 
abilities  of  an  army  in  having  to  guard  its  own  lines  of 
communications.  Apart  from  the  great  military  sta¬ 
tions  like  Gibraltar,  Aden,  Simon’s  Bay,  Colombo, 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


223 


Singapore,  and  Hong-Kong — and  sometimes  combined 
with  them — we  have  acquired  an  unsurpassed  chain  of 
coaling  stations  and  commercial  ports  all  over  the  world, 
so  that  the  world’s  traffic,  with  the  exception  of  that  of 
the  United  States  and  South  American  ports,  mainly 
passes  over  routes  in  which  all  the  stations  are  British. 
Hence  it  follows  that  the  things  requisite  for  ocean 
travel — coal,  supplies,  repairing  yards,  and  so  forth — 
are  mostly  to  be  found  in  British  ports.  We  have  the 
largest  mercantile  marine  as  well  as  the  strongest  war- 
navy  in  the  world,  and,  as  we  now  know,  in  the  age  of 
steam  as  in  the  age  of  sail,  our  mercantile  strength  in 
time  of  peace  has  given  our  Navy  strength  in  time  of 
war.  This  has  been  largely  due  to  the  wise  policy  which 
has  thrown  open  our  ports  to  all  and  sundry  to  trade  in 
and  to  use,  for  thereby  other  nations  have  been  relieved 
of  the  necessity  of  developing  resources  of  their  own 
overseas,  and  the  time  of  crisis  found  all  the  important 
links  in  the  chain  of  communications  in  our  hands. 

In  1815,  we  were  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  We 
had  emerged  from  a  great  struggle  more  powerful  than 
any  nation  upon  earth — more  powerful,  that  is,  in  the 
wider  politics  of  the  world.  It  would  have  been  an  evil 
thing  for  humanity  in  general,  and  not  least  for  our¬ 
selves  if,  having  a  giant’s  strength,  we  had  used  it  as  a 
giant.  A  Briton  is  entitled  to  say,  without  cant  or 
hypocrisy,  and  with  full  acknowledgment  of  the  blun¬ 
ders,  failings,  and  sins  of  this  nation  and  its  rulers,  that, 
on  the  whole,  this  power  has  been  used  for  the  benefit 
of  mankind,  and  in  a  large  and  unselfish  spirit.  A 
historian  says  of  Britain  in  the  years  immediately 
following  the  downfall  of  Napoleon: 

Never  before  had  the  whole  moral  of  the  nation  been 
jo  modified  in  so  short  a  space  of  time.  .  .  .  Nine  years 


224 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


spent  in  waging  a  war  of  opinions  and  ideas,  and  twelve 
years  more  spent  in  fighting  for  existence  and  empire,  had 
made  Great  Britain  wary,  resolute,  and  far-sighted  as  she 
had  never  been  before.  .  .  .  Faction  had  died  down  in 
a  way  which  would  have  seemed  incredible  to  an  eight¬ 
eenth  century  politician.  .  .  .  The  improvement  in  politics 
was  only  a  symptom  of  the  general  moral  improvement  of 
the  nation.  The  war  had  sobered  Britain.  .  .  .  If  it  taught 
the  nation  that  civic  virtue  and  conscientious  will  to  work 
must  be  demanded  from  the  leaders,  it  also  required  a  better 
general  level  of  life  and  duty  from  every  man.  This  was 
strengthened  by  a  strong  religious  revival.  .  .  .  For  the 
first  time  since  the  old  Parliamentary  wars,  men  armed 
with  a  crusading  spirit  against  a  spiritual  enemy,  and  the 
cry  “For  God  and  the  King”  had  a  real  meaning. 

The  words  might  have  been  written  of  this  our  day, 
when  the  old  spirit  has  so  miraculously  revived,  showing 
that,  after  a  hundred  years  of  ease  and  prosperity  un¬ 
known  before,  the  nation  has  bred  true  to  type :  as  prone 
as  ever  to  resist  “spiritual  wickedness  in  high  places.” 
Sea  power  is  a  force  potent  to  promote  right,  if  it  be 
rightly  used.  After  1815  it  was  in  our  hands  without  a 
question.  Was  it  rightly  used?  Has  it  contributed  to 
the  spread  of  freedom  in  the  world  and  to  the  general 
good  of  mankind?  There  is  abundant  evidence  that  it 
has,  and  the  best  is  the  fact  that  despite  the  spread 
of  commercialism,  with  its  inherent  selfishness,  our  old 
national  ideals  rang  true  as  in  the  eighteenth  century 
when  they  were  challenged. 

Let  us  put  the  matter  to  the  test.  Europe  had 
exhausted  itself  in  a  war  of  ideas  which  had  become  a 
war  of  ambitions.  Outside,  the  world  was  still  full  of 
violence  and  cruel  habitations.  The  European,  con¬ 
fident  of  superiority,  and  impelled  by  greed,  used  all 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


225 


other  races  as  pawns  in  his  game,  or  counters  in  his  mart. 
No  law  ran  on  the  sea  but  the  law  of  the  strongest. 
One  of  the  clauses  in  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  the  most 
profitable,  in  a  material  sense,  and  the  most  shameful  in 
a  moral,  was  the  famous  Assiento,  which  transferred 
to  Great  Britain  the  monopoly  of  the  slave  trade 
between  Africa  and  the  New  World.  The  British 
people  first  showed  their  moral  title  to  the  sovereignty 
of  the  seas  by  the  almost  instantaneous  revolt  of  the 
national  conscience  against  the  advantages  so  gained. 
Not  that  the  profits  were  immediately  foregone.  Far 
from  it.  But,  as  early  as  1772,  Lord  Mansfield  gave  a 
judgment  in  the  case  of  the  negro,  Somerset,  which 
practically  decided  that  no  man  could  be  a  slave  on 
the  soil  of  Great  Britain  herself.  It  was  not,  however, 
till  1807  that  the  slave  trade  was  made  illegal,  thanks 
to  the  work  of  Clarkson,  the  elder  Wilberforce,  and 
Zachary  Macaulay.  The  British  people,  moreover, 
were  not  content  with  abolishing  it,  so  far  as  regarded 
their  own  ships  and  possessions.  The  whole  force  of 
the  British  Navy  was  used  to  put  it  down,  after  the 
consent  of  other  European  Powers  had  been  obtained 
to  the  declaration  of  illegality.  Finally,  slavery  itself 
was  abolished  in  all  British  possessions.  Up  to  quite 
recently  we  expended  thousands  of  pounds  and  many 
lives  in  suppressing  the  traffic  in  the  Indian  Ocean 
and  the  Persian  Gulf,  at  not  a  little  risk  to  our  political 
position  there,  in  the  face  of  German  rivalry. 

To  cleanse  the  sea  of  piracy  was  a  task  which  went 
hand  in  hand  with  the  extirpation  of  the  slaver.  Piracy 
still  abounded,  not  only  in  the  distant  seas,  but  in  the 
Mediterranean,  when  Napoleon  fell.  There  is  nothing 
stranger  in  Nelson’s  career  than  his  relations  with  the 
piratical  States  of  Barbary,  with  the  Bey  of  Tunis  and 
is 


226 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  Dey  of  Algiers,  with  whom  he  treated  almost  on 
the  footing  of  an  equal,  cajoling  and  coercing  them  to 
refrain  from  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  French. 
After  1815,  the  hour  speedily  struck  which  brought 
about  the  end  of  these  nefarious  monuments  of  Turkish 
misgovernment  and  weakness.  In  1816,  Great  Britain 
demanded  reparation  from  the  Barbary  States  for 
injuries  wrought  on  British  subjects.  All  Christian 
slaves  were  to  be  given  up,  and  guarantees  given 
that  no  more  would  be  taken.  Tunis  and  Tripoli, 
conscious  of  weakness,  yielded  at  once.  But  the 
Dey  of  Algiers  was  recalcitrant.  The  place  was 
immensely  strong,  and  the  British  Government  were 
aghast  when  stout  old  Lord  Exmouth,  Pellew  of  the 
blockade  of  Cadiz,  undertook  to  reduce  it  with  five  sail- 
of-the-line.  He  was  joined  by  some  Dutch  frigates, 
and  sailed  into  the  harbour  on  October  20th.  The 
Dey  returned  no  answer  to  his  demand  for  restitution, 
and  next  day — the  anniversary  of  Trafalgar — he 
opened  fire.  The  action  was  a  bloody  one,  costing 
considerable  loss  to  the  British;  but  the  fortifications 
were  shattered,  the  fleet  destroyed,  and  the  Dey 
conceded  all  Exmouth’s  terms.  That  Great  Britain 
had  no  rapacious  design  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the 
place  was  left  in  the  hands  of  the  native  ruler,  and  so 
continued  until  the  French  took  it  in  1830. 

Thirty  years  later,  the  British  undertook  the  same 
work  on  behalf  of  humanity  in  the  Eastern  seas.  An 
Englishman,  James  Brooke,  had  become  the  Rajah  of 
the  State  of  Sarawak,  in  North-West  Borneo.  The 
seas  around  the  coast  were  infested  with  Malay  and 
Dyak  pirates.  Brooke  was  not  strong  enough  by  him¬ 
self  to  subdue  them,  so  Sir  Harry  Keppel  was  sent  with 
the  Dido  and  Meander  to  his  assistance.  The  pirates  of 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


227 


the  Saribus  and  Sekaran,  who  were  sea  Dyaks  led  by 
Malays,  and  the  Sooloo  and  Lanun  Malays,  made  a 
stout  resistance,  but  were  overpowered.  Piracy  was 
wiped  out  in  those  seas  as  an  institution,  though  it 
persisted  sporadically  among  the  Chinese  for  many 
years  longer,  and  even  still  shows  itself  from  time  to 
time.  The  examples  given  are  merely  instances  of  the 
work  the  British  Navy  did  to  make  the  seas  safe  for 
traders  of  all  nations,  as  a  matter  of  course,  simply 
because  we  were  the  first  Sea  Power  and  acknowledged 
the  obligation  which  lay  upon  us.  Of  necessity,  we 
served  our  own  ends  first.  But  we  shared  the  advan¬ 
tage  gained  with  every  nation  whose  flag  appeared  at  sea. 

Contrast  the  state  of  affairs  which  has  prevailed  at 
sea  since  1815  with  that  which  prevailed  during  all  the 
preceding  centuries.  The  sea  was  the  possession  of 
none ;  therefore  no  man  gave  the  law.  Private  war  was 
freely  levied;  trade  was  carried  on  only  with  the  high 
hand,  in  the  teeth  of  the  attempts  of  one  country 
or  another  to  maintain  a  monopoly.  Colonies  were 
always  regarded  as  the  strict  preserve  of  their  Mother 
Country,  and  organised  smuggling  led  to  constant 
encounters  between  the  smugglers  and  the  preventive 
forces  of  the  nation  whose  rights  were  assailed.  There 
was  always  war  on  the  seas,  and  the  greater  number 
of  merchantmen  either  sailed  armed  or  under  convoy. 
Great  Britain  arose  as  the  Restorer  of  the  Path.  Only 
a  Power  dominant  as  she  had  become  could  have  done 
the  work  which  she  did.  Only  a  Power  imbued  with 
big  ideals  would  have  used  the  power  as  she  used  it. 
The  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  before  the  days  of  Great 
Britain’s  control,  meant  the  freedom  of  the  malefactor. 

To  use  the  term  Free  Trade  is,  unfortunately,  to 
raise  visions  of  political  controversy.  But,  in  its 


228 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


essence,  Free  Trade  means  much  more  than  the  imposi¬ 
tion  of  customs  duties  of  a  greater  or  less  amount  on 
imported  goods.  That  is  a  matter  of  expediency.  It 
is  a  policy  which  may  be  followed  by  one  generation  and 
revoked  by  the  next  without  in  the  least  disturbing  the 
principle.  Customs  duties  on  cargoes  may  differentiate 
between  the  goods  of  one  country  and  another,  or 
between  different  kinds  of  goods.  But  while  the  ships 
of  all  countries  are  free  to  use  the  ports  of  all  countries 
on  equal  terms,  there  is,  in  essence,  free  trade.  That 
was  the  principle  established  by  Great  Britain,  the 
owner  of  far  the  largest  mercantile  marine  in  the  world. 
On  it  the  maritime  prosperity  of  the  smaller  countries 
such  as  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Greece,  is 
founded.  By  virtue  of  it,  even  more  than  by  the  reten¬ 
tion  of  her  East  Indian  possessions,  some  remnant  of 
the  maritime  greatness  of  Holland  remains.  Indirectly, 
we  have  taxed  ourselves  to  afford  naval  protection  under 
which  these  countries  have  flourished  and  grown  rich. 
This  is  not  altruism.  The  policy  suited  us,  and  it 
remains,  as  ever,  our  interest  to  see  that  the  border- 
States  of  Europe  remain  free  and  prosperous.  But, 
after  1815,  we  threw  over  completely  every  principle 
on  which  the  mercantile  system  was  founded,  and  sub¬ 
stituted  for  it  a  freedom  which  made  the  sea  the  true 
highway  of  the  nations. 

The  theory  on  which  this  policy  was  founded  has, 
doubtless,  been  carried  too  far.  We  saw  the  world 
pouring  into  our  ports  and  marts,  its  riches  from  every 
clime  in  the  ships  of  all  nations.  Wherever  a  com¬ 
modity  could  be  produced  best  and  cheapest,  there  we 
sought  it;  whatever  ship  could  convey  it  most  cheaply, 
that  we  employed  to  convey  it.  In  return,  we  secured, 
for  a  time,  at  least,  cheap  production  in  our  mining  and 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


229 


manufactures,  and  we  held  the  markets  of  the  world. 
Although  other  nations  were  ahead  of  us  in  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  marine  steam  engine,  yet  our  skill  in  ship¬ 
building  and  the  proximity  of  coal  and  iron  to  our  ports 
and  estuaries  kept  us  well  ahead  in  the  race  for  primacy 
when  iron  and  steel  ships  supplanted  wooden.  We 
turned  out  tonnage,  not  only  for  ourselves,  but  for  our 
competitors.  This  is  not  the  place  to  argue  as  to 
economic  soundness  of  this  policy.  But  it  is  permissible 
to  point  out  that  it  was  essentially  a  peace  policy;  that 
it  took  no  account  of  efforts  deliberately  made  to 
destroy  our  maritime  supremacy  by  the  adoption  of 
plans  similar  to  those  of  Colbert,  nor  did  it  allow  for 
the  fact,  still  more  serious,  that  we  might  find  ourselves 
involved  in  war  with  a  Power  capable  of  dealing  severe 
blows  at  our  commerce,  while  we  were  dependent  on 
imports  from  abroad  for  the  necessaries  of  life.  There 
have  been  numerous  attempts  since  1815  to  draw  up  an 
international  code  to  regulate  the  rights  and  duties  of 
belligerents  and  neutrals  during  a  period  of  sea  warfare. 
In  every  one,  the  instructions  of  the  British  delegates 
have  been  framed  on  the  assumption  that  we  should 
be  neutral,  not  belligerent.  As  the  greatest  oversea 
traders,  we  stood  to  lose  most  from  the  operations 
of  belligerent  Powers,  if  we  were  neutral,  and  sea  warfare 
was  not  restricted.  As  the  greatest  Sea  Power,  in  a 
naval  sense,  we  stood  to  lose  most  if  it  were,  supposing 
us  to  be  belligerent.  The  result  of  letting  our  agri¬ 
culture  decay,  of  becoming  dependent  on  foreign  ore, 
instead  of  working  our  own  iron  deposits,  and  of  suffer¬ 
ing  bounty-fed  sugar  to  kill  the  industry  of  our  West 
India  Islands,  is  now  seen  to  have  been  disastrous  in  a 
national  sense,  however  profitable  it  may  have  been  in 
the  economic  sense  to  buy  in  the  cheapest  market. 


230 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


None  the  less,  the  maritime  policy  of  Great  Britain 
during  the  last  hundred  years  is  one  of  which  we  may 
legitimately  be  proud,  and  which  has  won  results 
unknown  before  in  the  history  of  the  world.  She  did 
more,  indeed,  than  open  her  ports  and  the  ports  of  the 
Empire  oversea ;  more,  even,  than  suppress  piracy  in  the 
interests  of  mankind  and  the  slave  trade  in  the  name 
of  humanity  and  the  Gospel  of  Christ.  Her  ships  of 
war,  once  the  cannon  was  silent,  were  sent  into  every 
sea,  exploring,  sounding,  surveying,  charting,  marking 
the  spot  for  a  lighthouse  here  and  a  beacon  there.  It  is 
enough  to  mention  two  of  these  expeditions:  That  of 
the  Beagle  in  1831,  as  a  consequence  of  which  Charles 
Darwin  revolutionised,  if  he  did  not  create,  the  science 
of  biology,  and  that  of  the  Challenger ,  in  1872-6,  with 
the  valuable  knowledge  gained  of  deep-sea  soundings. 
Both  the  Arctic  and  the  Antarctic  regions  were  explored, 
and,  though  it  did  not  fall  to  the  lot  of  a  Briton  to 
discover  either  the  North  or  the  South  Pole,  yet  such 
men  as  Franklin,  Ross,  McClintock,  Nares,  Scott, 
and  Shackleton  were  the  pioneers  who  made  the 
successes  of  Peary  and  Amundsen  possible. 

Britain  went  to  war  with  Revolutionary  France  in 
1792  on  account  of  the  Proclamation  of  the  French 
rulers  that  the  forces  of  the  Revolution  would  be  used 
to  assist  any  nation  which  wished  to  free  itself  from 
monarchical  government.  The  consequence  of  that 
policy  was  that  France  herself  first  passed  under  the 
military  despotism  of  Napoleon,  and  that,  when  that 
despotism  was  destroyed,  the  greater  part  of  the  Con¬ 
tinent  of  Europe  found  its  neck  beneath  the  yoke  of  the 
Holy  Alliance,  while,  of  the  remainder,  a  large  propor¬ 
tion  remained  enslaved  to  the  Turk.  It  was  left  for  sea 
power  to  be  instrumental  in  the  work  of  liberation. 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


231 


Most  people  are  now  prepared  to  admit,  with  Lord 
Salisbury,  that  we  ‘'backed  the  wrong  horse”  when  we 
supported  the  Turk  against  the  Russians  in  1854  and 
again  in  1877-8.  We  were  moved  by  concern  for  the 
route  to  India,  and  by  suspicion  of  the  designs  of 
Russia,  founded  in  part  on  the  so-called  “Will  of  Peter 
the  Great,  ”  and  in  part  of  the  real  aggressiveness  of  her 
action  in  Central  Asia.  Moreover,  so  long  as  Egypt 
remained  in  fact  a  part  of  the  dominions  of  the  Sultan, 
the  passing  of  Constantinople  into  the  hands  of  the 
Power  which  controlled  the  Black  Sea  was  a  very  real 
danger.  British  interests,  therefore,  seemed  to  demand 
that  the  Empire  of  the  Turk  should  be  maintained,  while 
British  instinct  cried  out  for  the  redemption  of  his 
persecuted  subjects.  These  cross-currents  are  apparent 
all  through  the  history  of  our  foreign  relations  from  1828 
onwards,  and  they  found  their  culmination  in  the  great 
duel  between  Disraeli  and  Gladstone  in  1877-80.  In 
the  upshot,  we  fell  between  two  stools,  preserving  the 
Turk  as  a  malevolent  force  in  Europe,  while  earning 
his  ill-will  by  intervention,  covenanted  or  otherwise, 
on  behalf  of  his  subjects.  Brimstone  and  treacle, 
while  admirable  as  a  domestic  medicine,  is  rarely  service¬ 
able  in  business  or  politics. 

Our  first  essay  in  liberation  is  full  of  interest  to  us 
to-day.  In  1821  the  Greeks  rose  in  rebellion  against 
their  Turkish  masters.  The  horrible  cruelties  of  the 
Ottoman  troops  aroused  the  indignation  of  all  Europe. 
The  imagination  of  the  British  was  especially  stirred  by 
the  presence  of  Lord  Byron  as  a  volunteer,  fighting  in  the 
Greek  ranks.  An  international  squadron  of  British, 
French,  and  Russian  ships  was  sent  to  Greek  waters.  It 
consisted  of  twenty-four  vessels,  of  which  seven  were 
British  ships-of-the-line.  The  Turks  and  Egyptians 


232 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


had  over  forty  vessels  of  war,  besides  transports.  The 
Allied  fleet  had  not  intended  action,  but,  when  a  shot 
was  fired  at  the  French  flagship,  the  wrath  of  the  sailors 
at  the  atrocities  committed  by  the  Turks  and  the  bad 
faith  shown  could  not  be  restrained.  A  four-hours’ 
engagement  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  the  combined 
Turkish  and  Egyptian  fleets.  The  Independence  of 
Greece  was  recognised,  and  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia  thus  gained  the  title  to  be  the  protectors  of  that 
country,  on  which  their  action  of  to-day  is  based.  The 
Battle  of  Navarino  was  fought  almost  on  the  same  spot 
as  Salamis  and  Lepanto.  Ibrahim  Pasha,  son  of  Mehe- 
met  Ali,  Pasha  of  Egypt,  remained  in  the  Morea  a  year 
longer,  when  he  was  forced  to  retire  by  a  French  force 
under  General  Maison.  But  the  lesson  of  Navarino  is 
practically  that  of  Salamis:  that  no  power  can  hold 
Helas  which  has  lost  command  of  the  sea. 

The  power  of  Great  Britain  was  destined  to  clash 
with  Ibrahim  Pasha  again  twelve  years  later,  when  the 
Egyptian  forces  advanced  through  Syria  to  the  con¬ 
quest  of  the  Turkish  dominions  in  Asia  Minor.  It  is 
possible  that  the  ambitious  Albanian — for  such  was  the 
race  of  Mehemet  Ali — might  have  seized  the  Imperial 
Throne  of  Constantinople  and  the  Khalifate.  But  a 
combined  squadron  of  British,  Turkish,  and  Austrian 
ships,  under  Sir  R.  Stopford,  bombarded  St.  Jean  d’ 
Acre,  and  stayed  the  course  of  the  Egyptians  on  the 
very  spot  where  Sidney  Smith  had  made  Napoleon 
“miss  his  destiny.  ”  Since  that  time,  British  sea  power 
has  intervened  in  the  affairs  of  Eastern  Europe  on  many 
occasions,  in  Egypt,  in  Crete,  and  at  other  places,  in  a 
vain  endeavour  to  save  the  Turk  from  himself.  Success¬ 
ful  or  unsuccessful,  the  dispatch  of  a  fleet  has  always 
been  the  readiest  way  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear,  and 


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THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


233 


Lord  Salisbury,  who  never  seemed  thoroughly  to 
understand  the  principles  of  sea  power,  took  far  too  nar¬ 
row  a  view  of  the  possibilities  when,  in  defending  him¬ 
self  against  the  charge  of  inaction  in  the  cause  of  the 
Armenians,  he  dismissed  the  matter  with  the  remark 
that  “You  cannot  send  ironclads  up  Mount  Ararat.” 

The  campaign  against  Arabi  Pasha  and  the  revolted 
Egyptian  army  was  remarkable  from  a  naval  point  of 
view  in  several  ways.  In  the  first  place,  it  afforded 
another  instance  of  the  commander  of  an  army  making 
use  of  the  command  of  the  sea  to  shift  his  base.  Sir 
Garnet  Wolseley  thus  avoided  a  difficult  flank  march  in 
face  of  the  lines  of  Kafr  Dowar,  and,  by  re-embarking 
his  army  and  landing  it  on  the  bank  of  the  Suez  Canal 
at  Ismailia,  forced  Arabi  to  evacuate  his  position  and 
change  front  at  Tel-el-Kebir.  Sir  Garnet  now  had  the 
use  of  the  Sweet  Water  Canal,  and  was  able,  after  a 
night  march,  to  attack  the  Egyptian  lines  at  dawn. 
That  evening,  Drury  Lowe’s  cavalry  were  in  Cairo. 

Apart  from  the  military  interest,  the  Egyptian  affair, 
with  its  aftermath,  the  campaigns  in  the  Soudan,  are 
notable  from  the  fact  that  they  formed  a  part  of  the 
bloodless  struggle  between  British  and  French  sea 
power  which  continued  from  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon 
till  it  was  happily  terminated  by  the  establishment  of 
the  Entente  Cordiale  and  the  growing  evidence  of  Ger¬ 
man  ambition.  The  departure  of  the  French  fleet 
before  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria,  which  placed 
the  administration  of  Egypt  solely  in  the  hands  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  Fashoda  incident  are  recalled 
only  to  bring  home  the  fact  that  superior  sea  power  was 
able  to  work  its  will  without  the  necessity  for  hostilities, 
but  none  the  less  decisively.  Another  instance  is  to  be 
found  in  the  story  of  the  Italian  struggle  for  freedom. 


234 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Napoleon  III.,  in  1859,  made  war  against  Austria, 
promising  that  he  would  not  sheath  his  sword  till 
Italy  was  free  from  the  Alps  to  the  Adriatic.  After 
the  two  victories  of  Solferino  and  Magenta,  however, 
the  threatening  attitude  of  Prussia  and  the  North 
German  Confederation,  as  well  as  the  unwillingness 
of  Roman  Catholic  France  to  countenance  measures 
against  the  Papal  States,  impelled  him  to  sign  the 
Treaty  of  Villafranca.  By  this  instrument  he  not  only 
failed  to  redeem  the  promises  he  had  made,  but  he 
spoiled  Italy  of  Savoy  and  Nice,  which  were  to  have 
been  his  only  if  he  fulfilled  his  promise.  Had  it  not 
been  for  the  backing  which  the  British  Ministry  gave 
to  the  Italian  claims,  Tuscany,  Parma,  Modena,  and  a 
part  of  the  States  of  the  Church  would  have  been  lost  to 
the  kingdom  of  Piedmont.  The  Italians  recognised 
that  they  owed  more  to  the  moral  support  of  British  sea 
power  than  they  did  to  the  material  aid  of  France.  Nor 
was  that  all  they  were  to  owe.  When  Garibaldi,  having 
made  himself  master  of  Sicily,  crossed  to  the  mainland 
and  drove  the  King  of  Naples  into  Gaeta,  Napoleon  III. 
sent  the  French  fleet  thither  to  protect  the  latter. 
Lord  John  Russell  protested  effectually  against  the 
action  of  the  French,  and  Garibaldi  was  left  to  continue 
his  operations  without  interference.  Here  the  Land 
Power,  France,  was  stopped  by  a  threat  to  its  frontiers. 
The  Sea  Power,  unfettered  by  any  such  fear,  was  suc¬ 
cessful  without  firing  a  shot. 

In  other  directions  also  Great  Britain  was  instru¬ 
mental  during  this  period  in  foiling  the  effort  of  the 
sovereigns  of  the  Continent  to  rivet  the  principles  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  on  the  necks  of  European  peoples. 
The  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  were 
secured  by  treaty — so  far  as  a  “scrap  of  paper”  could 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


235 


secure  them;  the  independence  of  the  Spanish  settle¬ 
ments  in  South  America,  won  in  part  by  the  efforts  of 
Cochrane  and  other  British  sailors  and  soldiers,  was 
secured  against  a  movement  on  the  part  of  Spain  and 
France  by  the  joint  action  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  The  national  government  of  Spain 
herself  was  likewise  supported  against  French  aggres¬ 
sion.  It  may  be  said,  though  with  some  caution,  that 
the  fruits  of  the  French  Revolution  during  this  period 
were  consolidated  against  reaction  behind  the  aegis 
of  the  British  Navy.  The  subject  is  too  wide  to  follow 
out  in  detail  here.  But,  from  1815  to  1871,  the  French 
nation  was  struggling  uneasily  against  various  forms  of 
autocracy,  whether  imposed  by  the  Legitimist  mon¬ 
archy  of  Louis  XVIII.  and  Charles  X.,  by  the  Liberal 
monarchy  of  Louis  Philippe,  or  the  Caesarism  of  Napo¬ 
leon  III.  The  French  people  were  true  to  their  ideals 
of  liberty,  but  French  wars  were  mainly  dynastic,  and 
the  martial  nation  was  easily  roused  by  the  cry,  “  La 
Patrie  en  danger.  ’  ’  France  had  yet  to  find  herself — the 
France  that  we  know  to-day — and,  in  the  meantime, 
the  defence  of  the  smaller  nations,  of  the  principle  of 
national  unity  and  of  liberty  of  thought  and  life,  was 
left  to  the  silent  influence  of  the  British  Navy.  The  his¬ 
tory  of  Europe,  and,  indeed,  of  the  world,  for  the  past 
hundred  years,  can  only  be  read  rightly  in  the  light  of 
events  from  1914  onwards. 

In  one  direction,  Great  Britain  was  false  to  her 
ideals  and  her  mission  in  the  world.  She  allowed  the 
Austro-Prussian  attack  on  Denmark  in  1864,  and  the 
annexation  of  the  Duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Hol¬ 
stein  to  Prussia.  This  error  gave  Kiel  to  Germany, 
and  laid  the  foundation  on  which  the  German  Navy 
has  been  built.  It  was  the  direct  outcome  of  the  Ger- 


236 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


manism  which  had  been  allowed  to  pervade  the  Courts 
of  Europe. 

The  use  of  sea  power  during  the  Civil  War  in  the 
United  States  is  full  of  interest,  but  must  be  briefly 
touched  on.  The  superiority  of  the  North  at  sea 
brought  about  the  exhaustion  of  the  Confederacy  by 
the  stringency  of  the  blockade,  while  the  direct  naval 
action  of  Farragut  at  Mobile  and  elsewhere  practically 
cut  the  South  in  two.  The  blockade  was  only  main¬ 
tained  by  measures  which  strained  the  doctrines  of 
international  law,  as  then  laid  down,  to  the  uttermost, 
and  which  caused  serious  friction  between  the  Federal 
Government  and  this  country.  The  United  States 
which  had  gone  to  war  with  us  in  1812  owing  to  the 
high-handedness  of  our  restrictions  on  trade,  bettered 
our  model  in  their  own  hour  of  necessity.  We,  on  our 
part,  have  occasion  to  be  grateful  to  them  now  for 
the  precedents  then  created,  severe  as  was  the  distress 
caused  to  this  country  by  their  application  at  the  time. 
In  particular,  if  the  American  Courts  had  not  then 
evolved  the  doctrine  of  Continuous  Voyage,  which  lays 
it  down  that  a  ship  attempting  to  run  a  blockade  is 
capturable,  whatever  her  immediate  destination,  if  it 
can  be  proved  that  her  cargo  is  ultimately  consigned 
to  the  enemy,  we  could  exercise  no  control  whatever 
over  goods  going  to  Germany  by  way  of  the  Dutch  or 
Scandinavian  ports.  There  were  many  reasons  for  the 
sympathy,  now  almost  inexplicable,  which  was  widely  felt 
for  the  South  among  the  British  people.  But,  on  the 
whole,  the  cause  of  the  North  was  felt  to  be  that  which 
embodied  British  ideals  and  British  traditions,  and 
Lancashire  starved  without  a  murmur  in  order  that  that 
cause  might  prevail.  In  this  was  the  first  glimmering  of 
the  dawn  which  now  shines  in  the  union  of  the  English- 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


237 


speaking  peoples  to  maintain  the  principles  for  which 
their  common  forefathers  fought. 

The  latent  sympathy  came  more  fully  to  light  when 
war  broke  out  in  1898  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain,  on  account  of  the  barbarities  practised  by  the 
latter  against  the  Cuban  insurgents,  the  embarrass¬ 
ments  caused  to  American  trade  by  the  long-drawn-out 
revolution  in  that  island,  and,  above  all,  by  the  sinking 
of  the  battleship  Maine  in  Havana  Harbour.  The 
naval  incidents  of  that  war  supply  useful  comment  on 
the  true  understanding  of  sea  power.  The  Spaniards 
possessed  a  small  squadron  of  three  armoured  cruisers 
and  a  couple  of  destroyers,  available  for  service  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  The  American  fleet  was  at 
least  three  or  four  times  as  strong,  and  included  several 
first-class  battleships.  Yet  the  whole  East  Coast  was 
thrown  into  a  state  of  panic  by  the  approach  of  Cer-. 
vera’s  little  force,  and  the  naval  dispositions  of  the 
authorities  were  seriously  hampered  by  the  popular 
outcry  for  local  protection.  Serious  uneasiness  pre¬ 
vailed  concerning  the  fate  of  the  battleship,  Oregon , 
which  was  on  the  Pacific  Coast  at  the  outbreak  of  war, 
and  which  had  to  make  the  long  voyage  round  the  Horn 
unattended.  The  Spaniards  were,  of  course,  in  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  harbours,  not  only  of  Cuba,  but  also  of  Porto 
Rico,  and  there  was,  consequently,  a  real  uncertainty 
as  to  the  destination  of  the  squadron.  The  Americans, 
having  no  bases  on  the  European  side  of  the  Atlantic, 
could  not  watch  it  before  it  set  out,  according  to  the 
British  method.  But,  even  so,  it  is  quite  obvious 
that  concentration,  not  dissipation,  of  force  was  the 
sound  strategy.  Instead  of  ships  being  kept  to  do 
“sentry-go”  off  the  American  coast,  the  Spanish  har¬ 
bours  should  have  been  closely  watched  by  the  light 


238 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


forces,  while  the  main  fleet  was  kept  concentrated  at  a 
central  spot,  ready  to  fall  in  force  on  the  enemy  when  he 
appeared.  As  it  was,  the  land  expedition  was  kept 
waiting  for  weeks  before  embarkation,  until  Cervera 
was  safely  “bottled  up”  in  the  harbour  of  Santiago  de 
Cuba.  An  advance  against  the  land  defences  of  the 
port  at  length  drove  him  out  on  to  the  guns  of  Admiral 
Sampson’s  fleet,  and  his  little  squadron  perished  gal¬ 
lantly.  A  few  months  before,  Admiral  Dewey  had 
destroyed  a  small  squadron  of  antiquated  ships  in 
Manila  Bay,  and  the  Philippine  Islands  passed  finally 
from  Spain.  Thus  ended  the  once  mighty  oversea  Em¬ 
pire  of  the  Dons.  The  futility  of  trying  to  hold  distant 
possessions  without  the  power  to  protect  the  communi¬ 
cations  with  them  was  demonstrated  once  again. 

The  Spanish- American  War,  however,  was  chiefly 
noticeable  as  an  example  of  the  silent  but  far-reaching 
force  of  British  sea  power.  Continental  Europe,  with  a 
fellow  feeling  for  a  sister  in  distress,  and  always  resentful 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which,  in  truth,  the  Americans 
themselves  violated  by  the  seizure  of  the  Spanish  posses¬ 
sions,  was  of  a  mind  to  interfere.  But  the  necessary 
condition  of  intervention  was  the  adhesion  of  Great 
Britain  to  the  Continental  scheme.  With  British  sea 
power  hostile,  or  even  doubtful,  the  military  nations 
were  powerless.  Great  Britain  made  no  sign  of  acquies¬ 
cence,  and  the  whole  design  fell  to  the  ground.  Nothing 
was  done,  or  even  said,  overtly.  But  there  was  a  sig¬ 
nificant  incident  in  Manila  Bay.  A  German  squadron, 
which  had  followed  Dewey  from  China,  threatened  to 
interfere  with  his  operations.  Sir  Edward  Chichester, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  British  force  on  the  spot, 
quietly  anchored  his  ships  between  the  Germans  and 
the  Americans.  The  hint  was  sufficient. 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


^39 


In  the  following  year  sea  power  asserted  its  noiseless 
influence  even  more  decisively.  When  the  Boer  War 
broke  out,  European  sympathy,  for  reasons  we  can 
understand  and,  for  the  most  part,  respect,  was  very 
strongly  on  the  side  of  the  little  peoples.  Negotiations 
took  place  between  certain  Powers  for  active  interfer¬ 
ence  on  behalf  of  the  Boers.  But  there  were  then  no 
three  fleets  in  Europe  capable  of  meeting  the  British,  and 
the  negotiations  broke  down.  We  carried  our  armies 
and  all  their  stores  and  munitions  over  6000  miles  of 
sea,  as  if  it  had  been  along  the  highroads  of  our  own 
country,  and  not  all  the  ill-will  in  Europe  could  interfere 
with  us.  The  German  Emperor  has  taken  credit  for 
having  personally  vetoed  a  coalition  against  us.  His 
claim  may  be  justified.  He  was  not  ready.  Nor  did 
he  want  others  to  share  the  spoil.  But  he  improved  the 
occasion  afforded  by  the  capture  of  the  Bundesrat ,  a  Ger¬ 
man  vessel  conveying  arms  to  the  Boers,  by  uttering  the 
first  of  his  famous  trilogy  of  sayings,  “We  are  in  bitter 
need  of  a  strong  Germany  navy.  ’  ’  Of  this  more  hereafter. 

The  Boer  war  revealed  the  existence  of  a  new  organic 
force  in  the  world.  Colonisation  has  always  been  an 
intrinsic  part  of  sea  power.  But  the  colonies  of  other 
nations  have  been  either  subject  and  tributary  to  the 
Mother  Country,  or  they  have  soon  broken  away  from 
all  connection  with  her.  Many  instances  have  been 
given  in  earlier  chapters.  Great  Britain  had  a  bitter 
experience  of  the  consequences  to  be  expected  from 
straining  the  allegiance  of  a  great  offshoot  to  the  break¬ 
ing  point  when  the  American  settlers  threw  off  her 
allegiance  in  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Many  troubles  were  hers  afterwards  in  Canada,  in 
Australasia,  and  particularly  in  South  Africa.  The 
impossibility  of  controlling  distant  communities  of  her 


240 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


own  race  and  ideas,  without  a  share  in  those  repre¬ 
sentative  institutions  so  dear  to  the  British  heart; 
the  equal  impossibility  of  retaining  them  within  the 
Empire  if  they  should  wish  to  sever  themselves  from  it, 
were  impressed  upon  British  statesmen  of  the  Victorian 
era.  It  was  rather  in  weariness  than  with  a  true  vision 
of  the  future  that  the  white  communities  of  Greater 
Britain  were  endowed  with  the  rights  of  responsible 
government.  The  way  was  paved  for  their  separation 
when  they  were  strong  enough  to  stand  alone.  They 
were  made  free  to  develop  along  their  own  lines.  No¬ 
thing  but  “the  golden  link  of  the  Crown”  remained, 
to  outward  observance,  to  preserve  their  unity  with  the 
Mother  Country.  It  was  an  experiment  which  no 
conscious  Empire  builder  would  have  dared  to  try.  But 
the  invisible  forces  were  to  prove  stronger  than  the 
visible.  Common  thought,  common  speech,  common 
history  and  traditions  are  the  first  of  these.  Others  are, 
credit  and  the  Navy.  To  call  a  fleet  of  battleships 
an  “invisible  force”  seems,  at  first  sight,  absurd. 
But,  in  the  literal  sense,  the  Navy,  except  for  a  few 
ships,  generally  of  inferior  force,  has  been  invisible  to 
the  peoples  of  the  Dominions.  It  has  acted  from  far 
away,  and  it  unquestionably  took  the  Canadian,  Aus¬ 
tralian,  and  New  Zealander  a  long  time  to  realise  that, 
if  the  merchant  ships  coming  into  his  ports,  in  a  huge 
majority,  wore  the  Red  Ensign  of  Britain;  if  he  was  free 
to  develop  the  riches  of  his  land  without  keeping  sword 
and  buckler,  as  it  were,  at  the  end  of  the  furrow,  it  was 
due  to  “those  far-distant,  storm-beaten  ships,”  on 
which  he  never  looked,  and  for  which  he  was  not  asked 
to  pay  a  single  penny.  The  kings  of  the  earth  take 
tribute  from  their  subjects;  but  his  Motherland  gives 
and  does  not  take. 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


241 


That  the  Imperial  idea  first  awoke  in  the  White 
Empire  oversea  through  sea  power  admits  of  no  doubt. 
In  the  early  eighties  of  last  century,  the  Australasian 
Dominions  first  agreed  to  make  a  voluntary  contribu¬ 
tion  to  the  cost  of  the  Navy  in  return  for  the  permanent 
retention  of  some  light  cruisers  upon  the  station.  As  a 
result  of  the  enthusiasm  stirred  by  the  two  Jubilees  of 
Queen  Victoria,  the  Cape  presented  the  armoured 
cruiser  Good  Hope  to  the  Navy,  on  the  motion  of  a 
Dutchman,  Jan  Hofmeyr,  while  Natal  made  an  annual 
gift  of  coal,  and  Newfoundland  raised  a  Naval  Reserve 
from  among  her  fishermen.  With  the  growth  of  the 
German  menace  and  the  rise  of  the  navy  of  Japan,  the 
movement  took  on  wider  dimensions.  New  Zealand 
gave  a  battle  cruiser  to  the  Navy,  while  the  Common¬ 
wealth  of  Australia  laid  the  foundations  of  a  naval 
unit  of  its  own.  Canada  proved  her  desire  to  join  in 
the  union  for  defence,  but  action  was  postponed  owing 
to  internal  difficulties.  Her  Prime  Minister,  Sir  Robert 
Borden,  however,  was  the  first  to  utter  a  demand  for 
closer  political  union  with  the  Mother  Country  and 
the  Sister  Dominions.  “Call  us  to  your  councils”  are 
words  which  will  be  heard  more  insistently  when  the 
struggle  in  which  the  Dominions  have  borne  so  noble  a 
part  has  come  to  an  end. 

Military  aid  was  first  given  in  a  British  campaign  by 
the  New  South  Wales  contingent,  a  small  body  of  cav¬ 
alry  which  joined  the  British  force  at  Suakim  in  1885. 
When  the  war  with  the  Boer  Republics  broke  out, 
offers  of  aid  came,  and  were  accepted,  from  all  the  White 
Dominions.  What,  to  the  monarchies  of  Europe, 
presented  itself  as  a  war  of  aggression  and  oppression 
was  seen  by  the  citizens  of  the  free  communities  of  our 
family  to  be  a  war  for  freedom.  Their  sons  came 

16 


242 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


forward  with  an  enthusiasm  which  no  temporary 
reverses  could  check.  The  sea  power  of  Britain 
collected  them  from  all  the  ends  of  the  earth.  Nor  was 
that  all.  The  echo  of  the  last  shot  had  hardly  died 
away  before  the  South  African  peoples  themselves 
were  first  entrusted  with  the  rights  of  self-government, 
and  were  then  united  into  one  State  in  which  Boer 
and  Briton  shared  equal  rights,  the  Dutch  majority, 
under  the  leadership  of  the  general  who  had  led  the 
Boer  armies  against  us,  wielding  the  government 
of  the  country  behind  the  shield  of  the  British 
Navy.  Free  development  of  their  national  life,  a 
free  share  in  all  the  benefits  which  the  mighty  mari¬ 
time  resources  of  Great  Britain  could  give  them,  and 
free  protection  from  all  outside  aggression  were  bene¬ 
fits  apparent  to  the  naturally  shrewd  mind  of  the 
Boer.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  experiences  of  our 
history  and  all  the  forces  of  the  national  character  have 
gone  to  build  up  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  and  to  bring 
about  the  almost  miraculous  result  that  two  generals 
who,  in  1900,  were  waging  a  not  unsuccessful  war 
against  the  British  Empire,  between  1914  and  1916 
commanded  British  armies  in  two  victorious  campaigns. 

Outside  the  White  Dominions,  the  possessions  of 
the  Honourable  East  India  Company  grew  into  the 
Empire  of  India.  What  Alexander  and  all  succeeding 
conquerors  failed  to  do  by  way  of  the  land,  Great  Brit¬ 
ain  accomplished  by  way  of  the  sea.  Our  title  to  India 
has  never  been  disputed  since  Napoleon  fell;  no  Power 
has  ever  shaken  our  position.  Foreign  rival  and  native 
malcontent  has  learned  alike  that  England  is  nearer  to 
India  than  Petrograd  or  Berlin;  even  than  Merv,  or, 
to  employ  a  paradox,  Delhi  itself.  The  foreign  policy 
of  Britain  for  the  last  hundred  years  has  been  based 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


243 


almost  entirely  upon  considerations  which  touched  the 
road  to  India.  The  benefits  of  our  rule  there  to  our¬ 
selves  have  often  been  questioned  by  the  materialistic 
school  of  thought ;  the  benefits  of  our  rule  to  the  native 
population  have  never  been  seriously  called  in  question 
by  any  one  whose  opinion  counted.  India  has  repaid 
the  debt  by  the  aid  given  by  her  fine  regiments  on 
the  battlefields  of  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa.  The  place 
of  this  great  empire  within  the  Empire,  possessing,  as  it 
does,  a  civilisation  and  a  culture  of  its  own — perhaps  one 
should  rather  say  several  varieties  of  civilisation  and 
culture — and  with  a  history  extending  beyond  that  of 
any  of  the  Powers  of  Europe,  is  a  question  which  will 
have  to  be  settled  after  the  war,  and  which  may  afford 
the  most  crucial  test  which  the  British  race  has  ever 
undergone  of  that  capacity  for  leadership  which  it  has 
hitherto  so  strikingly  exhibited. 

With  the  peoples  of  India  may  be  ranked  the  Malays, 
and  such  of  the  Arab  and  Chinese  races  as  are  under  our 
rule.  The  gift  of  the  battleship  Malaya  by  the  Rajas  of 
the  Federated  Malay  States  proved  that  this  maritime 
race  of  the  East  has  a  grasp  of  the  essential  meaning  of 
sea  power.  These  peoples  are  not  to  be  ranked  with 
'‘the  heathen  in  his  blindness.  ”  Of  the  so-called  “sav¬ 
age”  races  of  mankind,  the  Ocean  Empire  has  many 
under  its  flag,  the  blacks  of  Africa,  the  Dyaks  of  Bor¬ 
neo,  the  Papuans,  and  the  inhabitants  of  countless 
islands.  Starting  with  trading  stations  on  the  coasts,  in 
the  great  majority  of  cases,  and  with  a  history  of  early 
contact  of  which  we  have  little  reason  to  be  proud, 
all  the  good  which  is  in  the  British  nature  has  asserted 
itself  in  its  further  dealings  with  native  races,  and  has 
exerted  itself  mainly  by  means  of  the  long  arm  of  the 
Navy.  The  overthrow  of  dark  and  bloody  tyrannies 


244 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


like  those  of  the  Khalifa  in  the  Soudan  and  King 
Prempeh  in  West  Africa,  and  the  substitution  of  a  just 
rule  for  theirs,  were  works  which  we  can  fearlessly  bring 
to  the  test  of  their  fruits,  without  heeding  the  charges  of 
rapacity  and  hypocrisy  hurled  at  us  by  people  whose 
record  in  dealing  with  the  backward  races  of  the  world 
will  not  bear  a  similar  test.  It  may  be  confidently 
asserted  that,  in  all  such  cases,  we  have  applied  unflinch¬ 
ingly,  so  far  as  they  are  applicable,  the  principles  on 
which  our  own  laws  and  government  are  founded,  even 
to  the  hurt  of  our  own  material  interests. 

Here,  too,  great  questions  face  us  in  the  future, 
especially  in  the  lands  where  white  settlers  live  in 
contact  with  native  races.  They  are  questions  which 
will  only  be  solved  if  we  keep  within  us  a  very  real  and 
high  sense  of  a  Divine  mission,  laid  upon  the  race  by 
“Him  Who  set  His  Briton  in  blown  seas  and  storming 
showers.”  This  line  of  thought  has  been  indicated 
before,  but  here  it  must  be  developed  in  greater  detail,  if 
the  reader  is  to  grasp  the  point  of  view  from  which 
the  writer  regards  the  Empire  and  the  history  which  has 
gone  to  its  making:  if  the  high  purpose  for  which  sea 
power  and  the  heritage  it  has  brought  has  been  entrusted 
to  us  by  Him  who  sitteth  above  the  water-floods  is  to 
be  fully  grasped.  Romans,  Saxons,  Danes,  Normans 
flowed  into  our  islands  ere  the  keepers  of  the  gates  came 
to  understand  the  principles  on  which  an  island  is 
made  safe  from  conquest.  Then  the  gates  were  shut, 
and,  with  many  a  struggle,  the  various  races  fused  and 
became  one  people,  with  very  definite  characteristics, 
contributed  by  each  of  the  elements.  They  fought 
among  themselves  for  principles  of  liberty  and  law, 
and  they  evolved  an  ordered  freedom,  foundations  of 
equity  and  justice,  and  a  temperate  polity  which,  if  it  is 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


245 


no  more  perfect  than  any  other  human  contrivance,  is 
yet  far  in  advance  of  anything  existing  in  the  world, 
save  that  which  is  borrowed  from  itself.  In  the  sphere 
of  religion,  no  less  than  in  that  of  law  and  politics, 
the  Church  of  England,  at  once  national  and  catholic, 
peculiar  to  ourselves,  is  an  instrument  unmatched  for 
spreading  an  ordered  Christianity  among  the  peoples 
who  dwell  under  the  flag  of  Britain.  While  the  British 
temperament  guarantees  freedom  for  all  forms  of  wor¬ 
ship,  the  Church  of  England  is  ready  with  the  organi¬ 
sation  which  supplies  the  ordinances  of  Christianity 
wherever  Britons  settle,  or  those  who  dwell  in  the 
shadow  of  death,  fast-bound  in  misery  and  iron,  crave 
for  the  light  of  the  Gospel.  All  this  was  forged  and 
formed  behind  the  shield  of  sea  power,  and,  by  sea 
power,  has  been  carried  to  the  ends  of  the  earth.  The 
United  States,  no  less  than  the  Dominions  of  the 
British  Crown,  stand  on  the  foundation  of  Magna 
Carta  and  the  Petition  of  Right.  Rudyard  Kipling 
has  summed  up  in  four  lines  the  ideal  on  which  the 
Empire  rests : 

Keep  ye  the  Law!  Be  swift  to  all  obedience, 

Cleanse  the  land  from  evil,  drive  the  road  and  bridge  the 
ford. 

Render  safe  to  each  his  own,  that  he  reap  where  he  hath 
sown. 

By  the  peace  among  our  peoples,  let  men  know  we  serve  the 
Lord ! 

Such  an  ideal  of  empire  can  never  contemplate  keep¬ 
ing  any  body  of  its  subjects  in  a  condition  of  permanent 
inferiority.  We  loosed  the  slave,  and,  thereby,  we 
endowed  the  coloured  skin  with  the  same  rights  of 
humanity  as  the  white.  There  is  no  need  to  press 


246 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


theory  to  its  extreme.  The  love  of  logical  symmetry, 
so  destructive  of  success  in  the  task  of  governing 
and  humanising  the  backward  peoples  among  other 
nations,  has  never  been  a  distinguishing  fault  of  the 
British  character.  Rough-and-ready  solutions  become 
the  habit  of  those  who  occupy  their  business  in  great 
waters,  and  are  the  pioneers  in  strange  lands:  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends.  But  there  are  native 
races  under  our  rule  which  are  attaining  to  a  high  degree 
of  education  and  a  European  standard  of  life.  Already 
we  open  the  doors  of  the  arts  and  sciences  freely  to 
individuals  among  these.  In  process  of  time  it 
must  become  a  question  of  granting  to  whole  races 
equal  rights  of  citizenship.  How  is  that  question  to  be 
faced?  The  attitude  of  the  white  inhabitants  of  the 
Dominions  towards  the  Indians  before  the  war  was  a 
matter  of  grave  disquiet  to  those  who  thought  seriously 
on  Imperial  questions.  The  events  of  the  past  three 
years  have  probably  paved  the  way  for  a  solution  of 
that  question.  But  how  are  we  to  prepare  for  the  day 
when  Basuto,  Kaffir,  and  Zulu  shall  claim  what  the 
Maori  already  possesses,  the  full  rights  of  British 
citizenship  ? 

The  answer  depends  on  the  view  we  take  of  the 
Empire.  On  the  “hen-and-chicken”  theory,  no  solu¬ 
tion  can  be  found.  But  if  the  advice  of  Sir  Robert 
Borden  be  followed  and  the  Dominions  be  called  to  our 
councils;  if  the  inhabitants  of  Canada,  Australia,  New 
Zealand,  and  South  Africa  come  to  regard  themselves 
as  parts  of  an  organic  whole,  sharing  with  us  the  responsi¬ 
bility  for  the  dark  lands  of  the  Empire;  if,  in  short,  the 
whole  meaning  of  the  Ocean  Empire  become  plain, 
then  a  way  may  be  found  for  the  application  of  the 
British  ideal,  suitably  modified,  to  the  whole  family  of 


THE  RESTORER  OF  PATHS 


247 


nations  which  dwells  under  the  British  flag.  The 
solution  is  not  to  be  looked  for  in  a  crude  equality  of 
conditions  promiscuously  applied.  The  white  people 
of  the  Dominions  have  ample  justification,  social  and 
economic,  for  their  objections  to  unrestricted  immi¬ 
gration.  The  mistakes  of  the  French  in  dealing  with 
Hayti  and  of  the  United  States  in  dealing  with  the 
emancipated  slaves  must  be  avoided  in  the  interest  of 
white  and  coloured  alike.  No  general  solution  of  the 
thousand  varying  questions  involved  will  be  even 
suggested  here.  But  it  is  strongly  urged  that  the  first 
step  toward  a  solution  is  to  be  found  in  the  conception  of 
an  organic  realm,  knit  together  by  sea  power,  in  which 
the  blood-brotherhood  of  Britons  shoulder  a  joint 
responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  the  coloured  races 
which  sea  power  has  committed  to  their  charge. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  CHALLENGE 

The  introduction  of  steam  and  steel  shipbuilding 
gave  all  nationls  a  fair  start  in  a  renewed  struggle  for  sea 
power.  But  the  advantages,  natural  or  acquired,  of 
Great  Britain  soon  enabled  her  to  distance  her  com¬ 
petitors  more  signally  than  ever.  These  advantages 
consisted  (i)  in  geographical  position,  (2)  in  the  char¬ 
acter  of  her  people,  (3)  in  the  colonies  and  possessions 
she  had  acquired  abroad,  with  their  commodious  ports, 
(4)  the  possession  of  the  best  kind  of  coal  for  maritime 
purposes,  and  the  proximity  of  coal  and  iron  deposits  to 
her  rivers  and  estuaries,  and  (5)  her  supremacy  in 
manufactures,  combined  with  the  necessity  of  fetching 
both  food  and  raw  material  from  abroad  for  her  indus¬ 
trial  population,  in  exchange  for  the  products  of  her 
looms  and  workshops.  The  Continent,  beaten  down 
by  war,  had  to  depend  on  her  both  as  provider  and 
carrier.  The  United  States  alone  might  have  chal¬ 
lenged  her  position  successfully;  but  the  United  States 
was  as  yet  undeveloped,  and  was  compelled  to  be  for 
many  years  a  borrowing  nation.  The  Civil  War 
destroyed  the  American  mercantile  marine,  and  the 
great  spurt  of  development  which  followed  constrained 
the  Americans  to  pay  the  interest  of  their  loans  to  a 

large  extent  in  the  freights  earned  by  British  ships. 

248 


THE  CHALLENGE 


249 


By  a  wise,  if  undesigned,  policy,  moreover,  Great 
Britain,  so  far  from  being  jealous  of  the  maritime  expan¬ 
sion  of  other  nations,  showed  herself  ready  to  build  both 
warships  and  merchantmen  to  their  order.  Thus,  for 
years,  she  alone  developed  the  new  industry  of  steel 
shipbuilding  and  was  able  to  turn  out  tonnage  at  a 
figure  which  no  other  country  approached  for  cheapness. 
On  the  Clyde,  the  Tyne,  the  Mersey,  the  Thames,  and 
in  many  other  places,  great  shipbuilding  establishments 
appeared,  which  for  sixty  years  at  least  no  other  nation 
attempted  to  rival.  The  craze  for  excessive  cheapness 
brought  drawbacks  in  maritime  affairs  as  well  as  in 
others.  The  mercantile  seamen  were  ill-paid  and  ill- 
fed,  and  an  undue  number  of  foreigners,  both  European 
and  Lascar,  were  employed.  There  were  serious  fears, 
which  the  war  has,  happily,  expelled  to  a  large  extent, 
that  the  old  breed  of  seamen  which  had  given  to  the 
British  their  supremacy  at  sea  might  become  extinct. 
On  the  other  hand,  no  nation  gave  more  heed  to  the 
safety  of  its  sailors  at  sea,  and,  wherever  the  benefits  of 
sea  power  are  recognised  the  name  of  Samuel  Plimsoll 
must  be  had  in  honour. 

It  was  not,  perhaps,  unnatural  that  a  service  which 
had  won  so  high  a  position  by  the  efficiency  of  its 
personnel  under  the  conditions  of  masts  and  sails  should 
prove  itself  reluctant,  as  did  the  Royal  Navy  of  Britain, 
to  change  its  motive  power  for  steam.  Long  after  the 
maritime  engine  had  superseded  the  wind  as  prime 
mover  in  all  ships  of  war,  masts  and  sails  were  retained 
in  British  ships  lest  the  British  bluejacket  should  lose 
his  seamanlike  qualities.  Only  within  the  last  ten  years 
has  the  engineer  been  accorded  his  rightful  place  among 
the  officers  of  the  ship.  During  the  preceding  period, 
the  Navy  was  organised  with  little  regard  for  strategical 


250 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


considerations.  Its  dispositions  were,  in  the  main, 
based  upon  the  old  rivalry  with  France,  and  its  later 
duty  of  supplying  the  world’s  police  of  the  seas.  How  a 
change  was  brought  about,  and  the  Navy  made  ready 
and  disposed  to  meet  a  new  challenge  will  be  told 
hereafter.  One  great  and  beneficial  change,  at  any 
rate,  marked  the  transition  period.  The  men  were 
enlisted  for  continuous  service,  and  the  calling  of  a 
man-of-warsman  at  last  became  a  regular  profession. 
The  change  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  much  greater 
specialisation  required  and  the  increasing  difference 
between  men-of-war  and  merchantmen.  Despite  the 
lack  of  organisation  and  training  in  the  Navy  as  an 
engine  of  war,  however,  sea  power,  in  the  wider  mean¬ 
ing  of  the  term,  was  never  more  completely  exercised 
by  any  country  than  by  Great  Britain  during  the  years 
of  maritime  peace  and  commercial  expansion. 

The  steam-driven,  armour-clad  ship,  with  her  turret 
guns  and  ram,  owed  her  origin  to  the  genius  of  the 
French,  and,  afterwards,  of  the  Americans.  The  ar¬ 
moured  batteries  employed  against  Kinburn  led  to  the 
construction  of  La  Gloire ,  a  wooden  frigate  with  four- 
inch  iron  plates  on  her  sides,  designed  by  Dupuy  de 
Lome.  We  followed  quickly  with  the  Warrior,  which 
was  built  of  iron  and  plated.  Then  the  deeds  of  the 
Confederate  ram,  Merrimac ,  and  the  Federal  turret- 
ship,  Monitor,  in  the  American  Civil  War  turned  naval 
thought  in  a  new  direction  as  to  tactics,  or,  rather, 
revived  a  very  old  school  of  tactics.  Steam  and  the 
ram,  it  was  argued,  had  restored  the  conditions  of  the 
oared  galley.  The  tactics  of  Salamis,  the  iEgatian 
Islands,  and  Lepanto  were  once  more  studied.  When 
the  Italian  flagship,  Re  d' Italia,  was  sunk  at  the  battle 
of  Lissa  by  the  impact  of  a  wooden  ship  of  greatly 


THE  CHALLENGE 


251 


inferior  force,  these  theories  were  greatly  strengthened. 
The  day  of  the  line  and  of  broadside  fighting,  it  seemed, 
was  at  an  end.  Line  abreast,  and  a  melee  in  which  the 
ram  would  decide  the  issue,  after  the  enemy  ship  had 
been  more  or  less  wrecked  by  a  heavy  bow-fire,  became 
the  conception  of  a  naval  fight.  Most  nations  set  to 
work  to  build  ships  which  should  be  as  unlike  ships  as 
possible. 

Had  this  view  finally  triumphed,  the  day  of  the 
soldier  on  shipboard  might  have  returned,  and  the 
priceless  heritage  which  we  possess  in  our  stored  sea- 
sense  might  have  been  rendered  of  no  avail.  But  the 
British  Navy,  though  it,  to  some  extent,  bowed  to  the 
prevailing  opinion,  never  entirely  surrendered  itself  to 
it.  The  loss  of  the  Captain  was  the  first  rude  shock.  It 
was  realised  that  the  British  must  be  a  sea-keeping 
Ns£vy,  and  that  weather liness  was  of  primary  impor¬ 
tance.  Then  the  coming  of  the  automobile  torpedo  and 
the  swift  torpedo-boat  showed  that  the  defence  of  big 
ships  against  such  attacks  could  not  be  entrusted  en¬ 
tirely  to  the  heavy  guns.  Finally,  the  catastrophe  to 
the  Victoria  and,  especially,  the  fact  that  the  Camper- 
down,  which  rammed  her,  nearly  shared  her  fate,  proved 
that  the  ram  is  a  two-edged  weapon  on  which  supreme 
reliance  could  not  be  placed.  The  pendulum  swung 
in  the  other  direction,  and  action  in  close  formed 
line-ahead,  with  a  tremendous  volume  of  quick-fire  to 
shatter  the  enemy’s  upper- works  and  destroy  or  demoral¬ 
ise  his  men,  became  the  accepted  theory  of  those  who 
held  to  the  battleship  as  the  arbiter  of  battle. 

At  the  same  time,  another  school  of  thought,  which 
described  itself  as  the  jeune  ecole,  was  gaining  weight  in 
France,  under  the  leadership  of  Admiral  Aube.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  its  adherents,  the  battleship  had  seen  her  day. 


252 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Swarms  of  torpedo-boats  would  forbid  the  use  of  the 
sea  to  her,  and  a  multitude  of  fast  commerce-destroyers 
would  cut  the  communications  of  the  Power  which 
rashly  trusted  to  the  command  of  the  sea  for  its  safety. 
The  stored  naval  wisdom  of  the  British  Admiralty 
forbade  assent  to  such  views,  plausible  as  they  might 
seem.  The  development  of  the  torpedo-boat  destroyer 
showed  the  first  hope  to  be  illusory,  while  the  second 
could  only  be  realised  if  the  ports  were  left  clear  of 
watching  squadrons.  Besides,  whatever  success  might 
be  achieved  in  denying  the  use  of  the  sea  to  the  enemy, 
the  theory  of  the  jeune  ecole  gave  no  promise  of  securing 
the  use  of  the  sea  for  itself.  The  British  Admiralty 
only  led  the  opinion  of  the  world,  holding  that  the 
strategy  which  had  been  proved  and  consecrated  by 
naval  history  from  the  earliest  times  remained  unaltered 
by  mere  mechanical  developments.  The  French  Navy 
alone,  with  its  flair  for  new  ideas  and  mechanical 
invention,  was  caught  by  the  new  conception,  greatly 
to  its  temporary  disadvantage.  The  effect  produced 
by  the  development  of  the  submarine  will  be  best 
discussed  in  another  place. 

Such,  in  brief,  were  the  changes  wrought  on  the 
fighting  navies  of  the  world  upon  the  technical  side  by 
the  introduction  of  steam  propulsion,  steel  shipbuilding, 
armour  plating,  the  shell  gun,  the  automobile  torpedo, 
and  other  like  developments.  In  maritime  affairs 
generally,  the  effect  of  the  changes  was  to  render  vessels 
independent  of  the  winds,  but  dependent  on  fuel  supply 
and  on  the  ports  where  fuel  could  be  obtained.  The 
ocean  routes  became  shorter,  but  at  the  same  time, 
speaking  generally,  narrower.  The  carrying  capacity 
of  ships  also  increased  enormously.  Thus  there  came 
about,  and  especially  since  the  introduction  of  wireless 


THE  CHALLENGE 


253 


telegraphy,  a  greater  concentration  of  traffic,  which 
made  ocean  travel  and  conveyance  more  secure,  at  any 
rate  in  time  of  peace.  Merchant  ships  came  to  be 
divided  into  “liners,”  or  ships  which  voyage  between 
fixed  points,  and  “tramps”  which  roam  the  world,  pick¬ 
ing  up  cargo  where  it  is  to  be  found,  or  are  hired  on 
charter  by  merchants  for  particular  purposes.  Liners, 
of  course,  are  the  descendants  of  the  old  East  Indiamen, 
and  of  the  “English  galleon”  which  sailed  once  a 
year  from  Venice. 

Up  to  1890,  the  world  was  content  to  increase  its 
merchant  traffic  on  the  ocean  without  giving  much  heed 
to  the  foundations  on  which  sea  power  rests,  or  the 
principles  by  which  it  is  defended.  The  ancient 
rivalry  between  France  and  Britain  prompted  the 
maintenance  of  naval  competition,  mainly  in  types 
and  theories,  between  the  two  countries.  There  were 
periodical  “scares”  in  this  country,  notably  at  the 
time  of  the  Penjeh  crisis  in  1885,  which  led  to  the  series 
of  articles  called  “The  Truth  about  the  Navy,”  pro¬ 
moted  by  Captain  Fisher,  now  Lord  Fisher  of  Kilver- 
stone,  and  published  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  by  Mr. 
W.  T.  Stead,  which  led  to  the  Naval  Defence  Act  of 
1889.  Italy  laid  the  foundations  of  her  navy,  but  on 
principles  which  offered  no  serious  prospect  of  the 
adequate  defence  of  her  peninsular  position  and  ex¬ 
tended  coast-line.  The  United  States  began  to  build 
battleships,  after  a  period  of  complete  paralysis,  but,  in 
the  main,  rather  because  the  American  Government  had 
money  to  spare  than  on  any  intelligible  theory  of 
defence.  Minor  states,  such  as  the  South  American 
republics,  China  and  Japan  (not  yet  a  first-class 
Power),  ordered  ships,  Elswick  cruisers  for  the  most 
part,  which  afforded  the  world  almost  the  earliest 


254 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


examples  of  sea  fighting  in  the  days  of  steam  and  the 
torpedo.  The  failure  of  the  French  Navy  to  accomplish 
anything  visible  to  the  naked  eye  in  1870  and  of  the 
Turks  to  contest  the  command  of  the  Black  Sea  with 
Russia  in  1877  caused  sea  power  to  be  held  in  light 
estimation  in  comparison  with  land  power,  and  the 
pervading  influence  of  the  British  Navy  in  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean  during  this  period  was  missed,  so  far  as  the 
general  public  was  concerned.  To  have  a  navy  was 
regarded,  one  might  say,  rather  as  a  sign  of  substance, 
like  keeping  a  carriage.  But  as  to  the  use  to  which  that 
navy  should  be  put,  the  prevailing  ideas  were  of  the 
mistiest. 

In  1890,  however,  an  event  occurred  which  had  the 
most  powerful  influence  on  the  course  of  events.  It  was 
no  more  than  the  publication  of  a  book,  and  a  book, 
moreover,  which  contained  little  which  was  absolutely 
new.  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan,  an  officer  of  the  American 
Navy,  and  professor  at  the  Naval  College  of  Annapolis, 
published  the  results  of  his  reflections  while  he  was 
preparing  his  lectures  under  the  title  of  The  Influence 
of  Sea  Power  upon  History .  He  owed  much  of  the 
germ  of  his  argument  to  two  English  writers,  Sir  John 
Knox  Laughton  and  Admiral  Colomb.  But  the  facts 
were  so  freshly  and  powerfully  presented  that  he  seemed 
the  prophet  of  a  new  school.  He  showed  that  sea 
power  consists  not  alone  in  the  military  navy,  but 
in  the  whole  maritime  industries  and  aptitudes  of  a 
nation,  based  on  geographical  position,  internal  eco¬ 
nomic  conditions,  the  national  character,  and  the  nature 
of  the  government.  He  went  on  to  prove,  by  a  wealth 
of  example  that  sea  power  is  silent  and  far-reaching  in  its 
operation,  affecting  the  national  well-being  in  peace  and 
the  national  strength  for  war  in  many  directions  which 


THE  CHALLENGE 


255 


do  not  appear  from  superficial  study.  His  keen  and 
penetrating  analysis  showed  the  action  of  this  force 
in  ways  unsuspected  by  the  reader  of  history  as  it  is 
commonly  written,  from  the  Punic  Wars  down  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution’.  This  book  was 
followed  by  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French 
Revolution  and  Empire ,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon 
the  War  of  1812,  The  Life  of  Nelson:  the  Embodiment  of 
British  Sea  Power ,  and  several  others.  Mahan  died 
in  the  early  part  of  1915,  just  when  his  theories  were 
being  put  to  the  sharp  test  of  a  well-nigh  universal 
war,  and  before  his  own  country  had  taken  the  step 
which  he,  of  all  men,  would  most  heartily  have  approved, 
of  lending  her  might  to  maintain  the  Freedom  of  the 
Seas.  -  His  work  had  an  effect  which  he  himself  can 
hardly  have  foreseen. 

Mahan’s  first  object  was  to  stir  up  public  opinion  in 
his  own  country  to  an  effort  to  recover  the  maritime 
position  which  had  been  lost  in  consequence  of  the 
Civil  War  and  the  great  internal  development  of  the 
United  States.  So  far  as  the  war  navy  was  concerned, 
he  was  successful.  The  war  with  Spain  in  1898 
emphasised  and  reinforced  his  teachings.  But  no 
eloquence  of  writing  and  argument  could  fight  against 
the  conditions  which  he  himself  laid  down  as  essential, 
to  maritime,  as  opposed  to  merely  naval,  expansion, 
and,  until  the  great  war  gave  the  United  States  the 
opportunity  to  recover  that  which  they  lost  in  war,  he 
fought  in  vain  against  economic  forces.  How  matters 
will  be  hereafter,  it  is  too  early  to  foresee. 

How  far  Mahan  was  prophet  and  how  far  only 
herald  is  hard  to  determine.  With  the  increasing 
contraction  of  the  world,  the  appropriation  of  its  waste 
space,  the  growth  of  its  population,  and  the  entry  of 


256 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


new  peoples  into  the  comity  of  nations,  it  is  probable 
that  the  wind  was  already  blowing  in  the  direction  of 
maritime  expansion  and  new  naval  rivalries.  In  the 
case  of  Japan,  for  instance,  an  island  state,  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  sea  power  was  inevitable,  once  her  self-imposed 
isolation  came  to  an  end.  It  is  hardly  likely  that 
the  Japanese  were  consciously  moved  by  the  teachings 
of  Mahan.  Indeed,  their  maritime  expansion  began 
before  his  day.  But,  in  another  direction,  and  that, 
for  the  moment,  the  most  important  of  all,  his  influence 
was  direct.  Among  the  warmest  admirers  of  his  writ¬ 
ings  is  the  German  Emperor,  who  found  his  vague 
aspirations  crystallised  on  his  pages.  Wilhelm  II. 
came  to  the  imperial  throne  two  years  before  The 
Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History  appeared.  As  the 
grandson  of  Queen  Victoria,  he  had  paid  many  visits 
during  his  boyhood’s  years  to  England,  and  had  spent 
considerable  time  in  Portsmouth  Dockyard  and  on 
board  British  ships.  These  early  impressions  left 
their  mark  upon  him.  He  became  an  ardent  admirer 
of  the  British  Navy  and  a  worshipper  of  Nelson.  He 
worshipped  also  the  deeds  of  his  ancestor,  Frederick  the 
Great,  and  of  his  grandfather,  the  old  Kaiser  of  the 
Franco-German  War.  The  opportunity  to  expand 
his  realm  on  the  Continent  was  exhausted.  He  looked 
east  and  he  looked  west.  His  Germans  had  left 
their  country  by  the  hundred  thousand,  and  were  settled 
under  foreign  flags.  The  growing  manufactures,  the 
product  of  German  skill,  science,  and  industry,  were 
carried  in  foreign  ships.  Germany  appeared  to  be  what 
List  had  called  her,  “the  step-child  of  Providence.  ” 
Reflecting  on  all  this,  the  teaching  of  Mahan  came  to 
him  as  a  gospel  newly  revealed,  and  the  second  word 
of  his  trilogy  was  spoken,  “Our  future  lies  upon  the 


THE  CHALLENGE 


257 


water.”  But  the  British  Islands  are  an  immovable 
barrier  across  the  only  path.  While  Britain  remained 
supreme  at  sea,  any  empire  which  Germany  could  found 
across  the  ocean  must  be  held  in  fee  of  her.  Very  well, 
then,  “The  trident  must  be  in  our  fist.  ”  Here  was  the 
new  vision  of  world  power,  ever  present  to  the  mind  of 
the  imperial  dreamer,  whether  he  were  preaching  his 
strange  mixed  doctrine  of  despotism  and  mystic  religion 
in  Hamburg  or  Kiel,  or  seeing  visions  on  the  Mount  of 
Olives,  wrapped  in  the  cloak  of  a  Crusader.  Perhaps 
he  himself  had  no  hatred  for  the  people  of  his  mother’s 
land.  But  he  and  his  school  imbued  his  people  with  the 
latent  hatred  which  has  flamed  up  so  fiercely.  The 
overthrow  of  Great  Britain  became  the  goal  of  pan- 
Germanism.  It  was  the  only  possible  goal  for  which 
it  was  worth  while  to  strive. 

German  maritime  expansion  was  carried  out  on  the 
lines  laid  down  by  Colbert  in  the  France  of  the  late 
seventeenth  century,  but  much  more  persistently  and 
scientifically  applied.  Bismarck  started  the  Colonial 
Empire  of  Germany,  with  his  tongue  in  his  cheek. 
Wilhelm  II.  made  that  rather  unprofitable  asset  the 
starting  point  of  his  naval  aims.  Somewhat  before 
his  time,  Germany  having  acquired  a  considerable  grip 
on  the  commerce  of  the  East,  liners  of  the  Nord- 
deutscher  Lloyd,  resplendent  with  much  gold  and  plate 
glass,  were  plying  to  China:  subsidised  vessels  which 
attracted  a  certain  amount  of  custom  from  English 
people  anxious  to  get  out  or  home  more  cheaply  than 
was  possible  by  P.  and  O.  Those  who  preferred  to  com¬ 
bine  more  comfort  and  less  glitter  with  a  cheap  fare, 
however,  preferred  the  Messageries  Maritimes.  The 
Kaiser  expanded  the  movement,  with  the  aid  of  German 
shipowners  and  financiers,  among  whom  the  most 


258 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


conspicuous  was  the  Jew,  Herr  Ballin,  and  soon  great 
vessels  of  the  Hamburg-Amerika  line  were  steaming 
into  Southampton  Water,  with  their  bands  blaring 
“ Deutschland ,  Deutschland  uber  Alles .  ”  A  sensation 
was  caused  in  Britain  when  one  of  these  obtained  the 
“blue  riband  of  the  Atlantic,”  and  a  rather  senseless 
competition  in  speed,  size,  and  luxury  ensued,  which 
was  chiefly  useful  as  an  advertisement  of  the  German 
shipbuilding  yards.  A  more  serious  matter,  really,  for 
our  maritime  position  was  the  institution  of  subsidised 
lines  running  to  East  Africa  and  Australia.  By  1914, 
Germany  owned  the  second  largest  mercantile  marine 
in  the  world,  though  her  steam  tonnage  was  still  only 
a  fourth  of  that  owned  by  the  British  Empire.  What 
was  formidable  about  German  competition  was  the 
direction  of  all  the  resources  of  the  State,  both  at  home 
and  abroad,  to  the  one  end.  The  ownership  of  the 
railways  by  the  State,  and  the  admirable  system  of 
internal  waterways  were  powerful  aids.  Hamburg 
outstripped  London  and  became  the  greatest  entrepot 
in  the  world.  Moreover,  with  all  the  efforts  made  to 
strengthen  the  maritime  position  of  Germany,  agri¬ 
culture  was  never  allowed  to  languish,  and  the  German 
people  went  into  the  war  almost  self-supporting,  so  far 
as  foodstuffs  are  concerned. 

A  military  navy  was  obviously  necessary  to  support 
and  defend  this  growing  volume  of  sea-borne  trade:  at 
least,  so  the  German  people  were  told,  when  it  was 
desired  to  obtain  credits  for  naval  expansion.  They 
were  not  told,  however,  that  a  military  navy  could  only 
protect  trade  adequately  if  it  were  supreme.  The 
unthinking  were  easily  caught  and  cozened  into  lending 
themselves  to  the  ambitious  schemes  of  the  Emperor 
and  his  pan-German  clique.  The  Deutsche  Flotten - 


THE  CHALLENGE 


259 


verein ,  established  on  the  lines  of  the  English  Navy 
League,  and  enjoying  Royal  and  Imperial  patronage, 
soon  numbered  millions  of  members.  Whatever  was 
intended,  there  was  only  one  end  possible.  Prior  to 
1888,  the  German  Navy  hardly  had  an  existence.  Ten 
years  more  passed  before  the  country  and  the  Reichstag 
could  be  brought  to  the  proper  frame  of  mind  to  con¬ 
template  naval  expansion.  But,  in  January,  1897, 
Admiral  Tirpitz  succeeded  Admiral  von  Hollman  as 
Secretary  of  the  Imperial  Navy  Office.  He  proved 
himself  a  statesman  as  well  as  a  remarkably  able  sailor. 
He  adopted  the  usual  German  methods  of  Press- 
manipulation  and  cajoled  the  Reichstag  into  resigning 
all  real  power  over  the  details  of  navy  expenditure.  In 
1898,  he  was  able  to  obtain  the  first  of  the  famous 
German  Navy  Acts,  that  known  as  the  Sexennate, 
which  provided  for  the  creation  of  a  fleet  of  certain 
fixed  proportions  within  a  period  of  six  years.  Battle¬ 
ships  were  to  be  automatically  replaced  at  the  end  of 
twenty-five  years  from  the  voting  of  the  first  instal¬ 
ment  for  their  construction,  and  large  cruisers  at  the 
end  of  twenty  years.  These  periods  were  reduced 
by  a  subsequent  Act  to  twenty  and  fifteen  years  re¬ 
spectively.  By  this  means  it  became  possible  to  re¬ 
place  a  miserable  little  coast-defence  vessel,  like  the 
Siegfried ,  of  about  4000  tons,  by  a  great  Dreadnought 
of  22,000  tons,  and  a  3000-ton  light  cruiser  by  a 
battle-cruiser  like  the  Hindenburg.  Even  before  the 
Act  of  1898  came  into  full  operation,  it  was  replaced 
by  the  Act  of  1900,  which  nearly  doubled  the  proposed 
number  of  ships.  The  Bundesrat  incident,  mentioned 
above,  was  made  the  occasion  for  obtaining  this  ex¬ 
tension.  The  famous  preamble  to  the  Statute  of  1898 
runs  as  follows: 


26o 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


To  protect  Germany’s  sea-trade  and  colonies,  in  the 
existing  circumstances  there  is  only  one  means:  Germany 
must  have  a  battle-fleet  so  strong  that,  even  for  the  adver¬ 
sary  with  the  greatest  sea  power,  a  war  against  it  would 
involve  such  dangers  as  to  imperil  his  position  in  the 
world. 

For  this  purpose,  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  that 
the  German  battle-fleet  should  be  as  strong  as  that  of 
the  greatest  naval  Power,  because  a  great  naval  Power 
will  not,  as  a  rule,  be  in  a  position  to  concentrate  all  his 
striking  forces  against  us.  But  even  if  it  should  succeed 
in  meeting  us  with  considerable  superiority,  the  defeat  of 
a  strong  German  fleet  would  so  substantially  weaken  the 
enemy  that,  in  spite  of  a  victory  he  might  have  obtained, 
his  own  position  in  the  world  would  no  longer  be  secured 
by  an  adequate  fleet. 

The  reasoning  is  identical  with  that  of  Nelson  when 
he  wrote,  “I  am  no  conjurer,  but  this  I  ventured  with¬ 
out  any  fear,  that,  if  Calder  (with  eighteen  ships)  got 
fairly  alongside  their  twenty-eight  sail,  by  the  time  the 
enemy  had  beaten  our  fleet  soundly,  they  would  do  us 
no  harm  this  year.  ’  ’  The  argument  is  a  perfectly  sound 
one,  as  Nelson  applied  it;  but  von  Tirpitz  made  the 
radical  mistake  of  supposing  that  the  nation  which  has 
always  realised  the  supreme  importance  of  defeating 
decisively  the  immediate  enemy  could  be  diverted  from 
that  policy  by  the  fear  of  ulterior  consequences  else¬ 
where.  In  the  German  view,  the  world  is  composed  of 
nations  who  are  always  on  the  look-out  to  pounce  on 
the  weak,  regardless  of  right  or  wrong,  as  opportunity 
offers,  as  wolves  will  tear  to  pieces  a  wounded  member 
of  the  pack. 

That  there  should  be  no  mistake  as  to  the  meaning 
of  this  preamble,  despite  the  almost  decent  restraint  of 


THE  CHALLENGE 


261 


its  language,  it  was  interpreted  for  the  German  people 
by  Admiral  von  der  Goltz.  This  officer  frankly  dis¬ 
cussed  the  chance  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  ending 
with  the  declaration  that,  with  the  additions  proposed, 
the  German  fleet  would  be  in  a  position  to  measure  its 
strength  with  the  ordinary  British  forces  in  home 
waters,  and  adding : 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  question  of  numbers 
is  far  less  important  on  sea  than  on  land.  Numerical  inferi¬ 
ority  can  be  compensated  by  efficiency,  by  excellency 
of  material,  by  the  efficiency  and  discipline  of  the  men. 
Careful  preparation,  permitting  rapid  mobilisation,  can 
ensure  a  momentary  superiority. 

These  words  have  a  most  important  bearing  on  the 
sequel.  The  hope  was  no  vain  one,  as  matters  stood  in 

1900. 

The  Reichstag  compelled  the  dropping  of  five  large 
and  five  small  cruisers  from  von  Tirpitz’s  programme  of 
1900,  but  these  were  restored  in  1906.  Two  years  later 
a  further  Act  was  passed,  shortening  the  statutory  age 
of  ships,  and,  in  1912,  the  final  Act,  providing  for  three 
additional  battleships,  and  increasing  largely  the  force 
to  be  kept  in  permanent  commission,  in  accordance  with 
von  der  Goltz’ s  demand  for  speedy  mobilisation.  In 
fourteen  years,  Germany  sprang  from  the  position  of 
an  insignificant  naval  Power,  superior  only  to  Austria- 
Hungary  among  the  greater  nations  of  Europe,  to  the 
second  place  in  the  world.  Instead  of  a  squadron  of 
four  coast  defence  vessels,  incapable  of  keeping  the  sea 
for  many  days,  she  disposed  of  four  squadrons  of  eight 
battleships  each,  two  of  them  composed  of  Dread¬ 
noughts,  with  four  older  battleships  in  reserve;  eight 
large  armoured  cruisers,  of  which  five  were  battle- 


262 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


cruisers,  with  two  in  reserve,  and  the  nucleus  of  a  strong 
squadron  of  cruisers  for  foreign  service,  of  which  the 
most  noteworthy  were  the  Goeben,  Scharnhorst ,  and 
Gneisenau.  Nor  does  the  number  of  ships  of  which 
she  disposed  in  1914  give  the  full  measure  of  her  increase 
in  naval  strength.  After  many  years’  toil,  the  works  at 
Wilhelmshaven,  acquired  from  Oldenburg  by  Prussia  in 
1852,  were  completed,  and  her  short-cut  from  the  Baltic 
to  the  North  Sea  secured  by  the  widening  and  deepening 
of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  necessitated  by  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  Dreadnought  era.  The  Kaiser  and  his 
Ministers  are,  at  least,  entitled  to  this  credit:  that  they 
have  spared  neither  toil  nor  treasure  in  their  attempt 
to  secure  the  mastery  of  the  world  by  land  and  sea. 

During  the  years  of  German  naval  expansion,  events 
of  equal  significance  were  taking  place  on  the  other  side 
of  the  globe.  The  growth  of  the  Japanese  Navy,  as  has 
been  pointed  out,  is  a  perfectly  natural  one.  The 
Japanese  people  have  all  the  qualities,  and  their  native 
land  all  the  advantages  and  needs  which  make  for  sea 
power.  Lying  off  the  mainland  of  Asia,  as  the  British 
Islands  lie  off  the  mainland  of  Europe,  the  geographical 
position  of  the  Japanese  Islands  confers  the  same  sort  of 
control  over  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans,  so  far  as 
the  mainland  is  concerned,  as  we  exercise  over  the 
communications  of  Germany,  Holland,  Scandinavia,  and 
Northern  Russia  with  the  Atlantic  and  Mediterranean. 
There  is,,  however,  this  important  difference;  that 
whereas  the  Continent  of  Europe  is  occupied  by  power¬ 
ful  organised  States,  standing,  roughly,  on  the  same 
level  of  civilisation  and  enterprise  as  we,  Japan  is  con¬ 
fronted  with  the  inchoate  mass  of  China,  the  prey  of 
European  ambitions,  and  with  the  lower  races  of  Korea 
and  Manchuria.  Under  no  circumstances  should  we 


THE  CHALLENGE 


263 


seek  possessions  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  The 
need  to  keep  the  conquering  white  race  out  of  Eastern 
Asia,  so  far  as  she  may,  has  compelled  Japan  to  seek 
territory  on  the  mainland.  Japan  emerged  from  a 
state  of  feudal  isolation  during  the  sixties  of  last  cen¬ 
tury.  The  necessity  for  a  navy  was  apparent  to  her 
statesmen,  and  she  called  upon  Great  Britain  for  aid. 
The  late  Sir  Archibald  Douglas  was  appointed  head  of 
the  Naval  Mission  to  Japan,  and  he  was  the  father  of 
the  navy  which  fought  the  battles  of  the  Yalu  and  Tsu¬ 
shima,  while  Admiral  Togo,  the  victor  in  the  latter 
engagement,  received  his  education  on  board  the  Wor¬ 
cester,  the  training  ship  for  cadets  for  the  British  mer¬ 
cantile  marine. 

The  war  with  China,  in  1894,  was>  essentially  a  war 
of  prestige.  China  claimed  a  suzerainty  over  Korea 
which  Japan  would  not  admit.  An  attempt  to  send 
reinforcements  by  sea  was  met  by  the  sinking  of  the 
transport  conveying  them  by  a  torpedo  fired  from  the 
Naniwa,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Togo,  as  he 
then  was.  A  naval  engagement  was  fought  off  the 
mouth  of  the  Yalu  River  in  Korea,  in  which  the  fast 
Japanese  cruisers  utterly  defeated  a  Chinese  force  which 
included  two  battleships.  The  Chinese  land  forces  in 
the  Peninsula  were  no  less  decisively  defeated  at  Ping- 
yang,  and  the  Japanese  then  set  themselves  to  reduce 
the  two  great  naval  strongholds  of  China,  Port  Arthur, 
and  Wei-hai-wei.  Their  efforts  were  successful,  and 
the  remnant  of  the  Chinese  Navy  fell  into  their  hands, 
but  the  intervention  of  Germany,  France,  and  Russia 
compelled  them  to  restore  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-wei, 
the  former  of  which  was  leased  to  Russia  two  years 
later.  About  the  same  time,  Germany  compelled  the 
Chinese  to  lease  them  the  settlement  of  Kiao-chau,  in 


264 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  Shan-tung  Peninsula.  It  must  be  added  that 
Great  Britain  acquired  Wei-hai-wei  as  an  offset  to  these 
concessions.  But  no  attempt  has  ever  been  made  to 
turn  the  place  into  a  great  naval  fortress,  as  did  the 
Russians  at  Port  Arthur  and  the  Germans  at  Kiao- 
chau. 

Although  the  Chinese  were  defeated,  Japan  suffered 
a  blow  to  her  prestige  by  the  European  intervention 
which  followed  her  victory,  which  she  could  not  endure 
patiently.  Europe  was  treating  China  as  an  artichoke 
to  be  eaten  leaf  by  leaf.  Besides  the  naval  stations  of 
Hong-Kong  and  Wei-hai-wei,  held  by  Great  Britain, 
Port  Arthur  held  by  Russia,  and  Kiao-chau  held  by 
Germany,  there  were  settlements  and  concessions  at 
Shanghai,  Hankow,  and  other  places,  while  Europeans 
were  under  the  extra-territorial  jurisdiction  of  their 
Consular  Courts.  That  would  not  have  mattered  had 
the  Japanese  had  a  similar  standing;  but  not  only  had 
they  no  such  standing,  but  Europeans  in  Japan  itself 
enjoyed  a  similar  right.  The  Japanese  were  thus 
placed  in  the  category  of  uncivilised,  or  semi-civilised 
nations,  along  with  China  and  Turkey.  They  owed 
their  release  from  this  humiliating  position  to  the 
friendly  sympathy  of  the  Sea  Power  of  the  West, 
which  elevated  their  Legation  to  the  dignity  of  an 
Embassy,  abandoned  its  Consular  Courts,  and  eventu¬ 
ally  entered  into  formal  alliance.  Other  nations  were 
compelled  to  follow  the  example  of  Great  Britain,  so  far 
as  the  first  two  matters  were  concerned,  and  Japan 
entered  fully  into  the  comity  of  Powers. 

She  had,  none  the  less,  to  struggle  for  breathing- 
space,  with  the  naval  Powers  of  Europe  hemming  her  in, 
if  she  was  to  attain  to  the  position  to  which  she  aspired, 
and  the  Russian  threat  to  Korea  brought  matters  to  a 


THE  CHALLENGE 


265 


crisis.  The  war  which  followed  presents  many  features 
of  interest  to  the  student  of  sea  power.  Japan  pos¬ 
sessed  six  first-class  battleships,  and  as  many  armoured 
cruisers  of  a  good  type,  which  were  reinforced  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  by  the  Kasuga  and  Nisshin,  vessels 
which  had  been  built  in  Italy  for  the  Argentine  Republic. 
Russia  had  six  battleships  of  approximately  equal  force 
to  those  of  Japan  in  Port  Arthur,  with  one  armoured 
cruiser,  while  three  armoured  cruisers  were  at  Vladi¬ 
vostok.  The  two  Powers  were  about  equal  in  light 
cruisers,  and  the  Japanese  superior  in  torpedo  craft. 
But,  whereas  the  force  enumerated  composed  the  whole 
of  Japan’s  naval  strength,  the  Russians  had  four  good 
battleships  in  the  Baltic  completed  and  another  com¬ 
pleting,  as  well  as  a  considerable  force  of  older 
battleships.  They  had  been  for  some  time  drafting 
more  ships  to  the  Far  East,  and  it  was  possible  to 
foretell  almost  to  a  day  when  war  would  break  out  by 
watching  the  movements  of  Russian  ships.  In  point  of 
fact,  when  the  seventh  Russian  battleship  reached  the 
Suez  Canal,  the  Japanese  opened  hostilities  by  a  sur¬ 
prise  torpedo  attack  on  Port  Arthur.  The  Kasuga 
and  Nisshin ,  at  the  same  time,  were  just  out  of  reach 
of  molestation. 

Russia  depended  on  the  long  single  line  of  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  for  her  communications.  The  Japan¬ 
ese  had  a  short  and  rapid  line  by  sea.  Moreover,  they 
held  the  central  position,  between  the  two  parts  of  the 
Russian  fleet  in  Port  Arthur  and  Vladivostok.  They 
sealed  the  former  port  in  order  to  get  their  armies 
ashore,  the  one  in  Korea,  the  other  on  the  neck  of  the 
Liao-tung  Peninsula,  at  the  head  of  which  Port  Arthur 
stands.  They  watched  the  Vladivostok  ships  with  a 
division  of  armoured  cruisers.  Thus,  secure  on  the  sea, 


266 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


they  threw  themselves  across  the  Russian  communi¬ 
cations  with  Port  Arthur,  and  soon  had  the  place 
besieged  on  the  land  side  as  well  as  blockaded  by  sea. 
They  suffered  some  damage  from  the  Vladivostok 
cruisers,  which  contrived  to  slip  out  in  a  fog,  and  sink 
the  vessel  which  was  carrying  the  siege-train  for  Port 
Arthur.  But,  except  for  this,  the  communications  of 
the  Japanese  were  not  interfered  with.  But  the  Rus¬ 
sians  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  treating  their  squad¬ 
ron  as  a  part  of  the  armament  of  the  fortress.  They 
lost  one  battleship  by  a  mine  explosion,  but  the  Japan¬ 
ese  lost  two,  and  the  latter  had  nothing  in  reserve, 
while  the  Russians  had  the  whole  Baltic  Fleet.  If  their 
admirals  had  remembered  the  saying  of  Nelson  recorded 
above,  and  had  engaged  their  enemy  resolutely  in  a  fleet 
action,  it  is  more  than  likely  that  the  Baltic  Fleet  would 
have  restored  the  local  command  of  the  sea  to  Russia, 
and  that  Port  Arthur  would  have  been  saved.  As  it 
was,  after  one  feeble  effort  to  escape  to  Vladivostok  on 
August  io,  1904,  in  which  they  lost  their  battleship,  the 
Tsessarevitch ,  which  was  interned  at  Shanghai  for  the 
rest  of  the  war,  the  Russian  fleet  tamely  awaited  de¬ 
struction  in  the  harbour,  and,  when  the  place  was 
surrendered  early  in  January,  1905,  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Japanese. 

By  that  time  the  Baltic  Fleet,  under  Admiral  Rojdest- 
vensky,  was  on  its  way  out.  But  the  purpose  of 
its  mission  was  gone.  It  was  the  laughing-stock  of  the 
world;  but  the  laughter  was  ill-timed.  Rojdestvensky, 
a  good  officer,  really  performed  a  remarkable  feat  in 
getting  his  heterogeneous,  ill-found,  ill-manned  fleet 
to  the  end  of  its  long  voyage  in  any  sort  of  fighting 
trim.  He  had  not  a  single  base  on  the  way,  and  had  to 
coal  in  ill-protected  roadsteads.  Every  place  he  passed 


THE  CHALLENGE 


267 


sent  news  of  his  passing;  the  French,  although  in  alliance 
with  Russia,  had  “paired”  with  Great  Britain,  the  Ally 
of  Japan,  to  substitute  benevolent  neutrality  for  active 
participation  in  the  struggle,  and  Rojdestvensky  got 
sympathy,  but  little  assistance,  from  the  French  posses¬ 
sions  he  passed  on  his  way.  J apanese  cruisers  shadowed 
him  from  Madagascar  onwards,  but  the  main  fleet  of 
his  enemy  awaited  him  in  the  Straits  of  Tsu-shima,  in 
confidence  that,  from  that  central  position,  it  would  be 
able  to  intercept  him,  whether  he  took  the  direct  route 
or  attempted  to  reach  Vladivostok  by  way  of  the  Tsu- 
garu  Strait  between  Nippon  and  Yezo.  His  ships, 
having  left  their  auxiliaries  off  the  Chinese  coast,  were 
weighed  down  by  deck  loads  of  coal  and  supplies  till 
the  upper  edges  of  their  armour  belts  were  submerged. 
No  fleet  was  ever  in  a  worse  condition  to  face  a  decisive 
action. 

Togo,  on  the  other  hand,  had  only  four  battleships 
to  oppose  to  an  equal  number  of  first-class  vessels  and 
several  of  more  ancient  date  possessed  by  his  enemy. 
Moreover,  his  guns  were  worn  with  his  ceaseless  service 
off  Port  Arthur,  and  he  had  no  time  to  change  them. 
But  his  war-hardened  crews  and  his  nearness  to  his 
bases  of  supply  gave  him  an  immense  advantage  over  his 
enemy.  On  the  morning  of  May  28th,  he  received  in¬ 
formation  of  the  approach  of  his  enemy.  In  probably 
conscious  imitation  of  Nelson’s  immortal  signal  before 
Trafalgar,  he  encouraged  his  men  with  the  words, 
“The  fate  of  the  Empire  depends  on  this  day’s  event. 
Do  your  duty,  every  one  of  you.”  The  sea  was  en¬ 
veloped  in  a  patchy  fog,  out  of  which  the  Japanese  ships 
suddenly  loomed  across  the  bows  of  their  enemy,  before 
the  latter  could  form  his  line  of  battle.  Togo  engaged 
the  head  of  the  enemy’s  line  with  his  battleship  division, 


268 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


to  which  the  armoured  cruisers  Kasuga  and  Nisshin 
were  attached,  while  Kamimura,  with  the  rest  of  the 
armoured  cruisers,  attacked  the  rear.  The  Russian 
battleship  Oslyabia  was  sunk  almost  at  the  first  salvoes. 
The  rest  of  the  fleet  succeeded  in  forming  some  sort  of 
line-ahead,  but  their  formation  was  almost  immediately 
broken  up,  and  the  rest  of  the  battle,  which  lasted  for 
the  best  part  of  two  days,  was  a  melee ,  in  which  the 
Japanese  torpedo-flotillas  played  a  deadly  part.  Togo 
was  forced  to  close  action  by  the  inefficiency  of  his  worn 
guns.  He  relied  on  the  devastating  effect  of  twelve- 
inch  shells,  charged  with  high  explosive,  on  the  crews 
and  upper  works  of  his  opponents.  He  could  not  pierce 
the  armour-belts  of  the  Russian  battleships.  Those 
which  were  sunk  by  gun-fire  owed  their  fate  to  their 
overloaded  condition.  The  water  pouring  in  above  the 
protective  deck  caused  them  to  capsize.  The  older 
ships  proved  themselves  utterly  incapable  of  resisting 
attack.  In  the  end,  one  modern  battleship,  the  Orel , 
was  captured,  together  with  two  small  coast-defence 
vessels,  while  the  Suvarof,  Rojdestvensky’s  flagship, 
Borodino ,  Alexander  III.,  and  Oslyabia  were  sunk, 
besides  all  the  rest  of  the  older  battleships,  the  armoured 
cruisers,  and  all  the  protected  cruisers  but  two.  Rojdest- 
vensky  himself,  wounded  in  the  head  and  senseless,  was 
removed  from  his  doomed  flagship  on  board  a  destroyer, 
and  captured  by  the  Japanese  on  the  second  day.  Tsu¬ 
shima  was  the  most  complete  “wipe  out”  in  the  annals 
of  fleet  warfare,  more  complete  even  than  the  Nile.  No 
Japanese  ship  was  sunk,  or  even  seriously  injured,  and 
the  loss  of  the  victors  in  men  was  astonishingly  small. 

British  opinion  was  highly  incensed  at  the  time 
against  the  Russians  on  account  of  the  stupid  affair 
of  the  Dogger  Bank,  when  British  fishing  boats  were 


THE  CHALLENGE 


269 


fired  upon  and  sunk  by  the  inexperienced  and  “jumpy” 
Russians,  in  the  absurd  belief  that  there  was  a  Japanese 
torpedo-boat  lurking  among  them  in  disguise.  But 
the  infinite  pathos  of  Rojdestvensky’s  attempt  and 
the  high  qualities  of  courage  and  endurance  displayed 
by  the  Russians  may  now  be  better  appreciated  and 
acknowledged.  Rojdestvensky  saved  the  honour  of 
the  Russian  flag  at  a  tremendous  cost.  There  was 
nothing  else  he  could  do.  Had  he  made  Vladivostok  in 
safety  there  was  no  service  to  his  country  he  could 
hope  to  perform.  Port  Arthur  had  fallen;  the  battle 
of  Mukden  had  been  fought  and  lost.  The  strength 
of  Japan  was  unequal  to  the  total  overthrow  of  Russia; 
but  the  Court  intriguers  who  had  brought  the  war 
about  had  thrown  and  lost.  Their  blunders  were 
irretrievable.  Success  or  failure  turned  on  the  com¬ 
mand  of  the  sea,  and  sea  power  once  again  refused  to  lend 
itself  to  the  purposes  of  dynastic  and  military  aggres¬ 
sion.  Its  use  misunderstood  and  its  elements  mis¬ 
handled,  the  navy  of  Russia,  greatly  superior  by  the 
book,  was  brought  to  ruin  by  the  lesser,  but  efficiently 
handled,  navy  of  Japan.  The  campaign,  admirably 
conceived  by  the  Japanese  General  Staff,  naval  and 
military,  is  a  model  of  that  type  of  “limited  war”  to 
which  sea  power  so  readily  adapts  itself.  The  objects 
of  Japan  were  attained  without  her  being  constrained 
to  the  hopeless  task  of  attempting  to  crush  her  giant 
adversary,  and  this  happy  result  was  due  to  her  com¬ 
mand  of  the  sea. 

Much  friction  arose  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia,  not  only  on  account  of  the  Dogger  Bank  inci¬ 
dent,  but  also  on  account  of  the  conduct  of  the  Russian 
auxiliary  cruisers  in  capturing  and  searching  British  ves¬ 
sels.  How  far  the  Russians  exceeded  belligerent  rights,  as 


270 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


we  should  be  inclined  to  claim  them  to-day,  when  we  our¬ 
selves  are  belligerents,  it  would  take  too  long  to  argue. 
Vessels  were  seized  and  searched  for  contraband  far  out¬ 
side  the  zone  of  hostilities,  with  an  entire  absence  of  proof 
that  any  part  of  their  cargo  had  an  enemy  destination, 
and  to  this  our  Government  took  a  strong  and  successful 
objection.  The  Russians  also  set  the  fatal  precedent 
of  sinking  ships  on  the  plea  of  “military  necessity” — 
that  necessity  consisting  of  inability  to  bring  them  into 
port — which  was  afterwards  admitted  by  the  Hague 
Conference,  and  thus  gave  the  Germans  a  handle  for 
their  submarine  campaign. 

Small  as  was  the  effect  of  the  Russian  cruiser  opera- 
tions  in  the  war  with  Japan,  those  operations  gave  clear 
evidence  of  the  ability  of  marauding  vessels  to  keep  the 
sea  for  many  weeks  together,  lost  to  the  ken  of  humanity 
and  subsisting  on  coal  taken  either  from  captured  ships 
or  from  colliers  chartered  for  the  purpose.  Two  vessels 
of  the  Russian  Volunteer  Fleet  from  the  Black  Sea, 
named  for  war  purposes  Dneister  and  Rion,  were  thus 
lost  to  sight  for  a  long  period.  Meanwhile,  the  British 
protest  against  their  action  was  allowed  by  the  Russian 
Government,  which  sent  orders  for  their  recall.  It  was 
one  thing,  however,  to  send  orders,  and  another  thing  to 
communicate  with  the  ships.  For  this  purpose,  the 
Russian  Government  had  to  appeal  for  the  good  offices 
of  the  British,  and  the  ships  were  eventually  found, 
and  their  orders  conveyed  to  them  by  British  cruisers 
on  the  Cape  Station.  The  reality  of  the  British  con¬ 
trol  of  the  seas  could  hardly  have  received  plainer 
demonstration. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  has  been  dealt  with  at 
some  length  because  it  is,  in  many  respects,  a  turning- 
point  in  the  history  of  sea  power.  The  Russian  Navy 


THE  CHALLENGE 


27 1 


was  annihilated.  The  growing  German  Navy,  by  no 
direct  act  of  its  own,  now  had  command  of  the  Baltic. 
German  ambition,  encouraged  also  by  the  apparent 
collapse  of  Russian  military  power  on  land,  had  now,  as 
it  considered,  a  free  hand  to  deal  with  France.  A 
period  of  provocation  at  once  began,  in  Morocco  and 
elsewhere,  in  the  course  of  which  France  was  subjected 
to  dire  humiliation.  The  balance  was  redressed  by  the 
formation  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  between  this  country 
and  her  gallant  neighbour,  to  which,  by  slow  degrees, 
Russia  became  a  partner.  The  grain  of  mustard  seed 
had,  indeed,  been  sown  by  the  wise  diplomacy  of  King 
Edward  VII.  some  years  earlier;  but  the  plant  came  to 
maturity  between  1905  and  1911.  The  consequences 
on  our  naval  policy  were  immediate.  On  the  very  day 
when  the  Russian  fleet  sank  the  fishing  boats  on  the 
Dogger  Bank,  Admiral  Sir  John  Fisher  became  First 
Sea  Lord,  with  practically  a  free  hand  to  carry  out 
a  gigantic  programme  of  reform,  which  was  to  prepare 
the  Navy  for  the  great  conflict  with  its  new  enemy. 
The  period  of  tension  which  followed  the  Dogger 
Bank  incident  showed  how  faulty  our  naval  dispositions 
were  to  meet  a  threat  from  the  North  Sea.  Our  princi¬ 
pal  fleet  was  in  the  Mediterranean;  the  Channel  Fleet 
was  at  Gibraltar,  and  the  defence  of  home  waters  rested 
upon  the  Home  Fleet,  a  collection  of  antique  vessels, 
used  for  port-  and  coast-guard  ships,  generally  known 
irreverently  as  the  ‘  ‘  gobby  fleet.  ’  ’  If  hostile  action  had 
been  taken  against  Rojdestvensky  before  he  passed 
Ushant,  and  had  the  French  joined  their  allies,  the 
British  Navy  would  have  been  liable  to  be  attacked  in 
detail.  The  lesson  was  reinforced  a  few  years  later,  when 
Germany  suddenly  presented  to  France  what  was 
almost  an  ultimatum,  demanding  the  dismissal  of  M. 


272 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Delcasse  from  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
Channel  Fleet  was,  once  more,  at  Gibraltar,  with  the 
newly  formed  Atlantic  Fleet.  Both  were  ordered  to 
stand  fast,  for  fear  the  diplomatic  situation  should  be 
unfavourably  affected  by  a  concentration  in  home 
waters.  The  Home  Fleet  was  then,  perhaps,  suffi¬ 
ciently  strong  to  deal  with  the  existing  German  Navy. 
But  if  these  things  were  done  in  the  green  tree,  what 
might  not  be  done  in  the  dry? 

Sir  John  Fisher’s  schemes  were  based,  in  his  own 
words,  on  the  necessity  for  securing  “the  fighting  effi¬ 
ciency  of  the  Fleet,  and  its  instant  readiness  for  war.” 
He  recalled  the  six  battleships  from  China,  where,  after 
the  disappearance  of  Russian  sea  power,  they  were 
no  longer  needed  for  the  time;  he  reduced  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean  Fleet  and  the  Channel  Fleet  each  to  six  ships, 
and  he  utilised  the  vessels  thus  obtained  to  create  the 
Atlantic  Fleet,  of  six  battleships,  and  to  strengthen  the 
Home  Fleet  with  comparatively  modern  vessels.  These 
latter  were  kept  at  the  three  great  naval  ports,  manned 
with  nucleus  crews,  and  organised  in  divisions  under  the 
officers  who  would  command  them  in  war.  The  neces¬ 
sary  men  were  obtained  by  recalling  the  small  cruisers, 
sloops,  and  gunboats  kept  on  foreign  stations,  ships  of 
little  or  no  fighting  power,  which  nevertheless  absorbed 
about  ten  thousand  seamen.  This  reform  was  hotly 
contested,  on  the  ground  that  the  number  of  battleships 
kept  in  full  commission  was  somewhat  reduced  thereby. 
But,  in  point  of  fact,  the  nucleus  crews  provided  were 
so  large  that,  since  they  included  all  the  skilled  ratings, 
and  were  continually  practised  at  sea,  they  were  fit  to 
fight  even  without  their  “balance  crews,  ”  which,  more¬ 
over,  consisted  of  the  men  who  were  going  through  the 
schools,  or  were  otherwise  employed  in  their  home  ports. 


©  Underwood  &  Underwood. 


British  Destroyer  “  Foam  ” 


mm 


A  British  “  Dreadnought  ” 


THE  CHALLENGE 


273 


The  net  result  was  to  render  nugatory  von  Tirpitz’s 
hope  of  being  able  to  mobilise  the  German  Navy  more 
rapidly  than  the  British  could  be  mobilised. 

Sir  John  was,  in  reality,  silently  and  adroitly,  swing¬ 
ing  round  the  British  battle-front  from  south  to  east. 
The  Dreadnought ,  the  first  of  the  all-big-gun  class 
of  battleship,  was  ordered  in  1905  and  pushed  to  com¬ 
pletion  in  a  year.  The  nation  was  astonished  when 
instead  of  being  placed  in  full  commission  in  one  of  the 
sea-going  fleets,  she  was  attached  to  a  new  nucleus  crew 
unit,  called  the  Nore  Division  of  the  Home  Fleet.  The 
new  class  of  battle-cruisers,  Invincible ,  Indomitable ,  and 
Inflexible,  followed  her  there,  and  then,  when  the  time 
was  ripe,  the  Nore  Division  and  the  Channel  and  Atlan¬ 
tic  Fleets  became  one  fully  commissioned  force,  the 
Home  Fleet.  This  force  was  further  strengthened  as 
ships  came  to  hand.  The  remaining  battleships  were 
withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean,  the  French  under¬ 
taking  the  guardianship  of  our  mutual  interests  in  that 
sea,  and,  eventually,  one  single  organisation  of  our 
battleship  force  emerged,  known  as  the  First  and  Second 
Fleets,  each  consisting  of  four  complete  squadrons 
of  eight  ships  each,  the  first  four  in  full  commission, 
the  second  with  nucleus  crews  of  greater  or  less  size. 
Each  squadron  had  its  attached  cruiser  squadron,  the 
First  consisting  of  battle-cruisers,  and  each  its  flotilla 
of  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  with  light  cruisers  as  flotilla 
leaders.  Besides  this,  the  surplus  torpedo-craft  and 
the  large  submarine  flotilla  were  organised  under  an 
Admiral  of  Patrol,  to  undertake  the  guardianship  of 
the  coast  and  thus  leave  the  fleets  a  free  hand.  The 
gunnery  of  the  fleet  was  revolutionised  according  to 
the  methods  of  Admiral  Sir  Percy  Scott,  while,  by  a  new 
system  of  common  entry  and  training,  it  was  sought  to 

x8 


274 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


*4 


amalgamate  the  officers  of  the  military  and  engineering 
branches.  A  War  Staff  was  appointed  at  the  Admiralty, 
and  a  War  College  established  at  Portsmouth,  for  the 
study  of  naval  strategy  and  tactics.  For  the  first 
time  since  1815  we  had  a  scientifically  thought-out  sys¬ 
tem  of  naval  defence,  based  on  the  occupation  of  a 
central  position  in  home  waters  over  against  the  anti¬ 
cipated  foe,  but  spreading  into  all  the  seas  of  the  world. 
All  the  advantages  of  recent  growth  were  taken  into 
account :  wireless  telegraphy,  the  turbine,  oil  fuel.  Ships 
were  designed  according  to  the  strategical  and  tactical 
theories  of  their  use  which  were  worked  out.  Moreover, 
the  war-navy  and  the  mercantile  marine  were  brought 
into  closer  relation  with  each  other,  mainly  through  the 
instrumentality  of  Lord  Charles  Beresford.  A  step 
which  has  proved  fruitful  of  good  in  the  time  of  testing. 

The  underlying  principle  of  strategy  in  all  these 
reforms  was  the  old  one:  that  the  main  force  of  Great 
Britain  should  face  the  main  force  of  the  enemy  in  over¬ 
whelming  strength  from  a  position  which  would  give  it 
the  best  chance  of  forcing  an  action  should  opportunity 
present  itself.  Behind  this  “sure  shield,  ”  the  activities 
of  the  country,  whether  military  or  commercial,  could 
go  on  unchecked.  A  military  force  was  postulated 
for  home  defence,  capable  of  dealing  with  a  raid  of 
seventy  thousand  men,  or,  in  the  formula  adopted,  of 
such  strength  as  to  ensure  that,  if  the  enemy  come,  he 
must  come  in  such  force  that  he  could  not  come  at  all. 
An  Expeditionary  Force  of  one  hundred  and  sixty 
thousand  men  was  provided  for,  which  the  naval  people 
hoped  would  be  used  in  conjunction  with  the  fleet,  to 
threaten  descents  on  the  enemy’s  coast,  and  thus  to 
immobilise  a  number  of  his  troops  out  of  all  proportion 
to  its  own  strength.  The  magnitude  of  the  effort 


THE  CHALLENGE 


275 


which  Great  Britain  has  been  compelled  to  make  by 
land,  and  which  has  upset  all  the  considered  strategy 
on  which  our  plans  were  based,  could  not  have  been  fore¬ 
seen.  But  the  Navy  was  prepared  to  guarantee  the  safe 
passage  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  to  the  Continent  of 
Europe,  even  before  the  fleet  of  the  Power  next  to  our¬ 
selves  in  strength  had  been  met  and  defeated,  and  to 
maintain  its  communications.  It  has  fully  made  good 
its  word. 

Sir  John  Fisher  did  not  remain  in  office  long  enough 
to  see  his  schemes  come  to  full  fruition.  He  reached  the 
retirement  age  of  an  Admiral  of  the  fleet  in  1910,  and 
was  raised  to  the  peerage  with  the  title  of  Lord  Fisher  of 
Kilverstone.  In  the  words  of  Lord  Brassey,  he  had  done 
“the  day’s  work  of  a  giant.  ”  Naturally,  some  parts  of 
his  schemes  raised  bitter  opposition;  but  they  gave  us 
the  Navy  with  which  we  have  successfully  faced  the 
German  onslaught.  That,  however,  is  a  subject  which 
must  be  reserved  for  the  next  chapter. 

In  1911  the  Germans  attempted  to  establish  them¬ 
selves  on  the  western  coast  of  Morocco,  in  a  position 
which  would  have  been  eminently  favourable  for  attacks 
upon  our  commerce.  The  gunboat  Panther  suddenly 
appeared  off  Agadir,  and  was  later  replaced  by  the  light 
cruiser  Berlin.  The  ensuing  period  was  full  of  danger. 
But  the  firm  attitude  of  Great  Britain,  whose  interests 
were  directly  menaced,  encouraged  the  French,  on  this 
occasion,  to  stand  firm.  The  matter  ended  by  a  com¬ 
promise,  the  French  yielding  a  part  of  the  French  Congo 
in  return  for  an  abandonment  of  German  pretensions 
in  Morocco.  It  was  a  piece  of  successful  blackmail  on 
the  part  of  the  Germans ;  but  the  event  showed  that  the 
Entente  Powers  were  no  longer  in  a  mood  to  allow 
the  bully  of  Europe  to  have  his  way,  and  the  reorganised 


276 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


sea  power  of  Great  Britain  forbade  him  to  hope  that 
he  could  reach  the  object  of  his  desires.  In  the  autumn 
of  the  same  year  the  Italians  attacked  the  Turkish 
possessions  in  Tripoli,  while  in  1912  the  war  between 
Turkey  and  the  Balkan  States  took  place.  These 
events  do  not  strictly  belong  to  our  subject,  but  they 
were  each  of  them  incidents  which  led  directly  to  the 
great  struggle  which  was  to  follow.  The  year  1913  was 
devoted  by  Germany  to  the  increase  of  her  land  arma¬ 
ments,  a  threat  to  which  the  French  immediately  re¬ 
sponded.  Internal  troubles  both  in  France  and  Great 
Britain  during  the  following  year  made  the  Germans 
believe  that  they  saw  their  chance.  The  time  was  ripe 
for  the  blow  in  other  ways  also. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 

Whenever  a  tyrant  has  come  into  conflict  with 
sea  power  it  has  broken  him.  It  is  a  force  which  tyrants 
have  attempted  to  wield,  but  have  consistently  failed. 
It  was  so  with  Xerxes,  with  Philip  II.,  with  Louis  XIV., 
with  Napoleon.  Xerxes  chastising  the  Hellespont  is  an 
allegory,  the  meaning  of  which  is  revealed  in  the  history 
of  mankind.  The  issue  was  raised  afresh  in  1914  by 
Wilhelm  II.  of  Germany  and  his  ally  of  Austria.  The 
arrogant  revival  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
which  was  witnessed  after  Sadowa  and  Sedan  had 
placed  Prussia  in  a  dominating  military  position  was  a 
gauntlet  thrown  down  to  the  free  nations  of  the  world. 
A  whole  logic  of  tyranny,  based  on  an  insane  pride  of 
race,  a  lust  for  domination,  a  worship  of  armed  might, 
and  a  theory  of  the  Divine  Right  of  Kings  was  worked 
out  by  soldiers  and  professors  and  presented  to  the 
mystic  dreamer  who  sat  upon  the  Imperial  Throne. 
The  descendants  of  Luther  took  Nietzsche  for  their 
prophet.  Christianity  became,  for  them,  a  “  slave 
religion”;  its  tenets  of  mercy  and  justice  were  deemed 
unworthy  of  a  race  of  super-men;  a  reincarnation  of 
Wotan  was  installed  in  the  Eternal  Throne  as  “the  good 
old  God”  of  the  German  tribes.  Not  consciously,  of 

course.  But  the  attributes  of  the  God  the  Germans 

277 


278 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


came  to  worship  were  those  of  Wotan  rather  than  of 
the  God  of  Love  revealed  in  Jesus  Christ. 

The  whole  machinery  of  the  State  moved  to  one  end. 
There  is  no  denying  the  energy,  capacity,  and  mental 
power  the  Germans  put  into  their  task  of  national  and 
Imperial  organisation  from  1871  onwards.  There  is 
this  much  to  be  said  for  them:  their  Empire  was  no 
natural  growth,  but  a  piece  of  elaborate  and  skilful 
cabinet-making.  By  the  sword  it  was  won;  by  the 
sword  alone  it  could  be  kept.  Moreover,  it  was  born 
late  into  the  family  of  nations.  The  vacant  spaces  of 
the  world  were  already  allotted.  Only  the  sword  could 
carve  a  way  to  world-power,  and  to  the  sword  must  be 
added  the  trident,  if  Great  Britain,  which  lay  like  a 
breakwater  across  the  path  to  oversea  empire,  was  to 
be  removed  out  of  the  way.  To  many  nations  the 
task  might  have  seemed  too  great.  They  would  have 
been  content  with  the  material  fruits  of  their  industry, 
and,  armed  for  defence,  would  have  abstained  from 
provocation  of  their  neighbours.  But  that  was  not  the 
tradition  which  the  Hohenzollerns  had  inherited  from 
Frederick  the  Great.  It  was  not  the  logical  outcome 
of  the  teaching  of  Bismarck — who,  be  it  said,  was  too 
great  to  be  logical.  A  frenzied  conceit,  spread  through 
all  classes  of  the  drilled  and  docile  nation  by  the  pro¬ 
fessors  and  school  teachers,  taught  that  the  world 
needed,  for  its  happiness,  to  be  brought  under  the  sway 
of  German  Kultur.  Thus,  while  other  peoples  stood 
dismayed  at  German  tastelessness  and  vulgarity,  this 
besotted  folk  regarded  itself  as  the  guide  predestined 
to  lead  the  world  in  sweetness  and  light.  The  smaller 
nations  had  no  right  to  a  separate  existence.  For 
their  own  good  it  was  requisite  that  they  should  come 
direct  under  the  benevolent  tyranny  of  Hohenzollern 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


279 


or  Hapsburg,  or  should  submit  to  the  rule  of  a  Teutonic 
princelet  placed  upon  the  throne  and  upheld  by  an 
army  trained  by  German  officers  on  the  German  model. 

Happily  for  European  liberty,  one  poison  counter¬ 
acted  another.  Pan- Germanism,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Pan-Slavism  on  the  other,  prevented  that  League  of 
Monarchs  which  would  in  very  truth  have  riveted  the 
principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance  on  the  necks  of  all 
Continental  peoples.  We  are  so  accustomed  to  think 
of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  as  composing  the  Triple 
Alliance,  that  we  forget  the  days  of  the  Drei-Kaiser- 
bund  which  threatened  a  revival  of  the  ‘  ‘  leagued  oppres¬ 
sion”  which  destroyed  Polish  independence.  The  work 
of  the  Imperial  meeting  at  Skiernevice  in  the  early 
eighties  of  last  century  never  came  to  fruition,  owing 
to  the  irreconcilable  antagonism  between  the  ambitions 
of  the  Slavs  and  the  Germanic  peoples  in  relation  to 
Turkey  and  the  Near  East.  Italy  was  forced  into 
an  unnatural  alliance  with  the  Tedeschi,  whom,  of 
all  people,  the  Italians  most  heartily  abhor,  by  the  pres¬ 
sure  on  her  northern  frontiers.  The  advantage  to 
Germany  and  Austria  of  her  adhesion  to  the  Central 
League  consisted  in  the  reinforcement  which  her  navy 
gave  to  their  sea  power  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the 
route  into  Eastern  France,  turning  the  flank  of  the 
French  positions,  which  the  use  of  her  territory  would 
give.  But  the  adhesion  of  Italy  to  the  Central  League 
in  the  event  of  war  depended  on  one  thing,  as  we  shall 
see:  on  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain.  With  the  excep¬ 
tion  of  the  future  of  Albania  and  Epirus,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  a  single  point  where  the  interests  or  sentiments 
of  the  Italian  people  were  identical  with  those  of  the 
Germans  and  Austrians,  and  even  in  the  excepted  case, 
the  identity  was  negative,  not  positive.  The  Italians 


280 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


desired  that  the  Serbians  should  be  kept  out  of  Durazzo 
and  San  Giovanni  di  Medua,  the  Greeks  out  of  Avlona. 
They  certainly  did  not  desire  to  see  these  ports  pass  to 
Austria. 

In  1914,  the  German  Navy  had  risen  to  the  position 
of  second  in  the  world.  It  was  far  from  being  in  a  posi¬ 
tion  to  challenge  single-handed  the  naval  might  of 
Great  Britain,  for  our  strength  in  heavy  ships  was  nearly 
two  to  one  numerically,  and  probably  a  very  great  deal 
more  than  two  to  one  in  the  other  elements  which  make 
sea  power.  But,  as  we  saw  from  the  Preamble  to  the 
German  Navy  Act  of  1900,  the  German  Admiralty 
held  the  opinion  that  “it  is  not  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  German  battle-fleet  should  be  as  strong  as  that 
of  the  greatest  naval  Power,  because  a  great  naval 
Power  will  not  be  able,  as  a  rule,  to  concentrate  all  its 
striking  forces  against  us.”  The  diplomacy  of  King 
Edward  and  the  naval  policy  of  Lord  Fisher  had  rend¬ 
ered  the  hope  underlying  this  sentence  nugatory.  Our 
battle-front  had  been  swung  round  to  face  eastward, 
and  our  rear  had  been  rendered  safe  by  the  new  and 
friendly  relations  into  which  we  had  entered  with 
France  and,  subsequently,  with  Russia.  There  re¬ 
mained  two  hopes  for  the  Germans :  First,  that  we  should 
argue  as  they  did,  that  the  defeat  of  a  strong  German 
Navy  would  so  substantially  weaken  us  that  our  own 
position  in  the  world  would  no  longer  be  secured  by  an 
adequate  fleet,  and  that,  therefore,  we  should  hesitate 
to  join  in  the  struggle;  and,  secondly,  that  their  antici¬ 
pated  superiority  in  training,  in  material,  and,  above 
all,  in  speed  of  mobilisation,  might  avail  to  give  them 
an  initial  advantage  which  would  counteract  their  total 
inferiority  in  strength.  Both  hopes  were  doomed  to 
disappointment . 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


281 


The  first  assumption  is  a  characteristic  manifestation 
of  that  cynical  philosophy  known  to  the  school  of  Bis¬ 
marck  as  “  Realpolitik.  ”  That  nothing  ought  to 
count  in  national  policy  except  advantage;  that  truth, 
honour,  faith,  loyalty  have  no  place  in  international 
relations;  that  the  plighted  word  of  king  or  people 
should  hold  good  just  so  long  as  convenience  prescribes 
and  may  be  broken  when  circumstances  alter:  such 
are  the  principles  underlying  German  statecraft,  and 
such  are  the  principles  on  which  the  Wilhelms trasse 
seems  to  have  believed,  quite  sincerely,  that  we  should 
act.  The  bond  we  had  signed  and  sealed,  along 
with  Prussia,  to  protect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium;  our 
amity  with  France  and  Russia,  were  not  expected  to 
weigh  with  us  against  the  chance  which  would  come  of 
fishing  in  troubled  waters  if  we  kept  our  sea  power  intact. 
The  earth  and  everything  in  it  would  belong  to  us  and 
Germany  if  we  held  aloof — until  the  time  came  for  Ger¬ 
many  to  swallow  our  share  as  well  as  her  own.  Such 
was  the  thought  underlying  the  dishonouring  conditions 
of  neutrality  offered  by  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg 
to  our  Government.  Such  was  the  ethical  outlook 
from  which  sprang  his  cry  of  mortification  and  anger 
that  all  this  should  be  thrown  away  for  the  sake  of  “a 
scrap  of  paper.”  The  British  and  the  German  minds; 
the  point  of  view  of  militarism  and  sea  power  are,  as 
the  mathematicians  say,  asymptotic.  If  it  be  true  that 
a  gentleman  is  one  who  “sweareth  unto  his  neighbour 
and  disappointeth  him  not,  though  it  be  to  his  own 
hindrance,”  then,  in  that  memorable  interview  with 
Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Bethmann-Hollweg  wrote  himself 
down  a  cad.  And  he  spoke  in  the  name  of  his  nation. 

Lest  the  charge  of  unctuous  rectitude  which  some 
of  our  own  countrymen  level  at  us  when  our  obligation 


282 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


to  Belgium  is  put  forward  as  our  ground  for  war  be 
brought  against  the  foregoing  passage,  let  it  be  frankly 
acknowledged  that  our  interest  jumped  with  our 
honour.  Otherwise  our  pledge  to  Belgium  would  never 
have  been  given.  We  were  about  to  fight  once  more 
the  age-long  issue  which  had  brought  us  into  the  field 
every  time  it  has  been  raised,  from  the  Spanish  Armada 
to  the  defeat  of  Napoleon.  To  maintain  the  independ¬ 
ence  of  the  small  nations  which  fringe  the  coastline 
of  Europe,  and  to  prevent,  so  far  as  lies  in  our  power, 
any  one  of  the  great  military  monarchies  of  the  Con¬ 
tinent  from  enlarging  its  access  to  blue  water  are  ob¬ 
jects  for  us  no  less  vital  than  to  preserve  the  balance  of 
power  and  to  check  all  attempts  at  universal  dominion. 
Indeed,  the  three  things  all  hang  together.  For  this 
reason,  we  have  always  fought  for  the  independence  of 
the  Low  Countries.  For  this  reason  we  have  been  the 
steadfast  ally  of  Portugal.  For  this  reason  we,  for 
years,  as  Lord  Salisbury  said,  “backed  the  wrong 
horse”  by  defending  the  Turks  against  the  Russians. 
Once  we  failed  to  be  true  to  our  policy,  and  our  failure 
gave  Kiel  to  Germany. 

Only  when  the  secrets  of  all  hearts  are  revealed  will 
the  cross-currents  which  swayed  the  minds  of  men  in  the 
eventful  days  between  the  murder  of  the  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand  on  June  28th,  and  the  outbreak  of  war 
be  fully  understood.  Nothing  is  yet  clear,  save  the 
dignified  determination  of  France  to  stand  by  Russia, 
the  heroic  resolve  of  King  Albert  and  his  Belgians  to 
resist  aggression,  and  the  calm  resolution  with  which 
Great  Britain  stood  to  her  word.  The  motives  of  the 
Russian  people  are  clear  enough  in  the  light  of  subse¬ 
quent  events;  but  those  of  the  Tsardom  are  less  easy 
to  unravel.  As  to  Germany  and  Austria,  arrogance, 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


283 


ambition,  and  panic  seem  to  have  borne  about  equal 
parts.  By  the  morning  of  August  4th,  Germany  knew 
that,  if  she  persisted  in  her  intention  to  attack  France 
and  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  in  order  to  do 
so,  the  sea  power  of  Britain  would  be  ranged  against  her. 
The  German  Higher  Command  could  hardly  be  so 
obtuse  as  not  to  realise,  at  least  partially,  what  that 
meant.  But  they  still  hoped  to  neutralise  their  dis¬ 
advantage  by  rapid  mobilisation  and  a  dashing  ‘  ‘  hussar 
stroke”  at  the  outset.  They  had  seized  an  opportunity 
which  presented  itself  at  a  favourable  moment.  The 
German  Navy  is  a  conscript  force.  It  has,  for  back¬ 
bone,  a  large  number  of  petty  officers  and  leading  hands 
who  volunteer  for  continuous  service  and  make  a  life 
profession  of  the  navy.  But  of  the  rest  one-third  is 
changed  every  year,  the  change  taking  place  in  the 
early  autumn.  In  the  month-  of  August,  therefore, 
the  German  Navy  reaches  its  highest  point  of  efficiency, 
the  youngest  members  of  its  crews  having  had  about 
a  year’s  training,  while  the  three-year  men  are  still  on 
board.  In  August,  1914,  the  High  Sea  Fleet  had  just 
returned  from  manoeuvres  when  war  broke  out.  The 
manoeuvres  themselves  had  followed  immediately  upon 
the  junketings  at  Kiel  to  celebrate  the  re-opening  of 
the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  after  the  widening  and  deep¬ 
ening  necessitated  by  the  coming  of  the  Dreadnought 
type  of  ship.  Admiral  Sir  George  Warrender  and  a 
division  of  the  First  Battle  Squadron  had  been  present, 
and  the  Kaiser  had  gone  out  of  his  way  to  show  excep¬ 
tional  courtesy  to  him  and  to  his  accomplished  wife. 

As  it  happened,  the  circumstances  were  hardly  less 
fortunate  for  the  British  Navy,  since  a  test  mobilisation 
of  the  Second,  or  nucleus  crew,  Fleet,  which  had  been 
ordered  months  previously  when  there  was  no  hint  of 


284 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


trouble  in  the  air,  had  just  been  brought  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  The  events  of  the  latter  half  of  July  will 
long  live  in  the  memory  of  those  who  took  part  in  them. 
On  the  eighteenth,  the  long  lines  of  ships,  stretching 
from  the  entrance  to  Portsmouth  Harbour  across  to  the 
Island,  lay  in  sunlight,  with  a  stiff  breeze  which  stretched 
the  ensigns  and  admirals’  flags  as  stiff  as  boards.  The 
picket  boats  and  pinnaces  raced  to  and  fro,  tumbling 
and  tossing  over  the  gleaming  waves,  bringing  parties 
of  guests  to  the  various  ships.  For  the  King  was  com¬ 
ing  to  inspect  his  fleets.  In  the  interval  of  waiting, 
Shamrock  III.  danced  down  the  lines  like  some  frail 
butterfly,  on  her  way  to  challenge  for  the  America  Cup, 
and  in  tow  of  the  Erin,  destined  to  finish  her  journey, 
not  in  New  York  Harbour,  but  in  the  Adriatic.  Over 
this  world  of  light  and  gaiety  came  the  first  shadow  of 
the  storm.  The  King’s  visit  was  cancelled.  He  was 
engaged  with  the  Party  leaders  in  a  last  effort  to  avert 
civil  war  in  Ireland.  That  even  graver  matters  lay 
behind,  few  guessed. 

Two  days  later  he  came.  It  was  a  grey,  wet  morn¬ 
ing  as  the  harbour  tugs  detailed  to  convey  the  spectators 
took  up  their  position  beyond  the  Horse  Fort.  The 
ships  weighed  anchor,  and  were  led  by  the  King  in  the 
Victoria  and  Albert  out  to  sea.  The  yacht  anchored 
hard  by,  and  the  guns  of  the  great  ships  pealed  forth 
their  Ave  Ccesar!  as  they  steamed  by.  First  battleships, 
Dreadnoughts,  and  pre- Dreadnoughts ;  then  battle¬ 
cruisers,  armoured  cruisers,  cruisers,  light  cruisers;  the 
destroyer  flotillas:  in  endless  stretch  of  pageantry  they 
went  by  while  the  seaplanes  wheeled  and  circled  and 
dipped  overhead.  The  mightiest  fleet  ever  assembled 
steamed  out  past  the  Nab  on  its  last  errand  of  peace. 
And  there  were  in  that  array  ships  which  should  return 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


285 


no  more  at  all.  The  war-cloud  was,  by  then,  bigger 
than  a  man’s  hand,  and  in  the  minds  of  the  spectators 
the  thought  was  present  that  things  might  be  as  it 
proved  they  were  destined  to  be. 

On  July  24th,  after  four  days’  exercise  in  the  Channel, 
the  First  Fleet  returned  to  Portland,  and  the  squadrons 
of  the  Second  Fleet  to  their  home  ports,  where  the 
reservists  were  dismissed  to  their  homes.  The  First 
Fleet  was  to  have  given  manoeuvre  leave  to  the  crews 
by  watches.  But  on  July  26th  the  order  was  flashed 
down  to  it,  “Stand  fast!”  The  ships  of  the  Second 
Fleet  were  ordered  to  remain  in  close  proximity  to  their 
“balance  crews,  ”  that  is,  to  the  men  in  the  schools  and 
harbour  establishments  detailed  to  bring  them  up  to 
full  complement.  On  July  29th  the  First  Fleet  moved 
from  Portland,  the  bands  playing  The  Red ,  White,  and 
Blue;  Britons ,  Strike  Home;  Hearts  of  Oak;  and  such  like 
stirring  airs  of  Eighteen  Hundred  and  War-time.  The 
movement  was  quite  unexpected,  and  only  a  small 
crowd  had  assembled  on  Portland  Breakwater  to  cheer 
them  as  they  put  to  sea.  They  “faded  like  a  cloud  in 
the  silent  summer  heaven,”  and  no  one,  the  Germans 
least  of  all,  knew  their  destination.  But  when  that 
fleet  steamed  out  of  Portland,  the  chance  of  a  sudden 
blow  on  which  the  hope  of  Germany  at  sea  was  based, 
vanished.  On  August  2nd,  Mr.  Churchill  took  the  step 
which,  whatever  view  is  taken  of  his  subsequent  actions, 
earned  him  the  undying  gratitude  of  his  country.  He  is¬ 
sued  the  order  to  mobilise  the  whole  of  our  naval  forces. 
The  response  bettered  expectation.  On  the  evening  of 
August  3rd  the  Admiralty  were  able  to  announce  that, 

the  mobilisation  of  the  British  Navy  was  completed  in 
all  respects  at  four  o’clock  this  morning.  This  is  due  to 


286 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  measures  taken,  and  to  the  voluntary  response  of  the 
reserve  men  in  the  absence  of  a  Royal  Proclamation, 
which  has  now  been  issued.  The  entire  Navy  is  now  on 
a  war  footing. 

The  force  so  mobilised  comprised  the  whole  of  the 
effective  warships  in  the  Navy  List,  and  the  trawler 
reserve,  which  had  been  organised  for  mine-sweeping. 
Mercantile  auxiliaries  were  taken  up,  and  their  guns 
mounted  with  extraordinary  rapidity.  Necessarily, 
many  men  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve,  which  consists 
of  merchant  seamen,  were  out  of  the  country  at  the 
start.  But  the  Fleet  Reservists  and  the  Royal  Naval 
Volunteer  Reserve  showed  up  in  full  numbers  from  the 
start.  That  the  English  had  not  lost  the  habit  of  the 
sea  was  soon  apparent. 

War  was  declared  at  II  p.m.  on  August  4th.  At 
9  a.m.  on  August  5th,  less  than  twelve  hours  later,  the 
German  mine-layer,  Konigin  Luise,  was  sunk  when 
laying  mines  off  the  coast  of  Suffolk.  Numbers  had 
already  been  laid,  with  the  object  of  catching  the  British 
fleet  on  its  way  to  its  war  stations.  But  the  British 
fleet  was  already  there.  Other  schemes  of  the  Ger¬ 
mans  to  hamper  our  mobilisation  and  to  destroy  our 
communications  were  nipped  in  the  bud  by  the  prompti¬ 
tude  of .  the  measures  taken  by  the  Admiralty.  The 
faith  of  Admiral  von  der  Goltz  in  German  superiority 
of  mobilisation  was  thus  brought  to  nought.  The 
mines  laid  by  the  Konigin  Luise  unhappily  caught  the 
Amphion ,  the  leader  of  the  flotilla  which  sank  the  mine¬ 
layer;  but  they  effected  nothing  else,  beyond  demon¬ 
strating  to  the  world  that  Germany  only  signed  the 
Article  of  the  Hague  Convention  dealing  with  the 
laying  of  mines  in  order  that  she  might  snatch  an 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


287 


advantage  by  disregarding  it.  The  cruisers  which  had 
been  built  to  prey  upon  our  commerce  were  forced  to 
remain  in  their  home  ports,  save  such  as  were  already  in 
distant  waters.  The  ships  of  the  German  mercantile 
marine  which  were  in  Hamburg  and  Bremen  were  laid 
up  where  they  were.  Those  which  were'  in  neutral 
ports  dared  not  put  to  sea,  but  interned  themselves 
at  once.  Those  already  on  the  high  seas  scuttled  like 
rabbits  for  the  nearest  neutral  ports,  among  others  the 
great  liner  Kronprinzessin  Cecilie ,  which  was  on  voyage 
home  from  the  United  States  with  a  precious  cargo  of 
bullion.  Within  forty-eight  hours  the  sea-borne  trade 
of  Germany  had  ceased  to  be.  In  all  our  successful 
naval  wars,  we  had  never  asserted  our  mastery  of  the 
ocean  routes  so  speedily  or  so  completely.  The  first 
half  of  the  function  of  sea  power  was  successfully  car¬ 
ried  out.  We  denied  the  use  of  the  sea  to  the  enemy, 
save  by  neutral  ships.  The  second  part  was  also  carried 
out,  though  less  completely.  We  secured  the  use  of  the 
sea  to  ourselves. 

The  immediate  results  of  the  entry  of  Great  Britain 
into  the  war  must  now  be  discussed  at  some  length. 
The  more  obvious  effects  are,  of  course,  easily  apparent. 
The  way  was  made  safe  for  the  passage  of  the  Expedi¬ 
tionary  Force  to  France,  and  its  immediate  dispatch 
was  permitted  by  the  inviolability  secured  to  our  shores 
by  the  “instant  readiness  for  war”  of  the  fleet.  The 
seas  were  kept  open  for  trade  both  to  the  French  and 
ourselves,  and  the  resources  of  the  neutral  world  were 
thus  made  available  to  correct  the  initial  unreadiness 
of  the  free  Powers.  The  French  were  enabled  to  bring 
their  oversea  armies  for  service  in  the  Western  battle¬ 
fields.  Moreover,  we  ourselves  brought  four  good 
divisions  of  Regulars,  the  26th,  27th,  28th,  and  29th, 


288 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


back  from  distant  parts  of  the  Empire,  replacing  them 
and  the  Indian  Army,  which  was  imperatively  needed 
to  strengthen  the  thin  line  in  France  and  Flanders, 
with  Territorial  troops.  And,  in  due  course,  Canadians, 
Australians,  and  New  Zealanders,  the  gallant  volunteers 
of  the  marches  of  the  Empire,  were  brought  to  stand  side 
by  side  with  the  sons  of  the  Mother  Country.  At  the 
same  time,  many  thousands  of  Germans  and  Austrians 
of  military  age  were  prevented  from  joining  the  armies 
of  our  foes.  Excluding  altogether  the  army  in  France, 
which,  of  course,  is  there  entirely  owing  to  sea  power, 
it  would  probably  be  within  the  mark  to  say  that 
the  same  force  has  been  worth  not  less  than  two  million 
soldiers  to  the  Allies.  Nor  is  the  total  number  of  men 
furnished  to  our  own  armies  and  denied  to  those  of  our 
enemies  the  only  thing  to  be  considered.  It  is  neces¬ 
sary  not  only  to  have  soldiers,  but  to  have  them  where 
they  are  wanted.  Whether  the  strategy  which  directed 
the  Gallipoli,  Mesopotamia,  Salonika,  and  Egyptian 
campaigns  was  sound  or  not,  at  any  rate  the  armies 
required  were  conveyed  to  the  chosen  spots  by  virtue 
of  sea  power,  and,  by  the  same  agency,  have  hitherto 
been  maintained  where  they  were  required,  or  have 
been  transferred  to  another  battlefield  and  redistributed 
according  to  need.  Egypt,  as  always  in  history,  has 
furnished  a  striking  instance  of  the  superiority  of  sea 
communications  over  land  communications.  We  used 
it  as  a  central  base,  not  only  for  the  army  defending 
the  Canal  or  designated  for  offensive  operations  in 
Palestine,  but  for  troops  whose  eventual  destination 
was  France,  Gallipoli,  Salonika,  or  Mesopotamia.  The 
Turks,  on  the  other  hand,  despite  the  ardent  desire  of 
their  German  masters  to  strike  at  what  they  term  the 
backbone  of  the  British  Empire,  have  never  been  able 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


289 


to  muster  a  force  sufficiently  large  to  cause  us  the  small¬ 
est  uneasiness.  The  sea-borne  troops  have  numbered 
hundreds  of  thousands,  the  land-borne  troops,  tens  of 
thousands. 

Two  other  episodes  may  also  be  mentioned  by  way 
of  illustration.  The  Serbian  Army,  scattered,  weary, 
ragged,  and  starving,  straggled  down  to  the  coast 
through  the  Albanian  mountains  in  the  autumn  of  1915. 
There  they  were  met  by  French  transports,  were 
snatched  away  out  of  reach  of  their  pursuing  enemies, 
fed,  re-equipped,  and  re-organised  in  Corfu,  and  were 
then  conveyed  to  Salonika  where  they  have  rescued 
Monastir  from  the  hands  of  their  inveterate  foes.  This 
was  a  feat  in  every  way  comparable  with  the  rescue  of 
Sir  John  Moore’s  army  at  Corunna.  Again,  thanks  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Japanese,  forty  thousand  Russian 
troops  were  brought  round  from  Vladivostok  to  fight 
in  France.  The  number  seems  insignificant  in  relation 
to  the  mighty  hosts  engaged  on  the  Western  Front. 
But  it  is  almost  as  great  as  Wellington’s  Peninsular 
army,  greater  than  the  number  of  British  troops  which 
fought  at  Waterloo,  and  not  much  less  than  the  original 
force  which  Sir  Red  vers  Buller  took  to  South  Africa  in 
1899.  It  was  thought  an  astonishing  feat,  of  which 
the  British  Empire  alone  was  capable,  to  convey  that 
army  six  thousand  miles.  The  Japanese  conveyed 
the  Russian  force  more  than  double  that  distance, 
covered,  of  course,  by  the  British  Navy,  and,  in  parti¬ 
cular,  by  the  Grand  Fleet,  ‘‘hidden  in  the  Northern 
mists.”  These  things  have  been  going  on  all  through 
the  war,  unseen  and  in  silence.  But  they  are  merely 
the  more  commonplace  workings  of  sea  power. 

If  we  look  a  little  deeper,  the  results  are  even  more 
momentous.  Without  the  aid  of  Britain,  the  navies  of 


19 


290 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


France  and  Russia  would  have  been  outnumbered  by 
those  of  Germany  and  Austria  about  two  to  one.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  Russia  had  not  a  single  Dread¬ 
nought  ship  in  commission,  the  French  but  four.  Ger¬ 
many  and  Austria-Hungary  opposed  to  them  no  fewer 
than  twenty-four  battleships  and  battle-cruisers  of  the 
Dreadnought  type.  It  is  evident  that  the  control  of 
the  Baltic  would  have  been  completely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Germans,  but  for  the  fact  that  the  presence  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  of  Britain  in  the  North  Sea  forbade  them 
to  concentrate  their  strength  to  the  North.  Had 
they  been  able  to  do  so,  a  swift  blow  at  Petrograd  by 
sea  might  have  settled  the  event  in  the  Eastern  theatre 
within  a  few  months.  Moreover,  the  coasts  of  North¬ 
ern  France  would  have  lain  open  to  attack  by  sea,  and 
the  French  must  have  kept  a  large  number  of  men  of 
the  fighting  line  to  watch  them.  With  Great  Britain 
on  her  side,  not  only  has  France  been  able  to  concen¬ 
trate  the  whole  of  her  fighting  strength  against  the 
German  armies,  but  the  Germans  have  felt  themselves 
compelled  to  keep  a  large  number  of  troops  in  the  North 
to  guard  against  a  sudden  descent  upon  their  coasts. 
But  there  is  more  than  this.  The  position  of  Italy  in 
the  Triple  Alliance  has  already  been  discussed.  If  the 
shores  of  Italy  had  not  been  secured  by  a  force  more 
powerful  than  anything  the  Austro-Germans  could 
bring  against  the  combined  naval  strength  of  France 
and  Italy,  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  the  Italians 
to  have  resisted  the  pressure  of  the  Teutons.  They 
would  have  been  forced  into  the  war  on  the  side  of 
the  Central  Powers.  That  would  have  meant  a  way 
open  for  the  invasion  of  France  through  Savoy,  and  the 
French  positions  on  their  eastern  frontier  taken  in 
reverse.  Mutatis  mutandis ,  the  situation  of  1796-8 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


291 


would  have  been  very  nearly  reproduced,  with  still 
greater  advantage  on  the  side  of  the  invader.  But  this 
time,  the  role  of  invader  and  invaded  would  have  been 
reversed. 

Nor  is  this  all,  important  as  the  considerations  just 
stated  are.  Turkey  hesitated  long  before  throwing  in 
her  lot  with  Germany  and  Austria.  But  for  the  unfortu¬ 
nate  affair  of  the  Goeben,  she  might  have  hesitated  till 
the  end.  Bereft  of  sea  power,  the  chances  of  war 
offered  few  attractions  for  her.  The  safe  arrival  of  the 
Goeben  at  Constantinople,  however,  gave  her  a  tempor¬ 
ary  command  of  the  Black  Sea,  for  the  Russian  Dread¬ 
noughts  were  not  ready.  Had  Great  Britain  not  joined 
the  Allies,  there  can  be  no  sort  of  doubt  that  the  chance 
of  striking  down  Russia,  her  secular  foe,  would  have 
brought  her  into  the  arena  at  once.  Bulgaria,  without 
any  question,  would  immediately  have  followed  her 
example.  These  things  were  all  included  in  the  calcu¬ 
lations  of  the  Central  Powers.  Russia  has  always 
found  it  a  sufficiently  difficult  task  to  fight  the  Turks 
single-handed.  With  Austria  and  a  part  of  the  German 
armies  on  her  hands,  and  with  the  Ottoman  forces 
supplied  by  Germany  and  led  by  German  officers,  she 
must  have  been  overwhelmed.  Then,  with  Serbia 
crushed,  Rumania,  like  Italy,  forced  to  abide  by  the 
engagements  into  which  she  had  entered,  and  Greece, 
under  her  ineffable  King,  siding  enthusiastically  with 
the  strongest,  the  whole  of  the  Teuton  ambitions  in  the 
Near  and  Middle  East  would  have  been  realised. 
Events  have  shown  us  plainly  enough  that  the  Central 
Powers  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  war  on  two  fronts 
unless  the  trident  of  Britain  were  thrown  into  the  scale. 

But  the  British  declaration  of  war  reversed  the 
situation.  Instead  of  being  two-fold  stronger  at  sea, 


292 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  Central  Powers  were  now  almost  exactly  two-fold 
weaker,  so  far  as  numbers  were  concerned.  How  much 
weaker  in  all  other  elements,  it  is  impossible  to  compute. 
This  gave  the  forces  of  liberty  the  precious  gift  of  time 
to  organise  their  resources,  they  being,  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  case,  less  prepared  for  the  struggle  than 
the  forces  of  tyranny.  In  all  history  it  has  been  so, 
and  in  all  history  it  is  fortunate  for  the  cause  of  right 
and  freedom  that  sea  power  does  not  flourish  under 
systems  which  make  for  aggression  and  oppression. 
The  Germans  have  come  nearer  to  success  than  any 
such  people  have  before.  If  the  trident  had  been  in 
their  fist  in  1914,  or  they  could  have  succeeded  in 
grasping  it,  the  world  would  by  now  have  been  at  their 
feet,  despite  all  the  armies  of  the  Allies.  The  recent 
history  of  Turkey  is  illuminative  on  this  point.  The 
Ottoman  Navy  once  ranked  third  in  the  world.  It  was 
still  formidable  as  lately  as  1877.  But  Abdul  Hamid 
feared  the  fleet,  and  he  deliberately  let  it  sink  into  decay. 
The  very  engines  of  the  warships  were  sold  by  the 
Minister  of  Marine  for  his  private  profit.  So  Turkey, 
with  the  most  magnificent  naval  position  in  Europe 
in  her  hands,  entered  the  final  struggle  for  existence 
(which  we  may  date  from  the  Italian  attack  on  Tripoli 
in  1911)  without  a  navy.  Had  she  been  more  powerful 
at  sea  than  the  Greeks  in  1912,  it  is  reasonable  to  sup¬ 
pose  that  Salonika  and  Dedeagatch  would  still  have 
been  in  her  possession,  along  with  the  islands  of  the 
iEgean,  and  that  the  Gallipoli  expedition  could  never 
have  taken  place. 

That  famous  adventure  failed  to  attain  its  ultimate 
purpose,  and  has,  in  consequence,  been  somewhat 
hastily  written  down  a  disastrous  failure.  But,  having 
regard  to  the  circumstances  and  needs  of  the  moment 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


293 


at  which  it  was  launched,  that  view  is  far  too  shallow. 
Had  the  Turks  been  able  to  bring  their  whole  power 
to  bear  against  the  Russians  at  the  time  of  Mackensen’s 
famous  “drive”  through  Galicia,  especially  had  the 
accession  of  Bulgaria  to  the  Central  League  then 
permitted  the  use  of  Turkish  and  Bulgarian  troops 
against  the  Serbians  and  thus  against  the  Russian 
flank,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  Allies  could  have 
avoided  signing  a  calamitous  peace.  That  the  greater 
positive  ends  were  not  attained  is  lamentable.  Had 
they  been,  it  is  probable  that  peace  would  also  have 
come  long  before,  and  that  it  would  have  been  equally 
calamitous  to  the  Central  Powers.  Russian  man¬ 
power  and  food-power  would  have  been  fully  combined 
with  Western  munition-power,  and  the  result  must 
have  been  overwhelming.  It  is,  of  course,  possible 
that  some  other  and  more  practicable  way  might  have 
been  found  of  obtaining  the  same  end.  Alternative 
schemes  were  proposed ;  but,  as  one  and  all  depended  on 
the  use  of  sea  power,  there  is  no  need  to  discuss  them 
in  detail  here. 

A  consequence  of  sea  power,  subtle  and  easy  to  be 
missed,  must  now  be  discussed.  As  time  went  on,  the 
huge  armies  placed  in  the  field  by  both  sides  extended 
in  fortified  lines  the  whole  length  of  their  natural 
frontiers.  Thus  the  line  on  the  Western  Front  extended 
from  the  Belgian  coast  to  the  borders  of  Switzerland; 
that  on  the  Eastern  Front  from  the  Baltic,  at  first 
to  the  Rumanian  frontier,  and  now  to  the  Black  Sea. 
The  Italians  extended  from  the  Swiss  Alps  to  the  head 
of  the  Adriatic.  In  Asia,  the  Turkish  line  extended 
from  the  Black  Sea  down  to  well  into  Persia,  with  its 
right  flank  refused  to  cover  Mesopotamia  from  a 
British  advance.  By  land,  therefore,  the  opportunity 


294 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


of  a  flank  attack  was  everywhere  denied  to  the  com¬ 
batants.  All  that  any  of  them  could  hope  to  achieve 
was  to  create  a  flank  by  breaking  through  the  enemy’s 
lines  by  frontal  attack.  But  command  of  the  sea 
confers  on  its  possessor  the  power  of  reaching  round  the 
flank  of  the  enemy’s  line  and  thus  turning  it.  If  the 
Germans  could  acquire  such  command,  they  could 
turn  the  northern  end  of  the  Russian  positions  beyond 
Riga.  A  successful  landing  on  the  Belgian  coast  or  in 
Schleswig  would  place  the  British  in  a  similar  position. 
But,  apart  from  such  obvious  strokes  as  these,  the 
apprehension  of  which  has  an  abiding  influence  on  the 
course  of  the  war,  there  are  more  distant  opportunities 
which  have  had  consequences,  the  full  effect  of  which 
will  only  be  seen  when  its  complete  history  is  written. 
Success  in  Gallipoli  would  have  turned  the  flank  of  the 
Central  Powers  to  some  purpose.  When  its  approach¬ 
ing  failure  became  apparent,  the  Bulgarians  were 
cajoled  or  bribed  into  the  war,  and,  for  the  moment,  the 
danger  was  averted.  But  the  concentration  of  German 
aims  was  none  the  less  dissipated,  and  the  Franco- 
British  force  at  Salonika  occupied  something  of  the 
same  position  that  Wellington’s  army  did  in  the  lines 
of  Torres  Vedras.  The  actual  turning-movement, 
however,  was  wider  still.  It  began  with  the  driving  in 
of  the  Turkish  right  flank  at  Kut  and  Baghdad,  aided 
by  the  British  movement  on  Palestine.  The  end  of 
these  things  is  not  yet;  the  military  effect  is  not  fully 
apparent.  But  this  much  can  be  said:  that  however 
valuable  Turkish  and  Bulgarian  aid  may  have  been  to 
the  Germans,  they  would  gladly  have  dispensed  with  it, 
if  the  dangers  against  which  it  was  intended  to  guard 
could  have  been  removed  at  the  same  time.  The 
existence  of  these  dangers  was  the  result  of  the  superior- 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


295 


ity  at  sea  which  we  and  our  Allies  possessed.  Sea 
power  has  shown  its  old  ability  to  force  its  energy 
into  excentric  movements,  with  consequent  dissipa¬ 
tion  of  his  energy  and  resources.  Turkey  and  Bul¬ 
garia  have  no  resources  of  their  own  for  the  manufacture 
of  guns  and  munitions.  Germany  and  Austria  must 
supply  them.  If,  then,  the  superiority  in  artillery  with 
which  the  Germans  began  the  war  on  the  Western 
Front  had  passed  to  the  other  side  when  the  campaign 
of  1917  opened,  the  fact  may  be  attributed,  in  part  at 
least,  to  the  fact  that  the  brooding  threat  of  sea  power 
compelled  the  enemy  to  seek  allies  whose  dependence 
on  him  for  the  equipment  of  war  weakened  his  own 
power  to  compete  with  the  output  of  material  which  the 
French  and  British  could  obtain  from  all  parts  of  the 
world. 

The  events  of  the  war  at  sea  may  now  be  briefly 
recorded.  As  we  have  seen,  the  first  function  of  sea 
power  was  speedily  fulfilled.  The  Germans  lost  the 
use  of  the  sea.  If  the  Germans  wished  to  regain  it, 
there  was  only  one  way  in  which  they  could  so  do. 
Sir  John  Jellicoe  and  Sir  David  Beatty  told  them  so  as 
plainly  as  acts  could  speak.  The  Grand  Fleet  swept 
the  North  Sea,  offering  battle.  When  this  had  no 
effect,  Sir  David  trailed  his  coat  inside  the  Bight  of 
Heligoland.  Thus  was  brought  on  the  dashing  action 
of  August  28,  1914,  in  which  the  German  cruisers 
Mainz ,  Koln  and  Ariadne ,  with  several  torpedo-boats, 
were  sunk  and  the  power  of  the  battle-cruiser  first 
demonstrated.  The  German  heavy  ships  refused  action 
and  hid  themselves  in  the  mist.  Germany,  then  and 
there,  surrendered  the  command  of  the  sea  on  the 
positive  side.  The  natural  consequence  was  that  she 
was  cut  off,  in  a  degree  more  or  less  complete,  from 


296 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


oversea  supplies.  Great  Britain  established  what,  for 
want  of  a  better  word,  is  called  a  blockade,  which  she 
tightened  at  will,  the  only  restraint  being  consideration 
for  the  interests  of  neutrals.  Measures  were  not  form¬ 
ally  adopted  until  the  Germans  announced  their  inten¬ 
tion  of  sinking  merchantmen  approaching  the  shores  of 
Great  Britain  by  submarines,  and  until  the  German 
Government  had  assumed  the  control  of  the  whole 
food  supply  of  Germany.  There  is  a  distinction 
between  the  British  blockade  of  Germany  and  the 
measures  taken  by  Order  in  Council  against  Napoleon 
which  has  been  generally  overlooked.  Napoleon’s 
expressed  intention  was  to  ruin  Great  Britain  by  shut¬ 
ting  her  goods  out  from  the  whole  Continent.  The 
British  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  was  willing 
that  not  only  British,  but  also  neutral,  goods  should 
reach  the  Continent,  provided  they  paid  toll  to  Great 
Britain  first.  Thus  the  financial  ability  of  the  country 
to  continue  the  war  was  maintained.  But  the  Contin¬ 
ent  was  made  to  feel  the  smart  by  exorbitant  prices. 
As  against  Germany  and  her  allies,  the  intention  has 
been,  on  the  other  hand,  to  cut  off  all  possible  sources  of 
supply.  The  difference  in  method  is  explained  by  the 
difference  in  the  character  of  the  two  wars.  In  the 
former,  it  was  an  affair  of  governments  and  armies; 
in  the  latter,  it  has  been  an  affair  of  whole  nations, 
of  the  efforts  of  every  man  and  every  woman,  in  the 
fighting  line  or  behind  it.  The  quickest  possible 
decision  was,  therefore,  imperative. 

The  “strangle-hold”  on  Germany,  however,  took 
effect  much  more  slowly  than  many  people  had  be¬ 
lieved  would  be  the  case.  For  this  there  are  two 
main  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  Germany  before  the 
war  was,  to  a  very  large  extent,  a  self-supporting  and 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


297 


exporting  country,  both  in  regard  to  food  and  to  many 
raw  materials,  especially  those  which  were  required 
for  the  production  of  munitions  of  war.  With  her 
export  trade  cut  off,  the  whole  of  the  stocks  of  these 
raw  materials  was  available  for  home  consumption. 
As  regards  food  supplies,  with  the  exception  of  the 
cereals,  previously  imported  in  the  main  from  Russia, 
the  greater  part  of  the  imports  were  from  Holland, 
Denmark,  Switzerland:  neutral  Countries  lying  along 
the  German  frontier.  The  circumstances  were,  in  an¬ 
other  respect,  different  from  those  which  obtained 
during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  Then,  almost  the  whole 
of  the  Continent  lay  at  the  feet  of  the  Emperor,  and  it 
was  easy  to  treat  goods  going  to  any  European  port 
under  his  domination  as  enemy  goods.  But  Holland 
and  the  Scandinavian  countries  were  in  every  way 
entitled  to  the  rights  of  neutrals.  To  interfere  with 
the  high  hand  with  their  right  to  trade  with  other 
neutral  countries,  especially  with  the  United  States,  was 
a  proceeding,  not  only  at  variance  with  all  the  principles 
for  theisake  of  which  Great  Britain  drew  the  sword,  but 
also  one  fraught  with  the  gravest  peril  to  us.  Gently 
as  we  dealt  with  neutrals,  the  sympathy  of  the  smaller 
countries  was  not  so  universally  with  us  as  the  mer¬ 
its  of  the  quarrel  and  their  own  deadly  peril  from  a  Ger¬ 
man  success  appeared  to*  make  it  probable  that  they 
would  be. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  experiences  of  the  war 
have  shown  that  the  economic  advantages  of  sea 
power  had  been  exploited  by  this  country  to  a  degree 
which  carried  with  it  a  grave  political  danger.  This 
was  particularly  apparent  after  the  Germans  adopted 
“unrestricted  submarine  warfare”  in  February, 
1917.  Flagitious  as  was  their  defiance  of  all  the  laws 


298 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


of  nations  and  of  humanity,  the  British  had  only  them¬ 
selves  to  thank  for  it  that,  in  the  many  years  of  peace, 
they  had  deliberately  shut  their  eyes  to  the  dangers  of 
war.  The  years  of  peace  may  be  many  and  those  of 
war,  mercifully,  few.  But  a  week  of  unsuccessful  war 
may  destroy  for  ever  all  the  benefits  accruing  from 
generations  of  peace.  Sea  power  is  essentially  pacific 
in  its  aims  and  workings.  But  behind  those  peaceful 
workings  must  always  stand  the  ability  to  keep  the 
paths  of  the  sea  open  against  any  foe,  whatever  weap¬ 
ons  he  may  use,  and  sufficient  means  of  endurance  to 
hold  out  until  the  effects  of  a  temporary  reverse  or 
a  delayed  decision  can  be  overcome.  Otherwise  the 
whole  country  is  in  the  position  of  a  maritime  fortress, 
meant  to  support  and  succour  the  fleet,  which,  like 
Port  Arthur  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  keeps  the  fleet 
tethered  to  itself  and  incapable  of  that  offensive  action 
which  is  its  true  function.  Great  Britain,  suffering 
scarcity  and  fearing  starvation  while  her  fleet  sealed 
the  Germans  into  their  ports,  and  while  one-fifth  of 
the  globe,  including  many  of  its  most  fertile  portions, 
was  included  within  the  British  Empire,  will  stand  for  a 
warning  to  all  time  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  man  lives 
by  Mother  Earth,  and  that  no  cheapness  of  imported 
commodities  can  compensate  for  the  ruin  of  a  country’s 
agriculture. 

The  Germans  knew  from  the  start  that,  while  they 
themselves  were  not  absolutely  dependent  on  imported 
goods,  at  any  rate  for  many  months,  the  British  were 
dependent  at  once  on  sea-borne  trade  for  the  very  neces¬ 
saries  of  life.  While,  therefore,  they  surrendered 
somewhat  tamely  their  own  use  of  the  sea,  they  made  a 
determined  and  well-organised  effort  to  stop  its  use  by  us. 
They  operated  in  home  waters  by  scattering  mines 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


299 


freely,  and  without  warning  to  neutrals,  in  the  paths 
of  shipping,  and,  in  a  growing  degree,  by  the  use  of  sub¬ 
marines.  In  the  distant  seas  they  let  loose  a  number  of 
cruisers.  The  Goeben ,  battle-cruiser,  and  Breslau ,  light 
cruiser,  were  in  the  Mediterranean,  while  outside  Euro¬ 
pean  waters  were  the  two  powerful  armoured  cruisers, 
Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  and  several  light  cruisers, 
the  most  famous  of  which  were  the  Emden,  Karlsruhe , 
Leipsic,  Dresden ,  Konigsberg,  and  Nurnberg.  In  addi¬ 
tion,  there  were  three  or  four  armed  auxiliaries,  which, 
in  defiance  of  all  agreements,  transformed  themselves 
into  warships  on  the  high  seas.  The  supply  of  these 
ships  was  skilfully  arranged  for  by  means  which  are  not 
yet  known  in  detail,  at  any  rate  outside  the  Intelligence 
Department  of  the  Admiralty.  If  war  against  com¬ 
merce,  most  carefully  organised  in  advance,  could  give 
the  command  of  the  seas,  the  Germans  would  have 
won  it  in  August  and  September,  1914.  The  success 
of  their  plan  was  frustrated  by  their  inability  to  get  a 
sufficient  number  of  cruisers  out  upon  the  trade  routes, 
and  that  failure  was  due  to  the  prompt  mobilisation 
of  the  Grand  Fleet  and  the  impotence  of  the  Germans 
to  contest  the  major  issue  with  it. 

To  deal  first  with  the  Goeben.  The  object  of  her 
presence  in  the  Mediterranean  was  undoubtedly,  in  part 
at  least,  to  interfere  with  the  transport  of  the  French 
African  army  to  France.  In  that  she  and  her  lighter 
consort,  the  Breslau ,  should  have  had  the  assistance  of 
the  Austrian  Fleet.  But  war  between  France  and 
Austria  was  not  declared  till  August  10th,  nor  between 
Great  Britain  and  Austria  till  August  12th.  The 
German  ships  bombarded  Algiers  and  Boma  during  the 
first  week  of  the  war,  and  then  betook  themselves  into 
the  neutral  port  of  Messina,  which  they  were,  of  course, 


300 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


bound  to  leave  at  the  expiration  of  twenty-four  hours  in 
accordance  with  the  Neutrality  Declaration  of  Italy. 
The  British  had  four  battle-cruisers  in  the  Mediterran¬ 
ean,  as  well  as  some  armoured  cruisers  and  light  cruisers. 
For  some  accountable  reason  the  battle-cruiser  squad¬ 
ron  was  not  concentrated  against  the  Germans,  but  was 
kept  watching  the  Austrian  fleet  in  the  Adriatic. 
The  task  of  watching  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  was 
entrusted  to  the  Defence  and  Gloucester , .the  former  of 
which  was  greatly  inferior  in  force  to  the  Goeben ,  while 
the  Gloucester  was  slightly  superior  to  the  Breslau. 
Wireless  messages  failed  to  bring  the  battle-cruisers  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Defence  in  time ;  the  Admiral  whose 
flag  was  flying  in  that  vessel  had  positive  orders  not  to 
fight  if  in  inferior  force,  and,  after  a  plucky  attempt  to 
engage  on  the  part  of  the  little  Gloucester ,  the  two 
German  ships  escaped  into  the  Dardanelles  and  up  to 
Constantinople,  carrying  a  whole  bag  of  troubles  with 
them.  Admiral  Sir  Berkeley  Milne,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  came  home,  the  chief  command  in  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean  being  handed  over  to  the  French  Admiral, 
Boue  de  Lapeyrere,  and  the  Admiralty  “approved  the 
measures  taken  by  him  in  all  respects.”  His  second 
in  command,  Rear-Admiral  E.  C.  T.  Troubridge,  was 
recalled  for  an  inquiry  to  be  made,  was  tried  by  court- 
martial,  and  was  acquitted.  As  my  Lords  are  in  sole 
possession  of  all  the  facts  of  the  case,  it  is  impossible  to 
dispute  the  ground  on  which  their  “satisfaction”  with 
the  conduct  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  was  based. 
But  the  failure  to  make  an  end  of  the  Goeben  and 
Breslau  was  a  costly  one  for  this  country  and  her  Allies. 

Equally  unfortunate  was  the  escape  of  the  Scharn- 
horst  and  Gneisenau  from  Tsing-tao  without  being 
watched  and  followed  by  a  superior  force.  These 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


301 


powerful  ships  vanished  almost  completely  from  sight 
for  over  two  months,  and  the  British  light  cruisers, 
engaged  in  hunting  down  the  commerce  raiders,  ran  a 
continual  risk  of  fetching  up  against  them.  Hunting 
commerce  raiders  entails  dissipation  of  force,  and  it 
was  not  the  least  able  part  of  the  German  dispositions 
that  they  provided  this  strong,  concentrated  force  to 
act  as  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  scattered  ships  of  the 
Allies.  Squadrons  were  formed  as  rapidly  as  possible 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  the  menace, 
but  unfortunately,  as  events  were  to  prove,  one  at  least 
of  these  squadrons  was  itself  insufficiently  powerful  for 
the  task.  The  one  British  battle-cruiser  on  the  station, 
H.M.A.S.  Australia,  was  for  some  time  engaged  in  sub¬ 
duing  German  islands  in  the  Pacific,  for  which  task  there 
was  doubtless  a  sound  political  reason.  The  navy  of 
Japan,  which  had  declared  war  in  September,  joined  in 
the  hue-and-cry;  but  it  was  only  in  December  that  the 
two  vessels  were  finally  run  to  earth,  and  then  only  after 
they  had  inflicted  a  reverse  on  the  British  Navy  of  a 
particularly  galling  kind. 

One  of  the  squadrons  organised  to  deal  with  the 
Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau  consisted  of  the  Good  Hope, 
flying  the  flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Christopher  Cradock, 
Monmouth,  Glasgow,  and  Otranto,  an  auxiliary  cruiser. 
The  Admiralty,  aware  of  the  inferiority  of  this  force  to 
the  Germans,  sent  out  the  old  battleship  Canopus  to 
support  Cradock,  sending  him  instructions  that  he  was 
not  to  fight  unless  she  was  in  company,  which  was 
equivalent  to  an  order  not  to  fight  at  all.  On  November 
1st,  Cradock  encountered  the  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau 
which  formed  the  German  squadron  under  Admiral 
Graf  von  Spee,  off  Coronel,  a  port  of  Chili.  The  Ger¬ 
mans  were  superior  in  gun-power,  disposing  of  twelve 


302 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


8.2-inch  guns  upon  the  broadside  and  six  6-inch,  against 
two  9. 2 -inch  in  the  Good  Hope  and  seventeen  6-inch  for 
the  two  British  vessels  combined.  But  the  main-deck 
6-inch  of  the  Good  Hope  could  not  be  fought  in  a  sea¬ 
way,  and  there  was  a  heavy  swell  running.  The  Ger¬ 
man  ships,  moreover,  were  homogeneous,  while  the 
British  were  diverse.  In  speed  the  British  had  a  small 
nominal  advantage.  This  might  have  enabled  Cradock 
to  avoid  action  if  that  had  been  his  mind.  But  it  was 
insufficient  to  force  action  on  the  enemy  until  the 
conditions  of  light  favoured  him.  When  the  British 
ships  were  silhouetted  against  the  afterglow,  and  he 
himself  had  become  almost  invisible  against  the  land, 
von  Spee  accepted  battle  at  twelve  thousand  yards. 
The  action  was  quickly  at  an  end.  Both  British  ships 
caught  fire  after  a  few  salvoes  from  the  Germans,  and 
just  before  eight  o’clock,  the  Good  Hope  blew  up.  The 
Monmouth  continued  the  hopeless  fight  for  a  while 
longer,  badly  down  by  the  bows,  and  then  the  Glasgow, 
which  had  parted  company  in  face  of  the  overwhelming 
odds,  saw  a  number  of  flashes,  which  were  doubtless 
the  final  attack  upon  the  Monmouth.  The  rest  is 
silence.  Not  a  man  of  Cradock’s  gallant  ships  survived 
to  tell  the  tale. 

There  has  been  much  difference  of  opinion  over  the 
conduct  of  the  British  Admiral  in  accepting  battle. 
That  he  disobeyed  a  direct  order  of  the  Admiralty  is 
clear.  That  he  was  outmanoeuvred  in  the  engagement 
is  equally  clear.  But  what  was  the  alternative?  Von 
Spee  might  very  well  have  escaped  from  observation  in 
the  night  and  have  gone  off  to  wreak  mischief,  perhaps, 
on  the  coast  of  British  Columbia,  which  would  have 
raised  an  outcry  throughout  the  whole  Empire.  Cra¬ 
dock  was  where  he  was  for  the  express  purpose  of 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


303 

stopping  von  Spee’s  career.  It  was  practically  certain 
that,  wherever  and  whenever  he  fought  him,  he  would 
have  to  do  so  without  the  aid  of  the  Canopus.  The 
sending  of  that  ship  to  support  fast  cruisers  was  little 
better  than  a  farce.  To  fall  in  with  an  enemy  so  nearly 
of  equal  strength  and  to  part  without  an  action  would 
have  been  to  fly  in  the  face  of  British  naval  tradition. 
Cradock  may  very  well  have  called  to  mind  Nelson’s 
words,  and  reasoned  that  by  the  time  von  Spee  had 
beaten  him  soundly  he  would  do  us  no  more  mischief 
that  year.  That,  in  the  event,  he  failed  to  put  the 
German  squadron  out  of  action  was  due  to  a  tactical 
miscalculation.  The  words  from  the  Book  of  Macca¬ 
bees,  inscribed  upon  his  cenotaph,  embody  the  verdict 
of  his  comrades  upon  this  gallant  and  unfortunate  sea¬ 
man:  “God  forbid  that  I  should  do  this  thing  and  flee 
away  from  them ;  if  our  time  be  come,  let  us  die  manfully 
for  our  brethren,  and  let  us  not  stain  our  honour.” 

It  was  a  consideration,  no  doubt  present  to  Cradock’s 
mind,  that  if  von  Spee  were  only  injured  comparatively 
lightly  he  had  no  port  within  many  thousands  of  miles 
to  which  he  could  go  for  repairs.  He  could  coal  and 
receive  supplies  at  a  secret  rendezvous ;  but  if  he  had  to 
seek  dockyard  repairs  he  could  receive  no  assistance 
from  neutrals.  Even  if  his  own  ships’  companies 
could  do  the  work,  his  whereabouts  in  port  would  be 
immediately  known.  It  was  even  an  object  worth 
considerable  risk  to  compel  him  to  empty  his  maga¬ 
zines.  The  British  squadron,  on  the  other  hand,  could 
rely  on  ports  under  its  own  flag  in  which  it  could  obtain 
the  necessary  succour.  In  the  sequel,  the  force  brought 
to  bear  on  von  Spee  was  so  superior  that  it  is  difficult  to 
say  that  Cradock’s  action  had  any  bearing  on  the  result. 
But  it  is  noteworthy  that  Admiral  Sturdee’s  despatch 


304 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


speaks  of  the  ammunition  of  the  Gneisenau  being 
exhausted  before  the  end  of  the  Battle  of  the  Falkland 
Islands. 

Lord  Fisher  returned  to  office  as  First  Sea  Lord  the 
day  before  the  action  off  Coronel  was  fought.  Not  a 
moment  was  lost  by  the  vigorous  old  seaman,  when  the 
news  came,  in  making  his  dispositions  to  avenge  and 
repair  the  disaster.  The  parent  of  the  battle-cruiser 
had  the  weapon  ready  to  his  hand,  now  to  be  used  for 
the  purpose  he  had  designed  her  for.  The  Invincible 
and  the  Inflexible  were  ordered  to  the  Pacific  immedi¬ 
ately,  Admiral  Sturdee  being  appointed  to  the  com¬ 
mand.  To  all  representations  as  to  the  need  for  a  refit 
the  answer  was  returned,  “Go,  and  go  quickly.”  The 
squadron  donned  the  cap  of  darkness  and  the  shoes  of 
swiftness.  As  it  went  the  still,  small  voice  of  the  wire¬ 
less  called  to  it  all  the  ships  which  were  cruising  in  the 
South  Atlantic  and  Pacific.  Kent ,  Carnarvon ,  Cornwall , 
Glasgow,  and  Bristol  flocked  from  all  quarters  to  the 
flag,  with  the  Canopus  and  auxiliary  cruiser  Macedonia. 
The  Australia  raced  across  the  Pacific  along  with  the 
Japanese;  but  they  were  too  late  for  a  share  in  the  grand 
event.  On  December  7th,  Admiral  Sturdee  arrived  at 
the  Falkland  Islands  and  there  assembled  his  squadron. 

Admiral  Graf  von  Spee  had  taken  similar  action. 
He  had  called  to  him  the  Number g ,  Dresden ,  and  Leipsic , 
together  with  some  colliers.  It  is  thought  that  his 
destination  was  South  Africa,  where  the  German  colon¬ 
ists  were  resisting  Botha,  and  where  there  had  lately 
been  an  outbreak  of  rebellion  among  the  unreconciled 
element  of  the  Dutch  population.  Had  he  arrived  in 
those  waters  the  mischief  he  would  have  done  might 
have  been  incalculable.  But  his  lucky  star  had ‘set. 
He  decided  on  his  way  to  look  in  at  the  Falkland  Islands 


' 


. 


•  1 1  /■  I  : 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


305 


and  destroy  the  wireless  station.  On  the  morning  of 
December  8th  the  Gneisenau  and  Niirnberg  approached 
to  reconnoitre.  They  found  the  Canopus ,  which  opened 
fire  upon  them  at  11,000  yards,  and  the  Kent  lying  at 
the  entrance  to  Port  William  as  guard-ship.  They 
stood  in  to  engage,  expecting,  probably,  an  easy  repeti¬ 
tion  of  the  Coronel  victory.  Then  they  saw  the  masts 
of  the  Invincible  and  Inflexible ,  recognised  the  trap 
into  which  they  had  fallen,  and  retreated  at  full  speed 
to  warn  their  consorts.  The  British  fleet  got  under 
way,  and  a  stern  chase  followed.  The  Germans  scat¬ 
tered,  but  the  Kent ,  Cornwall ,  and  Glasgow  accounted 
for  the  Niirnberg  and  Leipsic ,  while  the  battle-cruisers 
and  Carnarvon  went  after  the  armoured  ships.  The 
Dresden  alone  of  the  German  squadron  escaped,  to  meet 
her  fate  a  few  months  later  off  the  Island  of  St.  Juan 
Fernandez.  The  fight  between  the  battle-cruisers 
and  the  armoured  cruisers  was  a  long-drawn-out 
business,  for  the  former  made  no  attempt  to  close,  but 
made  use  of  their  superiority  in  gun-power  and  speed  to 
destroy  their  opponents  at  a  range  at  which  they  ran 
little  risk  of  incurring  severe  injuries  themselves.  The 
tactical  theory  on  which  they  were  designed  was  bril¬ 
liantly  vindicated  on  this  occasion.  But  it  must  be 
remembered  that  neither  succour  nor  escape  was 
possible  to  the  Germans.  Admiral  Sturdee  always 
retained  the  power  to  close  if  there  was  the  smallest 
indication  of  a  change  of  weather,  or  if  visibility  should 
deteriorate  from  any  cause.  At  4.17  the  Scharnhorst 
sank  with  all  hands,  the  gallant  von  Spee,  who  had 
shown  himself  throughout  an  honourable  enemy,  going 
down  with  her.  At  six  o’clock  the  Gneisenau  followed 
her,  having  fought  a  single-handed  battle  for  nearly 
two  hours.  Less  than  two  hundred  officers  and  men 


20 


3°6 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


were  saved.  Two  transports  or  colliers  were  destroyed 
by  the  Bristol  and  Macedonia. 

The  operations  which  ended  in  the  destruction  of 
Admiral  von  Spee’s  squadron  remain  the  most  brilliant 
and  decisive  of  the  war  at  sea.  Full  credit  must  be 
given  to  those  who  hunted  the  German  squadron  out  of 
the  seas  where  it  would  have  found  most  opportunities 
of  mischief,  both  by  direct  action  and  by  forming  a 
point  d'appui  for  the  light  cruisers  of  the  enemy.  But 
above  all  else  stands  out  the  sureness  of  touch  with 
which  the  veteran  seaman,  Lord  Fisher,  solved  the 
problem  of  being  in  superior  force  at  the  decisive  point. 
The  actual  meeting  at  the  Falkland  Islands  has  the 
dramatic  touch  about  it  which,  according  to  disposition, 
we  may  call  fortuitous  or  Providential  But  the  uner¬ 
ring  reading  of  von  Spee’s  mind,  the  instant  decision  and 
the  sure  adjustment  of  means  to  the  end  all  lend  to  the 
British  strategy  a  touch  of  genius.  Sturdee’s  ships, 
dependent  on  coal  supply  for  their  motive  power,  were 
lost  to  sight  for  a  month  as  completely  as  were  Nelson’s 
in  the  chase  after  Villeneuve.  But  whereas  the  Admir¬ 
alty  were  as  much  in  ignorance  of  the  whereabouts 

• 

of  the  latter  as  were  the  public,  the  secret,  noiseless 
whispers  of  the  wireless  not  only  kept  Whitehall  fully 
informed  of  all  that  was  passing,  but  also  summoned  all 
the  British  ships  within  the  area  to  the  fateful  rendez¬ 
vous.  The  Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  put  an  end 
at  once  to  all  hope  of  German  support  which  the 
disaffected  within  the  Empire  might  have  cherished, 
and  set  free  the  British  Navy  outside  the  Grand  Fleet 
for  any  work  it  might  be  called  upon  to  do.  There 
was  soon  plenty  ready  to  its  hand. 

The  havoc  wrought  by  German  light  cruisers  on 
British  shipping  in  the  first  phase  of  the  war  was  by  no 


THE  VALLEY  OF  DECISION 


307 


means  negligible.  The  Emden ,  in  particular,  boldly  and 
skilfully  handled,  not  only  sank  seventeen  vessels  worth 
over  two  millions  sterling,  but  even  bombarded  a  part  of 
Madras,  and  sank  a  small  Russian  cruiser  and  a  French 
destroyer  at  Penang.  On  November  9th,  however,  she 
was  caught  by  the  Australian  cruiser,  Sydney ,  off  Cocos 
Keeling  Island  and  destroyed.  The  Sydney ,  with  other 
light  cruisers,  was  engaged  in  convoying  Australasian 
troops — a  touch-and-go  business  under  the  circum¬ 
stances.  The  destruction  of  the  famous  raider  was  a 
very  decided  relief,  especially  as,  about  the  same  time, 
the  Konigsberg ,  which  had  sunk  the  small  cruiser  Pegasus 
off  Zanzibar,  was  driven  into  the  Rufigi  River,  and  there 
held  a  captive  till  she  was  destroyed  some  months  later 
in  a  curious  action  in  which  a  monitor  and  a  seaplane 
bore  part.  The  Karlsruhe ,  operating  in  the  Atlantic, 
also  destroyed  seventeen  ships,  valued  at  a  million  and 
a  half,  before  she  met  with  a  mysterious  end.  The 
Niirnberg,  Dresden ,  and  Leipsic  were  less  successful, 
the  chief  feat  of  the  first-named  being  the  cutting  of 
the  submarine  cable  at  Fanning  Island.  Two  auxiliary 
cruisers,  however,  the  Kronprinz  Wilhelm  and  Prinz  Ei- 
tel  Friedrich ,  sank  between  them  twenty-four  ships, 
worth  about  a  million  and  three-quarters.  They  both 
interned  themselves  when  they  had  exhausted  their 
means  of  obtaining  supplies.  But  another,  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  der  Grosse ,  was  sunk  in  action  by  the  Highflyer 
off  the  coast  of  Morocco,  and  the  Cap  Trafalgar  was 
destroyed  by  the  auxiliary  cruiser,  Carmania ,  after  a 
spirited  and  well-fought  action  in  which  the  victor  very 
nearly  shared  the  fate  of  her  victim. 

Since  the  Dresden  was  destroyed,  the  efforts  of  the 
Germans  in  the  outer  seas,  so  far  as  above- water  craft 
are  concerned,  have  been  confined  to  raids  by  disguised 


3°8 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


vessels  of  uncertain  type,  one  (or  two)  of  which  have 
been  known  by  the  name  of  Mowe.  This  vessel  (or 
these  vessels),  most  ably  commanded  by  Count  von 
und  zu  Dohna-Schlodien,  did  heavy  damage,  and 
succeeded  in  getting  at  least  one  prize  back  into  a 
German  port.  Another  ship,  the  Grief ,  was  discovered 
and  sunk  before  she  could  get  out  to  the  trade  routes. 
She  succeeded  in  torpedoing  her  assailant,  the  auxiliary 
cruiser,  Alcantara ,  before  she  succumbed.  A  sailing 
ship,  to  which  the  name  Seeadler  has  been  given, 
has  also  caused  considerable  havoc,  chiefly  by  means  of 
mines,  as  far  east  as  Colombo.  The  deeds  of  all  these 
vessels  put  together,  however,  by  no  means  approach 
the  loss  we  suffered  from  cruisers  and  privateers  during 
our  most  victorious  wars  in  the  past,  and  even  after  our 
greatest  successes.  Further  discussion  on  the  war 
against  commerce  must,  however,  be  postponed  till  a 
later  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 

The  activities  of  British  cruisers  in  all  parts  of  the 
world  were  thus  efficacious  in  clearing  the  seas  of  enemy 
surface-craft,  in  permitting  the  safe  transport  of  many 
hundred  thousands  of  troops,  and  in  clearing  the  way  for 
offensive  operations  both  by  land  and  sea.  Their 
success  in  this  depended  on  the  soundness  of  the  dis¬ 
positions  which  held  the  main  fleets  in  a  clamp  of  steel 
and  denied  ingress  and  egress  to  and  from  the  enemy’s 
ports  to  vessels  of  ajl  kinds.  This  was  the  root  principle 
of  the  strategy  inherited  by  us  from  the  past :  the  mod¬ 
ern  application  of  Drake’s  plan  of  “impeaching” 
the  enemy  off  his  own  ports.  To  observe  the  enemy 
fleet  from  a  central  position,  whence  any  threatened 
point  could  be  speedily  reached  and  the  foe  be  brought 
to  action  if  he  should  expose  himself,  was  once  again  the 
plan  adopted  by  the  Admiralty.  Togo’s  strategy  in  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  had  shown  how  that  plan  needed 
to  be  modified  in  the  face  of  modern  material.  In  the 
days  of  Cornwallis  the  heavy  ships  had  nothing  to  fear 
but  a  lee  shore  and  the  land  batteries  of  the  defenders. 
They  could  only  be  attacked  by  their  like,  which  was  ex¬ 
actly  the  contingency  which  they  hoped  to  bring  about. 
They  could,  therefore,  lie  in  as  close  proximity  to  the 
port  they  were  appointed  to  watch  as  facilities  for 

3°9 


3io 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


getting  the  requisite  supplies  permitted  and  the  cunning 
of  the  Admiral’s  brain  dictated. 

The  addition  of  the  torpedo,  carried  in  a  swarm  of 
light  and  fast  craft  operating  on  the  surface,  or  in  vessels 
moving  invisible  beneath  the  waters,  and  the  fact  that  a 
consumable  store  like  coal  or  oil  has  taken  the  place  of 
the  wind,  which  is  Nature’s  gift,  compelled  a  modi¬ 
fication  of  this  simple  plan.  Togo  kept  his  fleet  at  “a 
certain  place”  some  sixty  miles  away  from  Port  Arthur, 
keeping  the  fortress  under  observation  by  his  light  craft. 
The  British  Admiralty  adopted  a  similar  plan.  The 
problem  before  them  must  now  be  briefly  stated. 

The  British  battle-fleet  was  confronted  by  a  force 
numerically  a  little  more  than  half  as  strong  as  itself  in 
ships  of  the  first  line.  But  these  were  a  well-organised 
fleet,  provided  with  all  the  necessary  subsidiary  craft  in 
adequate  numbers,  and  aided  by  the  possession  of  a 
means  of  aerial  reconnaissance  which  the  British  were 
without,  namely,  the  famous  Zeppelin  airships.  More¬ 
over,  the  base  of  the  German  fleet  was  that  expanse  of 
intricate  water,  aptly  described  as  the  “wet  triangle,” 
over  which  the  Island  of  Heligoland  stands  sentinel. 
The  strategical  importance  of  the  island  has,  perhaps, 
been  over-estimated ;  but  it  has  a  value  as  an  advanced 
torpedo-base,  and  also  as  a  rallying  point  for  skirmishing 
craft,  as  was  proved  by  the  “Battle  of  the  Bight,”  and 
for  heavy  ships  driven  back  after  an  unsuccessful 
engagement.  The  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser,  with 
Jahde  Bay,  not  only  contain  the  strongly  fortified  naval 
ports  of  Wilhelmshaven,  Cuxhaven,  and  Brunsbuttel, 
but  also  the  entrance  to  the  passage  connecting  the 
front  door  with  the  back,  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal, 
which  joins  the  North  Sea  ports  to  the  great  Baltic 
port  and  dockyard  at  Kiel. 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


311 

The  British  fleet,  then,  had  to  watch  two  exits:  that 
from  the  “wet  triangle”  and  that  from  'the  Baltic 
through  the  Skager  Rak.  It  had  also  to  face  the 
possibility  that,  utilising  its  back-door,  the  German 
fleet  might  go  east  to  attack  the  Russians,  whose  naval 
force  at  the  outbreak  of  war  was  in  no  wise  equal  to 
a  single-handed  contest  with  the  Germans.  Events 
might  at  any  time  have  rendered  it  imperative  for  the 
British  to  enter  the  Baltic  at  all  costs  and  go  to  the 
succour  of  the  Russians,  threatened  with  a  land  and  sea 
attack  which,  if  successful,  would  bring  the  Germans 
within  easy  striking  distance  of  Petrograd.  Its  own 
problems  were,  roughly,  twofold.  It  had  to  cover  the 
coast  of  Britain  and  the  vast  stretch  of  sea  from  the 
north  of  the  British  Islands  to  the  edge  of  the  Arctic 
Circle.  The  North  Sea  may  be  compared  to  a  pyramid 
standing  on  its  apex.  The  distance  from  Wilhelmshaven 
to  Flamborough  Head  being  about  300  sea-miles,  and 
that  from  Dover  to  Calais  22  miles.  If  the  Germans 
were  to  be  prevented  from  enjoying  the  use  of  the  sea,  it 
is  obvious  that  a  position  had  to  be  found  as  a  base 
for  the  British  fleet  which  would  cover  the  route 
north-about.  This  would  necessarily  leave  the  Ger¬ 
mans  nearer  to  the  mouth  of  the  Thames  (to  treat 
that  as  the  vital  spot)  than  the  British  fleet.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  journey  to  and  from  the  English  coast 
would  be  longer  than  that  from  the  British  base  to  the 
entrance  to  the  “wet  triangle.”  There  was,  therefore, 
a  reasonable  certainty  that  if  the  Germans  undertook 
any  serious  enterprise  to  the  southward  they  would  be 
met  and  fought  before  they  could  return.  The  worst 
danger  to  be  feared  was  that  they  would  carry  out 
what  have  come  to  be  known,  from  a  phrase  of  Admiral 
Jellicoe’s,  as  “tip-and-run  raids.”  A  well-organised 


312 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


system  of  flotilla  defence  would  minimise  that  danger. 
The  place  selected  was  a  land-locked  basin  in  the  Ork¬ 
neys,  known  as  Scapa  Flow.  It  is  something  over  500 
miles  from  Wilhelmshaven  and  about  400  from  the 
Skager  Rak.  It  is,  therefore,  well  out  of  range  of  a 
night  attack  by  torpedo-boats,  and  it  covers  the  passage 
north-about.  The  battle-cruiser  fleet  was  stationed 
in  the  Firth  of  Forth,  being  thus  a  hundred  miles 
nearer  the  German  bases  and  150  miles  nearer  the 
mouth  of  the  Thames.  Translating  distance  into 
hours,  and  allowing  for  the  superior  speed  of  the  battle¬ 
cruisers,  it  may  be  said  to  have  been  nine  hours  nearer  to 
the  former,  and  ten  and  a  half  nearer  to  the  latter. 

Regard  the  North  Sea  as  the  Channel,  the  stretch  of 
water  from  the  Orkneys  to  the  Arctic  Circle  as  the 
Atlantic,  and  the  Baltic  as  the  Mediterranean,  and  the 
watch  off  the  “wet  triangle”  does  not  differ  fundamen¬ 
tally  from  the  watch  off  Brest.  We  had,  however,  no 
base  inside  the  Baltic  from  which  to  watch  Kiel  and 
prevent  the  enemy  fleet  from  acting  to  the  eastward  as 
Nelson  watched  Toulon.  The  German  fleet,  besides, 
was  concentrated  instead  of  being  divided  between  sev¬ 
eral  different  ports  with  no  communication  with  each 
other  except  by  way  of  the  open  sea,  and  it  had  the 
power  to  strike  either  east  or  west  without  our  having 
immediate  knowledge  of  its  intentions.  But  the  principle 
is  the  same.  It  was  the  enemy  fleet  which  was  watched, 
and  not  the  coast  which  was  guarded. 

The  choice  of  Scapa  Flow  for  the  base  of  the  battle- 
fleet  has  been  much  criticised ;  but,  on  the  wider  outlook, 
it  was  probably  sound.  At  first  sight,  perhaps,  it  seems 
an  inversion  of  common  sense  to  put  the  fastest  and 
least  powerful  ships  in  the  closest  proximity  to  the 
enemy  ports,  while  retaining  the  slower  and  more 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


3i3 


powerful  to  deal  with  a  possible  attempt  to  break  out 
to  the  north.  But  the  fastest  ships  were  best  qualified 
to  deal  with  the  kind  of  raids  which  the  Germans 
actually  undertook,  and  they  were  best  qualified  also  if 
the  enemy  should  come  out  in  force  to  the  southward 
to  overtake  him  and  fight  a  delaying  action  until  the 
battle-fleet  could  come  up.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  Germans  designed  to  get  their  cruisers  out  on  to  the 
high  seas,  they  would  probably  employ  their  battleship 
strength  in  order  to  force  a  passage  for  them.  Some 
such  design  seems  to  have,  in  fact,  brought  on  the  Battle 
of  Jutland  Bank. 

Having  failed  in  their  first  endeavour  to  reduce  the 
British  fleet  by  *  1  attrition,  ”  the  Germans  next  at¬ 
tempted  to  disarrange  our  plans  and  to  force  us  to  dissi¬ 
pate  our  strength  by  a  series  of  raids  against  our  coast. 
The  first  of  these,  undertaken  against  Yarmouth,  was  a 
ludicrous  failure.  Five  cruisers  took  part,  but,  so  far 
as  is  known,  the  battle-cruisers  were  not  out  on  this 
occasion.  They  attacked  the  little  gunboat  Halcyon , 
which  signalled  to  the  nearest  base,  “Am  engaging 
five  German  cruisers.  Enemy  retiring.”  They  then 
opened  a  furious  cannonade  in  the  direction  of  Yar¬ 
mouth.  Most  of  their  shells  fell  a  mile  short.  In  the 
faint  light  of  dawn  they  were  that  much  out  in  their 
reckoning.  British  forces  were  approaching,  and  they 
fled  incontinently.  On  their  way  the  rearmost  cruiser 
dropped  mines,  which  destroyed  submarine  D  5.  But 
that  loss  was  more  than  offset  by  the  destruction  of  the 
armoured  cruiser  Yorck,  which  hit  a  mine  and  foundered 
just  as  she  was  entering  Jahde  Bay. 

On  December  16th  a  similar  attempt  was  made 
against  Scarborough,  Whitby,  and  the  Hartlepools, 
which  resulted  in  the  death  of  over  a  hundred  civilians, 


3H 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


men,  women,  and  children.  Apparently  the  whole 
battle-cruiser  force  of  the  Germans  took  part  in  this. 
They  were  engaged  by  a  flotilla  of  destroyers,  which 
they  blundered  into  in  the  mist,  and  also  by  a  light 
battery  at  Hartlepool.  Whether  they  suffered  any 
material  damage  or  not  is  not  known,  but  a  careful 
study  of  the  German  casualty  lists  revealed  the  fact 
that  they  had  over  two  hundred  killed  and  wounded. 
So  the  “baby-killers,”  as  Mr.  Churchill  promptly 
dubbed  them,  had  by  no  means  the  best  of  the  deal. 
Only  a  thick  fog  which,  unhappily,  intervened  saved 
them  from  the  hand  of  Sir  David  Beatty  and  his  “Cat” 
squadron.  The  German  and  British  squadrons  were 
actually  within  gunshot  of  each  other.  The  occasion 
was  marked  by  the  publication  of  a  clear  and  strong 
statement  by  the  Admiralty,  warning  the  population 
that  coast  towns  could  not  be  guaranteed  immunity 
from  such  attacks;  that  their  inhabitants  must  bear  in 
mind  that  they  had  no  military  results ;  and  that,  while 
the  Admiralty  regretted  the  circumstances,  they  must 
not  be  allowed  to  modify  the  general  naval  policy  which 
was  being  pursued.  It  is  said  that  the  sceva  indignatio 
roused  by  this  wanton  destruction  of  defenceless  life 
was  worth  an  army  corps  to  the  New  Armies.  At  any 
rate,  the  spirit  displayed  by  the  sufferers  was  beyond 
praise. 

Sir  David  Beatty  was  compensated  for  his  disap¬ 
pointment  on  January  24th,  when  the  Germans,  intent, 
presumably,  on  a  similar  exploit,  were  met  by  the 
British  battle-cruiser  squadron  near  the  Dogger  Bank. 
The  enemy  force  consisted  of  three  battle-cruisers, 
Derfflinger,  Seydlitz,  and  Moltke ,  and  the  armoured 
cruiser  Bliicher ,  a  ship  of  an  inferior  type,  built  by 
the  Germans  as  a  reply  to  the  Invincible  class,  under  a 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


3i5 


misapprehension  of  what  their  design  was  to  be.  She 
carried  only  8.2-inch  guns,  and  was  a  drag  on  the  squad¬ 
ron.  What  had  become  of  the  fourth  German  battle¬ 
cruiser,  Von  der  Tann,  has  never  been  revealed.  It  is 
thought  that  she  was  severely  injured,  probably  by 
collision,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Christmas  Day  air  raid 
on  Cuxhaven.  There  is  good  reason  for  thinking 
that  she  took  part  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland  Bank. 

Beatty  followed  the  enemy  in  general  chase,  his 
flagship,  Lion,  leading.  Deliberate  fire  was  opened  at 
eighteen  thousand  yards,  and  the  official  report  says, 
“We  began  hitting  at  seventeen  thousand  yards.  ”  The 
Bliicher,  which  was  the  last  of  the  German  line,  received 
the  fire  of  each  ship  as  she  passed,  was  reduced  to  a 
sinking  condition  by  gunfire,  and  eventually  torpedoed 
by  the  Arethusa.  The  Derfflinger  and  Seydlitz  also  re¬ 
ceived  severe  damage,  and  were  seen  to  be  heavily  on 
fire.  But  an  unlucky  shot  disabled  the  Lion,  which  had 
to  sheer  out  of  line.  Submarines  were  about  and  the 
position  of  the  vessel  was  dangerous,  but  she  was  well 
screened  by  the  destroyers,  and  escaped  further  injury. 
Beatty  shifted  his  flag  first  to  a  destroyer  and  then  to 
the  Princess  Royal .  But  the  battle  had  gone  roaring  to 
the  east,  and  before  the  resolute  young  Admiral  could 
again  take  command  the  action  had  been  broken  off. 
The  Germans  claimed  a  victory ;  but  as  their  claim  was 
dependent  on  the  utterly  false  assertion  that  they  had 
sunk  the  Lion  and  Tiger,  its  baselessness  was  easily 
exposed. 

The  battle  was  one  of  the  most  picturesque  in  all 
naval  history.  The  battle-cruisers  flew  through  the 
water  at  twenty-eight  or  twenty-nine  knots,  and  the 
destroyers  dashed  hither  and  thither  at  even  greater 
speed.  A  general  chase  under  such  circumstances 


3i6 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


needs  the  most  exceptional  quickness  of  mind  on  the 
part  of  the  Admiral  in  command  and  of  every  captain  in 
the  fleet.  Action  was,  apparently,  broken  off  seventy 
miles  from  Heligoland,  and  it  is  not  therefore  surprising 
that  many  people  should  hold  that  a  little  more  deter¬ 
mination  and  readiness  to  take  risks  on  the  part  of  the 
second  in  command  when  Beatty  was  temporarily  out 
of  action  would  have  brought  about  a  more  decisive 
result.  Only  those  who  are  in  possession  of  the  secret 
information  held  by  the  Admiralty  can  express  an 
opinion  on  that  point.  The  battle-cruiser,  at  any  rate, 
justified  her  existence,  and  the  theories  of  those  who 
insisted  on  the  value  of  the  heaviest  guns  and  of  superior 
speed  were  justified. 

The  heavy  ships  of  the  Germans  made  one  more 
attempt  to  raid  the  coast,  attacking  Lowestoft  and, 
again,  Yarmouth  at  Easter,  1916.  Little  damage  was 
done,  but  the  battle-cruiser  squadron  failed  to  come  up 
with  them,  and,  under  the  Board  of  Admiralty  which 
succeeded  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  and  Lord  Fisher, 
there  was  an  unfortunate  appearance  of  yielding  some¬ 
thing  to  this  kind  of  terrorism.  Certain  alterations 
were  made  in  the  disposition  of  the  fleet.  But  this  was 
not,  in  itself,  so  serious  as  the  admission  in  a  letter  from 
the  First  Lord,  Mr.  Balfour,  to  the  mayors  of  the  two 
towns  that  the  Admiralty  could  now  be  brought  to  con¬ 
sider  the  question  of  local  protection  apart  from  the 
general  strategy  of  the  war  at  sea.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  was  some  evidence  that  “tip-and-run  raids”  were 
not  improving  the  morale  of  the  German  Navy.  A 
German  prisoner  captured  about  this  time  is  said  to 
have  replied  to  some  comments  on  the  poor  shooting 
of  the  German  battle-cruisers  by  naively  remarking, 
“How  can  you  expect  us  to  shoot  well  when  we  may 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


317 


have  the  British  fleet  upon  us  at  any  moment?” 
Whatever  truth  there  may  be  in  the  story,  it  is  certain 
that  on  more  than  one  occasion  the  German  gunners 
have  shown  a  tendency  to  go  to  pieces  after  the  first 
few  salvoes  when  the  British  return  fire  became  hot. 
To  fire  on  defenceless  places  and  to  turn  tail  directly 
there  is  a  chance  of  meeting  a  foe  who  can  hit  back 
never  can  conduce  to  a  high  military  spirit.  The  same 
inefficiency  has  been  noticed  in  the  U-boats  when  they 
meet  an  armed  antagonist. 

On  May  31,  1916,  the  main  fleets  met  for  the  first 
time.  The  German  battle-cruisers  had  steamed  north 
up  the  coast  of  Jutland  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
Skager  Rak.  They  chased  off  some  of  our  light  cruisers 
which  were  watching  the  exit  from  the  Baltic,  and  these 
were  followed  by  the  light  and  battle-cruisers  to  the 
eastward.  The  British  battle-fleet,  with  a  battle¬ 
cruiser  squadron  under  Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace  Hood, 
consisting  of  the  Inflexible ,  Indomitable ,  and  Invincible 
(flag),  and  an  armoured  cruiser  squadron,  consisting  of 
the  Defence  (flag),  Black  Prince ,  Warrior ,  and  Duke  of 
Edinburgh ,  under  Sir  Robert  Arbuthnot,  was  to  the 
north.  Eastward  was  Sir  David  Beatty,  having  un¬ 
der  his  command  the  battle-cruiser  fleet,  consisting 
of  the  Lion  (flag)  Tiger,  Princess  Mary,  Princess 
Royal  (flag),  New  Zealand  (flag),  and  Indefatigable. 
He  had  also  with  him  four  ships  of  the  Queen  Eliza¬ 
beth  class,  with  some  divisions  of  light  cruisers  and 
destroyers.  The  Queen  Elizabeth  herself  and  the  Aus¬ 
tralia  were  absent. 

The  German  battle-cruisers,  chasing'our  light  cruisers, 
found  themselves  in  the  presence  of  Beatty’s  force, 
and  turned  to  run  for  it  with  the  object  of  drawing 
him  down  on  to  the  German  battle-fleet,  which  was 


318 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


following  in  support  from  the  southward.  A  running 
action  ensued,  in  which  the  destroyers  played  a  dashing 
part,  attacking  the  big  ships  in  broad  daylight  and  fight¬ 
ing  miniature  fleet  actions  among  themselves.  Towards 
the  middle  of  the  afternoon  the  light  cruisers,  scout¬ 
ing  ahead  of  the  battle-cruisers,  came  within  range  of 
the  German  battle-fleet.  The  British  sustained  severe 
loss  in  the  first  part  of  the  action,  the  Queen  Mary  and 
Indefatigable  being  sunk.  The  Queen  Elizabeths  could 
not  get  near  enough  to  play  a  decisive  part.  Now, 
both  fleets  went  about,  Beatty,  in  his  turn,  trying  to 
draw  the  Germans  on  to  the  British  battle-fleet,  the 
approach  of  which  had  been  signalled.  The  running 
fight  between  the  battle-cruisers  continued,  while  the 
Queen  Elizabeths  engaged  the  battleships  at  long  range. 
The  weather  conditions,  unfortunately,  now  became 
unfavourable,  with  patches  of  fog  and  low  visibility. 
On  ascertaining  the  approach  of  Admiral  Jellicoe  the 
Germans  sheered  off  to  the  eastward,  with  the  obvious 
intention  of  evading  battle  and  returning  home  along 
the  Danish  coast.  The  movement  was  frustrated  by  a 
splendid  act  of  self-sacrifice  on  the  part  of  Admiral 
Hood.  His  battle-cruisers,  steaming  south-south-west, 
had  come  on  ahead  of  the  battle-fleet  and  appeared  on 
the  scene  just  as  Beatty,  on  the  outer  edge  of  the  circle, 
was  losing  his  position  abeam  of  the  German  battle¬ 
cruisers.  Hood  threw  himself  across  the  head  of  the 
enemy’s  line  by  a  movement  which  recalls  that  of  Nel¬ 
son  at  St.  Vincent,  and  endured  in  his  flagship  the  concen¬ 
trated  fire  of  the  battle-cruiser  squadron  and  the  leading 
German  battleships.  The  fire  of  the  Invincible  was 
noticeably  effective,  but  the  odds  were  too  heavy  for 
her,  and  she  blew  up  and  foundered,  carrying  with  her 
a  heroic  seaman  who,  in  this  one  short  fight,  outshone 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


319 


the  deeds  of  the  famous  sailors  from  whom  he  was 
descended.  Only  the  commander  escaped. 

The  Invincible  did  not  perish  in  vain.  Time  was 
gained;  Beatty  enveloped  the  head  of  the  enemy  line, 
and  Jellicoe,  now  able  to  solve  the  difficulties  of  the  situ¬ 
ation  and  to  form  his  line,  bore  down  upon  them.  The 
British,  however,  had  still  to  suffer  severe  loss  before 
darkness  closed  in.  Sir  Robert  Arbuthnot,  a  hard¬ 
bitten  sailor  of  impetuous  temperament,  either  by  acci¬ 
dent  or  design,  thrust  his  squadron  of  armoured 
cruisers  between  the  British  and  German  battle-fleets  at 
close  range  to  the  latter.  His  flagship,  the  Defence , 
was  instantly  sunk,  and  he  went  down  with  her. 
The  Warrior  sank  in  tow  shortly  afterward,  and  the 
Black  Prince  was  badly  crippled,  forced  to  leave  the 
line,  and  torpedoed  during  the  night.  The  Marl¬ 
borough ,  a  Dreadnought  battleship,  was  also  torpe¬ 
doed,  but  it  was  brought  safely  into  port  under  her 
own  steam. 

By  now,  however,  the  Germans  were  a  beaten  fleet. 
All  semblance  of  formation  was  lost.  The  ships  scat¬ 
tered  and  made  for  their  home  ports  as  best  they  could, 
furiously  assailed  all  through  the  night  by  the  British 
light  cruisers  and  destroyers.  It  is  further  evidence  of 
the  German  tendency  to  go  to  pieces  when  the  odds  turn 
against  them  that,  after  Hood’s  attack  had  foiled  their 
plan  of  escape,  our  light  cruisers  never  hesitated  to 
attack  their  battleships,  and  that  they  did  so  with 
impunity.  The  pursuit  only  ended  with  the  morning, 
when  the  British  found  themselves  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  German  mine-fields,  behind  which  the  battered 
enemy  had  withdrawn.  Jellicoe  remained  at  hand, 
searching  for  stragglers  all  day,  and  then  returned  to  his 
base,  whence  he  reported  himself  again  ready  for  action 


320 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


thirty-six  hours  later.  It  took  the  enemy  months  to 
repair  the  damage,  so  far  as  it  was  reparable. 

The  losses  on  the  British  side,  which  were  chiefly 
incurred  in  the  holding  attacks  necessary  to  bring  the 
German  main  fleet  to  action,  were  three  battle-cruisers, 
three  armoured  cruisers,  and  eight  destroyers  sunk. 
The  Germans  only  admitted  the  loss  of  a  pre- 
Dreadnought  battleship  of  the  Deutschland  class,  one 
battle-cruiser  ( Lutzow ),  three  light  cruisers,  and  a  few 
torpedo-boats  or  destroyers.  The  British  claim  to  have 
sunk  two  battleships  of  the  Kaiser  class  (Dreadnoughts), 
one  of  the  Deutschland  class,  one  battle-cruiser,  five 
light  cruisers,  six  torpedo-boats,  and  a  submarine.  Sir 
John  Jellicoe’s  despatch  adds  that  one  Dreadnought 
battleship,  one  battle-cruiser,  and  three  torpedo-boats 
were  so  badly  damaged  that  it  is  doubtful  if  they  could 
reach  port.  One  of  these  was  presumably  the  battle¬ 
cruiser  Seydlitz,  which  was  put  ashore  by  the  Germans 
in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland,  but  eventually  salved  and 
towed  into  Wilhelmshaven  in  a  plight  which  makes  it 
doubtful  if  she  will  see  any  more  service.  The  British 
figure  of  German  losses  may  fairly  be  taken  as  a  mini¬ 
mum.  As  a  rule,  a  routed  fleet  suffers  more  heavily  in 
its  flight  than  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  action,  and,  as  the 
Germans  were  relentlessly  pursued  and  attacked  all 
through  the  night,  it  is  hardly  likely  that  they  escaped 
further  losses.  But  the  darkness  prevented  the  British 
from  ascertaining  these,  and  gave  the  Germans  an 
opportunity  to  conceal  them. 

Take  any  test  you  please,  and  the  Battle  of  Jutland 
Bank  stands  declared  a  British  victory.  Take  losses  of 
ships,  the  test  which  the  public  most  readily  applies. 
The  Germans  lost  two  Dreadnought  battleships,  the 
British  none.  A  German  squadron  was  spoiled  thereby, 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


321 


and  the  huge  preponderance  possessed  by  the  British 
increased.  The  Germans  lost  one  battle-cruiser  out  of 
five,  and  the  British  three  out  of  ten — no  account  is 
taken  of  ships  completed  since  the  outbreak  of  war — so 
that,  while  the  margin  of  superiority  is  infinitesimally 
reduced,  it  is  still  sufficient.  If  the  Seydlitz  be  really 
an  irreparable  wreck,  the  British  preponderance — which 
stood  at  two  to  one  before  the  battle — is  actually 
increased.  In  light  cruisers  the  Germans  lost  five, 
against  which  we  may  set  the  three  armoured  cruisers 
lost  by  the  British,  for  these  vessels  are  really  of  little 
more  consequence.  Only  in  destroyers  was  the  British 
loss  a  serious  matter  from  a  military  point  of  view.  But 
destroyers  must  be  sacrificed  if  destroyer  work  is  to  be 
done  effectually,  and  there  can  be  no  question  that  the 
work  of  the  flotillas,  both  offensive  and  defensive,  more 
than  repaid  the  loss  they  suffered. 

Or  take  the  objects  for  which  the  battle  was  fought. 
The  ultimate  object  of  any  encounter  between  the  fleets 
must  be,  for  the  Germans,  to  regain  the  free  use  of  the 
sea  in  order  to  relieve  their  necessities  at  home  and  to 
enable  them  to  deliver  a  blow  at  our  heart;  for  the 
British,  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  gaining  that  use 
of  the  sea.  Decisive  victory  for  either  side  means  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy  fleet.  Short  of  that,  victory 
rests  with  the  British  if  they  prevent  their  enemy  from 
regaining  the  use  of  the  sea.  In  the  actual  event  the 
Germans  probably  had  a  more  limited  purpose.  They 
may  have  desired  to  break  a  way  for  some  of  their 
cruisers  to  get  out  and  harry  the  trade  routes,  or  they 
may  have  meant  to  compass  the  destruction  of  Admiral 
Beatty’s  battle-cruisers  by  drawing  them  on  to  the 
battle-fleet.  They  have  never  revealed  what  the  ‘'en¬ 
terprise  to  the  northward  ’  ’  was  on  which  they  professed 

21 


322 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


to  be  engaged.  But,  whatever  their  purpose  was,  they 
indubitably  failed  to  achieve  it.  No  cruisers  appeared 
on  the  high  seas;  the  battle-cruiser  fleet  was  not  de¬ 
stroyed.  And  the  Germans,  whatever  their  object,  cer¬ 
tainly  did  not  mean  to  return  weaker  than  they  set  out. 

From  another  point  of  view  the  British  victory  is 
equally  clear.  The  British  remained  in  possession  of  the 
field  of  battle;  the  German  formation  was  broken  up, 
and  their  morale ,  at  least  temporarily,  destroyed.  That, 
perhaps,  is  the  most  important  point  of  all.  The  case 
may  be  summed  up  in  homely  analogy.  If  a  little  boy 
engaged  in  robbing  an  orchard  be  chased  thence  by  the 
owner  with  a  big  stick,  the  owner  may  remain  in  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  orchard,  but  the  little  boy  may  have  the 
apples.  The  barren  fact  of  victory  rests  with  one  side, 
the  fruit  with  the  other.  But  if  the  boy  is  compelled  to 
leave  the  orchard  without  the  apples,  he  can  hardly  claim 
victory  on  the  ground  that  he  is  still  able  to  sit  down 
without  undue  discomfort.  The  German  claim  to  vic¬ 
tory  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland  can  only  be  maintained  on 
such  a  posteriori  grounds. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  British  victory  was'  not  so 
decisive  as  a  people  nourished  on  the  traditions  of  the 
Nile  and  Trafalgar  were  inclined  to  expect.  A  con¬ 
siderable  amount  of  criticism  has  arisen  from  that  fact, 
and  rather  loose  comparisons  have  been  made  with  the 
victories  of  Hawke  and  Nelson.  In  point  of  fact,  these 
comparisons  are  misleading.  At  Quiberon  Bay,  Con- 
flans  did  not  retreat  to  his  base  at  Brest,  where  he 
would  have  been  under  the  shelter  of  [the  shore  guns. 
He  fled  pell-mell  into  an  undefended  roadstead  where 
the  only  dangers  encountered  in  following  him  were 
the  dangers  of  a  lee  shore,  the  darkness  and  the  gale. 
Hawke,  a  consummate  seaman*  knew  the  coast  as  well 


I 


323 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 

as  Conflans.  He  “took  the  foe  for  pilot”  because  the 
dangers  were  inanimate  dangers,  and  at  fixed  points. 
The  chances  were  equal  for  the  two  sides.  To  follow 
the  Germans  into  their  protected  area  was  a  very 
different  matter.  Moreover,  magnificent  as  was  the 
victory  of  Quiberon  Bay,  the  loss  of  the  enemy  in  action 
was  actually  small.  Their  fleet  was  annihilated  because 
half  the  surviving  vessels  was  mewed  up  in  the  Vilaine, 
where  it  had  no  facilities  for  repair  or  supplies.  The 
German  fleet,  after  its  return  to  the  Bight  of  Heligoland, 
had  all  the  German  bases  at  its  back. 

At  the  Nile  the  French  fleet  was,  to  all  practical 
purposes,  destroyed.  But  Nelson  had  full  opportunity 
to  weigh  the  position  before  he  attacked,  and  he  acted 
upon  one  of  those  brilliant  intuitions  of  genius  which 
show  when  safety  lies  in  taking  apparent  risks.  Brueys 
delivered  himself  into  the  hands  of  the  British  in  a  way 
which  can  only  be  called  imbecile.  The  Germans  acted 
throughout  on  a  considered  plan,  the  ultimate  object 
of  which  was  to  draw  Sir  John  Jellicoe  on  to  do  just 
that  which  he  refused  to  do,  and  is  blamed  in  some 
quarters  for  not  doing.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  more¬ 
over,  that,  after  the  confused  night  action,  he  had  no 
certain  knowledge  of  the  dispositions  of  the  enemy  fleet. 
The  circumstances  of  Trafalgar  were  even  more  dis¬ 
similar.  It  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that,  in  that 
case,  Villeneuve  was  driven  to  sea  by  the  express  orders 
of  Napoleon  and  by  despair  at  the  news  that  he  had 
been  relieved  of  his  command  for  hesitation  to  obey. 
He  came  out  with  the  purpose  of  fighting  a  decisive 
action,  and  he  fought  it  stubbornly  to  the  point 
of  annihilation.  The  Germans,  as  their  movements 
showed,  had  no  intention  of  fighting  the  entire  Grand 
Fleet  to  a  finish. 


324 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


If  we  turn  from  these  three  crushing  victories  to 
others  of  fame  in  our  annals,  v/e  shall  find  that  the  result 
of  Jutland  Bank  compares  very  favourably  with  them, 
if  we  allow  for  certain  facts.  Wooden  ships  were  rarely 
sunk  in  action.  On  the  other  hand,  fighting  at  short 
range  and  even  yard-arm  to  yard-arm,  the  slaughter 
was  often  so  great  as  to  demoralise  the  crews  and  bring 
about  the  surrender  of  the  ship.  In  a  modern  action, 
fought  at  long  range,  with  the  crews  in  armoured 
positions,  damage  to  material,  causing  fire  and  explo¬ 
sion  which,  possibly,  end  in  the  destruction  of  the  ship,  is 
the  more  frequent  result.  That  the  fighting  spirit  of  a 
ship’s  company  should  be  so  demoralised  by  the  fire 
of  an  opponent  ten  thousand  yards  away  that  she  should 
surrender,  unless  cut  off  and  surrounded,  with  her 
motive  power  disabled,  is  almost  unthinkable.  Even 
under  the  latter  circumstances,  the  commanding  officer 
would  probably  order  the  destruction  of  the  ship.  The 
whole  standard,  therefore,  by  which  we  judge  actions 
like  The  Saints,  or  the  Glorious  First  of  June  is  altered. 
The  criterion  of  surrender,  which  was  the  best  evidence 
of  the  moral  superiority  established  by  the  British 
in  these  actions  is  absent  from  Jutland  Bank.  The 
evidence  of  demoralisation  is  of  a  different  kind,  but  it 
is  clear  enough,  and  it  may  be  said,  without  any  fear  of 
exaggeration,  that  the  victory  won  by  Sir  John  Jellicoe 
and  Sir  David  Beatty  was  at  least  as  complete  as  though 
won  by  Rodney  and  Howe,  or  gained  in  many  another 
battle  which  resulted  in  two  or  three  prizes  being  taken, 
but,  in  many  cases  had  important  strategical  results — 
e.  g.y  Saumarez’s  action  with  Linois  off  Algeciras  in  1801. 

Let  it  be  granted,  as  everyone  must  grant,  that  the 
complete  destruction  of  the  enemy  fleet  is  the  best  and 
surest  way  to  gain  control  of  the  sea.  Let  it  be  granted 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


325 


also  that,  until  the  enemy  fleet  is  destroyed,  it  is  not 
strictly  correct  to  speak  of  either  combatant  having 
command  of  the  sea.  ’  ’  Does  that  make  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  enemy  fleet  an  object  to  be  pursued  at  any 
risk?  With  due  deference  to  some  distinguished  naval 
officers  who  appear  to  think  that  it  does,  it  is  sub¬ 
mitted  that  such  was  not  the  practice  of  the  great 
masters  of  naval  war.  In  May,  1805,  Ganteaume,  by 
Napoleon’s  instructions,  left  the  inner  anchorage  of 
Brest  and  anchored  outside  the  Goulet  Passage  under 
the  protection  of  batteries  mounting  150  heavy  guns 
which  had  been  erected  for  the  purpose.  Neither 
Cornwallis  nor  Gardner,  who  was  in  command  during 
the  absence  of  the  former  through  illness,  made  any 
attempt  to  attack  until  August,  when,  hearing  that 
Villeneuve  was  at  sea,  Ganteaume  weighed  and  stood 
out  as  if  to  engage.  When  Cornwallis  took  up  the 
challenge,  he  thought  better  of  it  and  returned.  Corn¬ 
wallis  followed  him  and  engaged  his  rear,  but,  coming 
under  the  fire  of  the  shore  batteries,  desisted  from  the 
attack.  For  batteries  read  minefields  and  submarines, 
and  the  policy  pursued  by  Sir  John  Jellicoe  is  clearly 
identical  with  that  of  Cornwallis,  a  hard-fighting  old 
seaman  whom  no  one  has  ever  accused  of  undue  caution. 

Nelson’s  conduct  off  Toulon  was  precisely  of  the  same 
cautious  kind.  The  story  of  the  game  of  bluff  played 
by  him  and  Admiral  Latouche  -  Treville  in  1804 
makes  amusing  reading,  but  it  is  quite  conclusive  as 
to  the  principles  which  guided  him.  “My  friend, 
M.  Latouche,  sometimes  plays  bo-peep  in  and  out  of 
Toulon,  like  a  mouse  at  the  edge  of  her  hole,”  he 
writes,  and,  again:  “Yesterday  a  rear-admiral  and 
seven  sail,  including  frigates,  put  their  nose  outside  the 
harbour.  If  they  go  on  playing  this  game,  some  day  we 


326 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


shall  lay  salt  upon  their  tails,  and  so  end  the  campaign.  ” 
He  put  Bickerton,  with  five  sail,  close  to  the  harbour  to 
draw  the  French  out,  a  “method  to  make  M.  Latouche 
angry  ’  ’ ;  but  he  himself  kept  twenty  leagues  away.  And 
he  clinches  the  matter  in  the  following  passage: 

I  think  their  fleet  will  be  ordered  out  to  fight  close  to 
Toulon,  that  they  may  get  their  crippled  ships  in  again, 
and  that  we  must  then  quit  the  coast  to  repair  our  damages 
and  thus  leave  the  coast  clear;  but  my  mind  is  fixed  not  to 
fight  them ,  unless  with  a  westerly  wind  outside  the  Hyeres  and 
with  an  easterly  wind  to  the  westward  of  Side. 

Finally,  M.  Latouche  did  something  characteristic¬ 
ally  German.  He  came  out  with  his  whole  force  as  if 
to  offer  battle,  but  retired  under  the  guns  of  Toulon  on 
Nelson’s  approach.  He  then  made  a  report  that  Nelson 
had  run  away  from  him,  adding  that  he  pursued  till 
nightfall,  and,  next  morning,  could  not  see  the  enemy. 
Nelson’s  wrath  knew  no  bounds.  “You  will  have  seen 
M.  Latouche’s  letter,  of  how  he  chased  me  and  I  ran,  ” 
he  writes.  “I  keep  it;  and,  by  God,  if  I  take  him,  he 
shall  eat  it !  ”  But  M.  Latouche  died  shortly  afterwards 
from  another  cause. 

Minefields,  destroyers,  and  submarines  are  more  for¬ 
midable  to  a  battle-fleet  than  shore  batteries.  Yet  we 
see  that  Cornwallis  and  Nelson  steadfastly  refused  to  be 
drawn  into  action  under  the  shore  guns,  while  Hawke 
readily  accepted  it  when  and  where  there  were  no 
batteries  to  be  feared.  To  hold  that  battle  is  in  itself 
the  end  at  which  a  commander  should  aim  is  as  unsound 
as  to  hold  that  war  can  be  made  without  taking  risks. 
Those  who  accuse  Sir  John  Jellicoe  of  thinking  of  the 
safety  of  the  fleet  rather  than  of  victory  are  not  only 
doing  an  injustice  to  an  officer  whose  qualities  of  courage 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


327 


and  resolution  have  been  ofttimes  tested,  but  are  guilty 
of  very  shallow  criticism.  If  the  enemy’s  whole  fleet 
consist  of  ten  vessels,  it  is  worth  while  to  lose  twenty  in 
destroying  the  ten.  But  if  there  is  a  strong  probability 
that  a  part  at  least  of  his  force  will  escape,  while  the 
attacking  fleet  will  lose  so  heavily  that  it  will  be  left 
inferior  to  the  survivors,  then  an  attack  shows  not 
courage,  but  criminal  folly.  That  such  would  be  the 
result  of  engaging  the  Germans  a  outrance  under  condi¬ 
tions  chosen  by  themselves  is  most  probable.  “That 
they  may  get  their  crippled  ships  in  again,  and  that  we 
must  then  quit  the  coast  to  repair  our  damages  and 
thus  leave  the  coast  clear,”  was  as  plainly  the  object 
of  the  Germans  in  offering  battle  in  proximity  to  their 
ports  as  it  was  the  object  of  M.  Latouche.  The  pros¬ 
pect  is  not  made  more  seductive  by  the  fact  that,  under 
modern  conditions,  there  might  be  no  ships  to  repair. 

The  truth  is  that  the  critics  think  in  the  terms  of 
time  and  space  wdiich  belong  to  Nelson’s  day,  not  to  our 
own.  Nelson’s  position  at  twenty  leagues  from  Toulon 
in  his  day,  when  all  information  had  to  be  conveyed  by 
frigate,  and  he  was  dependent  on  the  wind  to  bear  him 
to  the  decisive  spot,  was  not  so  very  far  different  from 
that  of  the  Grand  Fleet  in  relation  to  the  German  bases 
to-day,  while  his  determination  not  to  fight  unless  he 
could  catch  the  enemy  at  a  distance  of  ten  to  fifteen 
miles  from  Toulon  is  certainly  not  extravagantly 
translated  into  an  intention  not  to  begin  an  action 
within,  let  us  say,  a  hundred  to  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  off  the  Bight  of  Heligoland. 

Nelson’s  principle  was  only  to  fight  under  conditions 
which  gave  him  an  assurance  of  decisive  victory.  That 
is  plain  no  less  from  the  tactics  of  Trafalgar,  where  he 
did  fight,  than  from  those  employed  off  Toulon,  where 


328 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


he  did  not.  The  whole  of  the  order  of  attack  at  Trafal¬ 
gar  was  based  on  the  idea  of  going  down  to  the  enemy 
in  order  of  sailing,  so  as  not  to  waste  time  in  forming 
the  line  in  light  airs  lest  the  day  should  prove  too  short 
for  a  decision.  Nelson  certainly  never  held  the  doctrine 
that  a  battle  was  an  end  in  itself.  On  the  return  voyage 
from  the  West  Indies,  he  was  accustomed  to  say  to  his 
captains,  speaking  of  the  French  fleet : 

If  we  meet  them,  we  shall  find  them  not  less  than  eigh¬ 
teen,  I  rather  think  twenty,  sail  of  the  line,  and  therefore 
do  not  be  surprised  if  I  do  not  fall  on  them  immediately; 
we  won’t  part  without  a  battle.  I  will  let  them  alone  until 
we  approach  the  shores  of  Europe,  or  they  give  me  an 
advantage  too  tempting  to  be  resisted. 

He  was  in  inferior  force,  and  he  would  not  fight  at  a  dis¬ 
advantage,  until  all  chance  of  reinforcements  reaching 
him  before  the  enemy  made  his  own  ports  had  vanished. 
Then  he  would  attack,  and  sacrifice  his  fleet,  if  neces¬ 
sary,  because,  by  so  doing,  he  would  reduce  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  relatively  to  the  British.  His  was  not  the 
fleet  upon  which  the  all  of  his  country  depended.  He 
relied  on  his  fleet  taking  heavier  toll  than  it  paid,  and 
knew  that,  by  so  much  he  would  relieve  his  comrades- 
in-arms.  He  kept  the  ulterior  objects  steadily  in  view. 
But  he  avoided  the  mistake,  which  is  what  Mahan 
really  criticises  in  the  French  school  of  naval  strategy, 
of  forgetting  that  all  ulterior  objects  are  best  served  by 
the  destruction  of  the  enemy’s  fleet,  if  an  opportunity 
offers  sufficiently  advantageous  to  give  a  reasonable 
certainty  of  success.  Until  it  is  proved  that  such  an 
opportunity  of  destroying  the  German  fleet  has  been 
offered  and  refused,  one  is  justified  in  maintaining 
that  the  strategy  of  the  Admiralty  and  of  Sir  John 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


329 


Jellicoe  has  been  in  accordance  with  the  best  doctrines 
of  naval  war  as  taught  by  its  greatest  professors. 

After  the  Battle  of  Jutland  Bank  the  Germans  made 
no  further  attempt  to  meet  the  British  fleet  in  force, 
though,  in  an  excursion,  the  details  of  which  have  never 
been  made  known,  they  succeeded  in  destroying  two  of 
our  light  cruisers  by  submarine  attack.  As,  however,  a 
Dreadnought  battleship  of  theirs  was  twice  torpedoed 
by  one  of  our  submarines,  they  suffered  more  heavily 
than  they  gained.  On  a  later  occasion  also  British  sub¬ 
marines  got  torpedoes  home  on  German  battleships. 

The  High  Sea  Fleet,  however,  remains  a  menace,  and 
is  the  chief  reason  why  we  are  unable  to  take  completely 
effective  measures  to  prevent  German  submarines  from 
reaching  the  trade  routes.  The  weapon  employed  for 
commerce  destruction  is  new,  and  the  method  of  its 
employment  is  an  offence  against  God  and  man.  But 
the  old  lessons  which  naval  history  has  taught  remain 
true:  that  the  power  to  use  the  sea  in  war-time  and 
the  power  to  restrict  the  use  of  the  sea  alike  depend  on 
the  existence  of  a  fleet  capable  of  fighting  for  suprem¬ 
acy.  These  matters,  however,  will  be  more  fully  dis¬ 
cussed  in  the  next  chapter.  It  remains  to  refer  briefly 
to  events  in  other  seas  in  which  fleets  of  heavy  ships  are 
employed. 

Both  the  French  and  the  Russians  have  very  largely 
increased  their  number  of  capital  ships  since  the  war  be¬ 
gan.  In  the  Black  Sea  the  latter  possess  an  undoubted 
supremacy  of  which  it  cannot  be  said  they  have  made 
full  use.  Along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  their  military 
operations  were  assisted  by  the  fleet  up  to  the  fall  of 
Trebizond,  and  it  appeared  likely  that  an  adroit  use  of 
the  tactics  there  employed  might  bring  them  to  the  head 
of  the  Bosporus.  This  hope  has  not  been  fulfilled,  and, 


330 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


furthermore,  the  Russians  failed  to  make  use  of  their 
maritime  superiority  to  frustrate  the  German  and 
Bulgarian  crossings  of  the  Danube  near  its  mouth  and 
the  consequent  outflanking  of  the  Rumanian  armies. 
It  was  a  severe  disappointment  to  every  believer  in  sea 
power  to  notice  the  absolute  neglect  of  the  means  of 
defence  afforded  by  the  waterway  of  the  Danube. 
The  Russian  Revolution  and  the  light  it  has  thrown 
on  the  chaotic  internal  condition  of  the  country, 
however,  go  far  to  explain  the  reason.  It  emphasises 
once  more  the  fact  that  the  sea  will  not  serve  a  tyrant. 
This  is  no  mere  rhetorical  phrase.  Since  the  Goeben 
was  disabled  and  one  or  more  of  their  own  battle¬ 
cruisers  were  finished,  the  Russians  have  had  no  main 
fleet  to  face  in  the  Black  Sea,  yet  their  own  greatly 
superior  navy  has  remained  impotent. 

In  the  Baltic,  as  has  been  pointed  out  before,  the 
situation  is  a  curious  one.  By  virtue  of  their  back¬ 
door  the  Germans  can,  in  theory,  bring  a  vastly  superior 
force  to  bear  against  the  Russians.  But  the  latter  are, 
more  or  less,  secure  in  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  and  the 
Germans  have  not  at  present  dared  to  risk  decisive 
operations  for  fear  of  weakening  their  position  in  the 
North  Sea.  The  Grand  Fleet  defends  the  gate  of 
Petrograd.  The  Germans  burned  their  fingers  badly 
when  they  attempted  conjoint  operations  against 
Riga  in  the  summer  of  1915,  and,  indeed,  up  to  now, 
have  met  with  nothing  but  misfortune  in  anything  they 
have  attempted  in  the  only  sea  which  they  can  claim  to 
control.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Russians  have  made 
no  use  of  their  opportunities  for  offensive  action,  if  only 
on  a  small  scale.  Once  again,  the  cause  must  be 
assigned  to  the  internal  condition  of  the  country  and 
the  hostility  and  suspicions  of  Sweden  which  have 


THE  MAIN  FLEETS 


33i 


hampered  the  Russian  use  of  the  sea  from  the  first.  It 
is  perfectly  true  that  the  Russian  battle-fleet  in  the 
Baltic,  like  the  German  in  the  North  Sea  is  precluded 
from  taking  heavy  risks  for  fear  of  “leaving  the  coast 
clear”;  but  our  Ally  is  strong  in  torpedo-craft,  and  is 
better  situated  than  any  other  member  of  the  Alliance 
for  forcing  action  on  the  Germans.  The  political 
consequences  of  successful  activities  would  be  such 
that  a  considerable  amount  of  risk  would  be  justified. 

In  the  Adriatic,  the  only  other  important  scene  of 
naval  activity,  the  French  and  Italians  have  been 
content  to  blockade  the  Austrian  fleet,  suffering  consider¬ 
able  losses  by  submarine  attack  in  the  narrow  waters. 
The  attempt  upon  Cattaro  in  the  earlier  part  of  the 
war  was  feeble  and  irresolute,  and  the  opportunity  for 
more  decisive  action  passed  when  the  Montenegrins  lost 
Mount  Lovtcha,  which  commands  the  harbour.  The 
geographical  features  of  this  sea  have  been  explained  in 
the  chapter  on  the  Mediterranean  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
Now,  as  then,  the  Italians,  for  this  purpose  the  succes¬ 
sors  of  the  Venetians,  are  eager  to  obtain  a  foothold  on 
its  eastern  shore.  They  have  one,  temporarily,  at  any 
rate,  in  Avlona,  but  political  and  national  jealousies 
dominate  the  situation..  If  Trieste  be  taken,  and  the 
Istrian  Peninsula  fall  into  the  hands  of  our  Ally,  the 
question  of  the  Austrian  fleet  will  be  speedily  solved.  A 
successful  advance  of  the  Allies  through  Serbia,  or  the 
elimination  of  Bulgaria  from  the  war,  might  also  render 
the  naval  positions  of  the  Austrians  untenable. 

The  naval  events  of  the  war,  in  fact,  have  reinforced 
the  lesson  learned  from  the  fate  of  Cervera’s  squadron 
in  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  of  the  Russian  fleet  in  Port 
Arthur,  that  a  naval  force  which  is  unwilling  to  fight  can 
only  be  compelled  to  do  so — or  perish  if  it  does  not — 


332 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


by  the  conjoint  use  of  sea  and  land  forces.  It  is  no  new 
fact,  but  one  which,  in  early  history,  is  obscured  because 
the  line  of  distinction  between  land  and  sea  forces  is 
narrow,  and  because,  before  the  days  of  long-range 
weapons,  actions  were  often  fought  within  the  harbours 
themselves.  Salamis  was  brought  about  thus,  and  so 
was  the  Siege  of  Sebastopol.  In  our  great  wars  with  the 
French  we  should  have  done  the  same  thing  had  we 
possessed  the  necessary  land  force.  As  it  was,  our  fleets 
had  to  wait  and  watch  until  other  conditions,  operating, 
perhaps,  at  a  great  distance,  compelled  the  enemy  to 
sea.  The  development  of  aerial  warfare  may,  perhaps, 
bring  about  a  change.  But  that  has  not  yet  gone  far 
enough,  and  the  hopes  which  some  built  on  the  sub¬ 
marine  and  its  possible  use  as  a  ferret  have  not,  up  to 
the  present,  been  justified.  The  main  fleets,  therefore, 
act  by  a  process  of  silent  constriction  which  is  elusive, 
though  all  pervading.  This  influence,  however,  is  not 
confined  to  the  stronger.  The  weaker  fleets  also  exer¬ 
cise  it  in  their  degree,  and,  in  considering  what  is  to 
follow,  it  is  important  to  recognise  the  difference 
between  a  fleet  which  will  not  and  a  fleet  which  can 
not  fight. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


CONCLUSION 

The  use  of  the  submarine  by  the  Germans  has  raised 
questions,  moral,  military,  and  economic,  to  which  vary¬ 
ing  answers  have  been,  and  will,  for  a  long  time,  be 
given.  Up  to  the  summer  of  1914  the  underwater  boat 
was  going  through  a  process  of  evolution  as  a  military 
weapon  which  followed  pretty  closely  that  of  the 
torpedo-boat  and  destroyer.  Beginning  as  a  mere 
engine  of  harbour  defence,  the  weapon  of  the  weaker 
Power,  the  submarine,  thanks  to  engineering  improve¬ 
ments,  chiefly  the  perfecting  of  the  heavy-oil  engine,  to 
optical  science,  and,  above  all,  to  the  daring  and  skill 
of  the  young  officers  trained  to  use  her,  had  become 
a  sea-  and  even  an  ocean-going  vessel  of  almost 
unlimited  possibilities  for  offence  and  observation. 
British  submarines,  before  and  after  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  war,  made  voyages  to  China,  from 
Australia,  and  across  the  Atlantic.  Within  three  hours 
after  the  beginning  of  hostilities  they  were,  as  Mr. 
Churchill  informed  the  House  of  Commons,  inside 
the  Bight  of  Heligoland,  watching  the  movements  of 
the  German  fleet,  and  they  were  used  to  guard  the 
passage  of  the  Army  to  France.  The  feat  of  Com¬ 
mander  Holbrook,  V.C.,  in  diving  under  the  Turkish 
minefield  in  the  Dardanelles  and  torpedoing  the  battle- 

333 


334 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


ship  Messudyeh,  the  actions  of  Commander  Nasmyth 
in  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and  many  like  exploits,  seemed 
to  confirm  the  hopes  of  those  who  believed  that,  in 
the  submarine,  we  possessed  a  weapon  which  might 
be  effectively  used  to  drive  a  reluctant  fleet  out  of 
harbour  to  battle.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans 
taught  us  lessons  of  caution.  A  single  submarine,  as 
the  Germans  claimed,  destroyed  the  three  armoured 
cruisers,  Cressy ,  Hogue ,  and  Aboukir ,  by  the  use  of  a 
decoy;  the  Pathfinder  and  Hermes  fell  victims  to  the 
same  agency,  and  the  Formidable  (battleship)  was 
torpedoed  and  sunk  by  an  attack  at  night,  when  it 
was  believed  that  the  submarine  must  be  too  blind 
to  be  effective. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  German  harbours  had  proved 
impregnable  to  attack,  and  many  attempts  on  our  fleets 
at  their  bases  were  unsuccessful.  Moreover,  the  main 
fleets,  manoeuvring  at  high  speed  and  well  screened  by 
destroyers,  moved  about  the  seas  with  impunity,  while 
the  underwater  craft  proved  more  vulnerable  to  the 
assaults  of  light  cruisers  than  their  more  enthusiastic 
advocates  had  foreseen.  As  a  military  weapon,  in 
fact,  they  proved  effective,  but  not  decisive.  An  armed 
and  organised  fleet  had  little  to  fear  from  them. 

But  the  successful  attacks  on  the  three  cruisers  and 
on  the  Formidable  showed  that,  under  certain  condi¬ 
tions,  they  might  be  used  with  deadly  effect  in  a  war  on 
commerce.  Admiral  Sir  Percy  Scott,  writing  to  the 
Times  a  month  or  two  before  the  war,  pointed  out  the 
possibilities,  and,  though  experience  proved  his  theories 
wrong  in  many  respects,  especially  as  to  the  submarine 
compelling  the  withdrawal  of  the  battle-squadrons  from 
the  seas,  in  others  he  proved  an  accurate  seer  of  the 
things  which  were  to  come.  The  Germans  were  late 


CONCLUSION 


335 


beginners  with  the  weapon  which  they  afterwards 
claimed  as  particularly  their  own.  It  is  one  of  the 
ironies  of  war  that  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  the  father  of 
submarine  piracy — a  term  which  will  be  justified  pres¬ 
ently — persistently  deprecated  the  military  value  of 
the  submarine  until  a  comparatively  short  time  before 
war  broke  out,  with  the  consequence  that  Germany  had 
only  thirty  completed  boats  in  August,  1914. 

The  various  attempts  at  codifying  the  law,  or,  rather, 
the  practice,  of  war  at  sea  had  left  matters  in  a  state 
of  royal  confusion.  Without  attempting  a  complete 
analysis,  it  may  be  said  that  enemy  ships  were  liable  to 
capture  and  neutral  ships  were  not,  save  under  condi¬ 
tions  shortly  to  be  named.  Under  the  Declaration  of 
Paris,  to  which  this  country  was  a  party,  free  ships  made 
free  goods — that  is  to  say,  enemy  goods,  except  contra¬ 
band  of  war  could  not  be  captured  in  neutral  ships — 
neutral  goods  in  enemy  ships  were  not  liable  to  capture; 
privateering  was  abolished ;  blockade,  to  be  binding  up¬ 
on  neutrals,  must  be  effective — that  is  to  say,  a  ship 
attempting  to  enter  a  blockaded  port  must  be  in  real 
danger  of  capture,  and  must  not  be  made  prize  as  a 
punitive  measure  subsequent  to  the  running  of  her  cargo. 
Moreover,  it  was  agreed  by  sundry  of  the  Hague  Con¬ 
ventions  that  ships  seized  by  vessels  of  war  must  be 
brought  into  the  Prize  Court  for  adjudication,  and 
might  only  be  sunk  in  the  case  of  urgent  military  neces¬ 
sity,  in  which  case  their  papers  must  be  preserved  and 
every  provision  made  for  the  safety  of  their  passen¬ 
gers  and  crews.  If  these  conditions  could  not  be  com¬ 
plied  with,  the  ships  must  be  released. 

The  flaws  in  this  rough-and-ready  code  of  rules  are 
easily  apparent.  One  or  two  only,  which  are  relevant 
to  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  need  be  mentioned.  The 


336 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


definition  of  “contraband”  was  left  to  the  discretion  of 
the  belligerent  Powers,  with  the  exception  that  certain 
articles  ancipitis  usus,  of  which  the  chief  are  foodstuffs, 
were  declared  contraband  conditionally  on  their  being 
consigned  to  the  government  of  a  belligerent  for  use  by 
the  armed  forces.  Again,  no  definition  of  “military 
necessity”  was  attempted,  nor  were  any  rules  laid  down 
as  to  what  constituted  adequate  provision  for  the  safety 
of  passengers  and  crews  in  the  case  of  ships  destroyed. 
Furthermore,  the  definition  of  “effective  blockade” 
was  too  loosely  framed  to  cover  the  conditions  which 
arose  with  the  use  of  the  submarine  for  this  purpose. 

The  Germans  hypocritically  pretended  that  they 
resorted  to  submarine  war  against  merchantmen  as  a 
reprisal  for  the  alleged  illegal  and  inhuman  action  of 
Great  Britain  in  cutting  off  imports  of  food,  and  thus, 
so  it  was  alleged,  starving  German  women  and  children. 
In  point  of  fact — it  is  worth  remembering — the  Ger¬ 
mans  by  their  own  act  in  declaring  war  on  Russia  cut 
themselves  off  from  the  main  source  of  their  imports  of 
breadstuffs,  and,  by  forcing  Turkey  into  the  war,  cut  us 
also  off  from  the  same  source  of  supply.  Their  demand, 
therefore,  was  that  we  should  allow  them  free  access 
to  markets  of  which  they  made  a  comparatively  small 
use  in  time  of  peace,  there  to  compete  with  us,  who  used 
them  largely  and  whose  need  was  the  greater  on  account 
of  the  closing  of  the  Dardanelles.  However,  that  point 
need  not  be  laboured.  It  is  enough  to  recall  that,  while 
the  German  cruisers  were  still  at  large,  they  deliberately 
sank  all  the  vessels  laden  with  foodstuffs  destined 
for  this  country  which  they  could  capture,  includ¬ 
ing  the  William  P.  Frye ,  an  American  sailing  ship 
bound  from  Seattle  to  Liverpool  with  a  cargo  of  wheat. 
Moreover,  our  Order  in  Council  was  not  issued  until 


CONCLUSION 


337 


after  the  first  submarine  campaign  had  begun,  and 
until  the  German  Government  had  taken  over  the  whole 
wheat  supply  of  the  country,  thus  acquiring  the  power 
to  allot  any  proportion  it  thought  good  to  the  armies. 

The  first  submarine  campaign  began  in  February, 
1915.  It  was  ostensibly  aimed  only  at  British  ships 
approaching  or  leaving  the  shores  of  this  country. 
Neutrals  were  warned  that  accidents  might  occur,  and 
“accidents”  did.  The  war  was  conducted  with  abso¬ 
lute  ruthlessness,  ships  being  torpedoed  without  warn¬ 
ing,  and  the  crews,  in  some  instances,  being  shelled 
as  they  were  leaving  their  vessels  in  their  boats.  The 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania ,  with  the  consequent  loss  of 
1100  lives,  and  of  the  cross-Channel  steamer,  Sussex , 
were  the  incidents  which  made  the  greatest  impression 
on  the  world,  but  they  were,  in  fact,  no  more  atrocious 
than  many  other  acts  done  by  the  Germans.  The 
campaign  in  this  form,  however,  was  a  total  failure. 
The  boats  used  for  the  purpose  were  small  and  designed 
for  military  purposes;  they  were  extremely  vulnerable; 
the  restrictions  imposed  to  avoid  offence  to  neutrals, 
and,  especially  to  the  United  States,  hampered  their 
use,  and  the  British  counter-measures  rapidly  became 
effective.  By  the  late  summer  or  early  autumn  of 
1915,  the  war  on  merchantmen  had  ceased  to  be  a 
matter  of  serious  concern. 

The  sense  of  victory  and  security  engendered  in  the 
British  people,  and,  unfortunately,  in  the  British 
Admiralty,  was,  however,  entirely  illusory.  The  Ger¬ 
mans  were  following  a  deep-laid  plan.  While  Count 
von  Reventlow  and  others  were  abusing  Herr  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  for  laying  aside  the  sharpest 
weapon  of  Germany;  while  von  Tirpitz  was  forced  into 
retirement,  and  while  the  Chancellor,  on  his  side,  was 


22 


338 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


protesting  that  lack  of  success  and  not  lack  of  will  had 
forced  the  termination  of  the  U-boat  warfare,  the 
Germans  were  building  boats  by  the  score  of  a  newer, 
bigger,  and  stronger  type,  training  crews,  laying  plans, 
experimenting,  preparing  the  ground  for  the  playing 
of  their  highest  trump — the  knave.  At  the  end  of 
1916,  after  much  preliminary  blowing  of  trumpets,  a 
so-called  “ peace-offer”  was  issued.  It  amounted 
to  no  more  than  an  invitation  to  a  conference,  at  which 
Germany  would  state  her  terms.  It  was  preluded 
by  an  offensive  claim  to  victory.  The  Allies,  wisely  or 
unwisely — it  depends  on  the  point  of  view — replied  by 
a  statement  of  their  aims.  Immediately  the  prepared 
outcry  arose  in  Germany  and  the  countries  of  her 
Allies.  “England”  had  spurned  the  hand  offered  to 
her  and  had  proclaimed  her  intention  to  destroy  Ger¬ 
many.  On  her  head,  then,  rested  the  guilt  of  the  con¬ 
tinued  bloodshed ;  Germany  would  now  use  her  sharpest 
weapons.  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  with  a  cyni¬ 
cism  worthy  of  his  “scrap  of  paper”  outburst  and  his 
admission  of  the  wrong  done  to  Belgium  when  the 
German  armies  set  themselves  to  “hack  their  way 
through”  her  territories,  declared  that  he  had  only 
been  waiting  for  a  favourable  opportunity  to  open 
“unrestricted  U-boat  warfare.”  The  time  had  now 
come ;  Germany  was  ready,  both  with  men  and  material ; 
the  food-supply  of  the  whole  world  was  short,  and,  if 
the  United  States  saw  fit  to  resent  German  measures, 
their  intervention  would  come  too  late  to  affect  the  issue. 
The  prophets  of  Germany  declared  that  the  U-boats 
were  in  a  position  to  sink  a  million  tons  of  shipping  a 
month,  and  that  Great  Britain  would  be  forced  to  sue 
for  peace  in  three. 

The  measures  proclaimed  were  a  challenge  to  the 


CONCLUSION 


339 


whole  world.  Every  ship  of  whatever  nationality 
which  approached  a  cordon  drawn  round  practically 
the  whole  of  Europe  would  be  sunk  at  sight.  Hospital 
ships  were  included  among  the  intended  victims,  on  the 
flimsy  pretence  that  the  British  employed  them  for 
the  conveyance  of  troops  and  stores.  The  proclama¬ 
tion  was  attended  by  every  sort  of  insult  to  neutrals, 
such  as  the  insolent  permission  given  to  the  Dutch  to 
send  a  weekly  paddle-steamer  to  Southwold  and  to  the 
Americans  to  send  one  ship  a  week,  painted  in  a  pre¬ 
scribed  and  ridiculous  way,  to  Falmouth.  Moreover, 
the  Chancellor,  having  protested  up  to  the  last  that  the 
Germans  meant  to  adhere  to  their  agreement  with  the 
United  States,  arrived  at  after  the  sinking  of  the  Sussex , 
that  they  would  not  destroy  passenger  steamers  without 
warning,  told  the  American  Ambassador  only  six  hours 
before  the  “unrestricted  warfare”  was  to  be  put  into 
effect  of  the  intentions  of  Germany,  with  the  calm 
intimation  that  the  German  word  held  good  just  so 
long  as  it  suited  Germany,  and  no  longer.  The  result 
was  an  immediate  material  success  for  the  Germans, 
and  a  crushing  moral  defeat.  Ships  went  down  like 
leaves  in  autumn.  Hospital  ships,  Belgian  relief  ships, 
under  German  safe  conduct,  anything  and  everything. 
Neutrals  hesitated  to  sail.  The  whole  trade  of  the 
world  was  thrown  out  of  gear.  But  the  United  States 
ranged  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  and,  from 
China  to  Peru,  the  neutral  States  showed  their  detest¬ 
ation  of  the  crime  either  by  declaring  war  or  by  break¬ 
ing  off  relations  with  the  German  Government.  Only 
the  little  sea-bordered  States  of  Northern  Europe,  too 
near  to  Germany  and  too  weak  to  resent  her  iniquity, 
bowed  the  head  and  suffered.  The  immediate  addition 
to  the  forces  of  the  Alliance  in  the  field  was  not  great. 


340 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


So  far,  the  German  calculation  was  correct.  But  the 
addition  to  the  unseen  forces  which  work  silently 
through  sea  power  was  enormous.  Every  embarrass¬ 
ment  felt  by  Great  Britain  in  her  blockade  policy  was 
swept  away.  She  became  to  the  whole  world  what  she 
had  never  been  before  in  all  her  wars,  the  champion  of 
its  rights  instead  of  the  tyrant  of  the  seas.  For  it 
has  always  been  the  weakness  of  Britain  that,  while 
she  was  fighting  for  liberty  against  land-tyranny,  she 
has  always  been  compelled  by  her  war-measures  to 
appear  as  the  antagonist  of  neutral  right,  or,  at  any  rate, 
of  neutral  interest. 

After  a  first  gasp  of  surprise  the  British  people 
steadied  themselves  to  meet  the  new  situation.  Never 
did  they  prove  more  gloriously  their  right  to  be  con¬ 
sidered  the  first  maritime  nation  in  the  world.  Not  a 
merchant  seaman  flinched  from  his  duty.  Not  a  British 
ship  the  less  sailed  from  or  to  her  ports.  Neutrals  might 
hesitate,  and  justifiably.  The  mercantile  marine  of 
Britain  carried  on.  The  Admiralty,  newly  formed 
just  before  the  unrestricted  warfare  began,  with  Sir 
Edward  Carson  as  First  Lord  and  Sir  John  Jellicoe, 
recalled  for  the  purpose  from  the  command  of  the 
Grand  Fleet,  as  First  Sea  Lord,  were  placed  in  the 
most  embarrassing  position.  Their  predecessors  had 
failed  to  foresee  the  German  plan.  The  advice  of  the 
Navy  had  not  been  sought  in  forming  the  general  war- 
plans  of  the  Allies,  and  the  nation  was  committed  to 
distant  enterprises,  demanding  the  protection  of  long 
lines  of  communications  which  could  not  be  secured 
without  complete  command  of  the  sea.  The  sinking 
of  hospital  ships  and  raids  from  Zeebrugge  on  the  coast 
of  Kent  caused  a  continual  demand  for  protection  which 
threatened  to  denude  the  Grand  Fleet  of  its  necessary 


CONCLUSION 


34i 


complement  of  destroyers  and  light  craft,  and,  perhaps, 
to  render  it  impotent.  A  clatter  of  interested  criticism 
arose;  but  the  nation,  as  a  whole,  would  have  none  of  it. 
It  quickly  recognised  that  no  magical  device  was  to  be 
expected  which  would  finish  the  submarine  at  a  blow, 
and  it  made  up  its  mind  that  “it’s  dogged  that  does  it.  ” 
By  the  end  of  May,  four  months  after  the  unrestricted 
U-boat  warfare  had  begun,  and  a  month  after  the  date 
at  which,  according  to  the  German  calculation,  we  were 
to  have  been  on  our  knees,  the  Prime  Minister  was  able 
to  inform  the  House  of  Commons  that  our  resources 
were  sufficient  to  pull  us  through.  By  September  it 
was  confidently  announced  that  the  U-boat  campaign 
was  defeated. 


War  in  itself  is  an  exhibition  by  man  of  the  elemental 
instincts  which  belong  to  the  animal  in  him.  The  profes¬ 
sion  of  arms  is  noble  only  because  man,  by  his  reason, 
realises  the  dangers  to  which  war  exposes  him,  and  faces 
them  with  a  steadfast  mind  at  the  call  of  faith  or  justice 
or  freedom.  It  is  an  offering  of  self  for  a  cause.  The 
cause  may  be  a  bad  one,  but  that  is  not  for  the  sailor  or 
soldier  to  judge.  The  motives  on  which  he  acts  are 
loyalty,  faithfulness,  duty.  It  is  for  others  to  bear  the 
responsibility  of  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  the  quarrel. 
Thence  comes  the  paradox  that  war,  in  itself  bestial, 
calls  forth  the  highest  qualities  of  which  man  is  capable. 
But  the  glory  is  in  dying,  not  in  killing.  The  warrior 
who  kills  the  unresisting  is  on  a  level  with  the  cutthroat. 
Progressive  consciousness  of  this  has  led  to  the  gradual 
evolution  of  a  whole  code  of  restraints,  wholly  illogical 
it  may  be,  but  firmly  rooted  in  the  better  nature  of  man, 
by  which  the  naked  horrors  of  war  have  been  mitigated. 


342 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


Those  who  cease  to  resist  are  spared ;  the  aged  and  the 
young  are  unmolested;  women  are  inviolate.  Even 
private  property  is  respected.  Nay,  more;  restraint  is 
placed  even  upon  the  weapons  which  may  be  used 
against  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  At  least,  all 
these  things  were  regarded  as  established  until  the 
German  tribes  arose  to  make  war  on  a  world  devoted 
to  peace  at  the  bidding  of  a  knot  of  half-crazy  soldiers 
and  statesmen  surrounding  a  potentate  drunk  with 
flattery.  Then  the  astonished  world  learned  that 
logic  and  science  could  bring  men  back  to  the  worst 
and  most  brutal  savagery  of  their  primeval  instincts, 
unchecked,  unsoftened,  and  unsweetened  either  by 
the  boasted  progress  of  humanity  or  the  revelation  of 
Divine  Love  which  the  Germans  nominally  accept  as 
their  religious  creed. 

Necessity,  we  know,  has  been  described  as  “the 
tyrant’s  plea.”  The  tyrants  of  Potsdam  have  used  it 
to  the  full.  Could  they  have  pleaded  truthfully,  as 
they  have  pleaded  mendaciously,  “We  are  fighting  for 
the  life  of  our  country  against  a  world  banded  against  us 
in  a  monstrous  act  of  aggression,”  some  justification  of 
their  violent  infractions  of  international  right  might 
have  been  admitted.  But  the  German  faith  is  that 
whoever  resists  the  ambitions  of  Germany,  no  matter  to 
what  degree  these  conflict  with  the  rights  and  interests 
of  her  neighbours,  is  thereby  guilty  of  an  “attack” 
upon  her.  Preventive  war  is  then  a  “necessity.” 
The  violation  of  her  neighbour’s  territory  is  also  a 
‘  ‘  necessity,  ’  ’  in  order  that  the  preventive  war  may 
be  carried  to  a  successful  conclusion.  The  ruthless 
shooting  of  those  who  resist  and  the  laying  waste  of 
their  cities  is  also  a  ‘  ‘  necessity.  ’  ’  And  all  is  tricked 
out  in  the  garb  of  mercy.  We  are  assured  that  “fright- 


CONCLUSION 


343 


fulness”  is  reluctantly  adopted  as  a  means  of  shortening 
the  war  and  bringing  the  blessings  of  German  Kultur  to 
the  nations  of  the  earth.  It  is  egotism  exalted  to  the 
seventh  heaven.  It  is  also  the  deliberate  denial  of  right 
to  all  nations  but  the  German.  Not  even  the  allies  of 
Germany  are  excepted,  for  the  reward  offered  to  them 
for  their  comradeship  in  arms  is,  in  the  case  of  victory, 
to  live  under  the  German  yoke,  and,  in  the  case  of 
defeat,  to  pay  the  price  thereof:  “ Oesterreich  mussen 
blut.  ’  ’ 

Now  this  is  the  very  antithesis  of  all  that  sea  power 
stands  for.  These  chapters  have  been  written  in  vain  if 
it  has  not  been  made  clear  that,  from  Xerxes  to  Napo¬ 
leon,  the  breed  of  men  who  have  used  the  sea  have 
stubbornly  upheld  the  right  of  men  and  nations  to  live 
their  lives  as  they  chose,  to  worship  God  according  to 
their  consciences,  to  enjoy  intellectual  freedom  under 
the  form  of  government  best  suited  to  themselves. 
No  gifts  which  the  best  and  wisest  despot  could  bring,  of 
material  prosperity,  of  ordered  and  sheltered  existence, 
could  compensate  for  the  loss  of  freedom  of  soul,  the 
unfettered  choice  of  paths  which  alone  forms  character. 
God  Himself  damned  Germanism  when  He  gave  free 
will  to  man. 

Secure  in  their  island,  when  once  the  secret  of  sea 
power  had  been  learned,  the  British  people  have  fought 
out  the  matter  of  freedom  among  themselves.  They 
have  curbed  the  power  of  kings  and  priests  and  nobles. 
They  have  learned  that  each  in  turn  may  become  a 
barrier  against  the  tyranny  of  the  other;  that  all,  in 
their  ordered  degree,  are  a  bulwark  against  the  hasty 
passions  of  the  mob,  as  the  groynes  on  the  coast  against 
the  violence  of  the  storm.  They  learned,  slowly  per¬ 
haps,  the  lesson  of  tolerance,  the  worth  of  compromise, 


344 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  worthlessness  of  logic  divorced  from  actuality. 
To  live  and  let  live  became  their  ideal.  And  with  the 
widening  of  the  world,  the  opening  of  the  sea,  they 
spread  that  ideal  over  the  globe.  Did  tyranny,  political, 
ecclesiastical,  or  economic,  at  any  time  threaten  to 
prevail  in  Britain,  there  were  lands  beyond  the  seas 
to  which  those  Britons  who  would  not  suffer  it  could 
pass.  There  they  widened  the  bounds  of  their  liberty, 
and  thence  the  tide  flowed  back  again,  bringing  new 
freshness  to  the  Motherland.  Others  went  but  for  a 
time,  as  sailors,  as  merchants,  as  administrators.  But 
all  alike  have  contributed  to  keep  the  national  life  sane. 
“  Insular  ”  we  may  be.  No  man  is  more  prone  to  poke 
fun  at  the  foreigner  than  is  the  Briton,  or  to  pity  him 
for  the  misfortune  of  his  birth.  But  the  Briton  does  not 
display  the  irritation  of  the  German  when,  for  instance, 
an  Englishman  takes  off  his  coat  to  play  lawn-tennis.  He 
has  a  salt  of  humour  which  forbids  him  to  believe  that 
all  races  of  mankind  would  be  the  better  if  they  could 
be  melted  down  and  cast  into  a  mould  of  his  pattern. 

Contrast  the  history  of  Germany.  Divided,  dis¬ 
tracted,  desolated  by  war,  foreign  and  civil,  the  German 
tribes  have  slowly  crystallised  round  the  military 
kingdom  of  Prussia.  The  threat  from  without  has 
always  checked  political  development  within.  Security 
had  demanded  unquestioning  submission  to  the  will 
of  the  ruler  and  the  classes  around  him.  That  all 
Germans  should  be  cast  in  one  mould  and  obedient  to  a 
single  mind  has  appeared  the  first  condition  of  existence. 
Generations  of  weakness  and  enslavement  to  petty 
potentates  or  prelates  paved  the  way  for  the 
domination  of  Prussia  over  the  lesser  States.  More¬ 
over,  having  no  national  life  of  her  own,  Germany 
for  centuries  supplied  the  mercenaries  of  Europe,  from 


CONCLUSION 


345 


the  Lanz-knechts  of  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  Hessians 
and  Hanoverians  who  left  so  evil  a  reputation  in  Amer¬ 
ica  and  Ireland.  Recollection  of  this,  perhaps,  accounts 
for  the  abhorrence  in  which  the  term  “mercenary”  is 
regarded  in  Germany  to-day.  Whether  derived  from 
them  or  not,  the  brutality  of  German  militarism  is 
worthy  of  their  traditions.  From  all  this  there  was  no 
escape  for  the  German  oversea.  If  he  left  his  native 
shore  it  was  in  a  foreign  ship,  to  dwell  among  foreigners, 
to  listen  to  a  foreign  tongue,  to  live  under  foreign  laws 
and  amid  foreign  customs  and  habits  of  thought.  He 
could  contribute  nothing  to  the  evolution  of  ideas  which 
were  essentially  German,  as  could  the  Briton  who  dwelt 
in  the  United  States,  Canada,  or  Australia,  to  ideas 
which  are  essentially  British.  He  could  not  get  out  of 
the  reach  of  the  long  arm  of  the  tyranny  under  which 
he  lived  at  home  save  by  forfeiting  much  of  that  which 
made  him  German.  Se  soumettre  ou  se  demettre  was  his 
painful  choice.  Intoxication  with  victory  completed 
the  work  of  turning  the  German  people  into  an  instru¬ 
ment  ready  to  the  hand  of  the  megalomaniacs  who 
dreamed  of  world-dominion.  Victory,  be  it  said,  not 
only  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  in  science,  in  commerce, 
and  in  organisation.  “We  Germans  are  the  salt  of 
the  earth”  was  a  phrase  quite  natural  on  the  lips  of  the 
monarch  of  this  self-centred  people. 

Only  such  a  people  could  be  brought  to  submit  to 
the  long  years  of  grinding  discipline  and  sacrifice  which 
had  to  be  lived  while  their  leaders  were  maturing  their 
plans  of  conquest.  The  Briton,  with  no  bitter  memo¬ 
ries  of  an  invaded  and  ravaged  land,  with  his  belief, 
tested  by  centuries  of  immunity,  in  the  security  of  his 
island  home  with  the  seas  and  all  that  lies  beyond  open 
to  him,  would  never  for  an  instant  have  endured  what 


346 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


the  German  has  endured  for  forty-five  years  in  the  belief 
that  what  was  prepared  for  aggression  was  necessary 
for  defence.  The  application  is  not  particular,  but 
general.  It  shows  why  a  Sea  Power  is  incapable  of 
planning  and  attempting  the  subjugation  of  other 
nations;  why  freedom  does  indeed  flourish  behind  the 
trident  and  not  the  sword. 

This  analysis  brings  us  to  the  underlying  factors  of 
the  submarine  war.  It  lays  bare  the  deeply-hidden 
springs  of  the  conflict  between  Britain  and  Germany, 
between  the  “elephant  and  the  whale,”  to  quote  Bis¬ 
marck.  The  submarine  war  is  the  attempt  on  the  part 
of  the  Prussians  to  bring  military  tyranny  to  bear  upon 
the  seas  and  to  carry  it  to  the  uttermost  parts  of  the 
earth  where  sea  power  has  planted  freedom.  Napo¬ 
leon  failed  at  the  water’s  edge.  Prussia  is  making  a 
desperate  attempt  to  succeed  in  the  dark  places  under 
the  waters.  This  makes  the  defeat  of  the  Prussian 
plan  a  question  not  only  between  Great  Britain  and  her 
present  foe,  but  between  freedom  and  tyranny  in  all 
parts  of  the  world.  For  a  German  success  means 
that  the  whole  world  is  to  bow  the  head  to  the  German 
plea  of  “necessity,”  which  means  submission  to  the 
arbitrary  will  of  Germany  on  pain  of  the  complete 
destruction  of  all  intercourse  between  nations,  of  all 
freedom  to  conduct  the  ordinary  affairs  of  men,  but  by 
the  Prussian  leave. 

The  Germans  claim  that  they  are  fighting  for  the 
Freedom  of  the  Seas.  It  is  an  effective  phrase.  It  has 
already  been  shown  that  Great  Britain,  as  the  fruit 
of  her  maritime  triumphs  down  to  1815,  and  by  the 
work  of  her  Navy  in  the  years  of  peace  that  followed, 
secured  that  freedom  for  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 
The  Germans,  however,  attach  a  different  meaning  to 


CONCLUSION 


347 


the  phrase.  They  design  to  overthrow  the  barrier 
which  sea  power  has  placed  between  tyranny  and 
freedom.  When  Mendoza  complained  to  Elizabeth 
of  the  insolence  of  Drake  in  daring  to  sail  in  the  Spanish 
Main,  that  high-spirited  Princess  replied,  “Tell  your 
royal  Master  that  a  title  to  the  ocean  cannot  belong 
to  any  people  or  private  persons,  forasmuch  as  neither 
nature  nor  public  use  and  custom  permitteth  any 
possession  thereof.”  Philip  claimed  the  monopoly  of 
the  Spanish  Main  as  a  way  by  which  the  long  arm  of  his 
tyranny  could  reach  his  subjects  in  Spanish  America. 
The  German  claim  is  really  identical.  They  do  not 
claim  possession  of  the  ocean,  it  is  true,  though  their 
contention  that  the  Baltic  should  be  regarded  as  mare 
clausum  shows  that  they  do  not,  in  their  hearts,  accept 
Elizabeth’s  repudiation  of  private  possession.  But 
they  claim  that,  in  time  of  war,  the  sea  should  be 
altogether  ruled  out  of  the  theatre  of  operations.  They 
claim  not  only  that  merchantmen,  belligerent  and  neu¬ 
tral  alike,  should  be  allowed  to  come  and  go  freely, 
but  that  the  same  immunity  should  be  permitted  to 
transports.  Hostilities  are  not  to  begin  until  the 
enemy’s  coast  is  reached.  We  and  every  nation  in  the 
world  are  to  be  compelled  to  lay  aside  our  shield  of  naval 
defence.  The  arm  of  military  autocracy  is  to  be 
extended  so  that  it  can  reach  to  the  further  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  into  the  Pacific,  to  the  Antipodes,  or  anywhere 
it  will.  Against  this  outrageous  demand,  Great  Britain 
stands,  the  one  firm  rock.  The  German  reply,  to  the 
whole  world,  is,  “Very  well.  So  long  as  'England’ 
resists  our  demand,  we  will  sink  your  ships,  murder 
your  people,  destroy  your  property.”  It  is  “neces¬ 
sary”  to  Germany  to  have  freedom  of  the  seas  in  her 
sense  of  the  word.  It  is  “necessary,”  in  order  to 


348 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


obtain  it,  to  break  “  England’s  ”  sea  power.  To  do  so,  it 
is  “necessary”  to  use  the  submarine  weapon,  and, 
since  “England’s”  supremacy  above  the  surface 
prevents  the  Germans  bringing  ships  into  port,  it  is 
1 1  necessary  ’  ’  to  sink  them.  Moreover,  as  ‘  ‘  England’s  ’ ’ 
patrol  craft  swarm  on  the  seas  and  her  merchantmen  are 
armed,  it  is  “necessary”  for  the  U-boats  to  remain  be¬ 
low  the  surface  and  to  use  the  torpedo  without  warning 
or  an  attempt  to  secure  the  safety  of  those  on  board 
the  ships  attacked.  Thus  the  plea  of  necessity  is  turned 
into  a  doctrine  of  devils. 

It  is  surely  clear  that  we  have  reached  the  ultimate 
issue  between  sea  power  as  the  instrument  of  freedom 
and  land  power  as  that  of  military  tyranny.  Let  us  see 
what  will  happen  if,  in  the  upshot,  the  submarine  is  not 
rendered  innocuous  by  force  of  arms.  It  is  idle,  in  that 
case,  to  suppose  that  any  international  agreement  will 
avail  to  stop  its  use  as  the  Germans  have  used  it.  Ex 
hypothesi,  the  naval  force  of  the  whole  world  would  be 
impotent.  Mankind  would  be  thrown  back  on  a  choice 
of  these  alternatives :  either  the  German  doctrine  of  the 
Freedom  of  the  Seas  must  be  accepted,  in  which  case 
every  country  in  the  world  will  lie  at  the  mercy  of 
military  power  unless  it  lives  armed  to  the  teeth,  or 
else  the  intercourse  between  nations  separated  by  the 
sea  must  remain  for  ever  subject  to  sudden  and  violent 
interruption  by  any  Power  which  has  an  ambition  to 
serve  and  which  deems  the  time  ripe  for  its  fulfilment, 
provided  it  has  sufficient  military  force  to  resist  invasion 
and  fortified  ports  from  which  its  submarines  can  issue. 
We  shall  be  thrown  back  upon  the  naked  rule  of  force, 
and  the  counter  check  which  sea  power  has  always 
placed  upon  the  misuse  of  land  power  and  vice  versa  will 
be  a  thing  of  the  past. 


CONCLUSION 


349 


To  those  who  hold  Free  Trade  as  an  article  of  faith 
the  prospect  created  by  the  methods  of  the  German  sub¬ 
marine  attack  upon  merchantmen  and  the  consequences 
which  would  flow  from  its  success  must  be  regarded  as 
particularly  serious.  No  country  will  dare,  in  future, 
to  rely  on  supplies  of  necessaries  from  abroad  if  it  values 
its  national  life.  Home  production  even  of  the  things 
which  the  country  is  least  fitted  to  produce  must  be 
maintained,  or  the  national  security  will  be  imperilled. 
International  trade  will  receive  a  severe  check,  and,  with 
it,  the  peaceful  intercourse  between  nations.  The  world 
will  be  thrown  back  on  the  old  conception  of  trade  as  a 
form  of  hostilities,  in  which  the  nation  which  attempts 
to  thrust  its  goods  into  the  markets  of  its  neighbours 
is  striking  a  blow  at  their  national  life.  That  view  will 
be  the  better  justified  in  the  light  of  our  past  experiences 
of  Germany’s  trade  methods  and  aims. 

To  the  British  Empire  the  state  of  things  here  fore¬ 
cast  would  be  particularly  disastrous.  We  look  to  the 
future  development  of  the  dominions  and  dependencies 
as  our  great  source  for  the  supply  of  foodstuffs  and  raw 
materials.  But  that  can  only  be  if  the  way  of  the  sea 
can  be  kept  reasonably  safe  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace. 
Take  sugar,  for  instance.  We  are  never  likely  to  repeat 
the  costly  mistake  by  which  we  became  dependent  on 
foreign  bounty-fed  sugar,  especially  from  Germany. 
But  sugar  is  an  essential  food,  and  the  alternatives 
before  us  are  to  set  up  and  foster  the  cultivation  of 
beet  in  this  country,  or  to  develop  the  supply  of  cane- 
sugar  within  the  Empire,  which  contains  many  areas 
particularly  fitted  for  its  production.  If  the  submarine 
is  allowed  to  continue  a  standing  menace  to  the  world, 
it  is  on  the  first  and  not  the  second  alternative  that  we 
must  rely.  The  same  remarks  apply  to  other  commodi- 


350 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


ties,  though,  perhaps,  not  so  forcibly.  The  submarine 
menace,  in  fact,  cuts  at  the  very  basis  on  which  the 
Ocean  Empire  is  founded.  While  all  the  world  is 
interested,  and  profoundly  interested,  in  its  suppression 
to  us  it  is  a  matter  of  life  or  death. 

It  is  essential,  then,  that  we  should  have  a  clear 
understanding  of  a  development  which  touches  the 
future  of  the  British  Commonwealth  so  nearly.  The 
“U-boat  warfare”  of  the  Germans,  in  its  eventual 
development,  was  a  surprise  sprung  upon  the  world 
because  it  was  the  use  of  a  weapon,  new  and  not  fully 
understood,  in  a  way  which  set  at  defiance  all  the  usages 
of  the  civilised  world.  It  is  quite  justifiably  described 
as  piracy.  Piracy  in  its  strict  sense  is,  of  course,  private 
war  levied  on  the  world  for  the  sake  of  gain.  But  there 
have  been  States  to  which  piracy  was  a  policy,  and  the 
action  of  Germany  does  not  differ  from  theirs  except 
that  direct  robbery  was  not  resorted  to  except  in  small 
and  insignificant  instances.  But  that  Germany  has 
levied  war  upon  the  whole  world  for  her  own  ultimate 
gain,  and  that  she  is,  in  the  words  of  the  old  jurists, 
hostis  humani  generis ,  is  a  matter  which  admits  of 
no  dispute.  It  is  a  rather  singular  instance  of  uncon¬ 
scious  prophecy  that,  in  1849,  when  a  German  fleet, 
flying  the  colours  of  the  empire  which  was  not  then  in 
existence,  had  a  skirmish  with  the  Danes  off  Heligoland, 
Palmerston  gave  great  offence  to  the  Germans  by  declar¬ 
ing  that  any  vessel  committing  acts  of  belligerency 
under  the  black-red-and-gold  flag  would  render  them¬ 
selves  liable  to  be  treated  as  pirates.  The  black-red-: 
and-white  which  has  succeeded  the  black-red-and-gold 
has  made  good  its  claim  to  the  inheritance  of  the  “Jolly 
Roger.  ” 

It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  sub- 


CONCLUSION 


351 


marine  is  an  engine  of  destruction  merely.  It  may 
hamper  and  harass  sea  power.  It  might  conceivably 
banish  it  from  the  earth  by  closing  the  seas  altogether 
to  the  use  of  mankind.  It  can  never  confer  sea  power 
on  any  nation.  The  theory  was  advanced  in  the  open¬ 
ing  chapter  of  the  book  that  the  natural  plane  of  man’s 
existence  is  sea  level.  Above  and  below  it  he  is  involved 
in  a  ceaseless  struggle  with  the  law  of  gravity.  Even  in 
surface  ships  cranes  are  needed  to  extract  cargo  from 
holds  below  the  water-line.  This  fact  seems  to  secure 
the  permanence  of  the  surface  ship  as  the  ultimate 
factor  in  sea  power,  using  the  term  in  its  broadest 
sense.  Despite  the  boasted  voyages  of  the  Deutschland , 
submarine  cargo-ships  are  never  likely,  for  very  many 
reasons,  to  replace  surface  vessels  for  trade  purposes. 
If  that  be  so,  it  follows  that  the  Power  which  is  inferior 
in  force  on  the  surface  and  relies  on  submarine  attack, 
while  it  may  forbid  to  its  opponent  the  use  of  the 
sea,  can  never  acquire  it  for  itself.  The  “fundamental 
basis  of  sea  power,  which  has  existed  since  Syracuse,” 
is  not  therefore  “shaken  by  this  new  development  of 
submarine  cruisers,”  as  was  somewhat  absurdly  asserted 
when  the  “unrestricted  U-boat  warfare”  was  at  its 
height.  No  mere  mechanical  invention  can  effect 
that.  The  fundamental  basis  of  sea  power  will  still 
remain,  and  must  always  remain,  the  force  which  pro¬ 
tects  the  use  of  the  sea,  and  the  ships  and  men  which  use 
it.  The  submarine  menace  does  not  differ  in  essence 
from  the  varying  dangers  which  have  threatened  sea¬ 
borne  commerce  in  the  past.  The  instrument  has  the 
added  power  of  becoming  invisible  at  will,  and  the 
German  method  of  its  use  involves  a  disregard  of  human 
life  and  human  right  which  belongs  to  the  centuries 
before  the  reign  of  law  was  extended  to  the  sea ;  that  is, 


352 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


before  peaceful  intercourse  between  nations  was  estab¬ 
lished.  The  sea  sense  of  a  maritime  nation  may  be 
trusted  to  prevail  eventually  over  the  particular  advan¬ 
tage  secured  by  invisibility.  Merchantmen,  as  of  old, 
will  be  compelled  to  go  armed,  and  their  crews  will  have 
to  be  included  in  the  category  of  combatants.  This 
will  involve  a  revision  of  the  rules  which  forbid  the  use 
of  neutral  ports  to  armed  vessels,  except  for  limited 
periods  which  are  too  short  for  the  loading  and  unloading 
of  cargo.  It  will  make  the  preservation  of  neutrality 
far  harder  than  it  has  hitherto  been,  and  will  pro¬ 
bably  extend  the  area  of  war,  as,  indeed,  it  has  done  in 
the  present  instance.  But  in  the  end  the  old  qualities 
and  aptitudes  will  prevail  to  give  command  of  the  sea 
to  the  nation  fitted  by  character  and  natural  advantages 
to  possess  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  disappearance  of  the  reign 
of  law  from  the  sea  in  war-time  will  greatly  modify  inter¬ 
national  relationships,  not  only  in  war  but  in  peace, 
unless  law  can  be  re-established  on  some  sure  basis. 
It  has  been  pointed  out  that  nations  must  become  more 
self-contained  and  self-supporting.  It  may  be  added 
that  the  great  maritime  Powers,  and  Britain  first  and 
foremost,  will  be  compelled  to  rely  more  exclusively  on 
their  own  ships,  which  they  can  protect  and  arm,  and 
that  in  all  probability  it  will  be  necessary  to  build  a 
greater  number  of  smaller  ships,  with  a  consequent 
increase  in  the  cost  of  ocean  travel  and  of  freight.  The 
eggs  will  have  to  be  distributed  in  as  many  baskets  as 
possible.  This  may  involve  a  return  to  something 
like  the  Navigation  Laws,  and  will  be  bad  for  the 
maritime  prospects  of  such  countries  as  Holland,  Den¬ 
mark,  Norway,  and  Greece.  But  here  a  consideration 
of  the  first  importance  intrudes  itself.  After  their  first 


CONCLUSION 


353 


failure  the  Germans  were  quick  to  recognise  that  a  sub¬ 
marine  campaign  against  commerce  offered  no  chance 
of  success  unless  all  merchantmen,  neutral  as  well  as 
belligerent,  were  subjected  to  attack.  The  reason  is 
partly  economic,  and  obvious,  and  partly  military.  To 
lie  concealed  and  shoot  at  sight  without  exposing  them¬ 
selves  to  make  inquiry  was  the  only  method  by  which 
the  U-boats  could  obtain  comparative  immunity.  If  in 
future  wars  neutral  nations  choose  to  submit  to  such  an 
assault  on  their  rights ;  if  they  will  not  even  resent  it  to 
the  extent  of  closing  their  harbours  and  territorial 
waters  to  the  pirate  boats,  but  extend  to  them  the  privi¬ 
leges  of  warships ;  if  they  tamely  submit  to  a  haughty 
summons  to  stay  at  home  or  take  the  consequences, 
then  this  menace  to  the  world’s  safety  will  never  be 
removed.  It  will  be  bound  to  spread,  for,  once  openly 
or  tacitly  admitted  to  be  within  the  limits  of  lawful 
warfare,  no  nation  will  be  able  to  abstain  from  its  use 
any  more  than  we  and  the  French  and  the  Russians 
could  abstain  from  the  use  of  poison  gas,  abhorrent  as 
it  was  to  our  consciences. 

No  conventions  in  themselves  will  be  binding. 
Deeds  alone  will  avail  to  free  the  world  from  this  assault 
on  its  rights.  Only  if  every  nation  which  uses  the  sea 
determines  and  declares  that  submarines  used  for  the 
indiscriminate  destruction  of  sea-borne  trade  shall  be 
treated  as  outlaws,  refused  all  rights,  and  destroyed  at 
sight  whenever  opportunity  offers;  only  if  every  State 
which  possesses  warships  will  assist  in  hunting  them 
out  will  the  plague  be  abated.  There  need  be  no 
Declaration  of  War.  Indeed,  there  should  be  none. 
They  should  be  treated  with  exactly  the  consideration 
extended  to  sharks. 


23 


354 


SEA  POWER  AND  FREEDOM 


In  the  Heavenly  Jerusalem,  as  seen  by  St.  John  in 
the  Apocalypse,  “there  was  no  more  sea. ”  But  there 
right  and  justice,  love  and  the  liberty  of  the  sons  of  God 
prevailed.  To  man  on  earth,  so  far  as  the  sea  has  been, 
and  is,  a  divider,  it  has  been  a  barrier  which  he  can 
place  between  himself  and  oppression  and  wrong.  To 
overleap  that  barrier  has  ever  been  the  aim  of  tyranny. 
The  tyrant  loathes  the  thought  that  any  man  should 
be  out  of  reach  of  his  arm.  Benevolent  or  harsh,  he 
demands  the  tribute  of  the  souls,  no  less  than  the  bodies, 
of  men.  The  tyrant  may  be  a  man  or  a  system — even  a 
democratic  system.  In  either  case,  blue  water  is  his 
bane.  To  the  sons  of  freedom,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
sea  is  a  pathway  which  unites.  Are  freedom  and 
tyranny  empty  words?  Recent  events  have  shown  us 
that  they  are  not,  though  they  are  terms  easily  misused. 
Let  us  hold  fast  our  heritage.  Though  there  is  much 
yet  to  gain,  something  has  been  lost  through  the 
circumstances  which  have  compelled  us  to  abandon  our 
historical  policy  and  turn  ourselves  into  a  Land  Power 
on  a  European  scale.  So  long  as  we  are  mindful  that 
our  past,  our  present,  and  our  future  lie  on  the  water, 
we  shall  refuse  the  temptation  which  might  possibly 
breed  the  will  to  enter  into  an  era  of  conquests. 

We  had  better  avoid  illusions.  There  is  no  security 
that  this  war  will  end  war.  Human  passions  remain 
what  they  ever  were,  and,  when  the  sick-headache  has 
passed,  it  is  only  too  probable  that  Europe  will  return 
to  its  wallowing  in  the  mire  of  jealousies  and  ambitions. 
The  hope  of  the  world’s  peace  rests  on  the  free  nations 
sprung  from  the  loins  of  Britain,  the  offspring  of  sea 
power.  On  these  united,  the  freedom-loving  races  of 
Europe  can  rest.  To  them  can  be  entrusted  the  main-4 
tenance  of  a  true  freedom  of  the  seas.  The  small 


CONCLUSION 


355 


nations,  deemed  by  the  Germans  unfit  for  separate 
existence,  will  look  to  them  with  confidence  to  guarantee 
them  equal  rights  with  the  greater  Powers.  There 
are,  perhaps,  internal  struggles  ahead  of  us,  not  less 
severe  than  the  great  struggle  with  the  Powers  of  Dark¬ 
ness  which  we  have  been  waging  since  1914.  Man  will 
still  seek  to  build  the  New  Jerusalem  on  earth  by  social 
and  political  changes,  oblivious  of  the  truth  that  the 
Kingdom  of  God  is  within  him.  And  greed  and  selfish¬ 
ness  will  resist  his  efforts.  If  we  are  to  come  through 
in  safety,  we  shall  need  to  be  taken  out  of  ourselves 
by  remembrance  of  the  duty  laid  upon  us  to  all  nations 
of  mankind  in  return  for  the  infinite  blessings  which 
sea  power  has  brought  us. 

Where  Britain’s  flag  flies  wide  unfurled, 

All  tyrant  wrong  repelling, 

God  make  the  world  a  better  world 
For  man’s  brief  earthly  dwelling! 


INDEX 


A 

Abbeville,  Henry  V.  turned  inland 
at,  70 

Abdul  Hamid,  292 
Aboukir,  expedition  under  Aber¬ 
crombie  at,  201 
Bay,  action  off,  199,  200 
Aboukir ,  the,  334 
Acre,  28 

defence  of,  217 
lost  to  Christian  cause,  98 
Napoleon  at,  200 
Sidney  Smith’s  resistance  at, 
217 

Actium,  40,  104;  Empire  of 

Caesars  founded  at,  20, 
4° 

Aden,  annexation,  222;  impor¬ 
tance  of,  221,  222 
Admiralty,  73,  286,  328,  309- 
335 

appointment  of  War  Staff  at, 
274 

Board  of,  316 

Intelligence  Department  of, 
299 

Adriatic,  Austrian  fleet  blockaded 

in,  331 

coast  of,  16,  90;  importance  of, 
to  Italy,  87,  88 
Italians  at  head  of  (1914),  293 
operations  in,  331 
Aegean  Islands,  Greek  colonisa¬ 
tion  in,  30;  ships  of,  34 
iEgean  Sea,  Persians  cross  the,  32; 
292 

Aerial  reconnaissance,  310 
Africa,  42,  109,  113 

British  possessions  in,  after 
Peace  of  1815,  220 
collision  of  races  in,  31 
German  subsidised  line  to,  257 
Greek  settlement  in,  30 


Phoenician  settlement  in,  31,  86, 
90,  105,  1 12 
Agadir,  275 
Agincourt,  15,  32,  71 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  Treaty  of,  175 
Albania,  future  of,  279 
Albanian  Mountains,  Serbian 
Army  in,  289 
Alberoni,  Cardinal,  164,  165 
Albert,  King  of  the  Belgians,  282 
Albion,  first  mention  of,  43 
Albuera,  15 
Albuquerque,  112,  167 
Alcantara ,  the,  308 
Alcibiades,  37 

Alexander  I.,  vowed  friendship  to 
Napoleon,  214;  rupture 
with  Napoleon,  217 
Alexander  III.,  the,  sunk,  268 
Alexander  VI.,  Bull  of  8,  115, 
116, 118 

Alexander  the  Great,  24,  26,  28, 

37,  39 
armies  of,  26 
conqueror  of  Egypt,  169 
Alexandria,  bombardment  of,  233; 

Nelson  at,  198 
Alexandrine  Empire,  38 
Alfred  the  Great,  blockaded  Dan¬ 
ish  fleet,  53;  grasped 
meaning  and  function  of 
sea  power,  53;  nation’s 
debt  to,  54;  treaty  of 
Wedmore,  53 
Algeciras,  324 

Algiers,  bombardment  of,  147; 

British  attack  on,  226; 
reduced,  105 

Ali  Pasha,  capture  of,  103 
Allies,  aims  of,  338 
armies  of,  288 

dependent  on  support  of 
navies  of,  292 

joined  by  Great  Britain,  291 


357 


358 


INDEX 


Allies,  reply  to  German  “peace 
offer,”  338 

unpreparedness  for  war,  1 
Alma,  15 

Almeida,  hi,  112,  115,  166 
Alps,  Italians  at  Swiss  (1914), 
293 

Amboyna,  fell  to  Dutch,  144; 

English  factors  murdered 
at,  145 

America,  Britain's  holdings  in, 
151,  160,  162 
Cabot  reaches,  119 
contrast  between  Latin  and 
Anglo-Saxon,  57 
discovery  of,  5 
effect  of  discovery  of,  80,  86 
English  trade  rights,  170 
first  settlement  in,  1 19-122 
France’s  foothold  in,  153,  166 
German  impertinence  to,  239 
hegemony  of,  16 1 
South,  1 13 

Spanish  claim  to,  109,  no,  116 
struggle  for  trade  in,  168 
American  Ambassador  flouted  by 
Germany,  339 

fleet,  strength  of,  in  Cuban 
War,  238 

Government  made  commercial 
grievances  a  casus  belli, 
218 

mercantile  marine  destroyed  by 
Civil  War,  248 
Navy,  253 

ships,  successes  of,  219 
American  War  of  Independence, 
adhesion  of  France  to 
Revolutionaries,  185; 
American  Colonies  and 
two  West  Indian  Islands 
lost,  186;  begun  by  re¬ 
sistance  to  Stamp  Act, 
184;  British  criticised  by 
Mahan,  188;  British  con¬ 
duct  of,  189;  British  sur¬ 
renders  in  America,  186; 
cause  of  British  defeat, 
188;  conditions  unfa¬ 
vourable  to  Great  Brit¬ 
ain,  185;  Great  Britain 
embarrassed  by  Dutch 
declaration  of  war,  and 
by  “armed  neutrality,” 
186;  operations  in  West 


Indies,  main  naval  inter¬ 
est  in,  187;  sea  power  of 
Britain  unshaken,  186; 
surrender  at  Yorktown, 
187 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  192 
Amphion,  the,  286; 

Amundsen,  230 

Ancient  world,  Empires  of,  19,  20 

Anne,  Queen,  158,  162 

Anson,  172,  174 

Antony,  40,  169 

Antwerp,  3,  186 

Arabi  Pasha,  campaign  against, 
233 

Arabs,  93,  ill,  112 
Aragon,  throne  of,  108,  114 
Arbuthnot,  Admiral  Sir  Robert, 
3 1 7-3 19 
Arethusa ,  the,  315 
Ariadne,  the,  295 
Ark  Royal,  the,  126 
Armada,  the,  117;  effect  of  defeat 
of,  134;  English  victory 
over,  128-131;  news  of, 
reached  England,  125 
Armenia,  11 

Armour-plating,  changes  wrought 
by  introduction  of,  250- 
253 

Artillery,  first  used  at  sea  by 
Spaniards,  75 

Asia,  armies,  of,  31,  231;  struggle 
between,  and  Europe, 
26,  27 

Asia  Minor,  28;  Greek  colonisation 
in,  30;  under  Persian 
monarchs,  31 
Assyria,  19,  23 

Athens,  sack  of,  32;  vital  impor¬ 
tance  of  sea  power  to, 
36 

Atlantic  routes,  our  control  of, 
262 

Fleet,  271-274 
Aube,  Admiral,  251 
Augsburg,  League  of,  157 
Austerlitz,  208,  21 1,  214 
Australia,  29;  Britain’s  claim  to, 
established,  220 
Australia,  the,  301,  304,  317 
Austria,  197, 282;  Napoleon  makes 
war  on,  234 

Austria-Hungary,  165;  army  of, 
291 ;  navy  of,  290 


INDEX 


359 


Austrian  fleet,  300,  331 

Succession,  War  of,  1 71-174 
Automobile  torpedo,  changes 
wrought  by  introduction 
of,  250-253 
Avlona,  280,  331 
Azores,  113,  114,  135,  136 

B 

Babylonia,  as  a  Sea  Power,  4; 
transports  to,  11 

Bacon,  on  command  of  sea 
(quoted),  17 
Badajoz,  1 5 
Balaklava,  15,  135 
Balance  of  power,  161 
Baldwin  of  Flanders,  Emperor  of 
East,  97;  fell  in  battle, 
97 

Baldwin  of  Jerusalem,  93 
Balearic  Islands,  154 
Balfour,  Mr.,  letters  to  Mayors, 
316 

Balkan  States,  war  with  Turkey, 
276 

Balkans,  19 
Ballin,  Herr,  155,  258 
Baltic,  control  of,  290,  317;  curi¬ 
ous  situation  in,  330; 
German  command  of, 
271 ;  Germany’s  difficulty 
of  entrance,  64;  naval 
stores  from,  186,  196; 
operations  in  the,  310, 
330;  Russian  battleships 
in,  265,  266,  331 
Baltic  ports  ice-sealed,  3 
Barbados,  taken  by  Penn,  147; 

secure  to  Britain,  151 
Barbarians,  assaults  of,  on  Britain, 
56 

Barbarossa,  Hairredin,  102 
Barbary  States,  139,  195,  197,  225 
Barca,  Carthaginian  house  of, 
38 

Barham,  Lord,  207,  209 
Baronage  destroyed  by  Wars  of 
the  Roses,  80 
Bart,  Jean,  157 
Bastia,  seized,  197 
Basuto,  future  of,  246 
Battle  of  Jutland  Bank  (see  Jut¬ 
land) 

Battle  of  Navarino  ( see  Navarino) 


“Battle  of  the  Bight,”  310 
Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands, 

.304 

Battleships  sunk  by  German  sub¬ 
marines,  334 

Bavaria,  Elector  of,  against  Maria 
Theresa,  172 

Bavarian  levies  of  Napoleon, 
214 

Bavarians,  defection  of,  at  Lobau, 
217 

Bay  of  Biscay,  44,  56,  70,  78 
Baylen,  French  corps  surrendered 
at,  213 

Beachy  Head,  Battle  of,  37,  156 
Beagle ,  the,  230 

Beatty,  Sir  David,  at  Dogger 
Bank,  314;  Battle  of 
Jutland,  315,  316,  317, 
319,  322;  “Cat”  squad¬ 
ron,  318;  victory  of,  323; 
offered  German  fleet 
battle,  195 

Bedford,  Duke  of,  victorious  at 
Harfleur,  71 

Belgium,  army  refitted,  16;  chief 
river,  3;  great  port  of,  3; 
invaded,  16;  independ¬ 
ence  of,  234,  282;  King 
of,  282;  neutrality  of, 
234,  281,  282;  pledge  to, 
of  England,  282;  resolve 
of,  282;  situation  of,  3 
Beresford,  Lord  (Charles),  brought 
navy  and  mercantile 
marine  into  closer  re¬ 
lation,  274 

Berlin,  Decree  of,  214;  Napoleon’s 
Decree  of,  212 
Berlin ,  the,  275 

Bermuda,  secure  to  Britain,  15 1 
Berytus,  Phoenicians  founded,  23 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  Herr  von, 

281,  337 

Bettes  worth  sent  to  England  by 
Nelson,  207 

Bickerton  at  Toulon,  326 
Bight  of  Heligoland,  the  320, 

327,  333 
Bigod,  Earl,  66 
Bismarck,  257,  278,  281,  346 
Black  Death,  5;  effect  on  econo¬ 
mic  position  of  England, 
80;  effect  on  sea  power, 

5 


360 


INDEX 


Black  Prince,  the,  317,  319 
Black  Sea,  19;  Germany’s  tempo¬ 
rary  command  of,  291; 
Russian  volunteer  fleet, 
270;  Russia’s  supremacy 
in,  330;  temporary  com¬ 
mand  of,  by  Turkey,  291 
Blake,  Admiral,  133,  146,  147 
Blenheim,  15 

Blockades,  179,  186,  207,  236, 
296,  336 
Bliicher,  315 
Boemond,  92,  93 
Boer  War,  the  239,  241,  242 
Bombay,  ill,  151,  166 
Bonaventure,  the,  126 
Bordeaux,  153 

Borden,  Sir  Robert,  241,  246 
Border  States  of  Europe,  Eng¬ 
land’s  policy  towards,  228 
Borneo,  Dyaks  of,  under  British 
rule,  243 
Boscawen,  179 
Boulogne,  204 

Bourbons,  the,  106,  157,  169,  191 
Boyne, James  II.  defeated  at  battle 
of,  William’s  victory  at, 

156 

Braganza,  Catherine  of,  15 1 
Brazil,  no,  113,  144,  166,  213 
Breda,  Peace  of,  150 
Bremen,  287 
Breslau ,  the,  299,  300 
Brest,  81,  83,  153,  179,  189,  190, 
193,  195,  203,  322,  325 
Bridport,  Lord,  195 
Brighthelmstone(Brighton)  burned 
by  French,  82 
Brindisi  sacked,  93 
Bristol,  Cabot  sailed  from,  119; 

Company  of  Merchant 
Adventurers  formed,  1 19 
Bristol ,  the,  304,  306 
Britain  ( also  see  Great  Britain, 
England,  etc.),  advan¬ 
tages  gained  by,  after 
Utrecht,  160,  161;  allied 
with  France,  148,  150, 
163;  defended  by  Roman 
legionaries,  51;  invaded 
by  Danes,  52,  53,  55*57; 
invaded  by  French,  68, 
69;  invaded  by  Normans, 
65;  struggles  withFrance, 
156,  176,  184 


British  Channel  Guard,  174 
British  cruisers,  309 
British  explorers,  230 
British  fleet,  base  for,  31 1 
British  foreign  policy,  in  relation 
to  India,  242;  under 
George  I.,  163,  165 
British  mercantile  marine,  223 
nation,  sea  power,  evolution  of, 
1 7 

Navy,  18;  mobilisation  of,  284, 
285 

sea  communications,  220-223 
submarines,  evolution  of,  333; 
feats  of,  333  _ 

Brittany,  harpooning  introduced, 

56 

Bronze  Age,  12,  25 
Brooke,  Sir  James,  Rajah,  226, 
Brueys,  French  commander  at 
the  Nile,  323 
Brunsbiittel,  310 
Buckingham,  Duke  of,  143 
Bulgaria,  crossing  of  the  Danube, 
330;  effect  of  possible 
elimination  of,  from  war, 
331;  induced  into  war  to 
avert  Germany’s  danger, 
297;  influenced  by  Tur¬ 
key,  291,  293;  resource- 
lessness  of,  295 
Bulgarians  in  Crusades,  97 
Bull  of  Alexander  VI.,  8, 115, 116, 
118,  124 

Buffer,  Sir  Redvers,  289 
Bundesrat  incident,  239,  259 
Byblus,  Phoenicians  founded,  23; 

submitted  to  Alexander, 
27 

Byng,  afterwards  Lord  Torrmg- 
ton,  destroyed  Spanish 
fleet,  165 

Byng,  John,  fatal  engagement,  176, 
1 77;  recalled,  17 7;  tried, 
177;  shot,  1 77 

Byron,  Lord,  in  Greek  ranks, 
231 

Byzantine  Empire,  86,  88,  90,  91, 
93,  97 

C 

Cabot,  John,  117,  119 
Cabral,  no 
Cacafuegos,  the,  123 


INDEX 


361 


Cadiz,  208,  210 
Cadmus,  12 

Caesar,  Julius,  43;  in  Gaul,  48; 

first  recorded  British  bat¬ 
tle,  48;  sees  England, 
49 

Calais,  loss  of,  1 19 
Cambrai,  League  of,  99 
Cambyses  169;  army  of,  perished, 
27;  invaded  Egypt,  27 
Camperdown,  battle  of,  194 
Camper  down,  the,  251 
Campo  Formio,  Treaty  of,  199 
Canale,  Antonio,  confronted  by 
Ottomans,  100;  banished, 
100;  sack  of  Negropont, 
100 

Canopus,  the,  301-305 
Cap  Trafalgar ,  the,  307 
Cape  Breton  Island,  166 
Cape  Horn,  no 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  137,  194, 
220 

Cape  St.  Vincent,  45 
Cape  Sunium,  32 
Carmania,  the,  307 
Carnarvon ,  the,  304,  305 
Carson,  Sir  E.,  340 
Carthage,  20,  25,  27;  as  a  Sea 
Power,  37,  39;  base  of 
Phoenician  sea  power;  31 ; 
ruin  of,  40 

Carthaginians,  14;  alliance  with 
Alexander,  39;  as  colo¬ 
nists,  38 

defeat  of,  by  the  Romans,  41 
expeditions  into  Atlantic,  42 
Cassiterides,  25,  43 
Catholic  League,  135 
Cattaro,  331 
Caxton,  108 
Central  Empires,  1 
Central  League,  293;  advantage 
to  Germany  and  Austria 
of  Italy’s  adhesion  to, 
279;  sea  power  of,  in 
Mediterranean,  279 
Central  Powers,  strength  of,  290, 
291,  294 

Cervera,  Admiral,  236 
Ceylon,  144,  220 
Chaldean  Empire,  20 
Kings,  6 

people  not  a  seafaring  race,  2 1 
Challenger ,  the,  230 


Channel  Fleet,  271-273 
Charles  I.,  138,  140;  demanded 
ship  money,  142 

Charles  II.,  Navy  under,  148, 
149;  relations  with  Louis 
XIV.,  148 

Charter  of  Merchants,  1303,  72, 
76 

Cinque  Ports,  72 
China,  war  with  Japan,  263 
Choiseul,  185 

Churchill,  Mr.  Winston,  314, 

316 

Cinque  Ports,  65,  68,  69,  72; 

charter  of,  72;  feudal 
obligations  of,  75 
Civil  War,  the,  destroys  American 
mercantile  marine,  248 
Claudius,  conquest  of  Britain,  50 
Clive,  1 12,  167 
Cnidus,  37 

Colbert,  153,  154;  policy  of,  for 
development  of  France, 
154 

Collingwood,  208,  210 
Colonies,  British,  in  North  Amer¬ 
ica,  166;  in  the  East, 
166;  in  the  Mediterran¬ 
ean,  166 

contribute  to  British  Navy, 
241,  243 

French,  in  North  America,  166; 

in  the  East,  166 
government  of,  184 
military  aid  given  by,  241 
North  American,  16 1 
Spanish,  165 

Colonisation,  an  intrinsic  part  of 
sea  power,  239,  241 
Colonists,  early,  11,  14 
Greek,  14,  29,  30 
Phoenician,  24,  29 
Venetian,  13 

Columbus,  Christopher,  108,  109, 
no,  115,  116 

Command  of  the  sea,  1,  8 
Commonwealth,  clash  with  Dutch, 
146 

Comnenus,  Alexius,  90 
Company  of  Merchant  Adventur¬ 
ers,  1 19 
Conon, 37 

Constantinople,  80,  88,  90,  91,  93, 
96,  97,  98,  99,  108,  109 
Contraband  of  war,  336 


362 


INDEX 


Convention  of  Cintra,  213 
Copenhagen,  16,  77,  202 
Corinth,  14;  colonies  of,  29 
Cornwall,  43,  52,  58,  304,  305 
Cornwallis,  203,  207,  208,  309, 
325,  326 

Coron  lost  to  Venice,  101 
Corsica,  11,  30,  44,  197,  198 
Cortes  conquered  Mexico,  115 
Corunna,  16,  127,  134,  136,  214 
Cradock  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Chris¬ 
topher,  301-303 
Cr6cy,  15,  69 
Cressy,  the,  334 
Crime  on  high  seas,  8 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  clash  with 
Dutch  under  145;  sol¬ 
diers,  13 1,  133;  wars  with 
Dutch,  145-147 

Cromwellian  wars,  Blake  in,  146; 

bombardment  of  Algiers, 
147;  heralded  long  series 
of  fights,  147;  sinking  of 
Spanish  fleet,  147;  bak¬ 
ing  of  Jamaica  and  Bar¬ 
bados,  147;  were  na¬ 
tional,  147 

Cruisers,  British,  309;  sunk  by- 
German  submarines,  334 
Crusades,  89,  91  94,  96,  97 
Cuba,  166 

Cuban  War,  237,  238 
Cuxhaven,  310,  315 
Cyprus,  7,  11,  24,  37,  91,  102, 
221 

Cyrenaica,  30 
Cythera,  24 

D 

d’Ache,  Commodore,  178 
Dandolo,  Doge  of  Venice,  re¬ 
lations  with  Crusaders, 
96 

Danelagh,  the,  53-56 
Danish  invasion  of  Britain,  52-57 
Danube,  Middle,  importance  of, 
169,  197;  waterway  of 
the,  330 

Dardanelles,  the  3,  37,  98,  100, 
104,  217;  closing  of,  336 
Darius,  27,  31 

Deal,  Julius  Caesar  lands  at, 
50 

De  Burgh,  Hubert,  58,  128 


Declaration  of  Paris,  335 
of  Independence,  19 1 
of  the  Rights  of  Man,  191 
Defence ,  the,  300,  3 17-3 19 
Defending  navy,  value  of,  63 
De  Grasse,  operations  of,  187 
De  Guichen,  operations  of,  188, 
190 

Delcasse,  M.,  272 
Delos,  League  of,  35 
Demerara,  194,  220 
Derfflinger,  the  German  battle¬ 
cruiser,  315 

d’Estaing,  operations  of,  187 
Deutsche  Flottenverein  (German 
Navy  League),  258 
Deutschland  class,  the,  320 
Deutschland ,  the,  351 
Diaz,  Bartholomew,  26,  108 
Dido ,  the,  in  action,  226 
Dogger  Bank,  battle  of  the,  314; 

incident,  268,  271 
Dragon,  the,  12 1 

Drake,  Sir  Francis,  expeditions  of, 
120-25,  135;  as  a  naval 
strategist,  128,  136;  pol¬ 
icy  of,  309 

Drake’s  ships,  122,  123,  126 
Dreadnought  class,  259,  261,  273; 
the  first,  126 

Dresden,  the,  German  light  cruiser, 
299,  304,  307 

Duke  of  Edinburgh,  the,  British 
armoured  cruiser,  317 
Duncan,  Admiral,  193 
Dunkirk,  193 

Dupleix,  exploits  of,  166, 175, 176 
Dutch,  14;  as  traders,  143;  colon¬ 
ies,  144;  conflict  with 
English  148-151;  East 
India  Company,  144; 
fleet  blockaded  in  Texel, 
193;  navy,  comparison 
of,  with  English,  151; 
mastery  of  the  sea,  de¬ 
cline  of,  148-152;  rise  of 
sea  power  of  142- 144; 
wars  against  Cromwell, 
145.  147 

E 

East  India  Company,  foundation 
of,  137;  nucleus  of  Em¬ 
pire  of  India,  242 


INDEX 


East  Indies,  British  position  in, 
187,  188 
Easter  Island,  221 
Eastern  Front,  extent  of,  293 
Edward  VII.,  diplomacy  of,  271, 
280 

Edward  III.,  67,  68,  69,  70 
Effective  blockade,  335 
Effingham,  Lord,  136 
Egbert,  51,  52 

Egypt,  20;  ancient,  fall  of,  caused 
by  sea  power,  22,  28;  as 
a  central  base,  288;  as 
a  Sea  Power,  4 ;  adminis¬ 
tration  of,  in  hands  of 
British,  233;  attempted 
invasion  of,  by  Napoleon, 
204;  invasion  of,  27; 
importance  of  position 
of,  153,  169;  occupied  by 
the  British,  221 

Egyptians,  ancient,  not  a  sea¬ 
faring  people,  22 
Elba,  198 

Elbe,  mouth  of  the,  203,  310 
Elector  Palatine,  the,  138 
Elizabeth,  Queen  of  England,  123- 
133 ;  as  protector  of  Prot¬ 
estantism,  134;  naval 
policy  of,  136 

Elizabethan  Navy,  the,  130,  13 1, 
132,  141 

Emden,  the,  299,  307 
Empire,  bond  of  15;  foundation 
of  British,  in  India,  178; 
foundations  of  Britain’s 
oversea,  151;  in  relation 
to  Mother  Country,  95; 
Ocean,  15,  161,  175 
Empires  of  ancient  world,  20 
England,  conflict  with  Spain,  124, 
125;  conflict  with  Hol¬ 
land,  146-152;  invasion 
of,  by  Spain,  127;  peace 
with  Spain,  139;  mari¬ 
time  greatness  of,  begin¬ 
ning  -of,  83  ( see  also  under 
Britain  and  Great  Brit¬ 
ain) 

English  nation,  effect  of  tribal  in¬ 
cursions  on,  58-60;  racial 
elements  of,  58 

Entente  Cordiale,  the,  233,  271, 
275 

Erin,  the,  284 


Espagnols-sur-Mer,  battle  of,  70 
Ethelred  the  Unready,  54 
Euphrates,  the,  11,  20 
Expeditionary  Force,  274;  passage 
to  France,  286 
Explorers,  British,  230 

F 

Falkland  Islands,  222;  battle  of, 
304-306 
Farragut,  236 

Federated  Malay  States,  develop¬ 
ment  of,  221 

Ferdinand  and  Isabella  of  Spain, 
108-109,  1 14 
Finland,  Gulf  of,  330 
Firth  of  Forth,  312 
Fisher,  Admiral  Lord,  253,  271- 
272,  275,  280,  304,  306, 
316 

Fleets,  First  and  Second,  composi¬ 
tion  of,  273 
Fleury,  Cardinal,  165 
Florida  regained  by  Spain,  188 
Fontainebleau,  Treaty  of,  181, 
184,  185 

Formidable ,  the,  334 

France,  3,  9;  as  a  Sea  Power,  4; 

alliance  with  Britain, 
163;  alliance  with  Spain, 
198;  allied  with  Britain 
against  the  Dutch,  148, 
150;  development  of,  by 
Colbert,  1 54-1 55;  failure 
of  English  attempt  to 
subdue,  67;  invasion  of, 
in  1415,  70;  invasion  of, 
by  Northmen,  55-57 ;  po¬ 
sition  of,  in  relation  to 
Egypt,  153;  war  with 
Britain,  156,  176,  184, 
230;  under  Louis  XIV., 
152,  155  r 

Franco- Prussian  War,  192 
Franz-Ferdinand,  Archduke,  mur¬ 
der  of,  282-283 
Frederick  the  Great,  182,  278 
Free  Trade,  227;  effect  of  sub¬ 
marine  warfare  on,  349 
Freedom  of  the  seas,  346 
French,  attempted  invasion  of 
Britain  in,  1340,  70;  as  a 
seafaring  people,  6;  fleet, 
329;  fleet  defeated,  195; 


364 


INDEX 


French — Continued 

invasion  of  Britain  in 
1217,  67;  Navy,  186; 

Navy  under  Richelieu, 
140;  relations  with  Spain, 
163,  165;  Revolution  in 
1830,  19 1 ;  struggle 

against  autocracy,  235; 
superiority  at  sea  shat¬ 
tered,  156;  trade  stopped 
by  Britain,  196-197;  war 
against  commerce,  156 
Frobisher,  voyages  of,  120 

G 

Gallipoli,  288,  292,  294 
Ganteaume,  Admiral,  204,  207, 
208,  215,  325 
Garibaldi,  234 

Genoa,  struggle  with  Venice  for 
mastery  of  sea,  97 
George  I.  of  England,  163;  foreign 
policy  of,  163-165 
German — ambitions,  antagonism 
with  Slav,  279;  Empire, 
growth  of,  278;  fleet,  310, 
31 1-3 13;  value  of,  64, 
65;  High  Sea  Fleet,  283; 
Higher  Command,  283; 
Kultur,  278;  light  cruis¬ 
ers,  actions  of,  299- 
308 ;  maritime  competi¬ 
tion  with  Britain,  258, 
259;  maritime  expan¬ 
sion,  257;  military  navy, 
necessity  of,  258;  na¬ 
tional  and  imperial  or¬ 
ganisation, 278;  naval  ex¬ 
pansion,  254-261;  Navy 
Act  of  1900,  280;  Navy 
in  1914,  280-283;  need 
of  strong  navy,  8;  raids 
on  seacoast  towns,  313- 
314,  316;  sources  of  food 
supply,  9;  statecraft, 
principles  underlying, 
281 ;  first  submarine  cam¬ 
paign,  failure  of,  337, 
338,  353 

Germany,  4;  as  a  self-support¬ 
ing  country,  296,  298; 
Colonial  Empire  of,  78; 
first  great  naval  power  of 
Europe,  79 
Ghent,  Peace  of,  219 


Gibraltar,  105,  165,  186;  captured 
by  Sir  George  Rooke, 

158 

Gilbert,  Sir  Humphrey,  120,  138 
Glasgow ,  the,  in  action,  301 
Gloucester ,  the,  in  action,  300 
Gneisenau ,  the,  in  action,  299,  300, 
301,  304,  305 

Gceben,  the,  262,  291,  299,  300, 
330 

Golden  Hind,  the,  122- 124 
Goliath ,  the,  in  action,  200 
Goltz,  Admiral  von  der,  261,  286 
Gondemar,  138 

Good  Hope,  the,  in  action,  301, 
302 

Goschen,  Sir  Edward,  interview 
with  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
281 

Grand  Fleet,  1,  295 
Great  Britain,  4,  17;  advantages 
of,  in  struggle  for  sea 
power,  248 ;  alliance  with 
Japan,  264;  alliance  of, 
with  Portugal,  113;  effect 
of  entry  into  the  war,  287 
-291 ;  growth  of,  as  a  mar¬ 
itime  State,  4;  not  a  self- 
supporting  country,  298; 
position  of,  in  Mediter¬ 
ranean,  168,  169;  posses¬ 
sions  in  hands  of,  at  the 
Peace  of  1815,  220 
Greece,  4,  17;  independence  of, 
recognised,  232;  invaded 
by  Mahomet  II.,  100 
Greek  colonists,  14,  29,  30,  32; 

Empire,  fall  of,  99;  fleet, 
action  with  Persian,  33, 
34 

Grenville,  Sir  Richard,  135 
H 

Hadrian,  51 

Hague  Conference,  270;  Conven¬ 
tions,  286,  335 

Halcyon,  the,  British  gunboat,  313 
Hampden,  John,  refusal  to  con¬ 
tribute  to  maintenance 
of  Navy,  142 
Hannibal,  27,  39,  40 
Hanno,  expedition  of,  42 
Hanoverian  succession  secured  to 
England,  163 


INDEX  365 


Hansa,  see  Hanseatic  League 
Hanseatic  League,  76-79,  137; 
conflict  with  Danes,  77; 
conflict  with  English, 
78;  effect  of,  on  British 
sea  power,  80;  expulsion 
from  England,  78;  politi¬ 
cal  constitution  of,  80; 
towns  of  the,  76 

Hapsburgs,  the,  279;  alliance  with 
Britain,  192 

Hartlepools,  German  raid  on  the, 
313 

Hasdrubal,  39,  40 
Hawke,  Admiral  Lord,  48,  49, 
133.  326 

Hawke,  174,  176,  179,  181 
Hawkyns,  Admiral,  expeditions  of, 
120,  128,  136 

Heligoland,  Bight  of,  295,  310, 
320,  323,  327,  333.  350; 
island  of,  214,  310, 

316;  possessed  by  Great 
Britain,  220 

Hellenes,  separatist  tendencies  of, 
29,3L33  . 

Henry  V.,  67,  68;  invasion  of 
France  by  (1415),  70 
Henry  VII.,  Navy  under,  80 
Henry  VIII.,  broke  with  Rome, 
108,  1 15;  Navy  under, 
80-84,  X4J 

Hermes ,  the,  in  action,  334 
Highflyer ,  the,  in  action,  307 
Himilco,  expeditions  led  by,  42, 

43,  45  ,  , 

Hindenburg,  the,  German  battle¬ 
cruiser,  259 

Hittites,  power  of,  broken  by 
Assyrians,  23 
Hogue ,  the,  in  action,  334 
Hohenzollerns,  the,  278;  alliance 
with  Britain,  192 
Holbrook,  Commander,  V.C.,  tor¬ 
pedoing  of  Messudyeh, 

333'  • 

Holland,  3,  9;  as  a  Sea  Power,  4, 
143,  144;  in  alliance  with 
England  and  France, 
163:  in  conflict  with  Eng¬ 
land,  145-1 52 

Hollman,  Admiral  von,  259 
Holy  Alliance,  230,  234,  277-279 
Holy  Island,  Ierne  or  Ireland*  43 
Home  Fleet,  271-273 


Hong-Kong  taken  and  held  by 
Great  Britain,  221 
Hood,  Admiral  Lord,  186,  187, 
194 

Hood,  Admiral  the  Hon.  Horace, 
3 1 7-3 19 

Hospital  ships,  339 
Hotham,  British  fleet  under,  196, 
197 

Howard,  Lord  Thomas,  126-129, 
133,  136 

Howard,  Sir  Edward,  82 
Howe,  324;  commanding  British 
fleet,  196 

I 

Ibrahim  Pasha,  232 
Indefatigable,  British  battle-cruis¬ 
er,  318 

India,  France’s  possessions  in, 
166;  foundation  of  Brit¬ 
ish  Empire  in,  178;  in 
relation  to  British  foreign 
policy,  242;  Portuguese 
expedition  to,  1 1 1 ;  search 
for  N.-W.  and  N.-E. 
passages  to;  118,  119 
Indomitable,  the,  British  battle¬ 
cruiser,  273,  317 

Inflexible,  the  British  battle¬ 
cruiser,  273,  304, 305, 317 
Intelligence  Department  of  the 
Admiralty,  299 

Invincible ,  the  British  battle-crui¬ 
ser,  273,  304,  305,  314, 
317,  318 

Ionian  Islands,  220 
Italian  Front,  extent  of,  293 
Italy,  as  German  food  source, 
9;  alliance  with  the  Te- 
deschi,  279;  in  relation  to 
the  Central  League,  279; 
neutrality,  Declaration 
of,  300;  Peninsula  of, 
106,  169 

J 

Jamaica,  geographical  position  of, 
222 

James  I.,  King  of  England,  138, 
139;  decline  of  trade 
under,  139;  Navy  under, 
139 


INDEX 


Japan,  3,  31;  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  264;  naval  mis¬ 
sion  to,  263;  war  with 
China,  263;  war  with 
Russia,  264,  265 

Japanese,  naval  strength  against 
Russians,  264-267;  Navy, 
growth  of,  262;  Navy 
transports  Russian 
troops,  289,  290 

Jellicoe,  Admiral  Sir  John,  295, 
318,  323,  324,  326,  329, 
340 

Judith ,  the,  one  of  Drake’s  ships, 
121 

Julius  Caesar,  defeats  the  Britains, 
48,  49;  lands  in  Britain, 
50 

Jutland  Bank,  Battle  of,  313,  315, 
317-322,  324,  329 

K 

Kaiser  class,  320 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  262,  283, 
310 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse,  Ger¬ 
man  auxiliary  cruiser, 
307 

Kamimura,  Admiral,  268 

Karlsruhe ,  the,  German  light 
cruiser,  299,  307 

Kasuga,  the,  Japanese  armoured 
cruiser,  265,  268 

Kempenfeldt,  Admiral,  186,  188, 
190 

Kent,  German  raids  on  coast  of, 
340 

Kent,  the,  in  action,  304,  305 

Keppel  attacks  French  fleet,  189 

Kiao-chau  leased  by  China  to 
Germany,  265 

Kiel,  64,  235,  282,  283,  310, 
312 

K'dln,  the,  German  cruiser,  295 

Konigin  Luise,  the,  German  mine¬ 
layer,  286 

Konigsberg ,  German  light  cruiser, 
299,  307 

Koweit,  possession  of,  by  British, 
221 

Kronprinz  Wilhelm,  German  auxili¬ 
ary  cruiser,  307 

Kronprinzessin  Cecilie ,  German 
liner,  287 


Kultur,  German,  278 
Kut,  Turkish  flank  turned  at, 
294 

L 

Lafayette  proposed  a  Declaration 
of  the  Rights  of  Man, 
commanded  the  National 
Guard,  191 
La  Gallissoniere,  176 
La  Gloire,  250 
La  Hogue,  victory  of,  156 
La  Rochelle,  attempt  to  relieve, 
140-141;  Battle  of,  75 
Latouche-Tr6ville,  Admiral,  off 
Cadiz,  204;  off  Toulon, 
325-327 

Law  of  Nations,  the  first,  25, 

165 

Le  Roi  Soleil,  157,  162 
Leipsic,  “Battle  of  the  Nations” 
at,  216 

Leipsic,  German  light  cruiser, 
299,  304,  307 

Lepanto,  battle  of,  1 03-104 
Levant,  11;  trade  with,  168 
Libanus,  ranges  of,  12,  23 
Lion ,  battle-cruiser,  315,  317;  the 
first,  126 

Lisbon,  expedition  against,  214 
Lissa,  battle  of,  250 
L’Orient ,  French  flagship,  197- 
200 

Louis  XIV.  of  France,  6,  152,  162, 
277;  France  under,  152- 
15 6,  159;  relations  with 
Charles  II.,  147 

Louis  XV.  of  France,  navy  under, 
179-181 

Louis  XVI.  of  France,  murder  of, 
191 

Louis  the  Dauphin,  67-68 
Low  Countries,  independence  of, 
191,  l93t  282  ( see  also 
Netherlands) 

Lowestoft,  German  naval  raid  on, 
316 

Liibeck,  town  of  the  Hanseatic 
League,  76,  77 
Lun^ville,  Treaty  of,  202 
Lusitania,  sinking  of  the,  337 
Lutzow,  German  battle-cruiser, 
320 


INDEX 


367 


M 

Macedonia ,  the,  304,  306 
Macedonian  Empire,  39 
Madrid,  occupation  of,  by  Napo¬ 
leon,  213 

Magellan,  no,  120;  Straits  of, 
122-123 

Mahan,  Capt.  A.  T.,  importance 
of  works  of,  254-256  ^ 
Mahomet  II.,  conquests  of,  99, 
100 

Mainz ,  German  cruiser,  295 
Malay  States,  Federated,  develop¬ 
ment  of,  221 

Malta,  220;  blockade  and  fall  of, 
201 

Manila  Bay,  238 
Marathon,  battle  of,  32,  33 
Marco  Polo,  no 
Mardonius,  32,  33,  35 
Marengo,  campaign  of,  202 
Marie  Antoinette,  murder  of,  191 
Marines,  Royal  Regiment  of,  13 1 
Maritime  expedition,  earliest  re¬ 
corded,  22 

Marlborough,  Duke  of,  158-159 
Marmora,  Sea  of,  334 
Matthews,  Admiral,  173 
Mauritius,  220 
Meander ,  the,  226 
Medina  Sidonia,  Duke  of,  127 
Mediterranean,  as  centre  of  the 
Ancient  World,  19;  en¬ 
gagements  fought  in, 
146;  evacuation  of,  198; 
importance  of,  to  Great 
Britain,  168;  importance 
of,  in  relation  to  sea 
power,  106;  position  of 
Great  Britain  in,  168; 
races,  first  contact  with 
Britons,  44 

Mediterranean  fleet,  271-272 
Merchant  fleet,  functions  of,  9 
Merrimac,  the,  250 
Mesopotamia,  288 
Messudyeh  torpeoed,  334 
Military  navy,  2,  7,  8,  18;  func¬ 
tions  of,  9 ;  German  neces¬ 
sity  of,  258 
Minorca,  186,  188 
Missiessy,  Admiral,  207 
Mobilisation  of  the  British  Navy, 

285 


Moltke,  the,  314 
Monastir,  289 

Monmouth,  British  cruiser,  301-302 
Monroe  Doctrine,  238 
Montenegrins,  loss  of  Mount 
Lovtcha,  331 
Moore,  Sir  John,  213 
Morocco,  271,  275 
Mount  Lovtcha  lost  by  Montene¬ 
grins,  331 
Mowe ,  308 

Mukden,  Battle  of,  269 
Mycale,  Greek  victory  at,  35 

N 

Naniwa ,  the,  263 
Napoleon,  attempt  to  invade  Asia 
Minor,  28;  campaigns, 
199,  213,  217;  “con¬ 

tinental  system,”  192, 
218;  first  contact  with 
sea  power,  194;  Order  in 
Council  against,  296; 
sea  communications  de¬ 
stroyed,  200;  strategies, 
192;  victories,  192,  198 
Nasmyth,  Commander,  334 
Natal  made  a  British  possession, 
221 

National  Debt,  182 
Naval  Defence  Act,  253 
Naval  defence,  British  system  of, 
205,  2735  principles  of, 
136 

warfare,  early  methods  of,  49; 
policy  of  Elizabethan, 
136-138 

Navarino,  Battle  of,  232 
Navarre,  Henry  of,  135 
Navigation  Acts,  145,  150,  154 

Laws,  352 

Navy  Acts,  German,  259,  261; 

Dutch  compared  with 
English,  1 51;  Elizabeth¬ 
an,  130-132 

Navy,  first  Controller  of,  81 

Importance  of,  as  first  line  of 
defence,  68 

League,  259 

neglect  of,  under  George  I., 
171 

under  Henry  VII.  and  Henry 
VIII.,  80—84 

under  the  Stuarts,  139-141 


368 


INDEX 


Navy  Office,  German,  259;  initi¬ 
ation  of,  81 

Nelson,  Lord,  28,  130,  197,  199, 
322,  325-328;  tactics  of, 
209;  victories  of,  193 
Netherlands,  revolt  of,  against 
Spain,  1 1 7,  134,  169, 173, 
179 

Neutrals,  German  proclamation 
to,  339;  rights  of,  295- 
297;  sinking,  337 

Newfoundland,  British  claim  to, 
151,  160;  discovery  of, 
1 19;  fisheries,  138 
New  South  Wales  formally  an¬ 
nexed  to  the  British 
Crown,  220 

New  Zealand,  317;  formally  an¬ 
nexed  to  the  British 
Crown,  220 
Nicias,  36 

Nile,  1 1 ;  Battle  of  the,  200-202 
Nisshin,  the',  265,  268 
Norman  power  and  influence  in 
the  West,  56 

Normans  in  conflict  with  Vene¬ 
tians,  90 

North  Sea,  312,  330,  331 
Northmen,  the,  51-56 
Number g>  German  light  cruiser, 
299,  304-307 

O 

(Estrymnis,  43-44 
Orange,  overthrow  of  House  of, 
193 

Orkney  Islands,  312 
Orleans,  Duke  of,  163-165 
Otranto ,  301 
Ottoman  Navy,  292 

P 

Pan-Germanism,  overthrow  of 
Great  Britain  the  goal 
of,  257-259,  279 
Pan-Slavism,  279 
Panther ,  German  gunboat,  275 
Paris,  Declaration  of,  335 
Parma,  Duke  of,  127 
Passaro,  Cape,  Battle  of,  165 
Pathfinder  sunk  by  German  sub¬ 
marine,  334 
Peace  of  1815,  220 


Pegasus ,  British  cruiser,  sunk  off 
Zanzibar,  307 

Pelican ,  Drake’s  flagship,  122 
Peloponnesian  War,  35 
Peloponnesus  under  leadership 
of  Sparta,  33 

Peloponnesus,  coast  of,  33,  35, 

37 

Peninsula  of  Italy,  strategical 
importance  of,  106 
Peninsular  War,  192-216 
Penjeh  crisis,  253 
Penn  captures  Jamaica  and  Bar¬ 
bados,  147 
Perim,  222 

Persian  Empire,  conflict  with  Hel¬ 
lenic  States,  31 

fleet,  action  with  Greek  fleet,  33 ; 

defeat  of,  33 
Gulf,  19;  sea  power,  33 
Petrograd  defended  by  the  Grand 
Fleet,  330 

Pett,  Phineas,  ship  designer,  138, 
140 

Pharaohs,  the,  6,  21-23 
Philip  II.  of  Spain,  240  ( see  also 
Spain) 

Philippine  Islands  pass  finally 
from  Spain,  238 
Philpot,  Sir  John,  73-74 
Phoceans,  the,  29,  31,  45 
Phoenicia,  4,  8,  17,  20;  cause  of 
fall  of,  24 

Phoenician  colonisation,  24,  29; 

conflicts  with  Greece, 
31;  trade,  26 

Phoenicians  as  a  seafaring  people, 
6,  8,  11,  13;  the  first  Sea 
Power,  23 

Piets,  march  on  London,  51;  Wall 
of  Hadrian  built  to  keep 
out  the,  51 

Pillars  of  Herakles,  19,  25,  26, 
104 

Piracy,  suppression  of,  225-227 
Plassey,  Battle  of,  178 
Pocock,  Admiral,  capture  of 
Havana,  178-181 
Polish  independence  destroyed, 
279 

Port  Arthur,  263-274,  310,  331; 
fall  of,  269 

Port  Mahon,  176,  189,  197 
Port  of  London,  139 
Port  William,  305 


INDEX 


369 


Portsmouth,  War  College  estab¬ 
lished  at,  274 

Portugal,  Britain  as  the  ally  of, 
1 14,  157,  282;  as  a  Sea 
Power,  1 12;  fall  of,  112- 
114;  pioneer  of  discovery, 
1 10- 1 12;  treaty  with,  184 
Portuguese  Empire,  range  of,  1 10- 
112 

mercantile  marine,  114 
trade  with  Great  Britain,  114 
War  Navy,  114 
Power,  Balance  of,  282 
Princess  Mary,  British  battle¬ 
cruiser,  317 

Princess  Royal ,  British  battle¬ 
cruiser,  315,  317 

Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich,  German 
auxiliary  cruiser,  307 
Protestantism,  Queen  Elizabeth 
as  protector  of,  134 
Prussia,  domination  of,  in  Ger¬ 
many,  344 

Ptolemies,  overthrow  of,  40 
Punic  Wars,  38,  42 
Pytheas,  explorations  of,  44-46 

Q 

Quebec  taken  by  Wolfe,  178 
Queen  Elizabeth  class,  317-318 
Queen  Elizabeth  of  England  (see 
Elizabeth) 

Quiberon  Bay,  Hawke’s  victory 
in,  48,  133,  173,  180, 
323;  the  Veneti  and  their 
allies  in,  50 

R 

Raids,  German  naval,  on  British 
sea  coast  towns,  313-314, 
3l6 

Raleigh,  Sir  Walter,  expedition 
against  Cadiz,  136;  at¬ 
tempt  to  colonise  Vir¬ 
ginia,  138 

Ram,  the,  in  naval  warfare,  250- 

251 

Re  d'ltalia,  Italian  flagship,  250 
Redoubtable ,  French  ship  of  the 
line,  21 1 

Reformation,  the,  109;  rupture  of 
relations  with  Rome,  115 


Reichstag,  and  German  naval 
expenditure,  259,  261 
Renascence,  the,  109 
Restoration,  Wars  of  the,  147 
Revenge,  Drake’s  flagship,  126,  135 
Reventlow,  Count  von,  on  sub¬ 
marine  warfare,  337 
Rh£,  Isle  of,  expedition  to,  140- 
I4I 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  and  the 
French  Navy,  140 
Richelieu,  Due  de,  expedition 
against  Port  Mahon,  176 
Riga,  German  operations  against, 
294,  330 

Right  of  Conquest,  12 
Rodney,  Admiral,  324;  attack 
against  the  Spanish,  189; 
expedition  against  St. 
Kitts,  188;  relief  of 
Gibraltar,  186 

Rojdestvensky,  Admiral,  com¬ 
mand  of  the  Baltic  Fleet 
against  Japan,  266-269, 
271 

Rollo,  or  Rolf  Ganger,  invasion  of 
France  and  settlement  in 
Normandy,  55-56 
Roman  conquest  of  Hellas,  40; 

occupation  of  Britain, 
5° 

names,  survival  of,  in  Britain, 

59 

Romano-British,  survival  of,  59- 

60 

Romans,  the,  as  an  agricultural 
and  military  people,  47; 
defeat  Britons  by  sea, 
48-49 

Rome,  conflict  with  Carthage, 
39 ;  supremacy  of,  39 
Roumania,  approach  to,  through 
the  Dardanelles,  3;  as  a 
source  of  supply  to  Ger¬ 
many,  8 

Royal  Naval  Reserve,  286 
Royal  Navy,  existence  in  pre- 
Tudor  times,  73;  in  the 
time  of  Queen  Elizabeth, 
126;  decline  of,  after 
peace  with  Spain,  139; 
introduction  of  steam 
power  into,  249 

Royal  Sovereign,  Collingwood’s 
flagship,  210,  21 1 


370 


INDEX 


“  Rule  of  1756,  ”  basis  of  Orders  in 
Council  and  Prize  Court 
Regulations,  183;  re-im¬ 
posed  by  Great  Britain, 
204;  resisted  by  the 
Dutch,  186 

Russia,  as  a  source  of  supply  to 
Germany,  8,  336;  friction 
with,  as  result  of  Dogger 
Bank  incident,  269;  sea 
power  of,  in  relation  to 
geographical  conditions, 
3 

Russian  fleet,  31 1,  312;  and  the 
Baltic,  329-331;  com¬ 
pared  with  Japanese  fleet, 
64,  264-267 
Revolution,  330 

troops  transported  by  Japan¬ 
ese  Navy,  289 

Russo-Japanese  War,  265-267 ;  Ad¬ 
miral  Togo’s  strategy  in, 
309 

Ruyter,  Admiral  de,  as  a  great 
commander,  152;  leads 
the  Dutch  fleet  against 
England,  149 
Ryswick,  Peace  of,  157 

S 

Sadowa,  277 

St.  Jean  d’Acre,  bombardment  of, 
.  232 

St.  Vincent,  Battle  of,  198 
Salamis,  332;  sea  battle  of,  34, 
36 

Salisbury,  Lord,  282 
Salonika,  288,  294 
Santa  Cruz,  127 

Santa  Lucia  in  British  possession, 
220 

vSarawak,  State  of,  226 
Saumarez,  action  off  Algeciras, 

.324 

Saxons,  invade  Britain,  51,  57 
Scapa  Flow,  222,  312 
Scarborough,  German  naval  raid 
on,  313 

Scharnhorst ,  the,  German  cruiser, 
262,  299,  300,  301,  305 
Scheldt,  186,  191 

Schleswig  and  Holstein,  annexa¬ 
tion  of,  to  Prussia,  235 
Scipio,  40 


Scott,  Sir  Percy,  gunnery  of  fleet 
revolutionised  by,  273; 
on  submarine  warfare, 
334 

Scutari  taken  by  Turks,  101 
Sea  communications,  8,  17;  im¬ 
portance  of,  to  Venice, 
93,  95 

Seafaring  peoples,  5;  early,  8;  of 
the  North,  45 ;  the  Veneti 
as,  47,  49 

Sea  fight,  earliest  recorded,  22 ;  in 
which  Britons  took  part, 
48,  49 

Sea  frontiers,  vulnerability  of,  63 
Sea  power,  advantages  of  Great 
Britain  in  struggle  for, 
248;  beginnings  of  Eng¬ 
lish,  67 ;  conditions  of, 
2,  3;  definition  of,  2; 
economic  advantages  of, 
297;  effect  of  Hanseatic 
League  on  British,  79; 
effect  of,  on  War  of 
Spanish  Succession,  159; 
essentials  for  effective, 
143;  during  Civil  War  in 
United  States,  236;  fac¬ 
tors  of,  2,  5,  254;  in 
relation  to  continental 
nations,  16;  of  ancient 
world,  20-22;  of  Greeks, 
29;  of  Persians,  32;  of 
Phoenicians,  23 ;  supreme, 
held  by  England,  161; 
the  basis  of  freedom, 
346-347 ;  the  key  to 
Egypt,  28;  under  Eliza¬ 
beth,  135;  value  of,  for 
transportation  of  troops, 
287,  288 

Sea  Powers,  great,  4 
Sea  routes,  control  of,  222 
Sebastopol,  siege  of,  332 
Sedan,  277 

Seeadler,  the,  havoc  caused  by, 
308 

Serbia,  rescue  of,  by  sea  power, 
16 

Serbian  Army,  beaten  and  re¬ 
equipped,  289 

Seven  Years’  War,  182,  183 
Sexennate,  the,  259 
Seydlitz,  German  battle-cruiser, 
3I5.320,  321 


INDEX 


37i 


Shamrock  III.,  the,  284 
Shell  gun,  changes  wrought  by 
introduction  of,  250-253 
Ship-money  fleets,  140;  instituted 
by  Charles  I.,  142 
Sidon,  meaning  of  name,  24 
Siegfried ,  the,  German  coast- 
defence  vessel,  259 
Singapore  purchased  by  the  Brit¬ 
ish,  221 

Skager  Rak,  311,  312,  317 
Skiemevice,  Imperial  meeting  at, 
279 

Slav  ambitions,  antagonism  with 
German,  279 
Slave  trade,  225,  246 
Sluys,  Battle  of,  69 
Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  exploits  of, 
200,  217 

Socotra,  British  possession  of,  221 
Somaliland,  earliest  recorded  mari¬ 
time  expedition  to,  22 
Soudan,  233,  244;  recovery  from 
barbarism,  221 
South  Africa,  Union  of,  242 
Spain,  alliance  with  France,  163, 
165;  conflict  between 
England  and,  125;  Fer¬ 
dinand  and  Isabella  of, 

108,  109;  geographical 
position  of,  3 ;  overrun 
by  Carthaginians,  38-40; 
Philip  II.  of,  102,124-127, 
136;  peace  with  England, 
138;  relations  of,  with 
France,  163,  165;  revival 
of,  8,  16;  sea  power  of, 
1 14,  1 15;  unification  of, 

109,  1 15;  war  with 
United  States  (1898), 

23  7  . 

Spanish — colonies  of  Phoenicia, 
25;  Main,  121-123,  128, 
1 3 1,  136,  137;  monarchy, 
subjects  of,  6;  Succession, 
War  of  the,  157,  159, 
160,  163;  leads  to  present 
struggle,  161 

Spee,  Admiral  von,  commands 
German  squadron,  301- 
306 

Stamp  Act,  resistance  to,  184 
Staples,  establishment  of,  72 
Steam  power,  introduction  of, 
into  Royal  Navy,  250 


Steel  shipbuilding,  changes 
wrought  by  introduction 
of,  250-253 ;  development 
of,  249 

Straits  of  Gibraltar,  ancient  boun¬ 
dary  of  habitable  world, 

1 9 

Straits  Settlements,  development 
of,  221 

Stralsund,  Peace  of,  78 
Strategic  principles,  of  Lord  Nel¬ 
son,  327-328;  naval  of 
Great  Britain,  275 
Sturdee,  Admiral  Sir  John,  action 
off  Falkland  Islands,  304 
-305 

Suakim,  possession  of,  by  British, 
221 

Submarine — campaign,  failure  of 
first  German,  336,  338; 
evolution  of  the,  333 ;  the, 
in  relation  to  sea  power, 
351 ;  telegraphy,  develop¬ 
ment  of,  221;  uses  of, 
333,  335;  warfare,  al¬ 
leged  German  reprisal, 
337;  underlying  factors 
of,  346-349 

Suez  Canal,  position  of,  168 
Sugar  supply,  stopped  by  sub¬ 
marine  campaign,  349 
Sussex ,  sinking  of  the,  337 
Swan,  the,  one  of  Drake’s  ships, 
121 

Swiftsure,  the  first,  126 
Sydney,  the,  Australian  cruiser,  307 
Syracuse,  36 

Syria,  n,  23;  conquered  by  Alex¬ 
ander,  27 

T 

Tarshish,  25 

Telegraphy,  submarine,  develop¬ 
ment  of,  221 
Tel-el-Kebir,  233 

Territorial  troops  replace  Regular 
Army,  286;  waters,  2 
Themistocles,  33,  35,  100 
Tiger,  the,  315,  317;  the  first,  126 
Tigris,  11,  20 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  259,  260; 

in  submarine  warfare, 
335,  337;  programme  for 
ship-building,  261 


372 


INDEX 


Tobago,  220 

Togo,  Admiral,  263,  267,  309, 
310 

Torpedo,  addition  of,  to  vessels, 
309;  automobile,  252; 
base,  Heligoland  as  a,  310 
Torpedo-boat  destroyer,  develop¬ 
ment  of,  252 
Torres  Vedras,  216 
Torrington  defeated  off  Beachy 
Head,  156 
Lord,  165 

Toulon,  173,  194,  325-328 
Trade,  advance  of  British,  during 
Napoleonic  wars,  201, 
21 1 ;  British,  with  Spain, 
170;  colonial,  in  relation 
to  Mother  Country,  1 83 ; 
decline  of, under  James  I., 
140;  England  struggles 
to  enlarge  her,  168; 
French,  1 83 ;  loss  of  Brit¬ 
ish,  during  Seven  Years’ 
War,  182,  183;  militates 
against  power  of  Navy 
under  George  I.,  171 
Trafalgar,  92,  322,  327;  Battle  of 
208-211 ;  effect  of  battle 
of,  21 1 

Transport,  early  methods  of,  1 1 ; 

importance  of,  10;  of 
troops,  309 

Trans-Siberian  Railway,  265 
Trebizond,  fall  of,  329 
Trinidad,  220 

Trinity  House,  foundation  of,  81 
Triple  Alliance,  279 
Tripoli,  Turkish  possessions  in, 
attacked  by  Italy,  276 
Triumph ,  the  first,  126 
Tromp,  Admiral,  exploits  of, 
145,  152 

Troops,  safe  transport  of,  309 
Tsessarevitch,  the,  interned  at 
Shanghai,  266 
Tsu-shima,  Battle  of,  267 
Tudors,  the  Navy  under  the,  141 
Turin,  Peace  of  (1382),  98 
Turkey,  alliance  with  Germany 
and  Austria,  291;  war 
with  Balkan  States,  279 
Company,  137 

Turkish  Empire  in  Middle  Ages, 
85,  86;  front,  extent  of, 
293;  navy,  292 


Turks,  advance  of,  in  Europe, 
98,  103;  allied  campaign 
against  (1821),  231;  as 
a  great  naval  Power,  100; 
defeat  of,  by  Venetians 
and  Spanish,  104;  in 
conflict  with  Venetians, 

99 

Two  Power  Standard,  140 

Tyre,  23,  25,  26,  39,  98;  fall  of, 
28;  King  Hiram  of,  23 

U 

U-boat  warfare,  317,  338,  339, 
348-35 1 ;  unrestricted , 

29 7,  339,  341 

Ulm,  208,  21 1 

Union  of  South  Africa,  242 

United  States,  161 ;  as  a  Sea  Power, 
4;  restrictions  on  sub¬ 
marine  warfare,  337-339; 
war  with  Spain  (1898), 
237 

Utrecht,  Treaty  of,  160,  162,  225 

V 

Vasco  da  Gama,  106,  no 

Venice,  4,  17;  as  a  naval  State, 
87;  as  safeguard  of  the 
West,  87,  91,  98;attacked 
by  Charlemagne,  87 ; 
breach  with  Empire  of 
the  East,  96;  cause  of 
fall  of,  24;  decline  of, 
98,  102,  106;  foundation 
of,  86;  in  alliance  with 
other  European  Powers, 
101,  102;  sea  power  of, 
causes  of  decline  of,  105- 
107;  struggles  of,  with 
Genoa,  for  mastery  of 
the  sea,  98 

Veneti,  Julius  Caesar  defeats,  the, 
48-50 

Venetian  alliance  with  Hungary 
against  Normans,  93, 
94;  colonists,  14,  94; 

conquests  on  land,  97; 
navy  and  the  Crusades, 
89 ;  trade,  development 
of,  88 


INDEX 


373 


Venetians  in  conflict  with  Nor¬ 
mans,  89;  with  Turks, 
98-101;  war-navy  estab¬ 
lished  by,  87 
Vera  Cruz,  199 
Vespucci,  Amerigo,  no 
Victoria ,  the,  120,  251 
Victoria  and  Albert ,  the,  284 
Victory,  the,  203 
Viking  Age,  the,  50 
Villafranca,  Treaty  of,  234 
Villaret-Joyeuse,  Admiral,  195 
Ville  de  Paris,  the,  188 
Villeneuve,  204,  208,  323 
Vladivostok,  267,  289 
Von  der  Tann,  the,  315 

W 

Wagram,  Battle  of,  193,  214 
Waingari,  Treaty  of,  221 
Waldemar  IV.,  King,  conflict  with 
Hanseatic  League,  77 
Wales,  descendants  of  Britons  in, 
58,  60 

Walfisch  Bay,  221 
Wall  of  Hadrian,  51 
Walpole,  Robert,  166,  171 ;  fall  of, 
171 

Walsingham,  letters  from  Drake, 
127 

Walton,  Captain,  165 
Wapping,  1 19 

War,  declaration  of,  286;  of  Jen¬ 
kins’s  Ear,  161,  170-171; 
of  1812,  192 

College  at  Portsmouth  estab¬ 
lished,  274 

navy  established  by  Henry  V., 
71 ;  in  Venice,  87 
staff  appointed  by  Admiralty, 

274 

Warrender,  Admiral  Sir  George, 
at  reopening  of  Kiel 
Canal,  283 

Warrior,  cruiser,  317;  sinks,  319 
Wars  of  the  Roses,  5,  80 
War  spite,  the,  126 
Waterloo,  15,  104,  192 
Wedmore,  Treaty  of,  53 
Wei-hai-wei,  221;  acquired  by 
Britain,  264 

Wellesley,  Sir  Arthur,  expedition 
against  Lisbon,  213 


Wellington,  Duke  of,  his  strategy, 
7 1 ;  success  in  Peninsula, 
216,  218,  294 
Weser,  310 
West  Africa,  244 

West  Indies,  islands,  150,  158, 
166,  171,  174,  180,  181, 
186,  187-190,  194,  196, 
206,  229 

Western  Front,  extent  of,  293 
Western  Mediterranean,  37 
Western  Powers,  Constantinople 
in  hands  of,  96;  Vene¬ 
tians  fall  from  headship 
of,  103 

Westminster,  171 
Whitby,  German  naval  raid  on, 
313 

White  Empire,  oversea,  241 
Wilberforce,  the  elder,  abolition  of 
slavery,  225 

Wilhelm  II., accession  to  throne  of 
Germany,  256-259,  262 
Wilhelmshaven,  completion  of 
works,  262,  310;  distance 
from  FlamboroughHead, 
312,  320 

William,  Frederick,  of  Prussia, 
214 

William  of  Normandy,  invasion  of 
England,  65,  66;  becomes 
King,  65 ;  descendants, 
66;  growth  of  sea  power 
under,  65 ;  remnant  of 
Duchy,  120,  152 

William  P.  Frye,  American  sailing 
ship,  336 
William,  Port,  305 
Willoughby,  Sir  Hugh,  search  for 
N.-E.  Passage  to  India, 
1 19 

Wimereux,  204 

Winchelsea,  70;  one  of  Cinque 
Ports,  72 

Winchester,  Venta  Belgarum,  59 
“Wineland  the  Good,”  identified 
with  Labrador,  50 
Wisby,  78 

Wolfe,  taking  of  Quebec,  178 
Wolseley,  Sir  Garnet,  233 
World,  New — cultivation  in,  153; 

Spanish  sovereignty,  157; 
English-speaking  nation, 
220,  225 

Wotan,  German  worship  of,  277 


374 


INDEX 


x 

Xerxes,  14,  31,  34,  85,  98,  2 77, 
343 

Y 

Yalu  River,  263 

Yarmouth,  German  naval  raid, 
313,  316 
Yezo,  267 
Yorck,  313 


Yorktown,  surrender  of  Corn¬ 
wallis  in,  1 87 
Young  Pretender,  174 
Yser,  inundations,  63 
Yukon,  120 

Z 

Zama,  campaign  of,  40 
Zanzibar,  307 
Zeebrugge,  340 
Zeppelin  airships,  310 


A  Selection  from  the 
Catalogue  of 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

* 


Complete  Catalogues  sent 
on  application 


. 


, 


- 


Belgium : 

Neutral  and  Loyal 

The  War  of  1914 

By 

Emile  Waxweiler 

Director  of  the  Solvay  Institute  of  Sociology  at  Brussels, 
Member  of  the  Acad£mie  Royale  of  Belgium 

12°.  $1.25  net.  By  mail,  $1.35 

In  order  to  clarify  opinion  and  to  correct 
wrong  judgment,  the  author  has  not  deemed  it 
superfluous  to  weigh  in  the  balance  all  the  im¬ 
putations  that  have  been  made  against  Belgium, 
even  to  the  inclusion  of  those  that  do  violence  to 
common  sense.  There  are  five  chapters,  with 
the  following  titles :  “  Up  to  7  P.M.  of  August 
2d,”  “To  Be  or  Not  To  Be,”  “  Belgian  Neutral¬ 
ity,”  “  Imputations  against  the  Loyalty  of 
Belgium,”  “  German  Rules  of  Waging  War  and 
their  Application  to  Belgium.” 


G.  P.  Putnam’s  Sons 

New  York  London 


Belgium 

and 

The  Great  Powers 

By 

Emile  Waxweiler 

12°.  $1.00  net  By  mail ,  $ 1.10 

The  eminent  scholar,  Emile  Waxweiler, 
Director  of  the  Solvay  Institute  of  Sociology 
at  Brussels,  presents  a  thesis  which  it  will  be 
difficult  for  his  opponents  to  disprove. 

With  calm,  dispassionate  judgment,  he  up¬ 
holds  Belgium’s  right  to  oppose  the  violation 
of  her  territory  by  Germany,  citing  with  tell¬ 
ing  force  the  Treaty  of  1839,  and  subsequent 
events  of  international  importance,  such  as 
Lord  Palmerston’s  action  at  the  time  of 
threatened  French  aggression  in  1848. 


G.  P.  Putnam’s  Sons 

New  York  London 


Brave  Belgians 

By 

Baron  C.  Buffin 

✓ 

Preface  by 

Baron  de  Broqueville 

Belgian  Minister  of  War 
Translated  by 

Alys  Hallard 

12°.  $1,50  net ,  By  mail,  $1,65 

This  volume  of  accounts,  collected 
so  patiently  by  Baron  Buffin,  well  de¬ 
served  the  award  of  the  AudifFred 
Prize  by  the  French  Academy  of 
Moral  and  Political  Science.  They 
make  us  live  over  again  the  whole 
campaign,  from  the  heroic  resistance 
at  Liege  down  to  the  hard  moments 
through  which  the  Belgian  army  passed 
in  its  victorious  defense  of  the  Yser. 

G.  P.  Putnam’s  Sons 

New  York  London 


+ 


r 


V 


